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ABSTRACT
This thesis reports the results of a major survey into
the determinants of bus driver performance. Over 600
drivers in the Scottish Bus Group were given a battery of
three psychological tests: (i) the Ingleton Word
Recognition Test, (ii) the IPAT Culture Fair test of "g"
and (iii) the Cattell 16PF. Scores on these were factor
analysed along with age to give six second-order factors.
Over forty measures of work performance were also
collected for each driver; these were factor analysed and
six factors emerged. Factor scores from the two
analyses were correlated and the main dimensions of
personality and performance determined. The thesis also
presents a review of the history and structure of the
British bus industry, and of the role and duties of the
bus driver. Methodological issues in the research also
receive detailed discussion. The results have already
started to be applied in the selection of new drivers by




This thesis reports on a research project set up by the
Scottish Bus Group and the University of Edinburgh in
order to study the determinants of bus driver
performance. There were two main aims: (i) to find
ways of determining driver "performance", in particular
whether there are ways of distinguishing between "good"
and "bad" drivers; and, as a result, (ii) to improve the
procedures for selecting new drivers, which in the past
have been fairly amateurish and selective.
The project arose from two directions. From the
University side, it was an ideal opportunity to continue
the work of C C P Ingleton and colleagues into the
determinants of worker performance in the service sector,
following from studies of, for example, bank staff,
computer repairmen and shop sales staff. From the side
of the Scottish Bus Group, there was concern to take
action to slow down the traditionally high turnover of
labour that characterised the industry in the 1960s and
1970s. It is costly to recruit and train bus drivers, so
there were pressures to find out what "types" of person
would ideally make a contented, long-serving and
(relatively) trouble-free employee. From this,
recommendations were to be made as to improving selection
methods and to training recruiters to apply them.
This thesis is concerned principally with the research
side of the project, the results are in the process of
being applied and notes on this are given in an appendix
at the end. This research is essentially exploratory, as
very little of this nature has been carried out on bus
drivers, and is not seeking to prove or disprove any hard
and fast hypotheses.
The first chapter provides a background to the industry,
charting its development from the latter part of the
nineteenth century to the present day, and discussing the
problems it has faced in recent years. Declining
passenger journeys and rising costs, combined with even
faster-rising public subsidies, produced pressure on the
present Government to "deregulate" services and increase
competition. This, combined with the privatisation of
the National Bus Company in England and Wales and the
proposed sale of its Scottish counterpart, the Scottish
Bus Group, has resulted in a massive change in the
structure of the industry.
Chapter two looks at the labour environment, examining
various historical aspects of changes in the driver's job
and aspects of the industrial relations environment in
recent years. The job is then analysed and key elements
discussed, as a precursor to later examination of
"performance". Recent changes in the nature of the job,
which have come hand-in-hand with legislative changes
mentioned above, are mentioned.
The third chapter reviews literature on drivers, both of
buses and of other vehicles, and finds that research
using psychological tests on bus drivers dates back over
seventy years. Admittedly, both the tests and the job
have changed over the years, but it still provides some
justification for the approach used.
Discussion of the actual research starts in the fourth
chapter. Some of the major theories underlying the
structure of the research are presented. The selection
of the sample of drivers for study is discussed, along
with the data collection methods - psychological tests
and measures of on the job performance - and the
rationale for them explained. A section on the data
analysis methods used completes the chapter.
Chapters five to seven report on the results and findings
of the research, at three levels. The first level
provides descriptive statistics of the variables used, in
terms of means, standard deviations and frequencies. The
second looks at the correlations between variables as a
precursor to the third part, the multivariate statistical
analysis. This discusses the results of the factor
analyses and its implications for the study of
determinants of driver performance.
The final chapter reviews each chapter and the research
methodology, before concluding by examining the results
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CHAPTER ONE
THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE
OF THE BRITISH BUS INDUSTRY
1.1 Introduction
It is perhaps appropriate to start with a discussion of
the history and development of the bus industry in
Britain, so as to give an indication of the context in
which the research has taken place. This chapter charts
the evolution of the industry through various important
phases, from its beginnings in the last century through
to its present structure. Its performance in recent
years is also examined, as are the effects of current
legislation. The Scottish situation receives more
emphasis than is usual in discussions of this nature, as
this chapter forms the background to the project studying
bus drivers in the Scottish Bus Group.
1.2 The early years
The origins of the motor bus lie in the horse buses and
trams (and later the electric trams) of the 19th century.
Horse buses initially developed in London where one
George Shillibeer is credited with running the first
service in 1829. His idea became so popular that in the
intense competition which followed, he became bankrupt.
By the mid-1850s, when the London General Omnibus Company
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was founded, 810 buses were operating in the capital.
The spread of horse omnibuses in other cities was
accompanied by the horse tramway from the late 1860s.
Legislation which eased restrictions on road speeds and
the development of electric traction in the mid-189 0s
helped to bring a period of great expansion of electric
tramways in the years which spanned the turn of the
century.
The evolution and development of the internal combustion
engine led to the appearance of the first motor buses in
the last years of the nineteenth century. The first
regular services with a petrol-engined bus started in
Edinburgh in May 1898, but the idea spread slowly at
first and indeed the company itself failed in 1901. The
early vehicles were costly to operate and suffered from
mechanical problems, breakdowns being frequent
occurrences. Gradually these were overcome and the
industry enjoyed a period of growth in the years up to
the First World War. The London General Omnibus Company
started experimenting with motor buses in 1905, had 1,000
running by 1908, and by 1913 they had replaced virtually
all the horse buses (Dyos and Aldcroft, 1974). In the
rest of the country development was slower and more
sporadic. A large number of new operations were
started, some of which failed (often through either the
owners' lack of bus operating experience or the high
costs and unreliability of the early vehicles), and some
of which survived and have developed into the operators
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in existence today. English examples of these include
Crosville Motor Services and the Birmingham and Midland
Motor Omnibus Co (Midland Red), both of which were
constituent companies of the National Bus Company.
In Scotland the Scottish Motor Traction (SMT) Company was
founded in Edinburgh in 1905 and ran its first service on
1 January 1906 - from the Mound to Corstorphine. In the
years preceding the War the network was expanded to cover
many of the towns and villages around Edinburgh and the
first scenic tours were operated. SMT was later to
become the driving force in expanding and concentrating
the industry in much of Scotland, evolving ultimately
into the Scottish Bus Group. Another example is Walter
Alexander who commenced bus operations in the Falkirk
area just before the War. By 1960 the company bearing
his name had developed into one of the three largest
operators in Britain.
In England, this period saw the first signs of activity
of the two major investment and holding companies which
were to dominate the industry in later years. These
were Thomas Tilling Ltd, a major horse bus operator, and
British Electric Traction Ltd (BET), which had invested
in many of the electric tramway systems and which was by
then diversifying into motor bus operations. Both these
groups invested in the larger companies which were aiming
for a monopoly of services in their areas. To enable
the operators to be free to meet competition from the
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smaller firms in their areas, the larger holding
companies started to divide the country into "spheres of
influence", defining clearly the boundaries of the
parties. The first area agreement was in Kent in 1916;
it was later to extend to most of mainland Britain.
Some of the railway companies were also to invest in
motor bus operation, buses being intended to feed traffic
to the railway system. The Great Western Railway was
one of the first to do this, with bus services starting
in Cornwall, the West Midlands, North Wales and the
Slough area in the early years of the twentieth century.
Others were soon to follow, including the London and
North Western Railway, the North Eastern Railway and the
Great North of Scotland Railway, the latter operating a
number of services on Deeside and in Aberdeenshire.
The First World War temporarily checked the expansion of
the motor bus industry, with many vehicles being
commandeered for military use, accompanied by a shortage
of labour and fuel. This was but a temporary setback -
once peace was restored, there followed a period of very
rapid growth. Several factors contributed to this, not
the least of which was the return to civilian life of
large numbers of men skilled in both driving and
maintaining buses. Many of these had a desire to start
their own bus companies, using war gratuity payments to
buy either ex-army vehicles or new ones at low prices.
There was also a growing demand for bus transport at this
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time, accompanied by technical improvements in engine and
vehicle construction and the replacement of solid rubber
tyres by pneumatic ones. Finally, the licensing system
was very weak and often ineffective, making it possible
for almost anyone with a bus to start a service.
Four distinct groups of operators emerged in this period,
three of which remain to this day. These were the
municipal authorities, the territorial or associated
companies, the railways and the independents. Local
councils tended to be slow in introducing bus services,
partly because many had invested heavily in tramways, and
partly because prior to 1930 they had to obtain powers to
run buses by special Act of Parliament. Despite this,
the number of municipalities operating bus services rose
from 18 in 1914 to 90 by 1928, mostly within their own
boundaries and often with inter-running agreements with
other operators, both municipal and private (Dyos and
Aldcroft, 1974).
The second group were the large private operators, most
of which, by the 1930s, belonged to one of the three
large holding companies. In England, as mentioned
earlier, BET and Thomas Tilling came to hold substantial
interests in over 40 of the largest private companies,
and by 1939 had divided the country up into "agreed
areas". This effectively gave the associated company in
that area a monopoly (ie. freedom from competition from
another associated company) and a territory in which to
"attack" the small, local competitors. Not only did the
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two holding companies increase their holdings in the
territorial companies, but the territorials themselves
expanded, often by buying out smaller independent
competitors.
Large-scale amalgamation did not come to Scotland until
1929, and then as a result of legislation regarding the
third group of operators - the railways. Although many
railway companies had bus fleets (the largest being the
Great Western with 300 vehicles by 1928) , legislation had
restricted the services which they could run, until 1928.
In that year the four Railways (Road Transport) Acts
enabled them both to run bus services on a large scale
and to invest in existing bus companies. The four major
companies mostly chose the latter path and acquired
substantial financial interests in the larger associated
companies.
In 1929 the SMT Company (which had enjoyed substantial
growth both before and after the War) was reconstituted.
The share capital was doubled to £200,000 and the LNER
and LMS each took about 25% of the shares. SMT, in
addition to operating its own services around Edinburgh,
also became a holding company and purchased two other
major companies - Walter Alexander and Sons Ltd, and
Midland Bus Services of Airdrie. Over the next few
years several other major companies were acquired,
including some which the LMS itself had taken over.
These came to form four of the major Scottish Bus Group
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companies, which remained virtually unchanged until 1985
- SMT (later "Eastern Scottish"), Walter Alexander &
Sons, Central SMT and Western SMT. Like their English
counterparts, these constituent companies of SMT enjoyed
great growth in the 1930s, often by purchasing smaller
independent firms. Walter Alexander & Sons Ltd, for
example, took over at least 14 operators between 1930 and
1938 .
The final group of operators to emerge in the 1920s were
the independents, or "pirates" as they were sometimes
known. Numerically these formed the largest group, but
carried a small proportion of passengers. Most firms
had fewer than five vehicles (many having just one),
although there were some with larger fleets. These were
the new pioneers - men with an entrepreneurial flair,
some capital and a bus, who went to seek out profitable
markets. Not only did these firms compete with the large
associated companies (often being bankrupted or bought-
out as a result), but they also opened up and expanded
contract, private hire and excursion work, which many of
the larger companies tended to ignore. Frequently they
brought services to rural areas, in the North and West of
Scotland, and the Western Isles, for example. For many
of these private operators, the bus was just one interest
- it may have been combined with a shop or garage as
well.
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It was these independent operators who provided the basis
for much of the cut-throat competition in the 1920s,
earning them the nickname "pirates" from the established
operators who saw their livelihoods threatened. This
was a period of free market competition - there were few
barriers to entry and competition forced down the fares.
Many of the smaller firms entering lasted only a short
time before they had to amalgamate with others or go
bankrupt, but there appeared to be no shortage of new
entrants. Dyos and Aldcroft (1974) describe the
situation thus:
Hundreds of small scale operators with little
capital and little idea of how to manage a
transport undertaking entered the industry soon
after the War. Many of them maintained
services with broken-down vehicles driven by
incompetent drivers; facilities for maintaining
the vehicles were often non-existent, the buses
being run until they dropped to pieces, (p.364)
The authors refer to these operators cutting fares to
secure support, and to the lack of timetables generally
in that period, quoting an example from the Motor
Transport Year Book for 1921-22 - of the 1,888 operators
listed, only 200 published timetables. They continue:
Many of the small bus companies adopted such
doubtful practices as 'chasing', 'hanging
back', running only at peak hours or on special
occasions, and generally 'creaming' traffic on
the road. Such intensive forms of competition
were not only wasteful but constituted a menace
to public safety. (pp.364-5)
There is some controversy over the extent to which the
independents engaged in these practices and as Hibbs
(1975) recognises, little evidence other than the
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anecdotal. He gives a more balanced view, that there
were both bad and good independents, some having very
high standards of maintenance; and that the
"territorial" companies often engaged in rate wars and
dangerous driving practices themselves to run the
competition off the road. Bagwell (1974) gives the
example of how Crosville dealt with competition on their
Chester - Ellesmere Port services in 1919: "the senior
company designed an exact replica of the rival bus,
complete to the same coloured livery, and ran it
immediately in front of the offending intruder who was
soon obliged to concede defeat" (p.226).
1.3 The 1930 Road Transport Act and its effects
Concern over unrestricted competition (which was
increasingly felt to be 'wasteful'), along with the
problems of irregularity, unreliability, dangerous
driving practices and often a lack of co-ordination of
services, led to the formation of the Royal Commission on
Transport, 1928-30. Incidentally, the Commission only
took evidence from the large vested interests (the
municipals, large territorials and the railways). No
evidence was taken from either the independents or the
public. The problem had become noticeable in London by
the early 1920s and the scheme of regulation of public
transport there was to become the basis for the rest of
the country.
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The result of the Commission's work was the Road Traffic
Act 1930 which established a structure that was to remain
virtually unchanged for 50 years. The Act instituted a
fairly rigid form of control over the industry, exercised
through sets of Traffic Commissioners. The new system
involved three sets of licences, all of which had to be
held before a service could be operated. The first was
the public service vehicle licence - issued only after
inspection by a qualified examiner. Both driver and
conductor were also required to be licensed, as a
guarantee of their competence, and the driver had to pass
a driving test. The third and most important type was
the road service licence, giving a company the right to
operate a service on a particular route. Applications
for these, along with objections, were dealt with by the
Traffic Commissioners at public sittings of the Traffic
Courts.
The Commissioners were given fairly wide powers over the
granting or refusal of road service licences. In
considering an application they had to take account of
factors such as the suitability of the proposed route and
the extent to which it was already served; the extent to
which the proposed service was necessary or desirable in
the public interest; and the needs of the area as a
whole in relation to traffic and co-ordination of all
forms of transport, including rail. Once a licence was
granted (for three years and not automatically
renewable), conditions were attached requiring a
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reasonable level of fares, the publishing of timetables
and fares tables, and that passengers be picked up and
set down only at specified places.
In carrying out their duties the Commissioners had no
precedent to refer to and no firm guidelines were laid
out by the Act, with the idea that each case should be
examined on its merits. As Chester (1936) was to
observe, they adopted the three principles of priority,
protection and public need. Established operators who
were providing a satisfactory service were given priority
over new applicants, and this applied just as much to the
independent firms as it did to the "territorial"
companies. Where more than one operator was covering a
route the services were allocated on a non-competitive
basis. Protection took the form of safeguarding local
services from express buses picking-up inside their area.
In addition protection was also given to other forms of
transport, such as local tramways and railways - for the
latter it often took the form of restricting long¬
distance (and often seasonal) coach travel. Public
need, which tended to be emphasised less, was usually
interpreted as providing some socially desirable but
unremunerative services, at less than cost, to be
subsidised by the more profitable routes.
Some of the main effects of the Act on the industry will
now be outlined, but it is not proposed to enter the
controversy that has arisen over its effectiveness (as
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discussed by Dyos and Aldcroft (1974) and Hibbs (1975)
for example). For the public, safer and more reliable
services were offered - there was no need for dangerous
driving practices to outwit the competition, and there
were general improvements in the design, comfort,
cleanliness and maintenance of buses. There were also
advantages in the co-ordination of timetables and fare
schedules: in the East Midlands Traffic Area, for
example, 600 time- and fare-tables were co-ordinated
within the first year of licensing. For the industry
this was a period of growth, but principally for the
larger firms, who continued to divide up the market
amongst themselves. This found favour with the Traffic
Commissioners, as it helped reduce wasteful competition,
and there was little evidence that these larger firms
abused their monopoly position or were inefficient.
Both the three holding companies and the railways
continued to invest heavily in the territorial operations
- by the end of the 1920s the holding companies, it is
estimated, controlled two-fifths of the buses in the
country; and the railways had collectively invested £ 9m
by 1933 (Barker and Savage, p.167).
Bagwell (1974) quotes Hurcomb's figures illustrating the
degree of consolidation that was encouraged (though not
initiated) by the 1930 Act. Between 1931 and 1937 the
number of bus operators fell by a quarter from 6,486 to
4,789 and the percentage of buses owned by operators with
over 100 vehicles rose from 47 to 61. The total number
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of buses in service fell from 52,648 (1930) to 49,372
(1937), although this was accompanied by an increase in
seating capacity. Despite the consolidation, by 1937
there were still 1800 operators who owned only one
vehicle.
It was mentioned earlier that the consolidation process
in Scotland took longer to start - it was not until 1929
that the SMT group was reformed - but it too continued at
a rapid pace in the 1930s, as Booth (1978) describes:
From [the 1920s] chaos came the 1930 Road
Traffic Act, and the need to license crews,
vehicles and routes forced many busmen off the
road. They were eagerly bought up by the
reformed SMT group, revitalised with railway
capital, and many of Scotland's stage carriage
and tour operating companies opted to sell out
during the 1930s. (p.96)
The Scottish General Transport Company, for example, was
sold by BET to SMT in 1931 and became Western SMT. By
the outbreak of the Second World War the latter had
acquired (either in total or in part) the operations of
at least 17 companies in the area to the south-west of
Glasgow.
The 1930s were very much the golden era for the bus
industry in Britain - there was a great expansion of both
numbers and types of service, and the situation was
established which was to remain virtually unchanged for
fifty years. As Bagwell (1974) describes, "the pattern
of social life was rapidly changing."
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. . . the rapid multiplication of bus services
greatly increased the mobility of those who
were not car owners . . . the person without
private transport was better served by public
transport in the 1930s and 1940s than had ever
been the case before or was to be the case in
the decades which followed. After the Second
World War, as the number of privately-owned
motor vehicles soared upwards from 2 million
in 1945 to 15 million in 1970, tramways
practically disappeared, branch railway lines
were closed, and many uneconomic bus services
were withdrawn. The low income earners and
the pensioners were then often less mobile than
were those of the previous generation. (p.231)
1.4 Legislation and consolidation, 1949-68
In the years immediately following the end of the Second
World War, conditions for the bus industry returned to
the levels of the 1930s. Petrol rationing restricted
private motoring, there were few other outlets for people
to spend money on, and fares remained largely at their
1930 levels. By the 1950s, however, rationing had
eased, private car ownership was increasing, and leisure
habits were starting to change (for example, the spread
of television reduced the demand for travel to cinemas).
Increases in fuel tax were passed on to passengers in the
form of higher fares, at a time when demand for bus
travel was falling. The industry thus started a period
of gradual relative decline.
The period since 1945 has seen a number of Transport
Acts, which have shaped the industry into its present
form. The 1947 Act did not provide for the immediate
nationalisation of the industry, but when the railway
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companies were taken into public ownership in 1948 their
shareholdings in bus companies passed to the newly-formed
British Transport Commission (BTC). The BTC was given
power to negotiate for the remaining shares in the Thomas
Tilling and SMT groups, along with some smaller operators
(such as the Highland Transport Company), while BET
remained independent, albeit with a substantial minority
of shares state-owned. The Road Passenger Executive was
formed to administer these. There appeared to be little
resistance to this gradual take-over by the State,
certainly in Scotland, as Booth (1978) describes:
The strains of World War Two left SMT with a
time-worn fleet of buses in 1945 and it was
clearly going to be a costly exercise if they
were to aspire to the standard of service
offered in 1939. The post-war travel boom
created extra problems and voluntary
nationalisation in 1947 was- seen as the
solution which was most in the public
interest. (p.7)
Further evidence that this was a practical solution was
witnessed when the provisions in the 1953 Act, which
empowered the BTC to dispose of their acquisitions, were
never exercised. Meanwhile, the road licensing system
of 1930 continued to regulate the industry, and was found
to be satisfactory in doing so by the Thesiger Committee
(on the licensing of Road Passenger Services) which
reported in 1953.
The SMT group adopted its present title upon
nationalisation in 1949 - the Scottish Bus Group - and
the SMT Co. itself became Scottish Omnibuses Ltd, later
taking the fleet name of "Eastern Scottish". Several
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important events occurred in the next two decades.
Highland Omnibuses was formed in 1952, an amalgam of the
Highland Transport Company (acquired by BTC in 1951) and
Alexanders' interests in the Inverness area, along with
the bus and coach operations of motor dealers Macrae and
Dick. From a financial viewpoint this was hardly a
sound move: in the late 1950s, when 25% of the total SBG
mileage was classed as unremunerative, over 80% of
Highland's mileage (rural routes outside Inverness) was
in this category (Barker and Savage, 1974). However,
acquisitions continued by all the SBG companies in the
1950s and 1960s, Highland being particularly active in
this respect, and by 1961 Walter Alexander & Sons Ltd had
grown to such a size that its three administrative areas
were split into separate companies - Midland, Fife and
Northern.
The Transport Act of 1962 brought about a minor change of
ownership - the BTC was disbanded and the bus interest of
the State came under a new Transport Holding Company
(THC). More major changes followed in 1968. The
imminence of legislation (following a series of White
Papers on transport) and the declining financial
situation in the industry led BET to sell its remaining
interests to the THC. The Transport Act later that year
broke up the THC - in England and Wales its bus companies
formed the National Bus Company (NBC); in Scotland the
SBG became part of the Scottish Transport Group, along
with the recent acquisitions of David MacBrayne Ltd and
the Caledonian Steam Packet Company. The shipping
interests of the latter two companies were combined to
form Caledonian MacBrayne Ltd, the bus operations of
David MacBrayne Ltd being merged into existing bus
companies (principally Highland Omnibuses) in 1970.
Very few new acquisitions were made in the 1970s, with
Highland in fact selling-off some of the more remote
parts of its operations on islands such as Islay, Harris
and Mull.
The declining state of the industry was recognised by the
1968 Act, in providing for certain types of financial
assistance. Grants of up to 25% were to be made
available for the purchase of new vehicles of standard
designs, and suitable for one-man-operation. (In 1971
this grant was increased to 50% of the purchase price.)
In addition, the fuel duty rebate was increased; there
was a 75% grant for fixed capital investment, in items
such as bus stations and depots; and finally a grant was
offered to local authorities of up to 50% of the cost of
subsidising unprofitable bus (and ferry) services.
The Act also established the first Passenger Transport
Authorities, which were to integrate all public transport
within certain densely-populated areas. Passenger
Transport Executives were established to undertake the
day-to-day running of the scheme, to take over and
operate the municipal bus fleets, and to co-ordinate
services with other operators and British Rail, who would
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receive payments for operating loss-making routes. The
first PTAs were established in the Birmingham,
Manchester, Liverpool and Newcastle areas, the last-named
also building and operating its own light rail system -
the "Metro" - on mainly ex-British Rail lines. Local
Government reorganisation in 1972 designated each
metropolitan county council as a PTA - as a result the
existing four PTAs altered their boundaries and were
joined by both West and South Yorkshire. In Scotland
Greater Glasgow PTA was established in 1973, and renamed
Strathclyde in 1980.
Various other Acts followed in the 1970s, making small
changes to the public transport environment. The 1972
Act also gave county councils the duty to co-ordinate bus
and rail services to meet local needs, enabling them to
subsidise services if necessary. The Local Government
Act 1974 allowed councils to include these subsidies in
their submissions for rate support grants. The
increasing role of local authorities in the co-ordination
of local transport was recognised in the Transport Act
1978, which changed slightly the criteria by which the
Traffic Commissioners were to use in deciding whether to
grant new road licences. They were to have regard to
local transport plans and policies, the needs of the area
as a whole and of particular communities, and disabled
travellers. The Act also facilitated car sharing (on a
non-profit basis) and the use of community minibuses
using volunteer drivers.
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1.5 The industry in recent years (with particular
reference to Scotland)
In retrospect, the various Transport Acts between 1949
and 1978 did little to change the underlying structure of
the industry. The road licensing system remained as the
keystone, providing much security, and the industry
continued to evolve slowly.
The ownership structure which persisted until 1986 bore
much resemblance to that which evolved in the 1920s, the
one exception being that the railways no longer ran
regular bus services. The state-owned sector comprised
the former holding companies and their constituents. In
England and Wales the interests of the Thomas Tilling and
BET groups went to form the National Bus Company; in
Scotland, SMT became the Scottish Bus Group. Many of
the 52 constituent companies of the NBC retained their
old company names, dating from the 1920s, such as
Crosville, Ribble and Midland Red. Until recently the
seven component companies of the SBG were registered
under their original names (Scottish Omnibuses, Highland
Omnibuses, Western SMT, Central SMT and the three
companies of Walter Alexander and Sons), although from
the mid-1970s a corporate image for fleetnames was
adopted. These took the form of "Central Scottish",
"Eastern Scottish", etc., and under the 1985
reorganisation (described later) were adopted as the
legal company names. In both the NBC and the SBG
control was fairly decentralised to company level: in
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the Scottish area many of the companies retained
attitudes and approaches individual to themselves.
The second group were those in local public ownership.
In 1985, 47 local authorities operated their own bus
services - the three Scottish ones being Lothian, Tayside
and Grampian regional councils. There were also seven
Passenger Transport Authorities, covering the six former
metropolitan counties in England and Strathclyde Region
in Scotland, responsible not only for their own buses but
for local rail services as well. London Transport until
recently was in this category (coming under the care of
the Greater London Council), but from June 1984 it became
directly accountable to the Secretary of State for
Transport. It was renamed London Regional Transport and
its activities split into two divisions - buses and
underground.
The final category are the privately-owned firms, ranging
in size from those with one or two vehicles, to those
with over fifty. There is a high rate of entry to and
exit from this sector, especially among the smaller
operators, and in recent years numbers have fluctuated
quite considerably. From 5,818 in 1976 they fell to
5,421 in 1981, rose to 5,849 in 1983 and dropped again to
5,635 in 1985 (Transport Statistics Great Britain,
various years). There are, however, a large number of
long-established operators - three Scottish examples are
Hutcheson's Coaches (Overtown) Ltd which started in 1913,
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the Al co-operative of Ardrossan, formed in 1926 and
McGill's Bus Services Ltd (of Barrhead), established in
1933.
The structure of the industry can also be viewed in terms
of the types of services offered. There are four types,
which again changed little since the Road Traffic Act of
1930. [The legal definitions in fact changed on 6
January 1986.] "Stage carriage" comprises local,
stopping bus services, run to a timetable and for which
passengers pay separate fares. "Express services" are
similar, although there are fewer stops and passengers
must travel at least 30 miles. "Excursions and tours"
are where passengers travel together to places and back
again, and pay the same fares. The final category
comprises contract work (regular private services, to and
from a factory or school, for example) and private hires
(occasional private services, eg. group outings). Table
1.1 below shows that the public operators predominate in
the stage carriage and express sectors, while the private
operators take most of the excursion, contract and
private hire work.
To some extent the figures are a reflection of the nature
of work in each category. The public operators (who
account for over 75% of both passenger journeys and
receipts for stage services) require regular, planned
work to make the most efficient use of their large fleets
and full-time staff. The private operators, however,
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Table 1.1
Passenger journeys and revenue: the percentage accounted
for by public and private sectors, by type of service
(1984).
Public Operators Private Operators
Type of Service
Journeys Revenue Journeys Revenue
Stage carriage 96.9% 95.5% 3.1% 4.5%
Express 76.5 78.7 23.5 21.3
Excursions and tours 13.3 11.8 86.7 88.2
Contract & Private Hire 15.0 12.2 85.0 87.8
All 89.4% 76 .3% 10.6% 23.7%
Source: Compiled from tables 2.30 (p.93) and 2.31 (p.94),
Transport Statistics Great Britain (TSGB), 1974-84
are more suited to adapt to the often seasonal, part-time
and ad hoc nature of the other sectors - in the smaller
firms especially, drivers may be employed part-time and
only when needed; in many cases vehicles tend to be
older and less able to cope with regular, all-day
running. On a more general level the table shows the
predominance of the public sector - it accounts for
almost 90% of all journeys, and three-quarters of
passenger revenue.
A more detailed breakdown of the relative importance of
each type of service to the public and private sectors is
given in tables 1.2 and 1.3, along with specific figures
for the SBG. For the industry as a whole, stage
services account for 90% of journeys and 75% of revenue,
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but for the public sector they account for 98% and 93%
respectively. These figures are skewed somewhat by the
effect of London Regional Transport, where stage services
account for over 99% of both journeys and revenue. (One
reason for the disparity between number of journeys and
passenger receipts for stage services is that many routes
are unremunerative, being supported in part by grants
from local authorities, which are not included under
'receipts'). Contract and private hire services come
second in importance overall, with over 8% of journeys
and almost one-fifth of revenue, but it is this sector
which accounts for most of the work for the private
operators. Express services and excursions combined
take less than 1% of passenger journeys but over 6% of
receipts. Excursions and tours are of importance to
private operators (almost 4% of journeys and 13% of
revenue), although it is mainly the larger ones who
undertake this work, such as the Wallace Arnold group.
Only some of the SBG companies undertake major programmes
of both day and extended tours, Eastern Scottish being
established in this respect.
Non-stage carriage work accounts for a greater proportion
of business for the SBG than it does for the public
sector as a whole. Express services take 0.6% of
journeys and 6.2% of revenue, as against 0.2% and 3.1%
respectively for the sector in general. The contract
and private hire services are also proportionately more
important (3.5% of journeys against 1.4% for the sector
23
Table 1.2











Journeys % Journeys % Journeys % Journeys % Journeys
Public 5,479 98.2 13 0.2 4 0. 1 81 1.4 5,577
SBG 299 96.1 2 0.6 - * 11 3.5 311
Private 171 25.9 4 0.6 26 3.9 459 69.6 659
ALL 5,650 90.6 17 0.3 30 0.5 539 8.6 6,237
Journeys are rounded to the nearest million.
- = less than 1;
* = impossible to calculate.
Source: taken from Table 2.30(c), p.93 TSGB, 1974-84
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Receipts % :Receipts % Receipts % Receipts % Receipts
Public 1,484.6 93.3 49.9 3.1 8.5 0.5 47.8 3.0 1,590.8
SBG 119.9 88.4 8.4 6.2 1.2 0.9 6.2 4.6 135.6
Private 69.5 14.1 13.6 2.7 63.6 12.9 347.1 70.2 493.8
1,554.1 75.6 63.4 3.0 72.0 3.4 395.0 18.9 2,084.5
Source: Taken from Table 2.31(c), p.94, TSGB, 1974-84
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in general) - for example contracts from schools, coal
mines and factories account for a significant amount of
business in many depots.
The gradual decline in the industry since the 1950s has
already been mentioned briefly, and is now discussed in
greater detail. Table 1.4 below gives an indication of
this decline in both actual and proportional terms. The
proportion of journeys by bus peaked at 42% in 1952, fell
steadily in the 1950s and 60s, slowed in the 1970s, and
levelled off at 8% in the early 1980s. Over this period
passenger distance travelled by bus halved. Related to
this, and even more dramatic, is the rise in private
transport, from 38% to 84% of journeys between 1952 and
1985, with an almost six-fold increase in passenger
distance travelled. The numbers of licenced private
cars rose from 2.4 million in 1950 to 8.3 million in
1964, and by 1985 stood at nearly 16.5 million. Air has
shown a gradual increase over the period whilst rail,
although declining in proportional terms from 20% to 7%,
fell only slightly in real terms. The oil crisis of the
mid-1970s, whilst checking the rise in car transport,
also halted the decline in both bus and rail travel,
causing both to rise slightly. The early 1980s have
seen a period of consolidation; car travel has increased
in real terms but by little in proportional terms; and
bus and rail are fairly static. The patterns described
above are set against a background of a two and a half-
fold increase in the total distance travelled.
25
Table 1.4
U.K. Passenger Transport by Mode, 1952-85.
Bus Private* Rail Air Total
PK % PK % PK % PK % PK
1952 81 42 74 38 39 20 0.2 0.1 194
1955 80 38 93 44 38 18 0.3 0.1 211
1960 69 28 138 55 40 16 0.8 0.3 248
1965 59 19 211 69 35 11 1.7 0.6 307
1970 53 15 271 75 36 10 2.0 0.6 362
1975 55 14 302 77 35 9 2.0 0.5 394
1980 45 10 375 82 35 7 3.0 0.6 458
1981 42 9 384 82 34 7 3.0 0.6 463
1982 41 8 398 85 31 6 3.0 0.6 473
1983 42 8 406 84 34 7 3.0 0.6 485
1984 42 8 422 84 35 7 3.0 0.6 502
1985 42 8 437 84 36 7 4.0 0.7 519
In 1982 ASLEF organised a major programme of industrial
action.
Figures are expressed in billion passenger kilometres
(PK) and as a percentage (%) of the total.
* Private transport includes cars, taxis, motor and
pedal cycles.
Source: TSGB, 1974-84, Tables 1.1 (p.18) and 7.1 (p.180)
An analysis of the situation over the period 1975-85
shows that the decline has not been uniform across the
industry; rather, the public sector has been affected
more than the private sector. Table 1.5 below shows
both the total passenger journeys and passenger receipts.
In terms of passenger journeys, the public sector as a
whole has declined by around the average rate for the
industry, but this masks important differences. The
SBG, for example, only suffered an 18% fall in journeys,






All public 7,452 5,564 -25.3
SBG 392 320 -18.3
All private 716 605 -15.5
All operators 8,168 6,169 -24.5
Passenger Receipts (£ million)
% change
1975 1985 1975-85
Actual Adjusted* Actual (real prices)
All public 701.5 1,943.8 1,683.6 -13.4
SBG 59.7 165.4 139.8 -15.5
All private 157.1 435.3 526.8 21.0
All operators 858.6 2,379.2 2,210.4 - 7.1
* Adjusted to 1985 values using GDP deflator
Source: TSGB 1975-85, tables 2.29 (p96) and 2.30 (p.97).
million to 1,453m). The fall for private operators has
been less than the industry average, and their share of
passenger journeys has risen from 8.8% to 9.8% of the
total. These percentages are somewhat misleading, as
passenger journeys for most classes of operator have
fluctuated in the 1980s: for the SBG, for example, they
fell to 314m in 1982, rose to 319m in 1983, fell again in
1984 to 311m with the miners' strike, rising again to
320m in 1985.
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The figures for passenger receipts show an interesting
disparity between the two sectors. Public operators'
receipts fell, whilst those of the private sector
increased. A possible reason for this could be the
expansion of express coach services following the 1980
Transport Act (see later), which private operators were
quick to take advantage of. Their share of receipts has
increased from 18.3% to 23.8% of the total for the
industry. It is interesting to note that the SBG has
suffered a greater decline than for the public sector as
a whole.
The number of vehicles in stock in the industry has also
fallen, with the greatest reduction being in the past
decade, as the table below shows. There has been an
overall decline of about 10%, but the reduction in the
public sector of 25% has to some extent been compensated
for by an increase of over 20% in the private sector.
For the SBG there has been a steady annual decline in the
last ten years, although in 1985 the number of vehicles
did rise slightly. [It is possible that this rise may
have continued, with the advent of mini-bus services in
1986 causing many SBG companies to purchase often
substantial numbers of such vehicles.]
This pattern has been reflected by a similar reduction in
the numbers employed in the industry. Table 1.7 shows
that, since 1968 (the first year for which such





1965 1975 1985 1965-85
All public 50,680 48,800 37,600 -25.8%
SBG 4,680 4,300 3,400 -27.3%
Private 24,800 28,100 30,300 +22.2%
All operators* 75,480 76,900 67,900 -10%
* Figures may not add up exactly due to rounding
Source: Compiled from TSGB 1964-74 table 45 (p.91)
& TSGB 1975-85, table 2.32 (p99).
by over 30%. A loss of 40% in the public sector,
however, is partially compensated for by a similar rise
in the private sector.
Table 1.7
Staff Employed, by Type of Operator
% change
1968 1975 1985 1968-85
Public 224,779 190,399 134,096 -40.3%
Private 28,455 34,031 40,206 +41.3%
All 253,234 224,410 174,302 -31.2
British Rail 266,000 229,800 168,100 -36.8%
Source: Compiled from TSGB 1968-78 table 68 (p.86)
and TSGB 1975-85 table 2.34 (p.101)
This accounts for a decrease in the proportion employed
by the publicly-owned companies, from 88% of total
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employment in 1968 to 77% by 1985. By way of
comparison, the figures for British Rail are also given -
here the fall since 1968 is even greater (36.8%). A
fuller discussion of the changes in employment is given
in the next chapter.
It is worth commenting here that the SBG appears to be
fairly efficient when compared against other operators in
the public sector. As the next chapter will show, the
SBG has reduced its staff at a greater rate than for the
industry as a whole. Several more comparisons are
presented here. The figures are broken down into the
operator categories which the Department of Transport
uses in its annual publication, Transport Statistics
Great Britain. Two measures are shown below in table
1.8, comparing 1975 and 1985.
The first part of the table shows the vehicle kilometres
per vehicle, ie, the average distance each operator's
vehicles travel in a year. It should be emphasised,
however, that these are very much average figures for the
fleet as a whole, and that the range of distances
travelled by vehicles in a fleet varies considerably.
In the SBG for example, a coach used on "Citylink"
express services to London may travel well in excess of
150,000 km per year, whereas a bus used on a few local
routes in the Highlands may journey than 20,000 km. In
the table the SBG ranks second (behind the NBC), has
shown an increase of over 10% since 1975. Next in the
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Table 1.8




L.T. 44,531 50,000 +12.3
PTEs 48,174 56,626 +17.5
Municipals 42,097 44,615 + 5.9
NBC 58,382 66,599 +14.1
SBG 55,814 61,765 + 10.. 6
Private 36,263 37,855 + 4.4







L.T. 5.44 4.94 - 9.2
PTEs 4.10 3.96 - 3.4
Municipals 3.49 3.10 -11.1
NBC 3.53 3.20 - 9.3
SBG 3.39 2.70 -20.3
Private 1.21 1.33 + 9.9
All 2.92 2.57 -11.9
Notes (1) Calculated by dividing, for each operator,
the total vehicle kilometres by the size of
fleet.
(2) Calculated by dividing, for each operator,
the number of employees by the size of fleet.
Source: TSGB 1975-85, tables 2-32, 2-33, 2-34; pp. 99-101
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league are passenger transport executives, followed by
London Transport with the municipals well down. A
possible reason for the well above-average distances for
both the NBC and the SBG is that many of their routes are
either rural or inter-urban. In addition both run an
extensive long-distance express service network, and
participate in the coach tours market. At the other end
of the scale, the municipal operators mostly run services
in urban areas (with occasional express services and
tours), and the private sector operate a very different
mixture of service types, as was discussed earlier.
The number of employees per vehicle is given in the other
part of the table, again comparing 1975 (when the move to
one-man-operation was starting in earnest) with 1985
(when it had been substantially completed). All public
operators reduced their staff-vehicle ratio over this
period: the SBG had both the lowest ratio in each year
and the greatest proportional reduction. London
Transport is at the other end of the scale, with almost
five staff for every vehicle - not unexpected owing to
the large number of conductors employed. The private
sector's figures are much lower than for the public
sector: in a sizeable proportion of firms there may be
little in the way of engineering or clerical staff;
similarly many employees may be part-time or be engaged
in both driving and maintenance, and in the smaller firms
it is quite common for the owner to do much of the
driving himself.
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Another indicator of the relative efficiency of the SBG
compared to the rest of the public sector is given in
table 1.9, below. It shows the number of passenger
journeys per employee, and there are interesting
differences between 1975 and 1985. In the earlier year
the municipals and PTEs carried the greatest number of
passengers per employee, with the SBG taking the least
for the public sector. It has already been mentioned
that, between the two years, both the number of passenger
journeys and the number of staff employed fell. By the
latter year, most public operators had improved their
ratio of passenger journeys per employee, with the 30%
increase by the SBG being by far the greatest. This
would be in part, at least, a result of the major
efficiency exercise which was carried out by the Group in
the early 1980s, and which is described later in this
chapter. The private sector shows a marked decrease
over this period: for them it was a period when
passenger journeys fell but staff numbers increased.
Table 1.9
Passenger Journeys per Employee*
% change
1975 1985 1975-85
London Transport 41,810 44,864 + 7.3
PTEs 49,004 51,083 + 4.2
Municipals 54,629 49,627 - 9.1
NBC 29,306 30,849 + 5.2
SBG 26,849 34,782 +29.5
Private 21,058 15,049 -28.5
All operators 36,399 35,393 00•<N1
♦Calculated by dividing, for each operator, passenger
journeys by total staff employed.
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The decline in demand for bus travel has, for operators,
caused a steady increase in the number of uneconomic
routes, not just in rural areas but in towns as well.
The 1960s and 70s were also a period of ever-increasing
costs (in particular of labour and fuel), despite
productivity improvements such as the introduction of
one man operation ("0M0"). In this situation, one or
more of a number of solutions were adopted by companies.
These were discussed by Maultby (1982) and included
cross-subsidisation, using revenue from profitable routes
to subsidise unprofitable ones; improving productivity
of vehicles, staff and capital; reducing service
frequency and increasing fares above the general level of
inflation (both of which can drive even more passengers
to alternative forms of transport); and seeking
subsidies from local authorities towards the costs of
maintaining unremunerative services, on the grounds of
"social need".
Despite productivity improvements in recent years,
financial support from local and central government has
increased almost three-fold in recent years, as can be
seen by table 1.10 below. This shows the principal
subsidies to the road passenger transport industry for
four selected years, both in actual and real (adjusted to
1985 prices) terms, with the figures for British Rail
again shown for comparison.
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Table 1.10
Public expenditure on subsidies and grants to inland
surface transport, 1975-85 (£ million).
1975 1978 1982 1985
Actual Adj. Actual Adj. Actual Adj. Actual
Road passenger
transport:
Fuel duty rebate 38 105 59 113 93 108 148
New bus grant 31 86 52 99 40 46 0
(1)
Concessionary fares 79 219 124 237 230 267 288
Revenue support 185 513 165 315 490 568 498
Other 10 28 15 29 39 45 39
Total (road pass.) 343 950 415 792 892 1,034 973
% of total exp. 36.9 38.6 43.3 44.2
British Rail(total) 514 1,424 571 1,089 987 1,144 1,001
% of total exp. 55.3 53.1 47.9 45.5
All grants (2) 929 2,574 1,076 2,053 2,060 2,388 2,200
Source: TSGB 1975-85, table 1-16, p.25
Notes
(1) Subsidy to the passenger, not to the transport
operator
(2) Includes subsidies and grants to other bodies such
as London Underground, National Freight Corporation
and British Waterways Board.
Actual = Actual cost, £m
Adj. = Adjusted to 1985 prices (£m), using GDP deflator
In real terms (with figures adjusted to 1985 prices) the
picture appears to be more one of fluctuation rather than
of steady increase. Certain items have increased, such
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as the fuel duty rebate and the cost of concessionary
fares, but revenue support has varied and is now lower in
real terms than it was in 1975. The new bus grant
(designed to assist operators in purchasing new vehicles
for local services) was progressively phased-out in the
early 1980s. It peaked at £73.6m in 1980/81, £5.8m of
which was received by the SBG. However the overall
level of subsidy to the industry remains high, at nearly
£1,000m in 1985. In addition, the bus industry in 1985
received a greater proportion of the total subsidy than
it did ten years previously. Whereas in 1975 bus was
almost twenty percentage points behind rail, ten years
later they received almost equal levels of subsidy.
Concern over subsidies in particular, and with the state
of the industry in general, shaped the present
Government's policies for this industry. Their feelings
were well summed-up by the following quotation from the
1984 White Paper Buses,
There has been too little incentive to develop
markets, to woo the customer. Operators have
been hampered by a philosophy that is defensive
and inward-looking. (p.l)
1.6 Deregulation
The present decade has brought the first major changes to
the operating environment of the bus industry since 1930.
The Conservative Government, since 1979, has been
dedicated to encouraging free market competition, growth
and efficiency by removing regulation and restriction.
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The Transport Acts of 1980 and 1985 reflected these aims,
for combined they repealed almost entirely the road
licensing provisions of the 1930 Act. Savage (1985)
discussed some of the Government's reasons behind these
measures. It was felt that regulation had discouraged
innovation, especially in rural areas where small private
operators might be able to cater more effectively than a
large company. (The 1978 Act had recognised this to
some extent in its measures on community mini-buses and
car-sharing.) It was considered also that the principle
of "priority" meant that inefficient companies could not
be challenged, since they were the established operator
on their routes. A protected bus market could hence
lead to a protected labour market where inefficiencies
such as restrictive practices could emerge. Finally, it
was believed that cross-subsidy caused a misallocation of
resources, and unfairly penalised those living in urban
areas in order to subsidise those living in rural areas.
The main feature of the 1980 Act was the abolition of
licensing for express services (including excursions and
tours) of over 30 miles. This resulted in a great
increase in express coach services - new routes, more
frequent services, lower fares and improved vehicles -
provided not just by the established operators (in most
cases the NBC and SBG) but also by independent firms
eager to take advantage of the new competitive
opportunities. It was these independents, some of which
were new to the industry, that led the field initially.
37
Stagecoach (of Perth) and Newton's Travel of Dingwall
were two of the most prominent in this respect in
Scotland, with luxury coaches, attractive timetables and
fares well below those of the SBG companies (and British
Rail). In time the SBG started to retaliate, cutting
fares at first and in 1983 forming "Citylink", the banner
under which all the express services are run. The Group
invested fairly heavily in new vehicles (of a higher
standard than previously) painted in a bright new livery
(common across all companies) and continued to improve
and extend its services.
The response of the SBG, whilst slow at first, regained
for it a prominent place in the express coach market (and
now provides serious competition for British Rail). The
NBC refurbished their "National Express" image and now
enjoy similar success, with a number of Anglo-Scottish
routes being operated in conjunction with the SBG. The
independents were successful at first (and provided much
of the incentive for change to the SBG) but have been
less so latterly, especially in Scotland.
The 1980 Act also contained several other provisions.
It became easier in theory to obtain a licence for a
stage carriage service in competition with an established
operator. There were a small number of attempts by
private operators to do this over profitable routes but
in practice, as the Department of Transport reported in
1985, only some were successful, others being refused by
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the Traffic Commissioners on public interest grounds.
Further provisions included the replacement of vehicle
licensing with operator licensing, ending the requirement
to licence conductors, the phasing-out of the new bus
grant, and the establishment of "trial areas", free from
all quantity licensing restrictions. The best known of
these was around Hereford (the others were in parts of
Devon and Norfolk).
Dunbar (1984) points out that the predominantly rural
county of Hereford and Worcester was hardly typical of
the country as a whole. The local NBC subsidiary
(Midland Red West) did not have a local "monopoly" over
bus services - there were a number of established
independent operators - and there were also very few
profitable routes. The deregulation trial brought an
increase in service on these routes (at times, on one
such route, three operators vied with each other for
passengers) and a reduction in service on many other
routes. A number of new operators entered the market,
some achieving moderate success, and others having their
operators' licences removed on account of the
unroadworthiness of their vehicles. Writing almost
three years after the experiment began, Dunbar feels that
the administration of the scheme had a "straightjacket"
effect on operators: they had to give 42 days' notice if
they wished to start a new service and 56 days' notice if




Operationally the experiment has been a
complete failure, in that no permanent
improvement in services has been engendered and
a well-organised network has been disrupted.
(p.446)
Many expressed fears that full-scale deregulation (see
later) will have similar effects.
The desire of the Conservative Government to set
financial targets for, and generally improve the
efficiency of nationalised industries, along with the
pressures for a more freely competitive operating
environment, caused the SBG to undertake a major
efficiency exercise in the early 1980s. It was modelled
on a similar exercise carried out by the National Bus
Company in the late 1970s. Entitled "Scotmap" (Scottish
Bus Group Market Analysis Programme), it involved on-bus
passenger demand surveys (to find out when, where and why
passengers travelled) and bus journey time analysis (to
measure reliability and discover where and when buses are
delayed). Large numbers of questionnaires were
distributed, both on and off buses, with home visits also
being used to find out views on fares, service
frequencies, facilities at bus stations, etc. In many
depots the result was a more efficient scheduling of
drivers' duties and vehicle allocations, reducing non-
driving time, and in some cases redundancies occurred.
"Scotmap" was the first major event to occur in the SBG
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in the 1980s. The second was the reorganisation of the
Group in response to the total deregulation of services
as set out in the 1984 White Paper Buses and as enacted
by the Transport Act 1985. The Government was
encouraged by the success of the first round of
deregulation: the White Paper quoted a report by the
Transport and Road Research Laboratory which suggested
that, between 1980 and 1983, fares on express services
fell by an average of 40% in real terms, while over 700
new services were introduced. The paper also states,
The last four years have shown that the
industry has able and energetic managers who
are ready to take advantage of new opportunities
and that there is life in the bus market where
operators have been prepared to try out new
ventures. It is now time to go further, (p.l)
The 1985 Act abolished road service licensing for local
services outside London from 26 October 1986. It
established two categories of stage services: those which
operators register to run without public subsidy, (and
therefore at a profit); and those which are not
registered (and are therefore unprofitable) but which the
local authority wishes to see provided on grounds of
social need. These are put out to tender - the company
offering the lowest price receives the subsidy. (This
replaces the revenue support grant.) Cross-
subsidisation was therefore forbidden. Municipal
authorities and PTAs running their own bus services now
had to do so through separate limited companies. Other
provisions included an easing of restrictions on taxis,
and the requirement of the NBC to prepare itself for
privatisation within three years. This has now taken
place, with the constituent companies being sold off as
individual entities. In early 1988 the intention to
privatise the SBG was announced.
The 1985 Annual Report of the Scottish Transport Group
explained the rationale behind the reorganisation that
took place in June 1985:
A massive challenge has been issued to the bus
industry and in anticipation of this the Group
. . . reorganised its bus subsidiaries into
smaller units, geographically more compact,
more closely aligned to market sectors, and
with a clearer definition of management skills
and responsibilities. (p. 9)
This marked the end of the seven, all-purpose companies
which had evolved from the formation of the SMT group in
1929 and which had changed little since the 1950s. They
were replaced by eleven smaller and predominantly stage
carriage companies, which (like their predecessors)
operate within geographical areas. This was accompanied
by some devolution of authority to local level, with the
creation of an area manager for each depot, in charge of
both maintenance and traffic. The express services and
extended tour market is now handled by "Scottish Citylink
Coaches Limited", which "buys-in" drivers and vehicles
from the operating companies. Finally, the central
workshops of six of the old companies were formed into
"SBG Engineering". As well as undertaking heavy
engineering work for the SBG companies they are now




This chapter has outlined some of the main features in
the development of the road passenger transport industry
in Britain, with some emphasis being given to the
Scottish situation. Two main themes which can be
identified are those of security and slow evolution.
The former was afforded by the licensing provisions of
the Road Traffic Act 1930. Slow evolution, as opposed
to rapid change, is a suitable description of the
development of the Scottish Bus Group from its origins in
the reformed SMT Company of 1929. This stable and
secure climate failed to stem a gradual decline in bus
patronage, however, which started in the 1950s and only
now is showing signs of levelling out. Concern over
this, and over the costs of maintaining increasingly
unremunerative services in particular, led the Government
to introduce the most radical legislation the industry
has seen since 1930. This, therefore, is the context in
which the research has taken place. The industry is now
being forced to change gear to cope with the demands and
rigours of free competition again. The effects of the
above features of the industry on the workforce (and in
particular the drivers) are discussed in the next
chapter, along with an analysis of the job of the bus
driver in the Scottish Bus Group.
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CHAPTER TWO
SOME ASPECTS OF THE LABOUR ENVIRONMENT
2.1 Introduction
The bus industry, by its very nature, is labour-
intensive. It relies very heavily on its employees,
being a service industry, and any "lost production" (in
the sense of a bus failing to run, due to staff or
vehicle shortage, or traffic congestion) not only is
immediately apparent to the customer, but also cannot be
recovered. Labour costs account for around 60% of total
expenditure, despite reductions in recent years. The
bus driver, therefore, plays a crucial role in his
company.
The previous chapter provided the background to the
research in terms of the industry's history and
development, and present structure. This chapter looks
at the background from the labour viewpoint. There is a
brief discussion of some of the main historical features
of the labour environment, followed by a more detailed
examination of the driver's job and the conditions in
which it is undertaken. This will be tailored
specifically to drivers in the Scottish Bus Group,
although there are many features which apply across the
industry. At this stage it should be said that there
appears to be very little literature on this topic - much
of what is written comes from Thomson and Hunter's (1973)
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chapter on the road transport industry, studies of
London and Dublin busmen in the 1960s (Foster and
Gardner, 1966; Van Beinum, 1966), postgraduate theses by
Johnston (1981) and Malins (1973) examining this aspect
of the industry, the reports of various Government bodies
and of the Scottish Transport Group, and finally personal
observation and informal interviews with management and
staff in various bus companies.
2.2 Some historical aspects
Johnston's thesis, which examines the bus driver's job
from a sociological "labour process" aspect, provides
some evidence of the harsh conditions for labour in the
early part of the industry's existence. In times of
hectic competitive activity (especially in London)
conductors had to use every ploy to fill their buses
with, often hesitant, passengers, and drivers had to race
from stop to stop to keep up to time. Working
conditions appeared to be harsh - staff were exposed to
all weathers on open horse and early motor buses, hours
were long (often 16 hours a day, seven days a week) and
wages were low. There was little security of
employment, and dismissal could occur for the slightest
offence or complaint. The latter years of the
nineteenth century, in particular, were ones of general
unemployment and recession, offering little scope for
organised protest or reaction.
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The situation started to improve towards the end of the
last century as trade union membership grew, first among
tramway workers and then busmen, and conditions of work
became more favourable. Wages rose and hours were
reduced to around eight or nine per day, although often
organised in two parts with a "spreadover" in-between.
Conditions fluctuated in the inter-war period, especially
in the often intense competition which took place in the
years preceding the 1930 Road Traffic Act, but in the
1930s there was a general improvement in wages, busmen
becoming relatively well paid in comparison to other
semi-skilled occupations. Trade union membership
continued to grow, it being in this period that the major
negotiating machinery was established. In the municipal
sector a National Joint Industrial Council was
established in 1919 for tramway workers and was
subsequently extended to include bus employees. The
Transport and General Workers' Union has had bargaining
arrangements with London Transport since the latter's
inception in 1933. The Tilling and British Electric
Traction groups were for a long time opposed to
unionisation, and it was not until 1940 that the National
Council for the Omnibus Industry was established.
Malins (1973) feels that the growth in trade union
membership may have been encouraged by the 1930 Act, as
the Traffic Commissioners had to be satisfied that an
operator paid "fair wages" before he was granted a
licence. The spate of takeover activity in the 1930s
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(of small operators by large firms) may have given
additional impetus to this: bus workers who found
themselves with more remote management and more
formalised systems may have turned to trade unions for
security and protection.
The labour environment worsened in the post-war years.
This was due less to the nationalisation of much of the
"company" sector (the Tilling and SMT groups), but more
to the changing patterns of transport usage and the
general economic conditions. In the last chapter it was
noted that, after rising to a peak in 1952, the number of
passenger journeys made by bus (and the proportion of
total journeys) fell for nearly 30 years. Fares had to
be increased by amounts above the general level of price
inflation to counter ever rising fuel, materials and
labour costs. The 1950s and 1960s were decades of
relative prosperity for the UK, which brought with them
low levels of unemployment. A period of falling demand
was accompanied by labour shortage, as the job of a bus
driver became increasingly unattractive. This was due
to features which included six-day weeks, split shifts
(eg. half a shift in the morning peak and half in the
late afternoon peak) and perhaps even twelve hour working
on a Saturday.
These problems occurred at a time when car ownership (and
traffic congestion) were increasing, and pay was falling
behind those working in comparable occupations. Heavy
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overtime working became a necessity if drivers wanted a
"reasonable" level of take-home pay (often 15-20 hours on
top of a 40 hour basic week), and staff shortages in many
depots ensured that it was often available. A survey by
the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) (1967)
conducted in the mid-1960s found that the average working
week for busmen in the "company" sector was 52.7 hours,
as against the average for all industries of 46.1 hours.
By working these extra hours their earnings matched the
average for all industries. In some depots the trade
unions imposed a restriction on recruitment: by keeping
the number of drivers below the optimum level, they
ensured there were adequate opportunities for overtime.
This was often condoned by management (at least at lower
levels) as a way of retaining staff.
Shortages of staff tended to be worse in larger urban
areas, where there existed plentiful opportunities in
other occupations. A survey of the state-owned sector
in 1966 found that 100 out of 545 depots had a shortfall
of drivers of over 15% (NBPI, 1966). As a result the
industry attracted "drifters" - both people who moved
frequently between jobs, either through lack of interest
or by being dismissed, and skilled craftsmen, temporarily
out of work, who would take up bus driving as a short-
term measure until employment conditions in their own
trade recovered. Similarly, a shortage of "traditional
material" for drivers and conductors resulted in
increasing numbers of women and immigrants being
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employed. As a consequence, the "image" of the job
declined, as the following quotation from Richman (1969)
illustrates:
Generally the public hold busmen in low esteem.
Many people have a "riff-raff" image of them,
which can be partly attributed to the early
post-war years when the labour shortage forced
companies to abandon selectivity in recruiting.
The job then became almost casual labour.
(p.243)
Problems of recruitment and retention of staff have
always been fewer in the less urban, more rural areas,
where there are fewer alternative sources of employment,
and where bus driving tends to have a higher status in
the local community.
Foster and Gardner (1966) investigated the labour problem
in London Transport in the mid-1960s. Amongst the
central London garages there was an average shortfall of
drivers of around 12% in this period, and annual turnover
fluctuated between 15 and 20% (it being 15.8% in 1962,
19.8% in 1963 and 16.0% in 1965). The researchers
carried out interviews and discussions with three
categories of people - potential recruits (men with an
interest in driving), existing bus drivers and former bus
drivers - and found that the job suffered from an image
problem. This was particularly so among potential
recruits: 87% of the statements they made about the job
were negative. When asked to compare the job of driving
a London bus with seven other driving jobs (such as
touring coaches and delivery vans) they placed it last.
It is interesting to compare this with the group of
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former drivers - they ranked the job equal first along
with driving petrol tankers and London taxis. The main
disadvantages as perceived by the potential drivers
included the monotonous nature of the work (stopping and
starting all the time), shift working (irregular hours
and weekend work), the difficulty of keeping to schedule,
the severity of discipline and the poor public image of
the job. The nature of the work and the shifts were
mentioned by the ex-drivers, along with the low pay and
the detrimental effects of the job on health (such as
strain, fatigue and ulcers).
Interviews carried out with serving drivers and trainees
on a less formal basis found that general morale tended
to be fairly low. In addition to the low level of pay
and the disruptive effect of shift working on one's
social life, the driving situation was felt to be a major
disadvantage of the job. In particular there were the
problems of increased congestion, people parking too near
to bus stops (making it difficult to pull in and out) and
the general lack of consideration shown by other road
users towards bus drivers. Management was also
criticised for being too distant and impersonal, with the
comment being made that it was demeaning to have to sign
a statement admitting one's faults.
It would appear that little has changed in the twenty
years since this report, especially in London Transport.
The number of drivers employed has continued to fall, but
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there is still a shortfall of drivers, with London
Regional Transport announcing early in 1987 that it would
have to recruit over 600 to maintain staffing levels (The
Times, 1.1.87). The driving situation has continued to
worsen throughout the country, with the only major change
being the increase in unemployment since the late 1970s
which has helped to reduce turnover. The fall in the
numbers employed in the industry is illustrated in the
following table.
Table 2.1
Staff Employed, by Type of Employment
% change
1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1966-85
Drivers 99,128 98,168 102,679 96,386 )
)105,368* -41%
Conductors 79,709 59,319 34,014 16,710 )
Other 87,667 87,909 87,717 87,931 68,933 -21%
All staff 266,504 245,396 224,410 201,027 174,302 -33%
Source: TSGB 1966-76 (table 63,p.89) and TSGB 1975-85
(table 2.34, p.101)
* The figures for drivers and conductors in 1985 were not disaggregated:
the figures for 1984 were 92,107 drivers (a fall of 8% since 1966) and
8,995 conductors (a fall of 90% over the same period).
The move towards one-man-operation (OMO) of buses from
the late 1960s is illustrated graphically in this table,
which shows the changes in numbers employed by type of
job in the bus industry. Between 1966 and 1984
employment fell by a third overall, by 8% for both
drivers and other staff, but by almost 90% for
conductors. This has been most marked in the municipal
and NBC/SBG sectors, especially in Scotland where neither
Strathclyde PTE nor the three municipal operators now
employ conductors. The fall is least in London; in
1984 6,184 conductors were employed by London Transport
as against 7,960 ten years previously. In 1974, LT
employed 20% of conductors, now they employ almost 70%.
The late 1960s were perhaps one of the worst periods the
bus companies have had to face. They were under
pressure from at least three directions - economic,
labour and Government. The economic problems have
already been discussed at some length - those of
declining demand and productivity, combined with
increasing costs. There were also pressures from the
labour side - the decreasing attractiveness of the
conditions of work (along with a low level of
unemployment) did little to ease the shortage of staff.
In addition, restrictive practices in the use of labour
became more entrenched in this period. The report of
the National Board for Prices and Incomes in 1966 listed
a large number which employers had reported to them.
These included those concerned with duty scheduling (such
as use of the slowest running times as the norm for a
route, and excessive times for clocking on and off, and
for resting at a terminus); restricting flexibility of
labour (preventing interchange of duties between drivers
and conductors, not permitting drivers to spend part of
their shift on cleaning or maintenance work, and
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resistance to the use of part-time labour) and strong
opposition to (and restrictions on) the use of one-man-
operation (0M0). Increased dissatisfaction, both with
pay claims and with conditions of employment generally,
led the TGWU to issue its "Busmen's Charter" in 1967.
This advocated not only a large increase in basic rates
of pay, but also improved conditions such as longer
holidays, a larger share of savings from 0M0 and full pay
for rest periods within a "spreadover" duty. (Eventually
many of these were achieved through negotiation.)
The slowness in improving rates of pay was to some extent
caused by the third pressure on the industry - the
government. The Wilson administration of the late 1960s
desired to restrict wage increases to those cases where
they were directly linked to improvements in
productivity. The National Board for Prices and Incomes
(NBPI) produced two major reports on the industry: Pay
and Conditions of Busmen, in 1966, and Productivity
Agreements in the Bus Industry the following year. Both
discussed the problems which the industry faced at that
time, and recommended the increased use of 0M0 as a means
of reducing costs and improving productivity. The Board
found that the UK compared unfavourably with Europe: in
this country one-man-operation was only being used on
lightly-used country routes and in a few towns (such as
Reading and Manchester); on the continent it was much
more widely spread, with major cities such as Stockholm
having had all its buses driver-only since 1960.
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Thomson and Hunter (1973) considered that the reluctance
to introduce 0M0 was to the industry's detriment in the
1960s:
It may in fact be one of the most pertinent
criticisms of the British industry that its
introduction was so long delayed. At all
events in the late 1960s it emerged as the
obvious way of solving the labour shortage,
cutting costs and yet increasing the
individual's pay.(p.305)
The NBPI felt that, although the benefits of OMO were
cost savings of around 15-20%, there were costs in terms
of slower average speeds, increased capital costs (new
vehicles and ticket machines suitable for OMO) and higher
pay for drivers.
The Government used these reports in an attempt to freeze
a pay increase that had been negotiated by the NJIC in
late 1967, as it was not linked to productivity
improvements. A series of moves by both parties took
place (including a strike in Dundee and the threat of a
national stoppage), until at the end of 1968 the "freeze"
powers expired, the busmen obtained their pay increase
(backdated to the original award) and there were no
productivity concessions. In addition, the NBPI had
produced nine reports on this one industry within three
years. [As well as the two major reports already
mentioned, there were seven others. One dealt with the
pay of municipal busmen, another with maintenance workers
in bus companies, and the rest with busmen in specific
areas, such as Rochdale, Dundee and Wigan.] This period
of poor industrial relations was improved little by the
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restrictions on drivers' hours contained in the 1966
Transport Act. These were introduced through a concern
for public safety, but the labour shortage meant that
companies could be less flexible with their existing
staff, and had more difficulty in recruiting and
retaining employees as the permitted amount of overtime
was reduced. Protests from the industry brought
temporary concessions, but revised restrictions on
working and driving hours, and rest days, were introduced
later.
It is perhaps appropriate to end this section on
industrial relations, with a few words on management.
Several of the studies in this area draw attention to the
poor quality of management felt to exist in many areas,
especially in the late 1960s. The NBPI were critical of
operating efficiency, and the extent to which restrictive
practices had become established (particularly with
regard to the amount of paid non-driving time). They
comment,
Some such practices, especially where agreement
to them is tacit rather than formal, will have
been the product of insufficiently firm
management, and, though we recognise that local
resistance to change in this industry has often
been strong, we note with regret that little
progress has been achieved [towards local
bargaining] for higher rewards in return for
changed practices involving more effective use
of manpower. (NBPI, 1967, p.22)
Malins (1973) studied the problem from the historical
aspect, saying that many managers have made the industry
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their career - they have a specialised knowledge
(especially in the traffic and engineering sides) with
skills that cannot easily be transferred elsewhere. He
felt that this long-term commitment of many managers to
the bus industry (and the relative infrequency of
movement between companies) fostered both a paternalistic
attitude and a lack of innovation. Writing in the early
1970s Malins considered that this environment of
inactivity manifested itself not only in a dearth of
ideas for new routes and fares structures, but also in
the management structure itself. He drew attention to
the comparative lack of money spent on training
(especially prior to the Industrial Training Act), market
research and publicity; the rarity of personnel
departments (in such a labour-intensive industry); and
problems with alienation of supervisors (inspectors), the
quality of which fell as drivers' earnings increased with
overtime and 0M0 bonuses. Drivers became more reluctant
to be promoted as the earnings differential between them
and their supervisors narrowed; indeed, some drivers
were able to earn more than inspectors.
Johnston (1981), who based his study on the Scottish Bus
Group in the late 1970s, went further in his criticism of
management. He considered that their "sleeper" attitude
(as opposed to a "thruster" approach) led to a reluctance
to deal positively with the industry's problems: they
were unwilling, for example, to alter timings or co¬
operate with local authorities on routes which had become
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heavily congested in recent years. This had adverse
consequences for the crews: not only did they have to
face angry passengers whose buses were delayed and behind
schedule, but also there was a preference for cutting
back services and imposing redundancies, instead of
marketing services more strongly. He also drew
attention to the poor facitities for passengers at bus
stations, and the use of old vehicles which not only were
difficult to drive but broke down frequently, with the
passengers venting their wrath on the unfortunate crew.
Johnston, who had worked both as a conductor and as a
driver for several SBG companies in the 1970s, summed up
his feelings thus,
The effects of the failure of bus managements
to tackle the underlying problems, and the
effects these have on the crews, is perhaps
best evidenced by the unwillingness of crews to
stay in the job. Again it is the rural areas
where problems are lesser that have the more
stable workforce, while the effects of urban
working take place in a more open labour
market, more open to alternatives, (p.77)
The 1970s saw a general improvement in industrial
relations with the increase in the levels of unemployment
gradually reducing labour turnover and making it easier
to recruit. The 1980s, with removal of licensing
restrictions first on express services and later on
virtually all services, have served to sharpen-up
management's attitudes in the way Johnston desired.
There have been very few widespread stoppages in recent
years, although local strikes over local issues do take
place from time to time. A lack of general material on
the present labour environment prevents further analysis
on a national scale; instead, the discussion now takes a
closer look at the Scottish Bus Group prior to an
examination of the driver's job and the conditions in
which it takes place.
2.3 The Scottish Bus Group in Recent Years
Study of the annual reports of the Scottish Transport
Group since its inception in 1969 shows a number of
interesting trends. One of the most important has been
the complete implementation of one-man-operation, and the
consequent reduction in the proportion of working
expenditure which is accounted for by labour costs, as
illustrated in table 2.2 below.
The proportion of routes operated by 0M0 rose fairly
rapidly between 1970 and 1973; it changed little until
1975, and then started to increase again at a fast rate
until 100% was achieved late in 1982. It was not
introduced at a regular pace throughout the country,
however; the 1976 report noted that only 9% of stage
mileage was OMO in areas of long-standing staff
resistance compared with 90% in predominantly rural
areas. In other areas traffic considerations and a
shortage of suitable front-entry double deck vehicles
delayed its introduction. In 1977 and 1978 new
agreements were reached with the platform staff,
simplifying the payment structure, consolidating basic
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Table 2.2 OMO mileage and labour costs.
% OMO Labour costs as %
















(1) One-man-operated stage mileage as a percentage of
total stage mileage (average per year)
(2) Labour costs (wages, national insurance and
pensions) as a proportion of total working
expenditure.
Source: Annual reports of the Scottish Transport Group,
1971-85 inclusive.
pay and OMO bonuses into a single basic rate, and
eliminating anomalies such as separate rates for single
and double deck operations. By 1980 staff resistance
had been overcome, and the Group was able to report that
the only problems delaying the full implementation were
those of vehicles and equipment.
The next table illustrates the reduction in the labour
force which has taken place since the SBG became part of
the Scottish Transport Group, illustrated below for
selected years. Employment has almost halved since then
(achieved almost totally by natural wastage, redundancies
59
being fairly rare); for the industry as a whole it fell
by 28% over the same period. More dramatic was the
total elimination of conductors by the end of 1982.
Interestingly, this process is now being reversed in some
areas. The company operating in the Paisley area, for
example, introduced several crew-operated services on an
experimental basis in an attempt to compete with similar
services operated by its independent competitors
(principally McGill's). The experiment was a success,
and this company (Clydeside Scottish) recruited 140
conducting staff and purchased rear-platform
"Routemaster" buses from London. They were followed in
this by the companies operating in the north of Glasgow
(Kelvin Scottish) and the Perth/Dundee areas (Strathtay
Table 2.3
Staff Employed, Scottish Bus Group
1969 1974 1978 1982 1985 % change
1969-1985
Platform:
Drivers 6,486 5,658 5,622 4,946 N/A
Conductors 5,923 3,982 2,057 - N/A
Other 65 47 55 56 N/A
Total
platform: 12,474 9,687 7,734 5,002 5,181 -58.5%
Engineering 3,654 3,071 3,224 2,734 2,678 -26.7%
Administration 1,715 1,828 1,762 1,558 1,550 - 9.6%
Total 17,843 14,586 12,270 9,294 9,409 -47.3%
Industry as
a whole 243,951 215,391 211,089 187,467 174,302 -28.5%
N/A = Not available : figures for platform staff in 1985 were not
disaggregated.
Source: S.T.G. Annual Reports, 1978, 1982 and 1985.
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Scottish). The number of drivers fell to its lowest
level in 1983 (4,941) and has risen slightly since then
to around 5,100. The numbers employed in the other
categories - engineering and administration - have also
fallen since 1969.
In recent years the Bus Group has suffered little in the
way of large-scale industrial action by its own
employees, and has more often been the victim of the
problems of other industries. . There was a four week
strike by drivers in 1970, over pay and conditions; and
in the last three months of 1974 there was a period of
unofficial strike action by platform staff (with often
intense local picketing). The background to this was
pressure at a local level for local wage settlements and
for complete withdrawal from the National Council for the
Omnibus Industry, the body through which the SBG and NBC
negotiated with the trade unions. This was successfully
resisted and the NCOI remained until it was disbanded in
1985 when the NBC withdrew. The third major piece of
industrial action was a strike of maintenance workers in
1984 which lasted for almost a month. Local strikes
have taken place from time to time, but rarely have these
lasted for long or spread to other companies in the
Group.
A number of the annual reports refer to a good climate of
industrial relations (though this is an expression which
is hard to define), with communication and consultation
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between management, unions and employees being
encouraged. Employee participation committees were
established in 1980, and there is a staff newspaper for
the Scottish Transport Group as a whole.
Other industries have had, at times, quite considerable
effect on the operations of the SBG. The problem of the
British motor manufacturing industry in the mid-1970s
resulted in a shortage of new chassis, and delivery dates
were well behind schedule for almost five years. This
was compounded by problems of unreliability with new
rear-engined double-deckers, especially in 1973/74 until
prototype trials had identified suitable new vehicles.
In the 1960s there had been a move away from the
traditional model of double, deck bus towards more modern
designs. The traditional model, although basic with
manual transmission and often an open platform at the
rear, was fairly reliable - the engine at the front was
easily accessible and the basic level of equipment meant
there was little that could go wrong. They were,
however, unsuitable for one-man-operation as the driver
sat in a cab separate from the passengers, and physically
strenuous to drive in congested streets, as the driver
had to "double-declutch" each time he changed gear. New
designs of double deckers in the 1960s and 1970s were
often unreliable in their early years - the engines were
less accessible, being placed at the rear - and the
vehicles had more sophisticated equipment, such as semi-
or fully-automatic transmission and power steering.
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These problems reached a head in 1973 when the Annual
Report noted that 94 rear engined double deckers had been
exchanged for older front-engined buses - this had
"proved operationally beneficial" as they were "more
reliable and economical than new ones" (p.15).
The difficulties with vehicle reliability and new vehicle
shortage meant that there was an increasing proportion of
old vehicles in the fleet. Not only did they become
increasingly costly to maintain, owing to their age and a
shortage of spare parts, but breakdowns were more
frequent. Eastern Scottish achieved some notoriety in
this respect in 1977/78; as both Hunter (1987) and
Johnston (1981) recount in some detail. The shortage of
new vehicles meant they had to persist with life-expired
buses, which broke down frequently, brought much public
protest, and were one of the reasons why a request to the
Traffic Commissioners for a fares increase was rejected.
At this time Lothian Region Transport had withdrawn the
last of their front-engined double-deckers: Eastern
Scottish bought several and ran them until they received
their own new vehicles.
Vehicle problems, in particular the lack of modern,
easier-to-drive buses, and the fairly frequent breakdown
rate of old ones, were one of the factors behind a fairly
general staff shortage in the mid-1970s. This was
particularly noticeable in the central belt (with often
well-paid jobs available in manufacturing and
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engineering) and increasingly in the north-east, with
high wages being paid by the companies developing the
North Sea oilfield. This affected both the retention of
existing staff and recruitment of new ones. The Bus
Group also lost a number of skilled maintenance workers
to the oil industry. These problems continued until,
with the increasing unemployment of the early 1980s, the
Group was able to comment,
. . . a feature of transport is that when times
are hard in the economy generally, public
transport benefits in staff recruitment and in
a resultant improvement in service reliability
and an easing of passenger decline.
(STG Annual Report, 1982, p.12)
The one advantage of fairly high turnover was that
reductions in the numbers employed (as a result of
operating economies, the phasing-out of crew operation
and efficiencies highlighted by "Scotmap") could be made
in most cases without the need for compulsory
redundancies.
The miners' strike of 1984/85 is a more recent example of
the Bus Group being affected by the problems of another
industry. In some areas, especially Fife and Ayrshire,
there was a significant drop in revenue from both NCB
contract services and from regular stage routes. This
served to reverse the upward trend in passenger journeys
which had occurred in 1983.
Labour turnover has been, and continues to be, costly in
terms of both time and money. A driver need give only
one week's notice if he wishes to resign, but it may take
six weeks to train someone to replace him (and far longer
to replace his accumulated knowledge and experience).
The process of recruiting and interviewing suitable
candidates, sending them for driving assessment, a
medical examination and checking their references can
take at least one or two weeks. Assuming all is
satisfactory, a trainee would then spend a fortnight in
the company's driving school, take his Department of
Transport test in the third week and spend the rest of
that week in learning how to issue tickets and calculate
fares. A further fortnight would be spent on becoming
familiar with the different types of vehicle the depot
has, and in travelling on service with other drivers to
learn the routes he will have to operate. The whole
selection and training process can amount to a minimum of
six weeks (and often longer): if a depot was a driver
short then the duties would have to have been covered by
the existing drivers working overtime.
The cost of training a driver is less easy to calculate
in financial terms, with different companies within the
Group producing estimates ranging from £284 to £725
(Scottish Bus Group, 1985). Certain costs can be
identified, namely the trainee's wages (around £80 a
week), instructor's wages (one instructor may teach three
or four trainees at once) and miscellaneous test and
medical fees. Others are harder to attribute to
individual drivers, such as the cost of fuel and
maintenance for the learner vehicles, route learning and
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additional training for those who fail their test
(usually less than 10%). Drivers are also issued with a
full uniform (which cannot be reissued to another if it
has been worn, even if only for a few weeks), and there
are the miscellaneous administrative costs of
establishing payroll and personnel records. At present
drivers who leave within a year of being trained have to
repay a training fee of £350, but this is obviously very
much an underestimate of the real costs involved.
The following illustrates how the labour turnover problem
has decreased in magnitude in recent years. The Traffic
Supervisor at a large depot in central Scotland gave
access to his records of drivers entering and leaving
service between 1973 and 1985, and these are reproduced
in table 2.2. During this period the overall level of
employment remained fairly constant (at around 180), but
it can be seen very clearly how turnover has fallen
dramatically, from 114 leaving in 1974 to only nine in
1985. This depot is situated in Lanarkshire, where
unemployment increased considerably in the early 1980s,
with the recession in the traditional large employers of
labour, such as heavy engineering firms and the British
Steel Corporation. The local management at the depot
felt that this was the main reason for turnover to fall
by so much, especially for those leaving of their own
accord. The number of dismissals was especially high in
the years 1974-76: indeed in 1975 seven drivers were
dismissed in one day for excessive absenteeism. In the
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1970s the majority of dismissals were for absenteeism,
lateness in reporting for duty, timekeeping whilst on
duty or for being drunk whilst in uniform.
Table 2.4
Labour turnover at a large depot in Central Scotland,
1974-1985.
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Total leaving 114 66 73 59 67 71 46 23 21 18 16 9
Percentage of
total number
63 37 40 33 37 39 25 13 12 10 9 5
Reason:
Own accord 78 37 41 37 45 52 20 18 12 8 11 2
Retired/deceased 8 8 3 4 3 2 1 2 3 7 2 -
Dismissed 27 19 27 6 13 11 16 3 2 1 1 -
Other 1 2 2 12 6 6 6 - 4 2 2 7
Source; Taken from depot employment records
2.4 The job of the driver in the Scottish Bus Group
The following job description form (figure 2.1) is a
useful starting point in examining the job of a bus
driver. It is taken from one of the few training
publications which exist in this field - as Crowther
(1985) explains, driver selection and training appears to




JOB TITLE: PUBLIC SERVICE VEHICLE DRIVER - STAGE CARRIAGE
EMPLOYEE'S NAME: DATE:
RESPONSIBLE TO: TRAFFIC SUPERINTENDENT
Duties and Responsibilities
1. Drives Public Service Vehicles of groups and classes for which he holds
a current driving licence in a safe, lawful and efficient manner to at
least the standard of the appropriate Department of Transport driving
test.
2. Carries out duties in accordance with the daily operating schedule.
3. Operates vehicle ancillary equipment safely and competently.
4. Reports, without delay, instances of breakdown, route deviation or
delay, and reports accurately the details of accidents in accordance
with company regulations.
5. Completes accurately all documentation and records of work connected
with the operation of the Public Service Vehicle in accordance with
training given and company regulations.
6. Will at all times safeguard, maintain and foster good customer
relations.
7. Will at all times act in a manner, using initiative and judgement,
which will result in maximum benefit to the company and customers.
8. Such other duties as may from time to time become necessary for the
operation of the company as directed by the Traffic Superintendent.
Source: Road Transport Industry Training Board, Training Recommendations
- Drivers and Conductors, May 1981, p.25.
This highlights a number of aspects of the job. In
respect of sections 1 to 3, driving a public service
vehicle (on the correct route and in accordance with the
operating schedule) is obviously of importance, as is
operating ancillary equipment such as the doors, interior
lights and heating. The next two sections highlight
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another important feature - the need to complete forms.
In the SBG drivers need to complete a "waybill" each
shift, recording vehicle mileage at the start of each
journey they make and, in some cases, readings from their
ticket machines. Those driving long-distance services
also have to set up a tachograph machine, and record
details onto the card at the end of a journey. In the
event of an accident or undue delay to a journey special
forms must also be filled in.
The third important feature listed on the job description
is that of encouraging good customer relations.
Increased competition in recent years has resulted in
this feature being given much more emphasis than in the
past, both on long-distance coaches and local stage
services. The driver is frequently the only company
employee a passenger will see (except perhaps an
inspector) - the driver's appearance and manner will
therefore determine to a large extent the passenger's
opinion of the Company and whether he use's their services
again (if there is a choice). One of the reasons behind
Clydeside Scottish reintroducing conductors on heavily-
used urban routes was that they could help to improve the
service offered to passengers. Not only would
passengers be able to enter a bus and sit down before
paying their fare, but conductors would be able to help
load and unload pushchairs, shopping, OAPs, etc. As
part of this, many of the Company's buses carry the
slogan, "Welcome aboard: we're going your way."
fi 9
The above job description presents only part of the
picture, however. As it was written primarily for
drivers, and not driver-conductors, one important
omission is that of ticket issuing, the majority of
services operated by the SBG being one-man-operated.
The driver has to operate a ticket machine (checking
stage and fares tables if need be), collect fares and
give change. He has to account for all cash collected -
any shortages, no matter how small, are deducted from his
wages at the end of a week - and for all passengers on
his bus having a valid ticket. This means checking all
season tickets, return tickets and passes shown to him as
people enter a bus. This requires some degree of
alertness, as there may be a variety of such tickets
(especially in areas where the local authority may issue
various kinds of concessionary passes to OAPs, disabled
people and school children), and passengers often have a
tendency just to show such tickets for maybe less than a
second while they board. Responsibility for cash is not
something which drivers for some of the other companies
have; those with Lothian Region Transport, for example,
only have to see that the correct fare is tendered and
the right ticket issued. Passengers put their fares
into a cash box directly - the drivers are not
accountable for every penny collected as the cash vaults
are emptied by depot staff at night, and drivers are not
allowed to touch the money.
The nature of operations in the industry, certainly for
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large operators such as the SBG, has always had an effect
on hours of work. Many depots operate on a nearly
continuous basis (maybe 18-20 hours a day, seven days a
week for 52 weeks a year), meaning that neither working
hours nor holidays can be the same for all employees.
Shiftworking is required, with drivers usually working
alternatively an early shift one week and a late shift
the next, with the starting times of each being staggered
to meet the demands of the timetable. Working at
weekends is also necessary, with many drivers being
employed under a "5 over 7" arrangement - they have to
work any five days out of seven. To increase the
attractiveness of weekend work, drivers receive double
pay on Saturdays (in many places the busiest day of the
week) and time-and-a-half on Sundays. There is no set
time for holidays in the industry: in most depots they
are either arranged on a rota or by ballot.
An element of variety in the work of a driver can also be
found. The role of the SBG in providing the majority of
services outwith the major cities (certainly prior to
deregulation) means that many routes incorporate a mix of
urban and rural driving, an example of this being the
Eastern Scottish routes that go between Edinburgh and
towns such as Dalkeith, Penicuik and Livingston. In a
number of depots there are opportunities for drivers to
undertake longer distance coach driving, either on
Citylink services, or on private hires and holiday tours.
Scheduling requirements often mean that a driver may
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operate a number of different routes in the course of a
shift, in a different vehicle each time. The vehicles
themselves vary considerably, both in type and in the
ease with which they can be driven; newer buses and
coaches have either semi- or fully-automatic
transmission, power steering, good ventilation, and often
a well-designed cab with controls easy to hand. The
same cannot be said for buses more than seven or eight
years old. Double-deckers have had semi-automatic
transmission since the late 1960s, but the SBG's policy
for single deckers was (for many years) to buy fairly
basic vehicles with manual transmission. Power steering
is rarer in old vehicles; the cab layout tends to be
poorer from an ergonomic viewpoint, and driver comfort
less well catered for. Heating and ventilation are
often less effective, for both the driver and passengers.
Regulation has for long been a feature of the industry in
general, certainly until the more recent Transport Acts,
and this extends to the job of the bus driver itself.
Government controls over the hours of work, in
particular, have increased in recent years, especially
with the influence of the EEC. There are limits on the
maximum length of time spent driving, the minimum length
of breaks and the number of compulsory rest days. These
conditions are stricter for those driving long-distance
express services and holiday tours, than for local stage
services, and on the former tachographs have to be used.
All this entails a considerable amount of administrative
work - those who plan duty rosters have to check that
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drivers do not exceed their permitted hours or days of
driving. The other major influence is over the driving
itself - trainees must undergo instruction in bus driving
and then sit a Department of Transport test. This is
similar to the test for car drivers, as it includes a
section on knowledge of the Highway Code and traffic
regulations. Once a driver passes his test he receives
a PSV badge bearing his licence number. Bus companies
also have to operate under the range of general
employment protection and health and safety legislation -
the increase of the former in the 1970s (especially that
regarding unfair dismissal) was one of the factors
leading to a greater codification of company rules and
the introduction of a rule book for drivers (Scottish Bus
Group, 1984).
The trade unions (in particular the Transport and General
Workers' Union) have also exerted influence over the job,
especially at company level. The T&GWU have a union
memebership agreement with the SBG, in effect meaning
that all drivers must be trade union memebers. The
union has negotiated set times for "booking on" and
"booking off" at the start and end of a shift, to allow
for completing waybills, setting up ticket machines and
counting cash; there are also allowances for paid and
unpaid rest periods in excess of the minimum laid down by
law. Drivers who work a "spreadover" shift, to cover
the morning and afternoon peak periods (eg. 06.00-10.00
and 14.00-18.00) receive payment for the time they are
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off duty in the middle of the day. Drivers in the SBG
can also receive a number of special payments above the
hourly rate of £2.65 (for a 39-hour week). These
include a shift bonus, special rates for weekend and
public holiday working, overtime (time-and-a-half) and
the proportion of their driving that is within large
urban areas. Those undertaking the long-distance
express duties (such as Edinburgh-London) receive
extended booking on/off times to increase the
attractiveness of this work: a driver may receive 17
hours' payment for only 8-9 hours actual driving time.
The union also oversee a hierarchy which is based on
seniority, through which overtime and tours and special
duties are allocated.
The third major type of regulation over the job is by the
companies themselves. Not only do they have a duty to
ensure compliance with both Governmental statutes and
trade union agreements, but also they have their own
standards which must be maintained. Each driver is
issued with a copy of the SBG Driver's Rule Book, which
codifies both legal requirements (eg. not smoking whilst
driving, not consuming or smelling of alcohol, and
overloading a vehicle) and company ones (such as wearing
of uniform, ticket issuing and fare collection, and
keeping to schedule). There is an agreed disciplinary
procedure which allows for a driver to be represented by
union officials, and permits appeals to be made to
various levels in the Group. (This aspect will be
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discussed in greater detail in the chapter on research
methodology.) There are strict rules and procedures,
therefore, but whilst out on the road drivers have
relative freedom from the sort of direct supervision
found in a factory or large shop. This is felt to be
one of the benefits of the job; as long as one keeps to
the operating schedule and to the rules there is little
need for contact with management. The following
quotation from Dudley (1982) illustrates this:
Throughout the history of the industry, bus
operation has been taken up by men who wished
to escape from the enclosed world of an office
or factory, and who enjoyed the relative
independence given to them . . . (p 70).
The major form of supervision is by the use of travelling
inspectors, who check not only passengers' tickets but
also that the driver is operating to schedule and in
accordance with the rules. If a rule has been broken, a
report is sent to the Traffic Supervisor, who conducts a
disciplinary interview with the driver and takes what
action is felt to be necessary. Complaints from the
travelling public are in effect another method of
supervision, although less reliable, as there are many
factors which influence whether someone will make a
complaint. However, when complaints are made they are
investigated and appropriate action taken.
A further aspect of the driver's job which can be
examined is the increased amount of change recently.
The road licensing provision of the 1930 Road Traffic Act
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meant that for many years there was little pressure for
large-scale changes in company structures, working
practices, routes or timetables, although minor
alterations were made from time to time to allow for
changing traffic patterns. The situation in the present
decade has been very different. The Scotmap exercise
entailed, for many depots, a complete reappraisal of all
services and routes, with duties and timetables being
rescheduled and the length of time allowed for breaks and
recovery times reduced. This often resulted in a great
upheaval for those drivers (and inspectors) who had long
service, and had been operating the same routes without
much change for many years. In some cases depots were
found to be overstaffed but with natural wastage the
number of compulsory redundancies was usually very small.
In preparation for increased competition most depots,
between 1983 and 1986, moved away from mechanical ticket
machines (such as the "Setright" and "Almex") to
electronic ones ("Wayfarer" and "Timtronic") which not
only issue tickets but collect valuable data on passenger
flows. Before starting a journey a driver inserts his
"ACE" (Automatic Computer Entry) into the ticket machine;
this subsequently records details of all tickets sold -
fare paid, type of ticket, length of journey, and stage
and time boarded. At the end of a shift, the "ACE" is
inserted into a terminal at the depot where all the data
are transferred to the main computer. This can then
produce a wide range of analyses on passenger flows,
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revenue of individual routes, etc., which enable the
local management to respond more effectively to changes
in passenger demands. As a footnote, computer control
and analysis has been extended to the engineering side:
records are kept for each vehicle on mileage run,
maintenance carried out, fuel consumption, etc.
Mention was made in the previous chapter of the rationale
behind the reorganisation of the Scottish Bus Group.
This again provided the older-established drivers with
some upheaval; many found themselves working for a
completely new company with a very different style of
livery on its buses. Although a corporate style for
fleetnames had been adopted in the mid-1970s (using
geographical locations with the "Scottish" suffix, such
as "Eastern Scottish" and "Western Scottish"), the
companies were until 1985 registered under the names many
had had since the 1930s, and older drivers (and
passengers) continued to refer to them as "Alexanders" or
"SMT". At both depot and senior levels the management
structure changed. Previously, a District Traffic
Superintendent was in charge of the traffic (drivers')
side, and a Depot Engineer was responsible for
maintenance. These two positions still exist (with
similar duties) but they have been renamed to Traffic
Supervisor and Maintenance Supervisor respectively and
now report to an Area Manager at the depot. The Traffic
Supervisor is still responsbile for selection and
dismissal of drivers, and for discipline, but the Area
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Manager is now the first level to which an appeal can be
made. The reasoning behind the change is a feeling that
local management are in a better position to monitor and
to respond to the local market (in terms both of what
competitors are doing, and of changing travel needs in
general) than centralised management at company level.
At the senior level the general manager now has a deputy
(an operations manager); and the increasing importance
of marketing is reflected in the creation of a specific
post to handle it. The creation of new positions at
depot level, and the general need to present a good
outward appearance in an increasingly competitive
environment, led to the refurbishment of many depot
buildings. Often this included the remodelling of both
office and driver accommodation, an upgrading and
modernisation of facilities and complete redecoration -
in some places, for the first time in many years.
Within the Bus Group the changes outlined above were
accompanied (in Autumn 1986) by additions to the types of
service offered. Three of the companies reintroduced
crew operation (ie. with separate driver and conductor)
in particularly busy urban areas, using old London
Transport "Routemaster" buses with an open rear platform.
Clydeside Scottish, for example, operated them on several
routes within Paisley and on the Greenock-Paisley-Glasgow
corridor. Most companies also introduced a new concept
(which had started earlier in some areas of England) -
minibuses. These are larger than the conventional Ford
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Transit type of vehicle, seat around 20-25 and are
intended for high frequency use. Eastern Scottish, for
instance, run a service between Wester Hailes and
Restalrig in Edinburgh via Gorgie Road and Princes
Street, at five-minute intervals for most of the day.
Not only are they frequent, but their size (which does
not exceed 22 feet) permits them to travel round streets
in housing schemes which conventional buses would be too
large for. Other companies have introduced them in some
smaller towns, serving areas where it would not be
economical to operate conventional sized vehicles.
However beneficial these two innovations might be for
passengers, they do have a potentially serious threat to
normal drivers. Both involve paying the crews concerned
less than a full "OMO" driver receives. A driver just
driving a bus (and not collecting fares) is paid the
"crew" rate, which is about 17% less than for a full
driver (and the conductor is paid about 20% less).
Traditionally, all drivers in the Bus Group have been
required to hold a full PSV licence, allowing them to
drive any size and type of bus. Those recruited for
minibus driving, however, only receive a restricted
licence (for a single deck vehicle, not longer than 22
feet and with automatic transmission), which means they
too are paid less (around 20%). The fear of trades
unions is that these new developments (especially minibus
operation) will spread and drive down wage rates (and
perhaps demand) for full drivers.
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A more disturbing change in recent years has been the
increase in violence towards bus staff. A Department of
Transport committee which examined the subject reported
10,000 such incidents between 1979 and 1983. Of the
2,000 which occurred in 1983, 1157 took place in London
(where conductors are especially vunerable). There the
rate was one assault per million passenger journeys, in
the PTEs/municipals it was one per four million and in
the NBC/SBG it was one per eight million journeys
(Department of Transport, 1983). The main causes, where
discernable, were listed as arguments over fares,
lateness of services and drunkenness and hooliganism.
In 1983 60% of incidents caused the victim to be absent
from work; this resulted in a loss of 20,000 working
days. Not only is this costly in terms of absent staff,
repairing damaged vehicles, reorganising duties and
police/hospital time, but the report highlights the cost
of preventative measures. These might include video
cameras (used experimentally in several SBG vehicles),
two-way radios, protective screens for the driver (first
installed in Glasgow PTE buses in 1976) and training of
drivers in ways to cope with and defuse potentially
dangerous situations. SBG drivers are in many respects
vulnerable to assault, as most vehicles have neither
protective screens nor radios, and many are likely to
have often substantial amounts of cash about their
person.
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The present decade is seeing great changes in the
environment in which bus drivers work - some good, some
less favourable - and it remains to be seen what long-
term effects they will bring. All this is occurring at
a time when the job is becoming harder as a result of the
ever-increasing number of vehicles: as existing roads
become less able to cope with traffic levels far in
excess of those for which they were designed, so
competition increases, time schedules in peak periods are
harder to maintain, and the potential for stress and
strain on the driver becomes greater.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed various aspects of the labour
environment in the bus industry by way of background to
the research. It has been seen that conditions of work
for drivers have varied over the years and that there has
been some criticism of management in the previous two
decades. Recent developments in the Scottish Bus Group
in the 1970s and 1980s were reviewed. The job of the
driver was then discussed, taking a basic job description
as a starting point and then looking at it from a wider
viewpoint - variety, regulation and recent change. The
purpose of this has been twofold - to show the importance
of the job of the driver in the Scottish Bus Group (and
indeed in any bus company) and to highlight some key
aspects of the job that feature in an assessment of work
performance. The next chapter reviews literature in the
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field of selection and performance of drivers, as a
prelude to introducing the research study proper on which





This chapter reviews some of the main themes in the
literature relevant to the research. A body of
literature exists on the bus industry, but much of this
concentrates on economic aspects (such as route costing
and planning, pricing policy, and the economic effects of
licensing and competition) with very little referring to
the labour side. Examination of literature in the area
of personnel selection and performance yields useful
references, not just on bus drivers in particular, but
also on other types of driver where similar techniques
have been used.
A number of approaches were made to the search for
literature concerning relevant previous research, in
other words that carried out on the recruitment/
selection/performance (measurement) of drivers
(bus/tram/car/truck/taxi), with special reference to the
use of psychological tests. Two computer searches
through "Dialog" were conducted, of the transportation
and psychology data bases, but these yielded very few
useful references. Manual searches using the Social
Science Citation Index for the past 20 years were also
made, working both from general headings (such as "bus
drivers" and "work performance") and from specific
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authors and titles. This yielded some useful material,
as did searches of past volumes of psychological journals
such as the Journal of Applied Psychology, the Journal of
Occupational Psychology, Human Relations, and Personnel
Psychology, and using the bibliographies found in
relevant articles. A search of the "ASLIB" index of
theses submitted to British universities and colleges
yielded little.
This chapter has been divided into two sections reviewing
different aspects of the literature examined. The first
part considers material concerning bus (and tram)
drivers. The second looks at studies on drivers in
general, which focus mainly on "attitudes", accidents and
accident-proneness.
3.2 Literature on bus drivers
Three fairly distinct, historical phases can be
identified when examining the literature dealing with bus
drivers. The first was the 1920s and 1930s, where
mechanical tests were used to determine a person's
aptitude for bus (or tram) driving, in particular in the
USA and Germany. The second period encompasses the late
1940s and 1950s, and concentrates to a large extent on
the work of Ghiselli and others. The final period,
covering the 1960s to the present, consists of a variety
of different studies which appear to focus more on
qualitative rather than quantitative aspects. It should
be said at this stage that the term "bus drivers" is
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being taken in a very wide sense. The job nowadays, and
the situation in which it takes place, are not
necessarily the same as they were in the 1920s and 1930s:
more physical effort was required then, the driver did
not usually collect fares and the traffic and road
conditions were very different. Similarly, the
literature comes not only from Britain but from Europe
and the USA: again many cultural and social differences
mean that their conception of the job is not strictly
comparable with ours.
3.2.1 Research up to 1939
The idea that psychological tests can be used to predict
the performance of, and select, drivers of public
transport vehicles is long established. In the first
period of the literature (up to the start of the Second
World War) the concern appeared to be in selecting people
who would make safe (and therefore accident-free) drivers
of both trams and buses. The tests used in selection
were mainly of a mechanical nature, designed to test
abilities such as visual acuity, reaction time, mental
alertness and presence of mind. (Tests such as these
tend not to be used nowadays.) Viteles (1925a) reviewed
some of the early studies in the field, the first being
by Munsterberg in 1912. His mechanical apparatus was
intended to measure how well drivers could monitor the
road in front of them and foresee possible movements of
pedestrians and vehicles. This may well have been a
forerunner of work on speed of closure (which led
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ultimately to the development of the Word Recognition
Test, used in the present research study), judging from a
remark of Munsterberg (1913):
... there are motormen who practically never
have an accident because they feel beforehand
even what the confused pedestrian and the
unskilled chauffeur will do, while others
relatively often experience accidents of all
kinds because they do not foresee how matters
will develop, (p.64)
Little detail is reported on the results of this test,
but it appeared to have been reliable when compared to
numbers of accidents. Munsterberg died in 1916 but his
test was adapted and developed by Gerhardt (1916), who
achieved some success in selecting good quality tram
drivers - not only were the number of accidents reduced
but also labour turnover decreased. A word of caution
should be issued here as neither researcher issued
precise details of correlations or reliabilities of their
tests, nor indicated how many men were tested.
Viteles reports that McCants was another early worker in
this field. One of his studies compared records of
service of motormen in San Francisco with biographical
data as supplied on their application form. Factors not
relevant to performance included citizenship, complexion,
colour of hair and previous occupation. Of relevance
were found to be height, age and place of birth, with the
best group being of American and North European origin,
having more insurance and property, possessing greater
wealth and being better educated. The poorest group of
employees (in terms of service record) were those of
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Mediterranean and Irish stock. Another of McCants'
studies involved assessing whether intelligence (as
measured by the Army Group Tests) was related to
performance. There was a very small, positive
relationship between test score and value to the company,
but this was not statistically significant. Despite
possible shortcomings of these investigations, Viteles
(1925a) noted that there was, within the industry, a
strong interest in the use of tests to select motormen at
this time. He says, "It is interesting to note that
Gerhardt and McCants are both practical railroading men
and not psychologists" (p.106).
A number of major investigations were also undertaken in
Germany in this period, again summarised by Viteles
(1925a). Piorkowski criticised Munsterberg fpr
concentrating just on qualities of attention (to what was
happening on the road) and failing to test ability to
respond to stimuli. Attention and response to varied
stimuli were combined into tests developed initially by
Stern and later by Bobertag and Sachs, along the lines of
an early tram simulator, but results at the time of
Viteles' article in 1925 were inconclusive. An
extensive study was undertaken by Tramm at the Greater
Berlin Tramway Company in the early 1920s (reported by
Gradenwitz (1922)) consisting of a battery of tests to
which applicants were subjected. These tested qualities
such as behaviour in the event of danger, "cold
bloodedness or nerve", presence of mind, colour and night
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vision and intelligence (in the sense of understanding
the mechanical principles of a streetcar). They
appeared to have achieved some success in selecting good
quality employees: in one case an experimental group of
50 employees were hired and compared with a control group
(hired at the same time but not using the tests). In
the first year the experimental group had a third less
accidents than the control group, and in the second year
40% fewer accidents. In addition to this, the tests
were found to be useful in re-engaging experienced
drivers, and in allowing a reduction in training time.
Viteles himself used psychological tests to select
motormen for the Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light
Company (Viteles, 1925b). He devised the Viteles
Motorman Selection Test to measure reaction to visual and
auditory stimuli, and in addition used intelligence and
personality tests. Some of the tests, when used
experimentally, yielded significant correlations (such as
scores on the judgement test and ratings on courtesy and
general ability), whereas others did not (for example,
intelligence and ratings on safety or general ability).
The major problem, however, was that ratings on the
motormen by instructors or supervisors were considered to
be too subjective and liable to the influence of bias.
As an intermediate solution, Shellow (1926) compared
motormen recruited in 1924 (without the use of tests)
with those selected by the use of tests the following
year. After one year, 40% of those recruited in 1924
were no longer employed (23% having been discharged).
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For those selected by the tests in 1925, only 28% were no
longer there a year later, with only 5.4% being
dismissed. The difference is all the greater when the
numbers discharged for accidents are examined: 14% of
the unselected group was in this category compared with
only 0.6% in the selected group. Later studies by
Shellow and others concentrated on making the
supervisors' ratings more objective (Shellow and
McCarter, 1927-28).
A study by Bacqueyrisse (1935) on tramway and bus drivers
in Paris was also concerned with selecting safe drivers.
He referred to the number of accidents declining as
psychological tests were introduced in selection in the
1920s. The average number of accidents per driver was
1.53 in 1923: ten years later it had fallen to 0.27.
Over this ten-year period the number of motor vehicles
registered in Paris increased three-fold; the total
number of accidents increased by 154% but the number
involving trams and buses fell by over a third. In 1923
buses and trams were involved in 22.7% of accidents: by
1933 they were involved in only 5.6% of accidents. Not
only were the psychological tests used in initial
selection of drivers, they were also administered to
existing drivers - those found to be unsuitable were
transferred to non-driving work. Bacqueyrisse's article
has one intriguing fault, however - he gave no details as
to what the tests were.
89
One of the few research studies of this nature in the UK
was by Farmer and Chambers (19 39) , who produced a report
on accident-proneness for the Industrial Health Research
Board. They investigated whether psychological tests
could be used to measure differences in accident
liability by looking at bus drivers in London, trolley
bus drivers in two towns and army drivers under training.
Some evidence was found of a relationship between
accident rate and age. The rate tended to decrease as
one got older, with a slight increase around middle age
«
followed by a fall again. Farmer and Chambers felt that
this may be due to advancing age coming almost
imperceptibly upon people, so that they continued to take
the same risks as they did in their earlier years. When
they were definitely old (whatever age that might be)
they realised that this could no longer be done and so
were more careful. The researchers also found that, for
bus drivers, the number of blameworthy accidents
decreased with length of service but that the number of
blameless ones increased, as shown in table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1
Accidents for a group of London Transport drivers (n=166)
Type Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Driver responsible 215 156 133 146 103
Driver not
responsible 86 100 135 104 152
(Farmer and Chambers, 1939, p.16)
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The blameworthy accidents were directly linked with the
driver's power of control over his vehicle, which tended
to improve at least over the first few years.
Farmer and Chambers used a variety of psychological
tests, but with only a limited degree of success. In
general they found that significant relationships between
the tests and accident rates existed only with beginners
of equal age and experience. There was no significant
relationship when they were applied to trained workers
with differing ages and experience. They felt that this
was because experience developed in a worker mental and
physical habits which tended to lower the accident rate
but which could not be measured by their tests. The
aesthetokinetic tests (including tests of "dotting", co¬
ordination and an "interrupted pursuit meter") were
positively related to accidents when measured over a long
time period. The intelligence tests, on the other hand,
were of a paper and pencil variety and caused the older
drivers to feel nervous:
The general trend of their remarks is to the
effect that they have left school a long time
and cannot be expected to do tests of this
kind. (p.26).
Consequently, there was a wide difference between the
average score for drivers (mean age of 28) of 64 and that
for 16-year old apprentices of 120. A simpler version
was developed but found to be equally unsuitable.
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A final example of this kind of mechanical test was the
American Transit Motor Ability Test, discussed by Waits
(1946). It attempted to measure abilities, such as
learning quickly, reacting quickly, following directions,
coping with difficult situations and physical co¬
ordination. The test was administered to 290 men (both
bus and tramcar drivers) and the scores correlated with
their accident responsibility rate and "total
desirability" rating. Each collision was assessed for
the degree to which the driver was at fault (on a five-
point scale, from "no responsibility" - to "totally
responsible"); these weights were summed and the total
expressed in terms of the number of accidents per 100,000
driving hours. Fairly low, although statistically
significant, product-moment correlations were obtained
between this accident rate and the test: for streetcar
operators, r=.29; for bus drivers, r=.43; and overall,
r=.33. Supervisory ratings, based on the individual's
desirability and worth to the organisation, produced a
much lower correlation of r=.09 with the test but r=.48
with the accident rate. Waits did not regard these
results as being formally conclusive, but felt they
pointed towards a potential usefulness of the test in
selection. Looking at those who scored above and below
the mean score on the test, if those who scored below it
had been rejected at selection, then 25 out of the 29
with the worst accident records would have been rejected.
Taking those who scored above it, 27 of the 29 with the
best records would have been selected.
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3.2.2 1940s and 1950s
The middle section of this part of the literature review,
although the shortest, contains material that is perhaps
most relevant to the current research project. Brown
and Ghiselli undertook a large programme of research in
the late 1940s, measuring the relationships between tests
and actual work performance, with a view to advising on
selection. They did not neglect public transport, and
at least four such studies were reported.
One of the first concerned motor coach operators. Brown
and Ghiselli (1947) used, as predictors, an intelligence
test score, age, amount of education and marital status
for people who applied for work in a large US city
transit company in 1943 and 1944. The criteria measures
used were accident rate, length of time on the job, and
whether the applicant actually reported for work (only
68% of applicants did so). The correlation between the
last of these and intelligence test score was r=.23:
this assumed some significance when considered with the
maximum score suggested by the reseachers. 32% of the
entire group of 363 applicants failed to report, but 51%
of the group scoring less than 30 were in this category.
On the whole the correlations were so low as to be of no
use, the one exception being age and length of time on
the job with a coefficient of r=.21. The authors
concluded that none of the predictors would be of use in
selection.
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The concept of accident-proneness was also investigated
by Brown and Ghiselli (1948) with respect to motormen and
coach drivers. They were concerned with the
relationship between different types of accident, to see
to what extent an individual could be classed as
"accident-prone". Accidents were divided into two main
categories - collision (collisions with pedestrians,
trolley cars and motor vehicles) and non-collision
(boarding and alighting accidents, and accidents aboard
the vehicle, such as passengers stumbling).
Correlations between the five individual categories were
on the whole low, the highest being of r=.22 between
collision with trolley cars and with motor vehicles, and
of r=.19 between boarding and alighting accidents and on¬
board accidents. Similarly, the correlations between
the two main categories of accidents were very low. The
authors were unable to substantiate accident-proneness as
a general trait.
Ghiselli and Brown (1947) also studied the effect of on-
the-job learning in accident reduction for both motormen
and coach drivers. They found that the actual motor co¬
ordination required to operate a streetcar was fairly
simple and could be learned in under an hour.
Similarly, a coach driver was required to have previous
driving experience and so had mastered the basic
movements before being given any formal training. The
most difficult aspect for both groups, however, was the
complex activities which required judgement of speeds and
spatial relations, often performed under conditions of
stress. Studying the accident research for 60 motormen
and 34 coach drivers, they found that most of the
reduction in accident rates took place within the first
six or seven months. However, after that they continued
to decline (at a slower rate) to beyond the seventeenth
month, with accident rates falling by more than half over
the whole period.
The theme of using tests to predict accidents was the
subject of another paper by Ghiselli and Brown (1949).
They referred to the pre-war work using apparatus tests
(such as those devised by Viteles), and felt their
application was limited on grounds of financial,
administrative and physical constraints. Instead, they
preferred the use of paper and pencil tests and referred
to the results of their work with motormen in San
Francisco. Their "dotting" and "tapping" tests had a
correlation of r=.35 with accident rate. The main study
referred to in this particular article was the use of
these and other tests in predicting accidents of another
type of public transport operator - the taxicab driver.
Eight speed tests and an interest inventory were used as
predictors. These paper and pencil tests included those
of "dotting" (putting dots in circles one-eighth of an
inch in diameter, irregularly spaced) and "tapping"
(putting three dots in circles of one-half inch in
diameter) referred to already. In addition, there were
tests of judgement of distance, distance discrimination,
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mechanical principles, arithmetic and two of "speed of
reactions" - an attempt to transfer the mechanical
Viteles test to paper and pencil form. The interest
inventory (with no time limit) required people to choose
one job from a choice of two, for each item, and produced
four sub-scales concerning occupational level, outside
occupations (ie out of doors), dealing with people, and
occupations related to driving. Several biographical
items were also used as predictors, such as age, years of
formal education, years of previous taxi driving
experience, and total driving experience.
Sixty-seven men were tested (those who were employed by a
taxi company within a 3-month period), and after 5 weeks
divided into an accident-free group (48 cases) and an
accident group (19 cases). Validity coefficients for
the predictors were calculated, and there was
considerable variation between these. Coefficients were
calculated as .35 for the dotting test, .47 for the
tapping test but much lower for the others. Distance
discrimiation had a coefficient of .20, but the
arithmetic and speed of reactions tests were below 0.1.
The low coefficient for the lattermost surprised the
authors (as the Viteles Motormen Test, on which they were
based, has useful predictive power), and led them to
conclude that certain types of abilities, important for
safe driving, could not be measured by written tests.
The interest inventory, in total, yielded a score of .28
(with .23 for both occupational level and outside
occupations), but the personal data brought correlations
of less than .1. Ghiselli and Brown were able to
conclude from this that accidents could be predicted by
paper and pencil tests, but expressed concern that the
highest coefficients were obtained from the two shortest
tests: the dotting and tapping tests took thirty seconds
each.
The results which Brown and Ghiselli have obtained in
this area, and in particular in the study described
immediately above, lead this author to insert a comment
here. The concern of these studies, and to a large
extent also those of the pre-war period, was the
selection of safe, accident-free drivers. While this is
undoubtedly an important aspect of a driving job, it is
by no means the only aspect of being successful in a job.
The research up until this period seems to have placed
much less emphasis on data concerning other aspects of
successful performance, such as attendance at work,
coping with paperwork and administrative details,
appearance, and ability to handle customers. These
would, the author feels, be of some importance in a job
such as the taxi driver's (especially dealing with
customers and fare collection), yet no notice was taken
of these in selecting criteria. One wonders what the
correlations would have been, for example, between the
arithmetic test and accuracy in cash collection, or the
"dealing with people" scale on the interest inventory and
a scale of complaints about rudeness.
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A broader examination of work performance was found in
McFarland and Moseley's (1954) book on the human factors
involved in road safety. They report a research study
of 200 long-distance bus drivers in the USA who were
given a battery of four psychological tests: the Kuder
Preference Record, the Otis Employment Test (of
intelligence), Johnson's Temperament Analysis and the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) -
short form. (Most of these are still in use in the
1980s.) The drivers were also categorised into the best
50 and the worst 50 by the company's safety director.
This was based on the following criteria: (i) accident
record (blameworthy); (ii) lateness; (iii) absenteeism;
(iv) disputes with supervisor; (v) arbitrations; (vi)
infringements of the law; and (vii) relations with
passengers (in terms of complaints). The object was to
find which of the 1139 items on the four tests could
discriminate between the good and bad drivers - at a 5%
significance level 98 fell into this category, which the
authors felt would form the basis of a new, shorter test
battery.
Heron's (1954) study of bus conductors employed by London
Transport is useful as he took a fairly broad approach to
the measurement of work performance. He was concerned
with looking at job satisfaction and "satisfactoriness" -
value to the employer - studying 144 conductors after the
first 26 weeks of employment. Feelings on job
satisfaction were obtained from two questionnaires, and
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after statistical analysis an overall score was obtained.
A rating of "source of concern to supervisors" was
obtained and used along with five variables from
personnel records. These were gross earnings (regarded
as a legitimate measure of value, as it was direct
measure of the extent to which individuals varied in
their willingness and availability to undertake
overtime), shortages in takings, number of periods of
absence, disciplinary actions (for offences such as
failure to collect fares or to alter destination blinds
at termini) and number of times when late for duty.
These six variables were then intercorrelated. Most
variables were fairly closely related to each other; for
example, supervisory rating correlated r=.30 with gross
earnings, r=.51 with cash shortages, r=.38 with periods
of absence and r=.48 with lateness. The exception to
this pattern was disciplinary actions. Heron explains
this fact as being due to the separation (at depot level)
between the supervisory staff in the garage and those out
on the road, so far as the conduct of individual
conductors was concerned. This relatively independent
variable has some correlation between shortages (r=.23)
and lateness (r=.27), which suggested some significant
pattern of individual differences. This may have been a
reflection of a form of behaviour which had at one end of
a scale "irresponsibility" and at the other
"meticulousness".
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The next stage was to submit the variables to a centroid
factor analysis. Two factors were extracted, accounting
respectively for 32.4% and 8.3% of the variance. The
first, general, factor loaded most heavily on ratings,
shortages, absence and lateness; the second on earnings,
shortages and absence. Heron took the general factor
(named "value to the employer") and found that it had a
multiple correlation with rating, earnings, shortages and
lateness of r=.86. This composite score was
significantly and linearly correlated with age (r=.52),
leading to the conclusion that younger men tended to be
more often late, to be less available for overtime, and
to have larger discrepancies in their cash. Taking the
job satisfaction and the value to the employer scores
together, they were found to be correlated r=.35.
Although Heron was more concerned with job satisfaction,
his work on classifying performance criteria for his
employees was of great use to the present author, as is
discussed in the next chapter. He was also one of the
first researchers in this field to use a form of factor
analysis, albeit a fairly rudimentary version.
2.2.3 1960s to the present
The final section of this part of the literature review
deals with research studies on bus drivers from the 1960s
to the present. A number of studies have been published
in this area, but few are directly relevant to the
present research, most being in the qualitative area.
Perhaps the most appropriate, at least in terms of its
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title, was the study by McKnight et al (1971) entitled
The selection and training of school bus drivers in the
USA. They administered questionnaires to nearly 3,000
school bus drivers, both newly-employed and experienced,
looked at their background and compared these with
supervisors' ratings of performance. In terms of
background they found that the better drivers (in terms
of supervisors' ratings) were those over 30 years of age,
and with at least 3 years' bus driving experience. Both
of these characteristics were statistically significant.
In addition, they had received between 8 and 12 years of
formal education, and were married with children who were
of school age. The tests and questionnaires used
included those of knowledge (of traffic regulations, of
how a bus worked), driving skill (assessed on the road)
and attitudes and personality. The knowledge and
performance tests both showed significant differences
between the experienced and newly-employed drivers.
When both groups were divided into the better and poorer
drivers, the knowledge tests only correlated
significantly with the performance of the new drivers.
The other tests showed little or no statistical
significance when correlated with the ratings.
McKnight et al also looked at the necessary physical
characteristics required for the job, such as general
fitness, eyesight, hearing and freedom from drug-taking.
As far as their recommendations for selection go, they
felt that background characteristics (with the exception
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of driving record, and despite the findings reported
above) on their own could not be used to reject a person
as they were not directly related to driving. All that
they could do would be to give clues as to possible
problem areas which would be investigated further. They
considered that psychological characteristics (including
knowledge, performance and attitudes) should be assessed
through interview, observation and references, rather
than by tests, as "available standard personality tests
lack sufficient validity to be employed for selection
purposes" (p.8). In their review of literature in the
area of driver performance (in addition to finding very
little material on bus drivers), however, they had
concentrated on studies made in this area and on the
tests that these studies had used (such as Viteles). It
would appear that little, if any, thought was given to
using other (more general) psychological tests such as
Cattell's 16PF (which even in 1971 was well-established
and well-used) which might have yielded more useful
results.
Two studies by I D Brown in the 1960s looked at ways of
predicting which trainee drivers with London Transport
would pass their Public Service Vehicle (PSV) test at the
end of training. The pilot study (Brown, 1966) compared
the results of 22 trainees taking the PSV test with their
previous driving experience, weekly progress checks on
driving ability, objective measurements of the use of a
vehicle's controls and reserve capacity as measured by
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performance on a subsidiary auditory task. The training
lasted five weeks, with progress checks taking place at
the end of each week. Several significant relationships
were found comparing those successful at the PSV test
with those who were not. All those with previous
driving experience were successful, whereas only 5 of the
14 with no experience passed. At the second weekly
progress check of driving ability (made by an experienced
examiner) 15 passed, 13 of whom went on to pass the full
test. All 6 of those who failed subsequently failed the
PSV test. No significant differences were found on the
objective measures of the use of the vehicle's controls,
but on the seventh day of training there were differences
between groups on the subsidiary auditory task.
Brown felt that these measures could be used to select-
out potential failures, and a further study was made two
years later, this time with 52 driver trainees (Brown,
1968). In addition to looking at whether the trainees had
previous driving experience, after seven days their
driving skill was assessed by an examiner, the time taken
to drive a standard route was measured, and they were
given the auditory task again. In particular, Brown was
interested in the extent to which there was a transfer of
training for those with driving experience. With regard
to previous driving experience, there were two clearly-
defined groups - experienced "natives" among those
successful at the PSV test and inexperienced "immigrants"
among the failures. Brown considered that the
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previously-learned skills which were positively
transferred were perceptual (ie experience in driving in
conditions similar to those in which the test took place)
rather than motor. Using previous experience in
selecting trainees may not be entirely accurate, as it
depends on subjective estimates of driving ability from
the trainee himself. The objective measure of the use
of the vehicle's controls did not yield appreciably
significant differences, but performance on the auditory
task did. The assessment of driving skill by an
examiner was also considered a good prediction - this was
accurate in over 80% of the cases.
The final two quantitative studies in this section are
both concerned with accidents, the first in connection
with age, and the second with the differences between
part- and full-time drivers. Spratling (1961)
investigated accidents among London Transport bus drivers
in the late 1950s, but did not take account of the
severity of each or whether the driver was blameworthy.
Age and experience (in terms of length of service) were
both significant factors - drivers under 30 years of age,
and drivers with a short length of service (of all ages)
both had high accident rates. As experience increased,
accident rates fell (most noticeable in the early stages)
and the older short-service drivers had a lower rate of
accidents than the younger drivers in this category.
Spratling felt that experience, therefore, was the more
important factor affecting accident rates.
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Hunt (1984), under the auspices of the Department of
Transport, conducted a study of the differences in
accidents between part-time and full-time bus drivers,
among both publicly-owned companies (PTEs/NBC
subsidiaries) and private operators. The public
operators had more than ten times as many accidents per
bus (and per driver) than the private companies: 940
accidents per 1,000 buses compared with 87 accidents per
1000 buses for private companies; the proportion of
drivers who were part-time varied between 50% for private
operators with fewer than five buses to 23.5% for those
with more than 50 vehicles, and was 16.9% for the PTEs
and NBC subsidiaries. (The mean for the whole sample
was 33%). The accident rates per 1,000 man driving
hours were as follows:
Table 3.2





Using a chi-squared analysis there were no significant
differences between types of driver in the private
sector, but there were for public sector drivers. There
were significantly more accidents among full-time drivers
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and fewer accidents among part-time drivers than
expected. Hunt's conclusions on the differences between
the two sectors are not entirely unsurprising: there are
more accidents in the public sector because much of their
work is stage carriage (intensive urban services), and
because a greater proportion of their drivers are younger
(with younger drivers tending to have higher accident
rates). Regarding the differences between part- and
full-time, he remarked that the NBC/PTE companies tended
to employ part-time drivers in the evenings and at
weekends when traffic is lighter (and therefore when
there is less risk of an accident); the full-time
drivers tended to be younger (more in need of steady
employment) with longer hours of work (most of their
accidents took place between the 4th and 6th hours of
duty, and after the 8th hour). Other than being useful
sources of statistics, however, both Spratling's and
Hunt's articles broke little new ground in the study of
bus drivers.
The search for appropriate literature revealed a number
of more qualitative studies of bus drivers, either
focussing on aspects such as job satisfaction and morale,
or being autobiographical accounts of a driver's life.
Some have been mentioned in the chapter on the labour
background. They have been of some use in providing a
picture of the driver's job, the conditions under which
it takes place, and will be referred to in the analysis
of the results from the current research. Two of the
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studies are mentioned here. Van Beinum's The Morale of
the Dublin Busmen (1966) was a study carried out by the
Tavistock Institute in the 1960s. The organisation of
the industry within the Scottish Bus Group in the 1980s
still bears much resemblance to the system in use in
Dublin twenty years previously. The low morale of the
busmen was analysed in terms of the characteristics of
the job, the management system and trade union structure,
and their roles. A socio-technical analysis was
employed but no specific recommendations were made and
the author had to conclude when the report was published
three years after the research, that the only changes
which had been made were better quality uniforms and an
improved pension scheme.
Johnston (1981), writing 15 years later, took a different
approach in looking at the busman's job from a
sociological, "labour process" view, focussing on control
and reactions to it. His themes were the control of
busmen by their organisations, and the busmen's struggle
for control over their work tasks. This thesis was
useful for its historical aspects and interesting on
account of most of its examples coming from the author's
experience as both driver and conductor at Eastern
Scottish's New Street depot in Edinburgh and has been
discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.
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3.3 Literature on drivers in general
A substantial amount of literature has been published on
drivers in general, much of it concentrating on
personality factors and attitudes which may give rise to
accidents or traffic violations. The bulk of this is
American in origin, and appears to be concentrated in the
1950s and 1960s. This section of the chapter reviews
some of the main articles felt to have some relevance to,
or connection with, the present research, in terms of
methodology.
Several studies have looked at the relationship between
psychological tests and driver performance - some have
achieved significant results, others have not. Taking
those in the former category, a few studies have used the
personality test employed in the research set out in this
thesis - the Cattell Sixteen Personality Factor
Questionnaire (16PF). [A full discussion of this test
is given in the next chapter.] Freeman (1952, quoted
Suhr, 1953) found two factors which differentiated
significantly between groups of accident-free and
accident-liable drivers - factors E (submission -
dominance) and Q1 (conservatism - radicalism). A high
score on each was associated with accident involvement.
Suhr himself made two studies using this test on truck
drivers. The first (Suhr, 1953) compared supervisors'
estimates and ratings of accident susceptibility, finding
that those who were rated high also had higher scores on
factors F, M* and 0 and lower scores on C* and Q3*.
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[Those marked * were significant at p=.10 or greater, the
remainder were approaching that level.] Those with
higher accident levels had lower scores on G* and Q3 and
higher scores on M and Q4. His later study (Suhr, 1961)
confirmed these results, by comparing another group of
truck drivers on the basis of high and low accident
records. Those with a high number of accidents also had
higher scores on factors F and M and lower scores on Q3
(F and Q3 at nearly p=.10; M at p=.05).
Bracy (1970) also found that personality factors
differentiated between accident-involved and accident-
free drivers, on a study of 80 undergraduate university
students using the 16PF. Those in the former category
differed from the latter in factors A, F and O (all at
the "high" end) and Q2 (low end of the scale). The
following summarises these studies and defines the
meaning of the factors briefly.
Table 3.3
Summary of 16PF factors found to be related to accidents
High acc.
Factor Direction Description (low/high score)
A High Reserved/outgoing










"High acc." direction = direction of scores linked with
high numbers of accidents.
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Continuing with research which has produced significant
results, Goldstein and Mosel (1956), carried out a factor
analysis of driver attitudes and criterion data.
Attitudes towards all aspects of driving (such as speed,
other road users, highway laws and risk taking) were
obtained from a 186 item self-report inventory completed
by 323 general drivers. Data was also collected on
years and miles driven, numbers of traffic violations and
accidents, and cost of damage/injury in accidents.
Thurstone's centroid method of factor analysis identified
five factors - (a) "attitude towards competitive speed",
(b) "attitude toward other road users", (c) "attitude
toward cops", (d) "attitude toward the vehicle", and (e)
"a general attitude of care or concern for safety".
A number of interesting correlations were found in the
analysis. For the women in the sample (69 cases) there
was a significant correlation between "attitude toward
speed" and number of violations of r=-.28. "Attitude
towards cops" had correlations with total accidents
(r=-.28), accidents at fault (r=-.28) and number of traffic
offences (-.24). Different relationships were found for
the male drivers on the sample (246 cases): "attitude
towards cops" was correlated with age (r=.19); "attitude
towards the vehicle" with both number of years driven
(r=.20) and miles driven (r=.26), "better" attitudes
being found with greater experience. The authors
undertook some further analysis on aggression (or
competitiveness), finding that it was significantly
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related (for just the men) positively to violations
(r=.13) and accidents at fault (r=.14), and negatively
with age (r=.13) (younger men being more aggressive).
[All three were significant at the 0.05 level.] They
felt that only greater maturity reduced aggressive
attitudes, as these were not related to either years
driven or miles driven.
A different approach has been taken by some researchers
who have used both data from personality inventories and
from biographical questionnaires as predictors in
multiple regression analyses, in an attempt to predict
accidents and traffic violations. Schuster and Guilford
(1962) were one of the first groups to publish in this
area. They used a General Attitude Survey, comprising 22
personality traits they considered might be relevant in
predicting accidents. The traits were gleaned from
several published questionnaires, including those of
general activity, restraint, sociability and friendliness
from the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey. In
addition, their Driver Attitude Survey collected data on
24 biographical items covering a wide range, such as age,
race, years of driving, education, physical and mental
health, number of employers in previous two years, and
details of all motor accidents and traffic convictions.
In multiple regression analysis, of predictors with
violations and accidents, they found that it was the
biographical items which were more important
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(statistically) in prediction than the attitude or
temperament variables. From the table below, which
summarises the statistically significant correlations, it
can be seen that for violations, years driven, annual
mileage, condition of car and amount of rural driving
were all significant at p=0.05 or better, whereas only
one attitude item was - general activity. Further items
were correlated with accidents (although all were at
p=0.05 level of significance only); in addition, the
number of employers in previous two years and the
personal relations attitude scale were important.
Table 3.4
Summary of significant correlation coefficients with
violations and accidents (n = 100)
Item Violations Accidents
Years driven -.24* -.21*
Annual mileage .28** .23*
No of employers in 2 years .18 .22*
Condition of car .31** .24*
Amount rural driving .35** -.05
General activity -.22* .12
Personal relations -.15 -.20*
* Significant at p=0.05 level, using Student's t test
** Significant at p=0.01 level, using Student's t test
(Adapted from Schuster and Guilford, 1962, table 1, p.19)
In both cases general attitude scores for both violations
and accidents were significant, and the number of
accidents and violations were correlated r=.38 (at p=0.01
level of significance). These findings enabled Schuster
and Guilford to construct regression equations. In
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cross-validation the predictors correlated p=.37 with
violations and p=.33 with accidents.
A later study, reported by Schuster (196 8) , found the
reverse to be true when regression coefficients were
compared with actual violations and accidents after a gap
of three years. The best predictors came from the
accident and violation attitude scales combined with
records of previous accidents and violations, with
biographical data adding no additional prediction. The
cross-validity coefficients were around the same for
accidents (0.32) but higher for violations (0.49). Peck
and Coppin (1967) employed a similar approach in an
attempt to predict accident involvement from a variety of
categories of traffic convictions, but found the
relationships too small to draw any practical conclusions
from.
A more straightforward correlational analysis of test
scores and driver performance (measured only by an
accident rate) was carried out by Moffie and Milton
(1952) on long-distance lorry drivers in the USA. Five
psychological tests of the paper and pencil variety were
used: the Otis SA Test of Mental Ability, the Bennett
Test of Mechanical Comprehension, the Kuder Vocational
Interest Test, the Bernreuter Personality Inventory and
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. An
accident score was calculated on the basis of weighting
preventable and non-preventable accidents, and dividing
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this into the number of months worked. 191 drivers were
tested, all of whom had at least six months' experience,
and were divided into three groups, an accident group of
30 drivers were matched with 30 similar accident-free
drivers, a group of 100 drivers with 6-12 months'
experience, and a group of 31 drivers who had been
employed for 12-18 months. For the first two groups, a
number of significant correlations were found.
Personality-wise (as measured by the MMPI), the accident-
free drivers tended to be more tense, less self-
sufficient and less dominant than the accident drivers,
although none of these differences were significant even
at the 0.05 level. The Bennet Mechanical Comprehension
Test indicated that the accident-free subjects had a
greater grasp of mechanical principles, (with a mean
score of 27.90 compared with 21.47 for the accident
group, significant at p=0.05) but, perhaps surprisingly,
the accident drivers had higher scores on computational
interest items (a mean score of 34.54 compared with 30.60
for the accident-free group, again significant at p=0.05).
A positive relationship between mechanical interest and
accidents was found for the group of longer-service
drivers. This took the form of positive correlations
between the Bennet test and accidents for drivers with
six to eighteen months' experience (r=.19) and between
the mechanical scale on the Kuder test and accidents for
the group with twelve to eighteen months' experience
(r=.44). The first was significant at p=0.05 level and
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the second at 0.01 level. This lead the authors to
suggest that the nature of the job (in terms of its
hazardous conditions, the dual nature of its operation -
the drivers worked in pairs - and the disruption of home
life) may cause psychological changes in those who stay
for a long time. This interesting aspect was not
pursued by further research. Moffie and Milton made a
further remark about the better drivers - the negative
relationship between them and self-sufficiency indicated
that they were more dependent on others, more hesitant
and cautious in their driving habits, and therefore more
likely to assess traffic situations before driving into
them.
Conger and his colleagues carried out similar - and more
extensive - large-scale studies on US airmen in the late
1950s, but achieved little in the way of satisfactory
results. In their first major study Conger et al
(1957), 264 airmen were subjected to a very thorough
battery of psychological tests (including the MMPI, the
Thurstone Temperament Scale and the Allport-Vernon study
of values), structured psychiatric interviews and
projective tests such as the Thematic Perception Test and
the Rorschach Ink Blot Test. The airmen were divided
into high-, moderate- and low-accident groups, but only
10 scales discriminated between these groups at p=0.20
level of significance, and only 1 at the p=0.05 level.
A cross-validation study showed that only one type of
measure was stable - the individual's value system, as
measured by the Allport-Vernon scales dealing with
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aesthetic, theoretical and religious concerns. The no-
accident group had low scores on the first two scales and
higher scores on the last.
This finding surprised the authors, and in a follow-up
study of 20 airmen (10 of whom had had road accidents and
10 of whom had not) similar results occurred (Conger et
al, 1959). In addition, ratings of the subjects on a
number of criteria following psychiatric interviews
showed statistically significant differences between the
two groups. The accident subjects tended to be less
able to control hostility, either to be excessively self-
centred or excessively sociocentric, to be more fearful
of loss of love and support, and less able to tolerate
and control tension. Not all subjects fell into each
category, however, and the small size of sample precluded
any recommendations in this area. On the objective test
side, the American transit motor ability test
discriminated between the two groups, the accident group
reacting more quickly and taking less time to complete
the task but making more errors than the other group.
Little of significance was obtained from the other tests
- the Wechsler-Bellevue adult intelligence scale, the
MMPI and the projective ones. In a third paper Conger
(1960) summed-up his finding that it was attitudes rather
than physical or intellectual qualities which determined
accident rates.
A single personality test - the MMPI again - was used by
Brown and Berdie (1960) in a study of nearly 1,000
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college students. The criteria of driving behaviour
used were again traffic violations and accidents, along
with years driven and annual mileage, for a period of
between four and six years since taking the test. A few
small, but significant, relationships were found between
scores on the test and the criteria. In particular, the
Pd scale had a correlation of r=.10 with violations and
r=0.08 with accidents, and the Ma scale had correlations
of r=.07 and r=.09 respectively (all significant at the
r=0.05 level or higher due to the large size of the
sample.) The Pd scale relates to attitudes of unconcern
about others, with a failure to benefit from experience
and a disdain for rules and regulations. A high Ma
score may indicate people who value effort and movement
for their own sake, who pay little attention to social
consequences of their actions, and who may have
accidents. The very low relationships that were found
led the authors to doubt their practical usefulness,
concluding that there may be a number of personality
patterns related to poor driving rather than a single
one.
Several papers summarising research in this field have
been published, including one by Goldstein (1961). He
reviewed a large number of studies which correlated
predictor variables (such as psychological tests and
biographical data) with criteria measures of performance
and several of these have been reviewed earlier in this
chapter. Among other interesting studies he reports was
one by Cobb (1939) on "general drivers" in Connecticut,
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USA: level of education was negatively related to number
of accidents per year (r=-.19, p=0.05). Lauer et al
(1952) also used education and aptitude, this time with
army drivers. The best predictors of performance (based
on ratings by supervisors and associates) were general
intelligence (r=.19), mechanical aptitude (r=.23) and
driving know-how (r=.28). These were all significant at
the p=.05 level, and obtained on a sample of 331 drivers.
When repeated on smaller samples only general
intelligence was significantly related.
Much has been written about personality and attitudinal
variables. In addition to the studies reviewed in their
own right earlier, Goldstein reports that Cobb (1939)
found that "attitude towards traffic" was significantly
correlated with accidents (r=.08) but that attitudes
towards society, and to risks and annoyances were not.
[There was much research into "attitudes" in the 1950s
and 1960s, particularly in the USA, not just on drivers
but in other areas as well. "Attitude towards traffic"
was not defined anywhere in the paper, though presumably
it refers to attitudes towards, and concern for, other
road users.] Conger et al (1956), on several small
samples of airmen in Colorado, found no significant
relationship between both the MMPI and the seven
Thurstone Temparament Scales, and driving accident level.
A number of studies focussed on the relationship of age
with accidents, several of them being the result of US
Government research in the 1930s. There was general
agreement that young drivers have the highest rates, but
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less agreement as to what constitutes a "young driver".
Three of the government studies classify this as being
under 30; on the other hand Lauer's (1952) study of
general drivers puts the worst group as 18-23 years and
Tillman's (1943) research into Canadian bus drivers
classifies it as 20-24. De Silva, (1938) is one of the
few to mention that accident rates were higher for both
young drivers (17-29) and for old drivers (50 years and
over). Young drivers lacked experience, domestic
responsibilities and tended to drive faster and more
recklessly. Older drivers also had a higher accident
rate on account of age slowing down reaction and motor
co-ordination; in addition, they had learned at a time
when there was less traffic, cars were capable of less
speed, and formal tests were often not required.
Another general theme underlying much of what has been
discussed above is that of "accident proneness". This
is the idea that certain individuals' personality
characteristics cause them to be involved in more
accidents than might be expected by chance. This
includes accidents at work, in the house and whilst
driving, the last of which is included here. Reviews of
research in this field include those by Johnson (1946),
Craske (1968) and Reason (1974), the latter referring to
research by Quenault on "dissociated" drivers. These
tend to be more accident-prone and are characterised by
lack of regard for information relevant to driving (such
as use of mirrors, taking notice of junctions and
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roundabouts and judgement in summing up traffic
conditions ahead). Such drivers tended to be
unconcerned when near-accidents occurred.
An earlier study was by Tillman and Hobbs (1949) who
studied bus drivers in Ontario, Canada and found that 10%
of drivers had 25% of accidents. They carried out
further research into taxi drivers, by means of
interviews and found clear differences between groups of
high and low accident drivers. The "personality
characteristics" (based on these interviews) of the high
accident group included unstable family background,
frequent short-term employment, police record, disregard
for the wishes of others and an aggressive and impulsive
driving style. The low accident group, by contrast, had
the opposite of those characteristics, with a tolerant,
cautious and considerate nature. The authors
recommended, therefore, studying the person's background
and personality as a means of reliably deciding on
whether they would be accident-prone or not. They did
not feel, however, that the psycho-physical tests
referred to in the studies above were able to
differentiate on accident-proneness.
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3.4 Summary and conclusions from published research
Some remarks can be made to summarise the published
studies on drivers, in particular those that have some
relevance to the present research. There is a long
history of using psychological tests of one form or
another to study or select drivers, both in the public
transport field (tramcar drivers, bus drivers and
conductors, and even taxi drivers) and in other areas
such as lorry driving. In the early decades of this
century the tests were mechanical in nature (such as the
Viteles Motorman Selection Test), requiring elaborate
equipment with its attendant capital and labour costs.
In the 1930s and 1940s paper-and-pencil tests became
increasingly popular, measuring not only intelligence and
personality, but speed of reaction as well (as was the
case in Ghiselli's research). The 1960s forward to the
present have seen a variety of studies, both qualitative
and quantitative, but without the strong central theme
that was found especially in the 1930s. In addition to
personality and intelligence tests, items of biographical
data have also been used as predictors in studying driver
performance.
The criteria of performance against which these measures
have been tested include both subjective standards (such
as supervisors' ratings) and objective ones (especially
accidents, but including pass/fail at the PSV test
(Brown) and work records (Heron). In some of the
studies the correlations obtained have been statistically
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significant, although in most cases they were fairly low.
There is some evidence, however, that age and accident
rates are linked, for example, and that personality
factors bear some relationship to performance. A number
of studies were also particularly useful for their
methods of classifying criterion data and are referred to





This chapter discusses both the theories underlying the
structure of the research and the actual methodology
involved in conducting it. This latter part looks at the
methods used to select the sample of drivers for the
research and its characteristics. The data collection
methods are discussed in some detail - the tests and the
measures of "performance" used - along with the rationale
for each. Finally, the statistical methods used to
analyse the data are described as a prelude to the next
chapters where the findings are presented.
4.2 Theories underlying the research.
There are three major sets of theories which underlie
this research and help explain why it has taken the
structure it has. The first follows closely the work of
R.B. Cattell, in his Handbook of Multivariate
Experimental Psychology (1966). Cattell expresses
dissatisfaction with the strict experimental, scientific
methods of research, (exemplified by what he terms the
Wundt-Pavlov bivariate approach) and proposes his own
more flexible and adaptable procedure, taking after the
multivariate approach of what he calls the Galton-
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Spearman tradition. This has the advantage of
attempting to bring into a single experimental
field of reference all the variables necessary
to detect and define the concepts that need to
be employed for scientific understanding and
without which it may not be possible to arrive
at any lawful relationship. By contrast, the
bivariate experimentalist often starts out with
such a meaningless fragment of the totality
that it is impossible to encompass any lawful
relation or construe the conceptual sentence.
(Cattell, 1966a, p.12)
The traditional, "hypothetical-deductive" method involves
taking a hypothesis right at the start, fully-developed
and finished, and testing it against facts derived from
experiment. This has several shortcomings, one being
that it does not teach students anything about research
as an exploratory process, generating hypotheses from
experiment. Furthermore, it is considered to be
restrictive, giving the impression that a single
hypothesis can be established on the basis of a single
measurement difference, referring to a single cause.
Instead, it is felt that the researcher should keep an
open mind - there may at first be several plausible
hypotheses, several sources of variance, and possibly
multiple causes.
The alternative method proposed is exploratory in nature,
and does not focus on one, sharply-defined hypothesis
tested by a single experiment. In fact, as Cattell
says,
Research need not begin with a hypothesis at
all, and in its true life setting, a finished
hypothesis is rarely the real germinal point of
research action. It can begin by noticing a
curious and intriguing regularity ....
(Cattell, 1966a, p.13)
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In essence, this involves looking at the world to see
what is there, drawing hypotheses out of the findings,
checking them against facts, and making adjustments as
necessary. This is "inspired exploration", with an
initial hypothesis that might be nothing more than a
desire to find out about something. This differs very
much from the traditional approach, in that,
Advance begins with dim, fleeting and far-flung
hypotheses, gleaned from the faint movement of
straws in the wind. . . . The hypothesis
spirals out of the dust of many observations,
and it is checked and tried many times. There
is rarely a one-step, final confirmation of the
hypothesis. (Cattell, 1966a, p.14)
There may be a large number of hypotheses to start with,
each of which is checked against the data, and either
discarded or developed further. The image of the
spiral, used in the above quotation, is also used in a
diagrammatical portrayal of this, the "inductive-
hypothetico-deductive" method, shown in figure 4.1 below.
This research project in essence follows this model and
is primarily concerned with the first two or three stages
of the spiral. "Observation" of the bus drivers is made
by the use of psychological tests and collection of
performance data. From the analysis of this data,
inductive reasoning enables hypotheses to be formed and




















The second theory underlying the research is one of
personality. There are two broad schools of thought
encountered in the study of personality, as discussed,
for example, by Mehrabian (1968). The first is the
cognitive-developmental approach. It regards
individuals as being like an "amoeba", growing and
developing a unique shape over time through a continual
process of adapting to changing environments. The
second school of thought, known as the instinct-need-
habit-trait-factor theory, believes that peoples'
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patterns of behaviour are relatively stable and
persisting over time, changing only gradually and in
response to continual demands for change. This is
popularly called the "inertia" model, and is the one
underlying this research. The personality test used,
for example, takes a standardised measure of behaviour.
The scores obtained should not differ too much from those
that might have been obtained a few years' previously.
Similarly, the collection of performance data for a four
year period, for example, should be a reasonably typical
sample of a driver's behaviour.
The other main theoretical area which influenced the
structure of this research is that of the "systems"
approach to industrial behaviour. One of the major
papers on this was written by Randell (1966) and the
theories embodied in his PhD thesis (1972). The paper
discusses the problems of measurement and prediction of
human behaviour in the field of applied psychology, in
particular those concerned with criteria of work
performance. Randell summarises the problem by saying
that applied psychologists "have to work with numerous
overlapping criteria that are dependent upon many
interrelated variables which are acted upon by various
interdependent treatments" (p 116). The questions that
the systems approach seeks to answer are "how can the
subject be best considered in terms of meaningful and
useful variables and groups of variables? and "how are
these variables interrelated?" (Randell, 1966, p 116).
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He discusses various previous studies which have been
made using a systems approach, both within the field of
industrial psychology (the work of the Tavistock Institue
in the early 1960s, for example - Rice's (1963) work in
Indian calico mills and Trist et al's (1963) study of the
"long wall" coal mining methods) and outwith, for example
in biology and child psychology.
Randell takes the concept further by seeking a system
which enables more precise empirical description of the
subjects being studied and which can be used for
prediction or control of behaviour. He adds,
If possible it should allow for the application
of theories, or at least throw up hypotheses
about them that can be tested. It should not
be bound to any particular theory, or way of
explaining behaviour in industry. (p 118)
The system put forward provides a means of interrelating
all the variables available, by studying the inputs,
treatments and outputs. The inputs are the workers'
aptitudes and behaviour (measured, for example, by
questionnaires and psychological tests), which progress
through the system in a number of stages (termed "systems
constants") being transformed by treatments (such as
training and the working environment) and result in
outputs (for example, goods produced, items sold,
accidents, job turnover). There are several conditions
for this. The system should be predictive in that it can
provide an indication of those inputs and treatments
which determine particular performances. The variables
should also be capable of measurement at the interval
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level, and further, it must be possible for a causal
relationship to be established between inputs and
treatments on the one hand to outputs on the other.
Various constraints are imposed on the system by the
environment - these are groups of variables which can
influence the outcomes and interact with other system
varaibles, but are outwith the influence of the
occupational psychologist. Examples of these include
economic conditions (changes in supplies of raw
materials, consumer demands and tastes, etc), changes in
work traditions (changes in entry/training requirements),
new types of machinery and technology (for example, the
move from manual typewriters to electronic word
processors) - all of which may alter work performance.
The systems approach can be related to the current
research, in the following way. The "inputs" are the
scores from the psychological tests, which provide
measures of the bus drivers' aptitudes and potential
behaviour. The "treatment" will be the conditions and
environment at individual bus depots (such as the number
of drivers employed) and the "outputs" are the measures
of work performance, most of which are negative in the
sense that they relate to things done wrongly, such as
accidents, disciplinery offences and attendance data.
Constraints outwith the control of the researcher might
include the differing levels of traffic faced by drivers
(both by time of day and by location of depot -
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urban/rural), the reorganisation of the Scottish Bus
Group (which took place during the period of the
research), the move by some companies to introduce
minibuses and to return to using conductors, and the
changeover from mechanical to electronic ticket machines.
The value of using the systems approach in a study of the
determinants of worker perfromance is well summed-up in
this quotation from Randell (1972):
The worth of the systems approach to industrial
behaviour can only be demonstrated by the
fruitfulness of the understanding that it
generates and the progress it brings about in
explaining and predicting worker behaviour. (p 47)
4.3 Research design
Some consideration is now given to the research design
appropriate to this project. Research design can be
defined as "the plan, structure and strategy of
investigation conceived so as to obtain answers to
research questions and to control variance" (Kerlinger,
1973, p 300). As this project is concerned with
observing and studying people at work, it does not fall
neatly into any of the categories put forward by writers
such as Campbell and Stanley (1963) . They refer to
"experimental" and "quasi-experimental" designs, often
used to study the effect on a dependent variable of a
change in an independent variable, with outside
influences being held constant or at least being fully
measured. This is in line with the traditional approach
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disapproved of by Cattell (1966a).
This research, by contrast, falls into the "ex post
facto" category, regarded by some as being deficient and
inadequate (eg, Kerlinger, 1973). In effect, it studies
something done or occurring after an event as the
following definition shows:
Ex post facto research is systematic inquiry in
which the scientist does not have direct
control of independent variables because their
manifestations have already occurred or because
they are inherently not manipulable.
Inferences about relations among variables are
made, without direct intervention, from
concomitant variation of independent and
dependent variables (Kerlinger, 1973, p379).
The most important difference between this type of
research and the more conventional experimentally based
type, therefore, is a lack of control over independent
variables. Subjects cannot be assigned to groups at
random, nor can controlled experimental manipulation be
applied to them. The researcher can only observe the
dependent variable and then investigate the independent
variables for their possible effects on the dependent
one. The danger of this lack of control is that it can
lead to misleading or even false interpretations based on
research results carried out under this system. Even if
a hypothesis is being tested (not always the case in this
type of research) the results could still be weak in that
they may capitalise on chance relations. Seemingly
plausible explanations may merely be a case of making the
interpretation fit the facts (Merton, 1949, quoted
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Kerlinger, 1973). This is an important criticism which
should be kept in mind.
Much ex-post facto research does take place, however,
"simply because many research problems in the social
sciences and education do not lend themselves to
experimental inquiry" (Kerlinger, p 391-2) In many
cases, the important independent variables cannot be
manipulated - in this research, for example, the
personality and intelligence of bus drivers - and all
that can be done is to adopt an approach that is non-
experimental in the traditional sense of the term.
This leads back to Cattell's work on research design.
He adopts a much wider definition of an experiment,
namely as
. . . a recording of observations, quantitative
or qualitative, made by defined and recorded
operations and in defined conditions, followed
by examination of the data, by appropraite
statsitical and mathematical rules, for the
existance of significant relations (p 20)
He avoids specific mention of terms such as "under
controlled conditions" and "manipulation", preferring to
include observation and measurement of both naturally
occurring events and those taking place within a
laboratory environment. He puts forward a scheme for
classifying research design along six bipolar dimensions,
which in combination make a total of 29 feasible
patterns. The appropriate ones for this research are
(code 9) m f d u a n
(code 14)m f s u a n
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The first letter in each refers to the number of
variables included in the research, in this case "m" for
multivariate, as this research is studying many variables
at the one time. The second letter refers to the
presence or absence of manipulation of variables by the
researcher, in this case they are freely happening ("f") .
The third item is the presence or absence of a time
sequence between measurement. In this case, both
alternatives have been included - "d" for dated and "s"
for simultaneous - as performance data was collected
relating both to the time at which the tests were
administered to the drivers and to prior and subsequent
performance.
The fourth dimension is concerned with the degree of
control over unmeasured (environmental) variables - in
this case the choice is "u" for uncontrolled. It was
not possible to control unmeasured variables in this
research, as it was concerned with investigating
performance of people at work. Such environmental
variables might include those relating to the
characteristics of population in the areas studied, the
nature of the road system, traffic flows and density. It
would have been a major task to measure these, if no
statistics existed, and almost impossible to hold them
constant in an experiment. The fifth dimension refers
to the choice of variables, in this case an abstractive
("a") selection of those which might be used to explain
relationships amongst the data. The final category
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relates to the representativeness of the survey
population, in this research normal and unselected within
the parameters. [It is biased in the sense that only
bus drivers in the Scottish Bus Group are the subject of
the research; within that population, however, a
representative sample was taken.]
4 . 4 Selection of the sample
In order to build up the picture of bus drivers, and to
attempt to ascertain the determinants of their
performance, a sample of those employed by the Scottish
Bus Group was taken. A sample was necessary owing to the
large size of the population (in this case, around 5,000
drivers) and this was chosen by the Group. It was
decided to collect data on (ideally) all the drivers in
selected depots, chosen on the basis of two depots from
each of the seven original companies. This enabled the
sample to be fairly representative in several respects.
By seeking data on all the drivers in particular depots,
it was hoped that a wide range of driver "types" would be
sampled. This would enable the variations on a number
of variables to be studied, including age, service,
accident and discipline records, as well as differences
on the intelligence and personality tests. Taking two
depots from each company enabled the sample to be well
spread geographically, and the use of one official at
Group headquarters level ensured that the sample
contained a reasonable balance between rural and urban
areas.
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Table 4.1 below shows that, to a large extent, the sample
of depots was representative. The depots were well
spread geographically, from Thurso in the north, to
Hawick in the south, and ranged in size from some of the
smallest in the Group to the largest (Edinburgh, with 235
drivers). There was also a reasonable mix between
areas. Fort William and Elgin represent fairly rural
parts of Scotland, Alloa and Cumnock are small towns in
industrial areas, and Paisley, Hamilton, Wishaw and
Edinburgh are all in large urban areas.
Most depots operated a range of services, from local town
routes to long-distance express work to large cities in
both Scotland and England. Although some of the large
depots operated quite substantial amounts of the latter
(Edinburgh, for example, and Paisley, to a lesser
extent), some of the smaller ones also provided such
services. Examples of these include Elgin (on the
Aberdeen-Inverness route) and Fort William (to both
Inverness and Glasgow). All depots offered private hire
facilities; only a few operated day and extended tours.
Edinburgh was the main depot for the latter, with some
also being operated by Cumnock and Paisley. A number
carried out fairly substantial numbers of contract
services, often for local schools, factories and coal
mines. Alloa and Cumnock were examples of the latter.
Much of the initial data collection took place during the
1984/85 miners' strike, and both depots were suffering
financially from the loss of contract work. At Cumnock,
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this was an exaccerbation of events in recent years: the
Ayrshire coal industry was very much in decline with very
few pits remaining open.
Table 4.1
The sample of bus depots used in the research
Number of Av size






















Highland 8 238 30
Midland 14 845 60
Northern 10 443 44
Western 12 1229 102






























Source: Information provided by the Scottish Bus Group.
Figures for number of depots does not include
sub-depots.
* = percentage of company's drivers in sample
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One possible criticism is that all the depots north of
the central belt were fairly small, and that a large
depot such as Aberdeen or Inverness might have been
included. The table quotes the average size of depot,
which is somewhat misleading as some of the companies
have both very large and very small establishments.
Western Scottish, for example, in its original form
consisted of both the large depots on the south side of
the Clyde (such as Johnstone, Inchinnan and Greenock) and
fairly small depots in Kirkcudbrightshire and
Dumfriesshire (such as Annan, Lockerbie and Stranraer).
On the other hand Central Scottish is perhaps the easiest
to obtain an average size of depot from, as all its five
establishments contain between 170 and 180 drivers.
Mention has been made in previous chapters of the
organisational changes which have taken place within the
Scottish Bus Group. Four new stage carriage companies
were created, resulting in a number of depots coming
under new ownership. Several other depots (often near
company boundaries) changed hands: Airdrie, for example,
was transferred to Central from Eastern.
Table 4.2 below shows how the sample depots are allocated
among the present eleven companies. (These changes were
not announced until over a year after the sample was
chosen, and after much of the data had been collected.)
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Table 4.2
Sample depots in relation to the new SBG companies.
New




























Fortunately from the viewpoint of representativeness, all
but one of the present eleven companies have at least one
depot in the sample, the exception being Strathtay which
took over the southern part of Northern and the
Perthshire operations of Midland.
4.5 Data collection methods: Introduction
The collection of data on the bus drivers in the sample
took place in two stages. The first involved giving
each driver a battery of three psychological tests; the
second required making return visits to the depots to
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collect background data and performance measures. In
most cases the second stage took place around a year
after the first, enabling the researcher to see what had
happened to each driver in the interim, in terms of
whether they were still employed, had resigned or had
been dismissed. The data collected can be divided into
two categories - predictor variables (psychological test
scores and background data) and criterion measures of
performance.
4.6 Predictor variables (i): the psychological tests
Three psychometric tests of individual differences were
used to obtain psychological data on each bus driver in
the sample depots. These were all written, scored
questionnaires, taken on a group basis, in sessions which
lasted approximately one-and-a-half to two hours. Two
of the tests were measures of ability/intelligence, the
third of personality.
4.6.1 Rationale for the tests
Comment can be made briefly as to why psychological tests
were used to gather data. To some extent the situation
in which the research took place dictated their use.
Access was allowed to over one thousand drivers, but for
only up to two hours with each. In addition, the budget
was limited to some extent, in that it would not have
\
been possible to employ a large team of interviewers, for
example. Tests such as the ones used were an economical
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way of collecting a fairly comprehensive amount of
psychological data on a large group in the time
available. Psychological tests often play a large part
in recruitment and selection procedures (particularly in
large companies and public bodies such as the UK Civil
Service) as well as in counselling and clinical
psychology fields. However, they also have an important
role to play in research, as Anastasi notes:
Nearly all problems in differential psychology,
for example, require testing procedures as a
means of gathering data. As illustrations,
reference may be made to studies on the nature
and extent of individual differences, the
organization of psychological traits, the
measurement of group differences, and the
identification of biological and cultural
factors associated with behavioral differences.
She adds that,
For all such areas of research - and for many
others - the precise measurement of individual
differences made possible by well-constructed
tests is an essential prerequisite.
(both Anastasi, 1982, p.4)
In reviewing his research using tests on selection of
salesmen, Randell also recomments their use,
... standardised tests and' scorable
questionnaires can play a crucial part in
revealing the basic information concerning the
individuals making up an organisation.
(Randell in Miller (ed), 1975)
Tests have the advantage of being standardised measuring
instruments. They are taken under the same conditions
by everyone, in terms of printed booklets and answer
sheets, verbal and written instructions and time limits.
They are scored objectively, producing numerical scores
(often at the interval or ratio level) which can be
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statistically analysed and "normed", so that different
groups can be compared with each other, or against a
general population.
Kline (1983) suggests a number of other ways in which
data, particularly personality data, could have been
collected. These include interviews, rating scales (of
the form which Cattell used in the development of his
personality theories and questionnaires), behavioural
observations and repertory grids. These all tend either
to have low reliability and validity (such as the
interview or rating scales) or are more suited to an
experimental or clinical environment, or to a small
number of people. The latter can also be said of the
forms of psychological tests other than personality
questionnaires, namely objective tests and projective
tests. Objective tests are those where the true purpose
of them is hidden from subjects therefore making them
less subject to distortion by "socially desirable" or
other forms of response sets. However, Kline reports
that there is little evidence of validity for them, and
that they may often require special laboratories for
their administration. Examples include the
"fidgetometer" (a special chair which records all
movements a person makes) and the "slow line drawing
test". Projective tests (such as the Rorschach Inkblot
Test and the Thematic Apperception Test) require subjects
to give responses to ambiguous shapes or pictures. They
also tend to have low reliability and validity, require
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an experienced clinical psychologist to analyse the
responses, and are more suitable for a clinical or
laboratory environment.
Anastasi (1982) discusses some of the advantages and
disadvantages of using group tests. One positive
feature is that they can be simultaneously administered
to a large number of subjects. There is no need for a
one-to-one relationship between tester and testee as
these tests use printed questionnaires needing simple
responses that can be recorded on an answer sheet. They
are fairly straightforward, therefore, both to administer
(requiring the ability to read out instructions and keep
accurate time) and to score (using either a computer or a
special stencil), with the question books being used over
and over again. Group tests also tend to provide better
established norms than individual tests, as data can be
easily obtained on very large samples during the
standardisation process. Over 2,200 took part in the
British Standardisation of the 16PF, for example,
conducted by Saville in the early 1970s (Saville, 1972,
p.14).
One of the drawbacks of group tests is that there is less
chance for the administrator to establish rapport, obtain
co-operation and maintain the interest of his subjects.
It is perhaps less easy to detect individual worries,
anxieties or tiredness than on a one-to-one basis. In
this research every attempt was made to establish and
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maintain rapport with the drivers. The administrators
would talk to them at the beginning and end of the
session, and also between tests, to try to make the
situation less artificial and formal than it might have
appeared to be. Inevitably, this was easier with the
smaller groups than with the larger ones. On some
occasions a qualified psychologist was available to give
feedback to individual drivers on their test performance:
the accuracy of this tended to leave the drivers
concerned with a much more favourable impression of the
research project than they might otherwise have had, and
helped to restore a public relations advantage. Little
attempt was made to control for the latter point made
above, in that no note was taken of whether drivers were
unduly worried about the tests, or the time they had
started duty that day (as a possible measure of fatigue).
However, overall a large number were tested, at different
times of the day, so that those who were fatigued by
coming at the end of a hard shift were counterbalanced by
those who came fresh before the start of their work.
On an individual level each of the tests used contained
examples which the subjects had to work through prior to
starting the test. The administrators were careful to
check that everyone had answered them correctly; if
there were mistakes then the correct answers were
explained fully to the drivers concerned. Fellow
drivers were often able to express the reasoning behind
the answers in a more-easily understood form than were
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the administrators, and this could help to reduce the
tension. In addition, every attempt was made to reduce
individuals' worries and fears about participating in the
research, by promising that the test scores would be kept
confidential from management (which they were) and that
they would not be used against them in any way. There
was no secrecy about individual results: drivers were
invited to write direct to the University if they wished
information about their own scores.
A more general criticism of group tests is that they may
restrict an individual's responses, in particular with
multiple choice items and where one has to pick the odd
one out in a sequence or deduce similarities. As
Anastasi notes, "One contention is that such items may
penalise a brilliant and original thinker who sees
unusual implications in the answers" and says later,
"Some critics have focussed on the importance of
analysing errors and inquiring into the reasons why an
individual chooses a particular answer" (p.301). Group
tests provide virtually no opportunity for a detailed
examination of why people pick particular answers
(especially if they are incorrect). However, to take
the first point the drivers were encouraged (in the
intelligence test) to pick the most straightforward or
most obvious answer. On the Word Recognition Test
(described later) the number of items answered
incorrectly was taken into account on a separate score,
although there was no analysis of which particular items
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were wrongly answered and why. The personality test
involved selecting one answer from a choice of three;
even when a subject felt that none of the answers applied
to him, the instructions said that he had to choose one
of them.
4.5.2 The tests themselves:
(i) Word Recognition Test (WRT)
The first test was developed at the University of
Edinburgh by C C P Ingleton, and is still undergoing
trial. (In part, this project was a testing ground for
it.) It is designed to measure the ability termed
"speed of closure", defined as "the facility with which
individuals can apprehend the structural implications of
a confused or incomplete visual configuration" (Mooney,
1951, pi). In layman's terms it might be called being
"quick on the uptake".
Mooney (1954) charts the development of the "closure"
concept from its origins in Gestalt theory. Closure was
one of the organising forces (along with similarity,
proximity and good continuation) which determined the
direction of perceptual organisation. As he says,
The early "crucial" illustrations of these
factors were given in simple visual patterns.
In these, closure has a literal aptness in
describing the closing of gaps in lines,
circles, triangles and patterns. (p 51).
In a more general sense, Mooney defines closure as "the
moment of perceptual resolution" and a "tension-relieving
instant" when meaning is recognised in a complex pattern.
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He considers it almost to be the opposite of insight,
which is not rapid, requires careful consideration of a
problem and often specialised knowledge to solve.
A number of psychological studies have attempted to
measure this ability. Thurstone (1944) devised a
"mutilated words test" (words with ink removed at random)
to see how quickly subjects could identify the words, and
was the first to use the phrase "speed of closure".
Mooney (1954) himself devised a battery of six closure
tests (including mutilated words and sentences, and
incomplete drawings); in the subsequent factor analysis
a "perceptual closure" factor emerged on which the
mutilated words test was strongly loaded.. Speed of
closure is one of fifteen factors which can be measured
by the "French Reference Kit" of tests (Ekstrom et al,
1976).
Various other pieces of research have referred to speed
of closure. Examples of these are Ohnmacht et al (1970,
1972) who deleted words from prose passages and asked
subjects to determine what they were. Adcock and
Webberley (1971) used tests from the "French kit" and
other sources (such as the IPAT "Culture Fair" and
"16PF"); and Mos et al (1974) discovered it among eight
factors derived from an eleven test battery of Gestalt
type tests. More recent studies have included Platnick
and Richards (1977) and Sparrow et al (1982), the latter
using a test of perceptual speed of closure in a
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personnel selection study.
The Ingleton Word Recognition Test takes these ideas
further, by seeking to apply them to personnel selection
in commerce. The WRT requires people to identify
partially-printed words. The words are not associated
with one another, and in each case the ink has been
ommitted in a random fashion. The words are all those
which might be found in "popular" newspapers (they are
everyday words which a person with average range of
vocabulary will be acquainted with) and there are no
trick words (ie, random collections of letters not
forming recognisable words). In general, it is felt
that those who recognise a large number of words
correctly are quick to identify and react to real-life
situations. For bus drivers, this might be the ability
to cope with dangerous and heavy traffic, or to deal with
a queue of passengers effectively. The construct "speed
of closure" has a number of characteristics, according to
Ingleton (1986). It is not influenced by experience
people have had in particular situations, nor is it
directly related to academic achievement. It may
however be linked with general intelligence ('g'— see
below). Ingleton also states that "it is an ability
that is either present or absent in a person. It cannot
be acquired over time and it can be easily measured"
(p.1) •
The number of words wrongly identified constitutes the
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person's risk-taking tendency, although this is at
present still at more of an experimental stage. Those
taking the test are told not to guess words they do not
know: it is felt that those who "see" words which are
not there are likely to take more risks in life than the
average person. These will be "errors of commission",
doing things that one is not supposed to do such as
issuing a ticket for the wrong fare or being involved in
accidents. These can be contrasted with "errors of
omission", not doing things that one ijs supposed to do.
The WRT is still in its developmental stages, with
various versions being available. That used in this
research was "form A" (although it was not the first
version). The little research evidence which is
available appears to suggest that it has some validity in
identifying the "better" performers among retail and
sales staff (Ingleton, 1987).
The other two questionnaires are long-established and
fairly well-known.
(ii) IPAT Culture-Fair test.
This produces a measure of "g" - general intelligence.
The test has been developed from research which Cattell
first started in the 1920s, following on from the work of
Spearman and others who were concerned to investigate the
nature and accurate measurement of intelligence.
Spearman's two-factor theory underlies this test. He
proposed that one possesses both general intelligence
(the 'g' factor) which governs all one's activities,
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along with several specific types ('s' factors). These
influence particular, individual activities. Anastasi
(1982) highlights the importance of measuring an
individual's 'g' with psychological tests:
If this factor runs through all abilities, it
furnishes the only basis for prediction of the
individual's performance from one situation to
another. It would be futile to measure
specific factors, since each by definition
generates in only a single activity. (p.366)
Cattell developed this further (as reported by Kline,
1976) into fluid ability ('gf') and crystallised ability
('gc'). The former refers to an individual's innate
reasoning power whereas the latter is this reasoning
power as it exists in a particular culture. The Culture
Fair test is therefore a measure of 'gf*.
The first tests appeared in 1930, but it was not until
1949 that the present format appeared. Advances in
electronic computing facilities permitted more advanced
item analyses to be carried out, and the present version
was first published in 1961. Scale 2 (form A), which
was used in this research, is intended for children
between the ages of 8 and 14, and for adults of average
intelligence. Two other scales exist - Scale 1 is for
children between 4 and 8 years old, Scale 3 is suitable
for older children and adults of above-average
intelligence, such as university and college students.
The test has four sub-tests consisting entirely of
drawings, requiring subjects to complete progressive
series, find the odd one out, solve incomplete designs
(matrices), and discover rules. Instructions are read
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out at the beginning of each test, but there are no words
on either the test booklet or the answer sheet. This is
intended to make the test as "culture fair" as possible,
so it can produce a measure of intelligence irrespective
of the cultural, social or educational background of the
participants. There are two or three examples for
subjects to practice on before taking each sub-test -
each is fully explained, and if someone gets a wrong
answer or fails to understand it, then the administrator
has to show how the answer is derived. Within each
subtest, the items get progressively more difficult.
There is a time limit for each subtest. Norms are
available enabling bus drivers to be compared with a
general population.
This test was included to provide some overall measure of
intelligence of the bus drivers. The intelligence
quotient ("IQ") is popularly perceived as "the" measure
of intelligence, but in academic circles it is not as
popular as in the past (eg. Tyler and Walsh, 1979), and
receives only passing reference in this study. It is
calculated by dividing the person's mental age by his
chronological age, and is suited for measuring the
average growth in intelligence in children. IQ is not
felt to be so appropriate for adults, however, as their
mental growth lacks the predictable regularity it has in
children. A standardised score is of much greater use:
it is more meaningful to see how many standard deviations
above or below average a person is, than to calculate
"IQ".
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(iii) The Sixteen Personality Factor questionnaire (16PF)
Cattell's personality questionnaire was the final test in
the battery. The first version of the 16PF was
published in 1949, after ten years of research, and there
have been five major revisions since, the most recent
editions being published in 1979. Cattell started by
taking all the adjectives which could be used to describe
people (over 4,000) and refined them by combining those
with the same meaning. A large group of people were
then rated by trained observers on the 171 surface traits
which were left. After extensive statistical work using
factor analysis Cattell reduced these to what he called
his sixteen "primary source traits of personality".
These were held to underlie the enduring aspects of human
behaviour. The factors themselves are supposed to be
relatively independent, not being correlated with each
other to any significant degree. A score on one factor
should not be influenced by a score on another, although
there may be some weak correlations. Further analysis
by Cattell produced eight "second-order" factors
(underlying the primary ones), including anxiety and
extroversion.
The test gives scores for fifteen bipolar personality
factors, including reserved vs. outgoing, expedient vs.
conscientious, shy vs. venturesome, and group-dependent
vs. self-sufficient. The sixteenth scale measures
intelligence. Five versions of the test are available:
Forms A and B are the longest (each containing 187
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questions) and require about 45 minutes to complete.
Forms C and D each contain 105 items, taking around half-
an-hour. These four versions are suitable for those
over 16 years of age who have had a normal education. A
fifth version, Form E, is available for those with well-
below average reading ability. Form A (1979 edition)
was used in this research.
The test is a self-report inventory, where respondents
have to pick one answer from a choice of three, based on
their "normal" behaviour. The following are two of the
examples on which subjects practice prior to starting the
test:
1. I like to watch team games
(a) yes (b) occasionally (c) no
2. I prefer people who:
(a) are reserved,
(b) (are) in-between,
(c) make friends quickly.
The test is scored by placing stencils over the answer
sheet, and counting up marks as appropriate. Privacy is
maintained, therefore, by not inspecting answers to
individual questions (this is emphasised by the
administrators at the start of the test). As with the
Culture Fair test, norms are available to compare those
taking the test with the general population. UK norms
have been developed by Saville (1972).
A test of this nature has a number of potential problems,
the first being that people might not tell the truth.
This is more of a problem in personnel selection, where
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people could be tempted to lie in order to give a good
impression. In this research the drivers were
specifically told to give truthful, natural answers, as
the researchers wished to obtain as accurate a picture as
possible. Another difficulty is response sets - the
tendency to give a certain type of answer regardless of
the content of the question. These may include
acquiescence (answering "yes", "agree", etc., to most
items) and cautiousness (non-committal, neutral answers).
Again, the drivers were asked to approach each question
individually, and the administrators checked to see that
no-one merely put crosses in boxes at random. They were
also told to avoid using the middle, "average" answer in
each case, unless it was impossible to chose one of the
others.
Harder to control for were situations where, although
people answered truthfully as they saw it, they had an
unrealistic picture of themselves. Little could be done
about this, except again encouraging them to take a
realistic, natural viewpoint when approaching the
questionnaire. They were told not to spend too much
time thinking about each question - the first natural
answer often being the most accurate. Indeed many of
the questions are virtually unanswerable if one thinks
for too long about them, provoking much self-debate about
the kinds of people whom one prefers, for example.
Despite the drawbacks of tests of this nature, Kline
(1976) says that "impressively consistent and
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psychologically meaningful results have been obtained
with these tests." (p.56)
An enormous amount of research has been carried out into
the 16PF, both by Cattell and his team at the Institute
of Personality and Ability Testing in the USA, and by
other researchers testing and applying it. Buros, for
example, quotes over 1,500 studies using it in his Eighth
Mental Measurements Yearbook (1978, p.1077). In the
first twenty years of its existence it was principally
used for research; since the 1970s however, as Krug
(1981) notes, its use has expanded into both the clinical
and occupational psychology fields. In the latter, for
example, it is frequently used as an aid to management
selection, development and promotion; and in other
exercises such as team-building, stress research and many
aspects of counselling (Tyler, 1986). There is a
clinical guide to its use (Karson and O'Dell, 1976); in
addition there is a guide to interpreting profile
patterns (Krug, 1981) and numerous studies have been
published outlining profile patterns (and multiple
regression equations) for specific occupational groups.
Some of these from the USA appear in the Handbook
(Cattell et al, 1982) ; some recent British ones have
been outlined by Handyside (1986) and McKenna (1987), for
example. The 16PF has been translated into many foreign
languages and applied to many countries overseas, with
the factors being found to apply in countries as diverse
as Germany, Japan and Ghana (Kline, 1976). Without
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doubt, the 16PF is a very widely-used questionnaire both
in research and applied settings.
This extensive application of the 16PF has produced much
debate as to its usefulness, reliability and validity.
This is such a large subject, with almost as many papers
criticising the test (or aspects of it) as praising it,
that only a few general points will be made here. There
appears to be some agreement (eg, Anastasi, 1982; Bloxon,
1978) that reliability (on a test-retest basis), although
fairly low, is satisfactory. There is more debate,
however, as to whether items in each scale correlate
higher with their own scale or with other scales
(factorial homogeneity of items); similarly, over the
extent to which scales are independent of each other
(factorial independence of scales), as is discussed in
Bolton (1978) for example. There is also controversy
over whether an individual's personality can be reduced
to a mere sixteen dimensions. The Handbook has been
criticised by many (including Bloxom, 1978 and Walsh,
1978) as providing inadequate data on the construction of
the test and on reliability and validity studies, and for
being hard to understand.
The impression is gained, however, that despite its
weaknesses, the test probably provides as good a measure
of personality as can be obtained in an efficient manner.
The following quotations illustrate this. The first are
from Bolton:
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The scientific foundation of the 16PF is at
least as solid as any of its major competitors.
When evaluated by reasonable standards, the
16PF compares favourably with any other
inventory that purports to measure variations
in normal personality functioning.
(both Bolton, 1978, p. 1080).
Kline is also praiseworthy of the test:
So large a body of research has been carried
out that, to a properly trained psychologist,
the test variables are psychologically
meaningful. Thus we know for each one what
influences affect its development, what sort of
people score high on a certain factor and what
kinds of behaviour each factor is related to,
as well as what other test varaibles are
correlated with it.
(Kline, 1976, p 67).
In discussing the test he acknowledges its weaknesses and
says that it is far from perfect, being " fairly easy to
distort if used for selection". These apart,
. . . it is certainly one of the best and most
practicable personality questionnaires.
(Kline, 1976, p 70).
4.7 Predictor variables (ii): Background data
Background data on the drivers was also collected. This
section reviews briefly some previous studies which have
used this type of data, before discussing in more depth
the actual measures collected and their classification.
Several studies in this field have used biographical data
when measuring job performance, and this has been
repeated in this research. Brown and Ghiselli, for
example, in their 1947 study of motor coach operators
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looked at age, extent of education and marital status in
addition to taking an intelligence test score.
Similarly, in their 1949 study of accidents among taxi
drivers they collected data on age, years of formal
education, and years of driving both taxis and in
general. Schuster and Guilford (1962) collected and
used 24 biographical items in their Driver Attitude
Survey - as well as those mentioned above, they included
physical and mental health, race and number of employers
in the previous two years.
A number of general items were collected, namely the year
the driver was born, the year he/she commenced
employment, and whether male or female. Some data on
the circumstances in which the driver works were also
noted to see if they had any influence on performance.
These comprised the size of the depot (in terms of number
of drivers employed) and the distance of the depot from
the company head office.
The other source of background data was that obtainable
from the job application form. The format varied between
the different companies in the Group, but the information
obtained was basically the same. A copy of one such
version is given in the appendix. One drawback is that
they may be incomplete: information may be incorrect or
omitted (either because the person has forgotten or feels
it might unfairly prejudice his application). A degree
of caution has to be exercised with this data, therefore,
as it is based on what the person has said he has done
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(although he has to sign a statement to say that
everything he has written is true).
The information collected from the application form
comprised the following. First were the types of
driving licence held at the time of application - the
number of years the driver has had a car licence, and
whether he held Public Service Vehicle (PSV) or Heavy
Goods Vehicle (HGV) licences as well. Next were the
types of educational qualifications the person had
obtained, both academic (school and college/university)
and technical (such as "City and Guilds"). These were
arranged into the following categories
General certificates, such as "Third Year Leaving






Trade Certification (usually the result of an
apprenticeship, often "City and Guilds" or equivalent);
The final category of data taken from application forms
concerned previous employment, subdivided between that in
a bus company and that elsewhere. Previous chapters
have mentioned that turnover in the industry has been
high (and continues to be so in areas such as Edinburgh);
accordingly there is some movement between different
types of operator (SBG, municipals and independents).
The SBG trains all its drivers of full-size buses to hold
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a category "A" PSV licence, which allows them to drive
any type of bus, and accordingly makes them valuable to
independent concerns who have neither the facilities nor
the resources to train people themselves. The movement
is not all one-way, however: there are a number of cases
of drivers starting off with an SBG company, moving to an
independent and then returning to their original company,
perhaps because of the lower wage rates and lesser
security of employment commonly found in the independent
sector. This is especially the case in areas where
there are a number of well-established independents:
examples include Paisley (with McGill's of Barrhead and
Graham's Bus Service being strong competitors for the
SBG) and Wishaw (where Central Scottish compete with
Hutcheson's of Overtown and Irvine's of Law).
Staff shortages in the past meant that many depots had to
be less selective in their recruiting - if a person had a
PSV licence and no serious convictions, they were almost
certain of employment. Especially in the Central belt,
there are many cases of drivers having one, two or more
periods of previous employment with their firm.
Unfortunately, there are also cases of drivers who were
dismissed (some even for having breath smelling of
alcohol) gaining re-employment.
The information pertaining to previous employment in a
bus company was recorded as follows, in the form of "yes"
or "no":
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own company: resigned of own accord;
own company: dismissed from employment;
worked for another company in the Scottish Bus Group;
worked for a municipal operator, or one of the companies
belonging to the National Bus Company;
employed by an independent operator;
("own company" refers to his employer at the time the
records were examined).
The other area related to previous employment outwith the
bus industry. This was divided into 10 fairly common
categories, and it was recorded (on a yes/no basis)
whether the person had held a job in each. The
following were the classifications used:
manual unskilled: no qualifications and very little
skill/experience needed; eg, labourer and dustman;
manual semi-skilled: no qualifications necessary in
many cases; some measure of training required plus an
element of experience built up by doing the job.
Includes production or machine operator, storeman,
railway guard, brewery/distillery workers, etc.;
manual skilled: qualifications usually required,
often after serving a traditional apprenticeship
(leading to "City and Guilds" or similar). Includes
building trades (bricklayer, carpenter, plumber,
electrician, painter and decorator), turner,
blacksmith, baker, butcher, gardener, etc.;
clerical: covers a range of clerical and secretarial
tasks;
managerial: refers to a fairly low level of
management in most cases, but where there is some
element of responsibility. Examples from the
research include pub managers, shop branch managers,
and foremen in a factory;
"off-road" driving: where a formal licence to drive
is not required as work takes place either inside a
factory (eg forklift trucks) or off a public road, on
building sites for example (drivers of cranes,
bulldozers);
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"licensed" driving; occupations where certainly a
normal licence and often a special licence are needed;
includes delivery vans, taxis and heavy goods
vehicles. There is some movement from both taxi and
lorry driving to bus driving, often on account of the
greater security of employment in the SBG and the
lesser need for long-distance overnight journeys;
selling: those who have worked in a commercial
relationship with the public. Examples from this
study have included barmen, milkmen, shop assistants,
insurance collectors and sales representatives.
HM Forces and Police; These tend to be favoured by
those who recruit drivers, the logic being that as
they are disciplined, well-dressed and take orders,
they will make good employees;
miscellaneous: anything not covered above, or where
the person has just put the name of an organisation
with no indication of the position held or type of
work.
The final piece of data in this section was the number of
jobs the person had held in the five years prior to his
application - this included those of under 12 months'
duration and previous employment in his own company (if
applicable), but excluded periods of unemployment. The
intention was to give some idea of permanence or
commitment - between a person who had held a job for a




Much has been written about the collection, use and types
of performance data; appearing in specialised texts on
the subject (such as Landy and Farr, 1983); in more
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general texts on industrial psychology (for example,
Ghiselli and Brown, 1955; Guion, 1965; and Smith in
Dunette (ed), 1976) and some theses (for example,
Morrison (1981)). This category of data can be divided
into judgemental and non-judgemental methods, with the
former tending to be more popular.
According to Landy and Trumbo, three-quarters of
published research studies used judgemental measures as
the primary criterion variable. In essence, this method
involves someone assessing another's performance (either
on specific variables or in general) by giving a rating
on a scale. These may be either verbal (from "very
good" to "very poor", with various stages in-between) or
numerical (for example, from one to five). Rating
scales can either be criterion-referenced (where
performance is evaluated against a set standard) or norm-
referenced (where an individual's performance is compared
with a group or other individuals). Despite attempts to
increase the objectivity of ratings (such as the
development of "Behaviourly Anchored Rating Scales", eg,
Smith and Kendall, 1963) they remain subjective
judgements based on personal estimates of others'
performance, and this is one of their main drawbacks.
Supervisors may, for example, see some of their employees
in a better or worse light than others and rate their
performance accordingly, irrespective of actual
performance. Other supervisors may be unwilling to use
the extremes at either end of the scale, or may
162
consistently rate people either well or badly.
The other category of performance measures are those
which are more objective and described as non-
judgemental. Guion (1965) subdivided them into
production and personnel data. The former comprise
measures of output which can be easily counted and
attributed to individuals. For factory workers, for
example, these may include quantity or quality of units
produced, scrap rate, bonuses earned, etc; for sales
staff, volume or cash value of sales, commission level or
profit on sales are possible inidices. An example of
the latter is found in Randell (1972) for salesmen of gas
appliances. Measures available included number of
sales, mean value of sales, and days worked for each
month over a three year period (Randell, 1972, p 73).
Personnel data, on the other hand, do not represent
performance directly but are often used in any definition
of effectiveness. These may comprise absenteeism,
turnover, grievances, accidents, job level/salary or
promotions. It is mainly measures in this latter
category which were used in this research, as bus drivers
do not really "produce" anything. The revenue they
collect is usually beyond their control (ie, they have
little or no control over who travels where or when);
and they may drive a number of different vehicles in a
day, so it would be hard to monitor fuel consumption,
wear and tear, etc.
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4.8.2 The measures themselves: (i) Rationale
A system for classifying the performance data was
established after an initial survey had been made of the
sorts of data which were available. Reference was made
to some of the published research studies referred to in
the previous chapter which have used criterion measures.
To some extent the classifications used in those studies
have influenced the system produced for this project.
Two papers in particular were useful for their categories
of accident data. The first was Farmer and Chambers
(1939) who used the following:
a) Driver not responsible
b) Driver responsible:
i) Errors of judgement (eg, miscalculating the space
between two parked cars or taking corners too sharply)
ii) Over-runs (failing to stop in time and hitting the
rear of a vehicle in front)
iii) Skids (on wet or icy roads)
iv) Miscellaneous
Ghiselli and Brown's study of motor coach operators was
also useful in this respect:
a) Collisions - with pedestrians
- with trolley cars
- with motor vehicles
b) Non-collisions - boarding/alighting accidents
- accidents aboard the vehicle
The author's research was not concerned solely with
accidents, however, and two other studies were of benefit
in defining criteria. Ghiselli and Brown (1955) report
these ten measures used to assess the performance of
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"streetcar motormen" (tram drivers) in San Francisco:
1. Collisions with vehicles/pedestrians.
2. Traffic violations.
3. Commendations from the public.
4. Complaints from the public.
5. Number of times company rules broken.
6. Sleepovers.
7. Number of times schedules broken.
8. Reprimands from inspectors.
9. Ratings by inspectors.
10. Errors reported by dispatchers.
Heron's study of bus conductors in London was also useful
for selecting criteria for the non-driving aspects of the
job being studied, principally fare collection. He used
five objective measures (taken for the first six months
of the conductors' employment) and one rating:
1. Gross earnings.
2. Cash shortages.
3. Periods of absence.
4. Lateness for duty.
5. Disciplinery actions.
6. Rating - "source of concern to supervisors".
(ii) Disciplinery action
Based on these studies, and the material which was made
available, the classification which follows was produced
for the criterion measures. As a proxy for
"performance", therefore, drivers' offence, accident and
other records have been used, which in most cases were
fairly comprehensive. All disciplinary interviews are
recorded, whether action is taken or not, and all
accidents that occur have to be reported, however trivial
they may seem, on a standardised form which can then be
sent to SMT Insurance if need be. In some depots copies
of these forms were available; in others a card in the
driver's record file gave a summary of each accident.
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A disciplinary procedure is set out in the drivers' rule
book, outlining the types of disciplinary action, the
appeal procedure and stating that an offence can no
longer be held against a driver after two years. This
is the subject of an agreement between the Group and the
Transport and General Workers' Union. The main
categories of action are as follows
informal warnings; given in cases where "an employee
is in breach of normally accepted practices, or fails
to achieve the required standard of performance"
(p.63). Although the rule book says that no official
record shall be kept of these, they tend to be
recorded on a record card along with the reason.
formal (written) warnings; issued if informal
warnings fail to achieve the desired effect, or if
there is a more serious breach of the rules. Copies
are given to the driver concerned, often to his shop
steward, and placed in his record file;
suspension (without pay): for anything between one
and seven days can be imposed if both the above fail
to achieve any lasting improvement in the appropriate
area, or if the offence is sufficiently serious
enough. Seven or more days' notice of suspension is
normally given to enable the driver's duties to be
reallocated.
final warning (written); that dismissal will follow
if a particular offence is repeated, or if performance
does not improve;
- dismissal; if a series of warnings fail to have the
desired effect, or if, again, an offence is serious
enough.
These categories of action are applied both to breaches
of the rules and to accidents, although with the latter
there are two additional categories. "Not at fault" is
where the driver is totally blameless; "no action"
refers to where the accident was the fault of the driver
but it was so minor that it was not considered worth
while taking action against him. There is, therefore, a
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hierarchy of punishments. Dismissal is not necessarily
the end - in the research a number of cases were found of
an employee (with his union) appealing against it
successfully, and being reinstated. It was also found
that "final warning" was often not the last action taken
- some records contain several final warnings, with one
driver receiving seven in the space of three years. A
count was taken of the number of occurrences of each type
of action, both for disciplinery offences and for
accidents.
(iii) Offence records
Referred to as "defaulters' records" in some companies,
these are based on breaches of the Bus Group rules.
These may arise as a result of an inspector finding a
fault when checking a bus (eg. a destination blind
wrongly displayed, a passenger with a wrongly printed or
priced ticket, or not keeping to schedule), a complaint
by a member of the public (eg. that a bus failed to stop
at a particular point) or an observation by a clerical
employee of the company (eg. a wrongly-completed waybill,
or "excessive" absenteeism). The headings under which
it was decided to categorise these offences were decided
upon from looking at the rule book and at the frequency
with which each type of offence occurred. It was
considered desirable to subdivide the offences (at least
for the early stages of analysis) - as opposed to
aggregating them - to see whether certain types of driver
committed certain types of offence. For each driver
offences were put into the following categories
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timekeeping; whilst driving, in particular being
early or excessively late at particular points. Rule
26 (a) states "The Driver is responsible for the bus
leaving the terminus and all intermediate timing
points at the appropriate time, and is responsible to
regulate the speed of the vehicle that he does not
arrive at any point en route ahead of time." (pp. 21-
22) If a driver is unduly delayed by traffic
congestion, a delay report has to be submitted.
fare charging and ticket issuing; charging the wrong
fare for the journey (too much/too little), issuing a
wrongly printed ticket or failing to issue one at all,
not carrying emergency tickets, and not checking
season tickets/passes correctly are all included in
this section (covered by rule 22).
failure to stop and uplift; both passengers and
inspectors. As rule 27 states, "The failure of
intending passengers to give a signal when standing at
a stopping place will not be accepted as an excuse for
failure to uplift the passengers, except at a request
bus stop." (p.23)
rudeness; also referred to as insolence or
"attitude"; this can be to passengers (intending or
actual), other road users and inspectors. Rule 7
puts in this category demeanour towards passengers (he
must be "civil, courteous and obliging") arguments
(which drivers should avoid, or if caught in them be
tactful and take names and addresses of witnesses) and
service to passengers (knowledge of services and
tours). (p.6)
general carelessness; a catch-all for a number of
miscellaneous breaches of the regulations. Included
here are failure to wear uniform correctly (rule
7(a)), displaying the wrong destination on the front
of the bus (rule 19), failure to carry or return a
duty board (rule 19 (b)), illegible or wrongly-
completed waybills, driving on the wrong route and
breach of EEC rules on using a tachograph.
quality of driving; often from a complaint or the
observation of a company official. This includes
excessive speed, dangerous driving with respect to
other road users, and misuse of the vehicle, often
connected with the gearbox.
excessive absenteeism or lateness in reporting for
duty; in some depots this was recorded on the
discipline record (as opposed to general records of
same) and appropriate action taken;
excessive cash shortages; as with the above, where a
specific entry was made for having an "excessive"
difference between cash paid in and the total value of
tickets sold, as recorded by the ticket machine;
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miscellaneous; anything not covered above (very few
in this category);
number of complaints: from members of the public.
If the reason for the complaint was given on the
record, it was also recorded as an entry under the
appropriate category. For example, "Complaint -
failure to uplift passenger at x": an entry would be
made under both "failure to stop and uplift" and
"complaint";
(iv) Accident records
A similar approach was taken in recording accidents.
There is a comprehensive procedure which has to be
followed when any accident occurs: "Every accident,
however trivial, must be reported to the management by
the drivers involved when they go off duty, and a report
form completed." (Rule 32(m), p.27). Following Brown
and Ghiselli (1947), the accidents were divided into
collision and near-collision types, as follows:-
Collision accidents:
collision with other road vehicles: (usually on
public roads, but can include reversing into other
buses in a bus station or depot);
- collision with pedestrians: (fairly rare, but from
reading the records those that do occur tend to be
mainly with drunks);
- collision with animals;
collision with inanimate objects: (such as fences,
walls, gateposts, pillars, lamp-posts and bus shelters;
in the highlands this can include hitting packed snow
on the roadside and the effects of skidding on ice).
Non-collision accidents:-
boarding and alighting accidents: (people falling on
the steps whilst boarding or alighting from a bus);
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accidents aboard the bus: (commonly referred to as
"passenger injury" - often includes people being hurt
(even slightly) when a bus has to brake suddenly, or
falling off their seat when going round a sharp
corner, or losing their balance if the bus starts off
before they are seated).
vandalism from outside; (commonly includes windows
being smashed by bricks and lights being broken);
vandalism from inside; (mostly seats being ripped and
lights smashed, almost always by unruly school
children);
miscellaneous: covers anything else, mainly including
windscreens being broken by stones flying up from the
road.
(iv) Other indicators of performance
In some depots specific data relating to cash shortages
and lateness/absence were available. A detailed record
is kept of all cash shortages (ie, the difference between
the value of tickets sold, as recorded by the ticket
machine, and the cash paid in) so that they can be
deducted from wages at the end of each week. As might
be expected there is considerable variation between
drivers in the extent and quantity of shortages, from
those who have very few shortages (those that they do
have being of small amounts) to those who are frequently
in deficit (sometimes of large amounts). In the depots
for which these figures were available, the number of
weeks in which the driver was short was recorded; so
that the data would be compatible between depots it was
converted into the average number of weeks short per
year.
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Data was also made available, in some depots, on lateness
in reporting for, and unauthorised absence from, work.
Both can cause disruption to operations; each driver is
allocated a "duty", which starts at a particular time.
If he fails to appear at that time the control staff have
to allocate another driver to his duty, using either
spare men or those who have reported early. If
alternative arrangements cannot be made in time, then a
service may run late or even not at all. Absence is
taken in the sense of unauthorised absence from work, and
does not include scheduled rest days, paid holidays and
sick leave. Both are recorded as an average number of
days per year.
On the positive side, a number of drivers received
letters of commendation; these were found most
frequently at New Street depot, Edinburgh, which operates
a large number of extended tours. A fairly close bond
is often established between driver and passengers over
maybe 5-7 days; some drivers obviously make such a good
impression that the company receives letters praising
them (and the drivers receive large tips).
Status of drivers was the final category; approximately
a year after they had taken the psychological tests. In
particular, this was included to see how many had left,
and for what reason; also to see whether any were
promoted.
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The classification used was as follows:-
1. Still employed as a driver;
2. Still employed as a depot controller: "a driver who
does not drive" except when there is a shortage and
who spends most of his time in allocating drivers and
vehicles to duties;
3. Shop steward;
4. Since resigned from the company: unfortunately, only
very rarely were the actual reasons recorded;
5. Since retired or deceased;
6. Since dismissed and not reinstated: as with
resignations the reasons were not always available
either in writing or verbally from the appropriate
Traffic Supervisor;
7. Since promoted. Depot Controllers and Inspectors are
recruited from the ranks of drivers: some become
Depot Controllers and then Inspectors if they are
suitable; other drivers achieve direct promotion to
Inspector.
A practical approach was taken to the collection of this
data. The companies of the Scottish Bus Group
fortunately keep fairly comprehensive records on each
driver, and access was given to these. It was decided
to record as much detail as possible about each driver.
The records were divided into two main sections -
"background" (such as age, previous employment and




Test administration took place at various intervals
between September 1984 and October 1985. The pattern
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was usually for the researchers to spend perhaps a week
at a depot, testing most of the drivers who were
available, then to return perhaps for a day or two on a
few later occasions in an attempt to test the remaining
drivers. As hours of work, rest days and holidays are
staggered, the SBG advised the researchers that a few
return visits would enable drivers who were not available
on the first occasion to be given an opportunity to
participate. Visits to the depots were always arranged
in co-operation with local management so as to be made at
times when it would be most convenient to see their
drivers. The actual conditions in which the tests were
conducted varied quite considerably. They ranged from a
noisy, cramped entrance lobby (closed-off to the public),
a "Portacabin" and a bus to a modern conference room,
offices and a lecture room with refreshments laid on.
A total of 670 drivers took part in the questionnaires,
49% of the original sample.
Drivers were tested in groups of between one and sixteen,
with the session lasting around one-and-a-half to two
hours. Figure 4.2 is an example of the format of a
typical testing session.
The project had been approved at a national level between
the SBG and the national negotiating committee of the
TGWU. The latter agreed to recommend to all their
members to take part - in particular they were interested
in whether there was any evidence of stress.
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Figure 4.2
A typical test session.
- drivers arrive and are welcomed by the administrator.
Given a copy of the letter from the University if they
had not already received one.
- brief introduction (5 minutes approximately):
- who the administrator(s) is/are and where they are
from
- purpose of the research
- confidentiality of results
- opportunity for drivers to write in if they wish a
brief summary of their scores
- opportunity for drivers to ask questions
- Word Recognition Test (12 minutes including introduction)
- Culture Fair test (20-25 minutes including instructions)
- 16PF (40-50 minutes); drivers leave when they are
finished and are thanked for participating.
Participation in the testing was voluntary, though
drivers who attended were paid two hours at the standard
rate. Prior to testing taking place in each depot, a
consultation meeting was held between the local
management, shop stewards and the researchers. At such
meetings, the project was explained and any queries dealt
with. It was stressed that all the completed
questionnaires, and analyses of results for individual
drivers, would remain strictly confidential. Both the
SBG and the trade union would receive a general report at
the end of the project, and under no circumstances would
individual scores be divulged to management. Prior to
each driver taking the tests, he was given a letter from
the researchers explaining the purpose of the project,
giving examples of the questions asked in each test, and
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inviting him to write in if he/she wished a personal
summary of his own results. 81 drivers did so.
4.9.2 Problems in obtaining participation
There was a wide variation between depots in the numbers
of drivers who took part in the tests, despite the
willingness of the researchers to make return visits.
Table 4.3
Participation rates for each depot
Drivers
Total tested Days
Depot drivers No % test
Alloa 42 24 57 2
Cowdenbeath 87 0 0 0
Cumnock 66 46 70 8
Edinburgh 235 170 72 12
Elgin/Forres (1) 58 23 40 8
Fort William 23 15 65 2
Hamilton 177 139 78 7
Hawick 20 14 70 4
Larbert 100 10 10 1
Paisley 146 81 55 11
Peterhead/Fraserburgh (2) 50 36 72 6
St Andrews 34 0 0 0
Stepps 100 36 36 6
Thurso/Wick 50 9 18 4
Wishaw 180 67 37 6
TOTAL 1368 670 49 77
Notes (1) Turnout at Elgin was 17 out of 44 drivers
(38%); at Forres it was 6 out of 12 drivers
(50%) .
(2) Turnout at Peterhead was 24 out of 39 (61%);
at Fraserburgh all 11 drivers took part in
the survey.
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Table 4.3 above shows that turnout varied from just 10%
of the drivers in one depot to over 70% in several, and
that in Fife the project never got off the ground. In
addition, the project had to be abandoned after just one
day at Larbert.
Five main reasons may be advanced for the variations in
turnout. The first appeared to be a general fear and
suspicion of the project, despite assurances that it was
not a device to give management reasons to dismiss
drivers, and that all test scores would remain
confidential. It was believed that participation was
lower among older drivers (it may have been something
alien to many of them) and those who may have lacked
confidence in their own ability. A number of older
drivers, in particular, commented that they had
difficulty with the tests as it was maybe twenty or
thirty years since they had left school, and were not in
the habit of taking "exams" (as some of them referred to
the tests). This is the same reaction as Farmer and
Chambers (1939) found nearly fifty years prior.
There was also the experience of "Scotmap" two or three
years previously. As discussed earlier, this large-
scale review of all SBG services resulted, not only in
more efficient rostering of vehicles and drivers, but
also in some redundancies. In a number of depots there
was a body of opinion which believed that the union
officials had been tricked into agreeing to "Scotmap" and
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that this project was in similar vein.
The researcher found often quite hostile responses when
he mentioned "Scotmap" in conversation, among both
drivers and depot management (inspectors and traffic
supervisors) alike, and frequently had to reassure people
that this project was being carried out independently of
both the Group and the Unions. As was discussed in
earlier chapters drivers had found that duties revised
after Scotmap allowed less time for breaks at either end
of a journey, and felt that insufficient allowance was
made for recovery time if a journey was delayed due to
traffic congestion. Local management considered that
they should have been consulted more when services were
altered, as many of the new routes and timetables did not
appear to be an accurate reflection of local travel
demands and patterns, as they saw them.
A second reason for the differing levels of turnout was
that the organisation of the project at depot level
varied greatly. In some cases it appeared that
management and/or union officials did not encourage
sufficiently drivers to participate. An example of this
was at Wishaw, where the DTS felt that all he needed to
do was to post names of drivers and the times they were
to appear, and leave it there. A more personal approach
might have brought greater success, as would perhaps have
been making smaller groups of drivers come at times more
convenient to themselves. For example, a number of
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drivers were not keen to come to the depot two hours or
more before their shift; similarly, drivers who finished
their early shift at, for example, 14.00 hours were often
unwilling to wait until 15.00 hours or so (when a group
would be assembled to take the tests) , despite the offer
of extra money. [This problem was by no means confined
to this depot.] The shop stewards at this depot
appeared to give the project less support than some of
their colleagues had done elsewhere; for some of the
time they were preoccupied with union meetings and
organising a "day of action".
This can be contrasted with depots in which there was a
reasonably high turnout. In Hamilton, for example, the
supervisor took the attitude that all drivers were to
participate unless they had a very good reason for not
doing so. After the first three days, when the drivers
were booked to come at particular times, they took
drivers as they came off shift along to the testing room.
This was accompanied by encouraging remarks such as,
"Just come in and answer a few questions", "You'll enjoy
it", and, "People who have done this are doing well when
they fill in their football coupons". This brought a
lot of hard work for the researchers, with different
drivers starting different tests at different times, but
it worked well, and meant that a large number of drivers
were seen. Similarly, in Fraserburgh the depot
controller just assumed that all his drivers would take
part in the survey, gave them little opportunity not to,
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and with the backing of the local shop steward, had no
difficulty.
The offer of two hours' payment was not in places as
strong an incentive as was thought initially. There
were cases of depots where a significant proportion of
the drivers were ill or absent, thus providing lucrative
opportunities for overtime earnings. (The drivers
taking the questionnaires were only paid the standard
rate.) One such depot was Stepps, where despite
apparently vigorous attempts being made to encourage
drivers to take part, only 36% did so. A different
situation was found in Thurso and Wick: a number of
drivers had shares in crofts or family shops, and thus
driving was not their only source of income. [During
the research visit, in fact, one was dismissed for
driving a taxi for his wife's firm - in strict
contravention of the SBG rules.] In addition, the
nature of services there meant that many duties involved
maybe ten or eleven hours on duty, spread over the day
(rather than the usual mixture of early/late shift) and
accordingly drivers received above-average earnings.
Many of those operating the contract services to the
Dounreay nuclear establishment, for example, would maybe
work a ten- or eleven-hour split shift. This might
involve being on duty from 06.30 to 10.30 hours and 14.00
to 18.30 hours: in addition to being paid for eight and
a half hours, there would also be a spreadover allowance
for the time off-duty in the middle of the day.
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These cases can be compared with depots such as Cumnock,
where Scotmap revisions had not only reduced the number
of duties (and therefore the number of drivers) but also
cut many of them back to the basic 7 hours 48 minutes.
[SBG Drivers are guaranteed a minimum 39 hour week,
usually comprising five days of each 7 hours and 48
minutes.] Opportunities for overtime were scarce and
therefore one extra two hours' payment, even just at
standard time, was seen as an incentive by many of the
drivers. 70% participated at this depot.
A fourth factor contributing to a poor response in some
depots was a loss of interest in the project once the
initial enthusiasm had worn off, despite the efforts of
the researchers. This was something of a problem in
Paisley, for example, where testing took place one or two
days per week over five weeks. In some other depots,
there was a gap of several weeks between the initial
consultation meeting and the start of testing. By the
time the testing did start, the project was no longer at
the forefront of the minds of either union officials or
depot management. This was especially the case at both
Elgin/Forres and Thurso/Wick.
A final consideration in this section is that the project
was sometimes the victim of circumstances outwith the
control of the researchers. In some cases, this took
the form of very poor relations between management and
union, for example at Larbert where the project had to be
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abandoned after just one day. In addition, the local
shop stewards at that time appeared to be opposed to
anything recommended by their national negotiating
committee, and this had casued a number of local disputes
at the depot. They were extremely sceptical of the
project, and it appeared that all they had done to inform
their members about it was to place the following notice
in the drivers' room.
Drivers are reminded that the Edinburgh
University driver research project is
voluntary, and that any driver who does not
wish to participate does not have to do so.
In Elgin, there had been a change in shop steward since
the original consultation meeting, and the new one was
regarded, by management as being militant. He did not
encourage any drivers to participate (some felt that he
actively discouraged them) and never sat the tests
himself. In both Elgin and Peterhead, the traffic
supervisors were elderly and very near retirement, and
neither put much effort into organising drivers for the
project. In Wishaw, another reason for the low turnout
may have been rivalry between Wishaw drivers and those
from Carluke depot nearby which had been merged into
Wishaw around eight or nine years previously. For a few
years after the merger there remained separate duty
sheets for the two groups. This rivalry appeared still
to be present, not helped by the Area Manager and most of
his inspectors coming from Carluke originally.
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In one company, Fife, the project never commenced at all
- one of the shop stewards' demands was for the overtime
rate to be paid to all who participated. Not only did
the Group object to this for fear of repercussions in the
other companies, but the Company itself was under
financial pressure due to the miners' strike.
Subsequent attempts to restart negotiations did not
succeed.
In not all depots did local circumstances appear to
conspire against the project. In Edinburgh, for
example, all seemed to be against the project. The
Assistant Traffic Supervisor was under considerable
pressure owing to promotion of his superior with no
successor being appointed, continuing labour turnover of
around 20% per year, drivers undergoing training for new
ticket machines which were introduced whilst the research
took place, lack of spare drivers with the start of the
coach tours season, and consequently plentiful overtime
opportunities. Remarkably, this depot had one of the
highest participation rates.
A fear was that these factors may have resulted in an
imperfect sample having been taken. Some areas were
barely covered (eg, Fife, Falkirk, Caithness); and in
some depots certain groups (such as the most anxious or
the least intelligent), who could have made a significant
difference to the results, may have been omitted.
Subsequent analysis was able to determine whether major
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differences existed between those tested and not tested,
as background and performance data were collected for all
drivers at most depots.
4.9.3 Collection of data from depot records
The bulk of the personality tests had been administered
by the summer of 1985, and discussions took place with
the Group to decide from which depots the remaining data
from records would be collected. Visits were made to a
small depot (Hawick) to investigate what data was
actually available, and this enabled the researcher to
design a form to collect the data from the other depots.
By mutual agreement it was felt inappropriate to return
to some of the depots. The small number of drivers
tested at Thurso and Wick, combined with the great
distance of these depots from Edinburgh, meant that no
further data was collected there. Similarly, the small
numbers seen at Larbert, combined with the industrial
relations atmosphere there, resulted in that depot not
being included. Stepps was also abandoned - there had
been a low turnout, and in addition another depot from
another company (Baillieston from Eastern) had been
merged into it, resulting in great organisational
problems which caused the resignation of the manager
owing to illness.
Collection of background and performance data took place
between October 1985 and March 1986, with attempts being
183
made to leave a gap of approximately a year between
testing and examination of records. The researcher
carried out this task virtually single-handed, receiving
some clerical assistance only at Edinburgh. Data was
collected under the categories described in the previous
sections. The following table summarises what was
obtained from each depot. In the following sections,
the reasons for the disparities and the problems involved
with the collection of this data are discussed.
Table 4.4
Collection of background and performance data, by depot
Type of data
App. Cash
Depot Form Off Acc. Shorts Absence/late
(i) (ii) (ii) (iii) (iii)
Alloa Most 6 6 DR None
Cumnock < 50% 6 4 6 mnths None
Edinburgh All 5 5 4 years 4 yrs
Elgin Most 8 8 6 mnths 7 yrs
Forres Most 8 8 6 mnths None
Fort William Most 6 6 None None
Fraserburgh Most 8 8 6 mnths None
Hawick Most 5 5 6 mnths None
Hamilton 79-85 3 2 6 mnths 1 yr
Paisley c. 50% 6 6 DR None
Peterhead < 25% 8 8 6 mnths None
Wishaw 79-85 5 2 6 mnths 4 yrs
Notes:
(i) Either proportion of those available for inspection
("most", "all" or a percentage) or the years for which
they were available.
(ii) Number of years for which records inspected
(iii) Number of years/months for which records inspected;
"DR" = only appeared in disciplinery record
"None" = no such records available for inspection
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4.9.4 Problems with biographical and performance data
A few problems were encountered with this, one of which
was that a full record of previous employment Was not
always available. The application form asks applicants
to declare their last two employments; if they do not
cover five years, then details of all of those that do.
Some people were meticulous in filling in five previous
jobs (which might have covered their whole working life
to that time), others just put in those covering five
years (or less). An additional problem was that, in
some depots, drivers entering prior to c.1965-1970 had
completed an older style of form, with less information
on previous employment and the length of time a licence
had been held, and no record of school and other
educational qualifications. This was especially
noticeable in depots where a higher-than-average
proportion of drivers had long service, such as Cumnock.
An added complication was that, in not all depots, were
all the application forms available. In the two Central
Scottish depots, for example, all records of that nature
were stored at the company's head office, where recently
a new person had taken charge of them. He had decided
to reorganise the filing and disposed of all those prior
to 1979 (only a few months before permission was
requested to see them). In some depots the storage of
such forms was rather disorganised, and only a quarter to
a half were able to be found. In others, however,
meticulous records were kept and the bulk of such forms
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were available. In most cases it was possible to
determine, from the driver's record card, whether he had
previously been employed in that company and, if so,
whether he had left voluntarily or not.
One of the major problems encountered with this data was
that it did not all cover the same length of time.
Drivers had differing lengths of service, from less than
a year to over 30 years. Similarly, in some depots
discipline and accident records were available for longer
time periods than in others. The problem was how to
make the records from each depot (and each driver)
compatible with one another. It was decided that an
average would be used: the number of years for which the
records were taken was entered in the data file prior to
both the discipline and the accident records. The
computer program used divided each record by the
appropriate number of years to give an annual average for
each.
It appeared from collecting the performance data, that
there were variations between depots in the way
management treated offences and accidents. The action
taken against drivers appeared to vary considerably, even
within companies (comparing for Northern, for example,
Elgin and Peterhead; Hamilton and Wishaw in Central),
perhaps reflecting differing managerial approaches.
Minor accidents for which a driver is responsible are a
particular example of this : in some depots there was
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almost always a "no action" recorded, whilst in others a
seemingly similar accident brought a "warning" or worse.
Similarly with minor discipline offences - some areas
appeared to have far more, on average, than others.
Written and final warnings, and suspensions occurred far
more often in some depots than others. In addition,
there were variations in the way this information was
recorded. In the two Central Scottish depots,
blameworthy accidents were noted in the driver's record
file, whereas those not to blame were all entered in a
large book. At Cumnock all accidents were recorded in a
book, with a symbol to indicate if the driver was at
fault. In other depots (such as Paisley, Alloa, Fort
William and those of Northern) a photocopy of every
accident report was put in the driver's file, while at
others (such as Edinburgh) there was just a summary sheet
of accidents and action taken. Attempts were made to
standardise this data when it was being recorded and
coded for computer analysis.
Information tended to be recorded in differing ways
between depots, cash shortages being one example. Each
depot kept a record of whether a driver's takings were
under or over what they should be (in Peterhead and
Fraserburgh they were more often over than under), and at
the end of the week the shortage was deducted from wages.
In some of the larger depots in particular, the driver
was given a disciplinary interview if his shortage
exceeded a certain level, and this was recorded
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specifically on his record. In Alloa this took place
where the shortage was over £1; in Wishaw and Paisley
when it was in excess of £2; and in Hamilton if greater
than £4. At Edinburgh and other depots very rarely were
there specific interviews; rather if a driver was
persistently short he would receive a general interview
and reprimand, with words to the effect of "excessive
cash shortages" being recorded but with no indication of
what was "excessive".
Lateness and absence records were only available in some
places, as were separate details of cash shortages, and
the problems with availability of application forms have
already been discussed. Fortunately most depots did not
adhere too strongly to the two-year rule (after that time
an offence cannot be held against a driver) - although
records of more than two years were often scored out,
they were usually still readable and able to be recorded.
At Central a new style of record book had been introduced
approximately five months prior to the researchers
examining the records - at Wishaw all the old record
cards had been placed into the books but at Hamilton very
few had been put in (presumably only the more serious
ones).
4.9.5 Types of data not collected
Mention can be made briefly of the sorts of data that
might have been used, but were not. Rating scales
188
(discussed earlier), either in their basic form or
"behaviourally-anchored", are widely used in research of
this nature. The SBG did not permit their use, however,
mainly on the grounds of time. Not only would
behaviourally-anchored scales have taken some time to
establish, but the whole exercise of getting Traffic
Supervisors and Inspectors to rate each driver would have
taken too long. Salary levels were another possibility;
however, all drivers (once qualified) are paid the same
rate per hour as different grades do not exist. Gross
earnings might have been used, as a reflection of the
amount of overtime and extra days a driver was willing to
work. (This was one of the criteria employed by Heron,
1954.) This is allocated on a seniority basis, however,
and opportunities for it vary considerably between
depots. Tachograph discs could have been a source of
data, showing those drivers who exceed the speed limit or
leave early or late. Not all drivers work long-distance
services, though, and the discs (which exist in great
quantity) require both time and skill to interpret
properly.
Repeated attempts were made to obtain financial data from
the Bus Group, each without success. Although it would
be hard to assign everyday costs to individual drivers
(such as fuel consumption, wear and tear) for the reasons
already stated, it might have been useful to gain some
data for depots as a whole. This could have taken the
form of average costs of fuel and spare parts, and
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perhaps indices such as the average number of breakdowns
per vehicle per year, average size of repairs to buses
and average running costs of each depot. These could
have been compared with average test scores and other
indices at a depot-by-depot level. Costs of accidents
could also have been useful. It was mentioned earlier
that each accident has to be reported formally - if the
cost of rectification is in excess of a certain amount
then in most cases a full report is sent to SMT
Insurance. Information on accident costs could have
been used at either an individual driver level (eg, an
average cost of each driver's accidents) or aggregated
for use at a depot level, along with the other statistics
above. Despite considerable efforts by the researchers,
none of this data was forthcoming. In particular with
the first category, the more competitive environment
which followed deregulation in October 1986 has made the
individual companies even less willing than they were to
divulge data of this nature, which could potentially be
of great benefit to their competitors.
A different aspect on the collection of performance data
would have been to undertake some form of observation of
individual drivers. This could have been either as a
definite outsider, travelling on buses and watching how
individual drivers coped with the demands of the job, or
for the researcher to have become a participant observer,
taking on the role of a driver and watching his
colleagues at work. No form of direct observation was
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in fact used. One of the problems would have been to
find ways in which to make the fliany observations or
ratings compatible with each other so that they could
have been analysed statistically. All the other data in
the research is in numerical form. Another difficulty
might have been one of ethics - would the driver have
been told that there was someone on his bus assessing his
performance? What would happen if the driver was not
told but discovered that this was occurring? How could
the differing social, cultural and traffic conditions be
controlled for across the country? If drivers had been
told, would that have affected their performance in the
wajgy that car drivers tend to be more careful when they
see a police car near them? There was also the
logistical problem of observing nearly seven hundred
drivers. These were the main considerations in deciding
against collecting this form of performance data; on the
other hand plentiful data was available from individual
driver and depot records.
4.10 Data analysis
4.10.1 Coding
A system for coding the background and performance data
was devised, and two part-time clerical assistants were
employed to transfer this qualitative and quantitative
data into a form which could be analysed by mainframe
computer. This took four months; the completed sheets,
along with the test scores, were forwarded to the
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University's Data Preparation Service to be keyed into a
computer file.
The eventual sample, from which both personality and
performance data were available, was therefore somewhat
altered from the original. Complete records existed for
613 drivers, or 61.5% of a potential sample population of
997.
4.10.2 Methods of analysis: overview
The statistical analysis was carried out using the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences; "SPSS-X"
(release 2.1) on the Edinburgh University mainframe
computer (Amdahl V7). This powerful package enabled a wide
range of statistical operations to be performed.
The results are presented in three chapters. The first
describes all the variables, in terms of means, standard
deviations and frequencies. With all but the test data,
the drivers who participated in the research were
compared with those who did not, using the Student's t-
test to determine whether the two groups differed
significantly. The second results chapter takes the
analysis one stage further, by examining the correlations
between variables. The final chapter reports on the
results of multivariate analysis. It covers not only
analysis of the data as a whole, but also that of sub¬
sections (younger/older drivers; those in large/small
depots).
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The statistical techniques used in the first two chapters
of results were of a fairly elementary nature - means,
standard deviations and Pearson product-moment
correlations - and receive no further mention here. The
final, multivariate analysis is of greater complexity and
receives more detailed treatment in the next section.
4.10.3 Methods of analysis; multivariate analysis
Multivariate techniques were used in this research to
analyse statistically the data. These techniques enable
a number of interrelated variables to be examined
together, taking the analysis a stage further from the
bivariate level of correlation. The multivariate
approach encompasses a number of different techniques:
multiple regression, for example, produces a formula
which relates a dependent variable to a number of
independent variables; canonical analysis is similar but
with more than one dependent variable; and multivariate
analysis of variance examines the equality of sets of
means for different populations. Other techniques in
this field include cluster analysis, which classifies
objects, persons, animals into groups with common
characteristics and discriminant analysis which produces
equations to distinguish between members of mutually-
exclusive groups (Norusis, 1985).
The technique used in this research was factor analysis.
It can first be described using Cattell's (1966b) system
for analysing the dimensions of "mathematico-statistical"
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methods, using similar notation to that for the
experimental designs. It becomes
(code 7) e h g p
The first dimension is the extent of the measurement
property assumptions of the statistics used: in this
case "e" stands for extended, as parametric,
distribution-assumed data and statistics are used. The
second dimension is the degree of built-in complexity of
the statistical model used: "h" refers to highly-
structured. The third code refers to the number of
simultaneous relationships handled: "g" stands for
multiple and general relationships. The final part -
"p" - stands for plenary use of all the information
available, as opposed to a limited use. Cattell
specifically defines this formula as one applying to
factor analysis.
The following covers a general discussion of the
technique and its potential, as well as the particular
variations used in this research. It does not cover in
any depth its algebraic and geometric theories and
properties, which are discussed in detail in Cattell
(1966c, 1978), Lawley and Maxwell (1971) and Maxwell
(1977), for example.
Factor analysis is essentially a simplifying process, as
Child (1970) says, "Factor analysis seeks to do precisely
what man has been engaged in throughout history, that is
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to make order out of the apparent chaos of his
environment" (p.l). Similarly, Kerlinger defines it as
serving
. . . the cause of scientific parsimony. It
reduces the multiplicity of tests and measures
to greater simplicity. It tells us, in effect,
what tests or measures belong together ... It
thus reduces the number of variables with which
the scientist must cope. It also (hopefully)
helps the scientist to locate and identify
unities or fundamental properties underlying
tests and measures (p 659).
It refers to the belief that the variation in a number of
observed variables can be accounted for by a smaller
number of underlying constructs (hypothetical entities)
known as "factors". All variables (such as test scores
or performance data) are treated alike, which is where it
differs from some of the other statistical techniques
referred to above. These tend to involve the use of
regression equations to predict a dependent variable from
a number of independent variables. "Factor analysis" is
something of a generic term - it embraces a wide variety
of methods and computer programs, and only those
particular operations which were used in the research
will be discussed here.
The process of factor analysis is useful for several
levels of research. The first is essentially
exploratory and descriptive - it enables the reduction of
a large number of seemingly confusing variables to a
smaller number of factors which can be used to describe
the group being studied. This may well enable the
generation and testing of initial hypotheses to take
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place, even at the level of trying out "hunches". The
second, confirmatory level takes this further, in
creating and testing hypotheses - the underlying
dimensions from the first stage may suggest causal
relationships. A third level is the use of the
technique as a measuring device, to construct indicies to
be used as variables in future analyses. In this
research project only the first level, descriptive, is
used to reduce test variables and performance measures to
a more manageable number. This will enable propositions
about the determinants of bus driver performance to be
put forward.
There are three main stages which factor analysis goes
through. Each can be performed automatically by
computer. In this research, the "Factor" program of
SPSS-X analysed the data using specific procedures and
algorithms. The first stage is the preparation of a
correlation matrix: ideally, there should be a fairly
high degree of inter-relationship amongst them. Next is
the extraction of initial factors from this. Classical
factor analysis is based on the belief that there is some
underlying regularity in the data being analysed, and
that part of each variable is influenced partly by common
variance (that shared with other variables) and partly by
unique variance (not contributing to the relationships
amongst variables). The analysis seeks to extract the
maximum amount of common variance to explain the
relationships in the data.
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The particular extraction method used here was alpha
factoring (Kaiser, 1963) which assumes that the variables
used in the analysis are a sample from the universe of
potential variables. The intention is to make
inferences about this universe from a sample of
variables; it is assumed that the variables were
collected from a given population of subjects. This
differs from other methods (such as maximum likelihood
and unweighted least squares) which consider the cases in
an analysis to be a sample from a population and the
variables to be fixed.
The final stage of computation takes the factors which
have been extracted and rotates them into a more
meaningful and interpretable pattern, which will enable
new insights into the data. This is the goal of factor
analysis. There are two major methods by which the
factors can be rotated - orthogonal and oblique.
Orthogonal rotation produces mathematically simpler
factors, but treats them as being unrelated. By
contrast oblique rotation, which was used in this
research, treats the factors as being correlated with
each other, and this is felt to produce much more
meaningful factors.
Cattell is a strong supporter of the second method of
rotation, arguing that "we should not expect influences
in a common universe to remain mutually uninfluenced and
uncorrelated" (1978, p 128), and that
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all research on second and higher order factor
structures - which often greatly illuminate our
scientific concepts - is cut off, as completely
as circumnavigation of the earth by a belief in
a flat world, when we insist on the mathematical
habit of orthogonality" (1966c, p 211).
The latter is a most important argument in this research
study, as the data from the 16PF is subjected to factor
analysis. As its name implies, this test gives scores
on 16 first-order factors; any further factor analysis
therefore produces second-order factors. If it was
assumed that the first order factors were uncorrelated,
then higher order analysis would be impossible.
The rotation was performed using the "oblimin" algorithm
on the "Factor" procedure of SPSS-X. Computer rotation
is, however, rejected by both Guilford (eg, Guilford and
Zimmerman, 1963; Guilford, 1985) and Cattell (1966c,
1978) who prefer hand rotations. Guilford considers
that computer rotation may underestimate the true number
of factors, as it may reject those with small loadings
which nevertheless could contribute to understanding of
the data. This may oversimplify the nature of the
factors. In addition, Cattell warns of a "misplaced
faith that automatic programs, being couched in terms of
mathematical perfection, are bound to give the correct
result" (1978, p 130). Rotation by computer was
performed in this research, as the intention was to use
factor analysis as a tool to discover the determinants of
driver performance, rather than to study factor analysis
as such.
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The last task in a factor analysis, once the mathematical
stages are complete, is that of giving the factors
meaningful names. This often involves some subjective
judgement in order to ascertain the meaning behind the
results: Lemke and Wiersma (1976), for example, say that
naming is easier in well-researched areas such as
personality and intelligence than in less researched
areas or where factors appear more obscure. Van Geer
(1971) takes a more straightforward approach - he
recommends making a guess on the basis of the (measured)
variables which the factor is (and is not) correlated
with. Gillham (1978) warns that the names may not fit
the factors very well, and that, once named, a factor may
be associated with its unsuitable name for eternity.
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4.11 Summary
This chapter has reviewed a number of themes pertinent to
the research. It first examined the theories underlying
the structure of the research - in particular those of
Cattell and Randell - before discussing the design. The
methods were then dealt with both at a theoretical level
(the rationale for their use) and at a practical level
(the particular methods used). The final section
examined in more detail the main statistical method used
to analyse the data - factor analysis - as a prelude to
the full treatment of the results which now follows.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS (1): DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the basic data from the
psychological tests, biographical, situational and
criterion measures. SPSS-X procedures sorted the data
into suitable forms for analysis. For the data which
was in interval or ratio form (for example, age and
service, accident and discipline records) the "breakdown"
procedure was used to produce means and standard
deviations for each variable by depot and by group.
Less could be obtained from the data which was mainly in
nominal form (such as previous employment) - here,
"frequencies" produced counts of the presence or absence
of a variable after having been sorted using "sort cases"
and "split file" procedures.
A word of caution should perhaps be inserted at this
stage in connection with data in interval or ratio form.
A number of the depots produced very small samples
(several are less than 20), where the presence of one or
two either very high or very low values could distort the
arithmetical mean. In such cases a check was kept on
the actual frequency distributions and any such cases
will be highlighted in the course of the text.
In order to examine how representative those who sat the
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psychological tests were of their depot as a whole,
Student's t-tests were also carried out on all
"performance" variables from which it was possible to
obtain means, to see whether significant differences
existed between different groups. Very few significant
differences were found: these are discussed in a section
at the end of this chapter.
The results presented in this section are fairly
extensive, each variable or category being broken down by
depot. As a result, the text highlights the main
features of the analysis with tables summarising the data
where appropriate. The full breakdown of each variable
is given in tables in appendices A and B. The results
are presented in the three categories described in the
research methodology chapter - test, "background" and
"performance" data.
5.2 Analysis of predictor variables
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the
predictor variables used in the research. The
psychological test scores are analysed first followed by
the biographical data.
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5.2.1 Analysis of test scores
(i) The Ingleton Word Recognition Test
This 72-item test gives two scores - quickness on the
uptake (as measured by the number of words correctly
identified) and risk (number of words wrongly
identified). Preliminary norms only were available, as
research is still proceeding with this test, although a
number of studies on specific occupational groups have
been made and the sample of bus drivers is compared with
four of them.
The drivers' scores on the Word Recognition Test were as
follows:-
Table 5.1
Drivers' mean scores on the WRT.
Mean Standard deviation Range
words correct 21.53 10.53 0-47
words wrong 3.93 3.13 0-19
In terms of quickness on the uptake the drivers scored
lower than for the general population, although they did




Drivers' scores on the WRT, by grade.
(a) Words correct
Proportion of drivers
Grade Band Scores with these scores (%)
A Top 10% 42-72 2.4
B Next 20% 33-41 13.1
C Middle 40% 22-32 35.8
D Next 20% 13-21 24.9
E Lowest 10% 0-12 23.7
(b) Words wrong
Proportion of drivers
Grade Band Scores with these scores (%)
A Top 10% 0,1 24.0
B Next 20% 2,3 29.1
C Middle 40% 4-6 30.1
D Next 20% 7-9 12.6
E Lowest 10% 10+ 5.7
To assist in interpreting these tables, 10% of a general
population, for example, would obtain between 42 and 72
words correct in the test. However, only 2.4% of the
sample of drivers had scores in that range. At the
other end of the scale 10% of a general population would
be expected to score 12 or less - nearly a quarter of the
drivers did, though. The appropriate percentage bands
for the driver sample were as follows:
Words correct Words incorrect
Group
Overall pop. Sample Overall pop. Sample
Top 10% 42-72 35 + 0,1 0
Next 20% 33-41 28-34 2,3 1
Middle 40% 22-32 15-27 4-6 2-4
Next 20% 13-21 7-14 7-9 5-7
Lowest 10% 0-12 0-6 10 + 8 +
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Further evidence that the drivers had lower than average
scores can be found in the next table, which gives mean
scores for four other occupational groups:
Table 5.3













































Source: unpublished research reports, C C P Ingleton and
associates, 1985 and 1986.
All four groups had higher average scores for words
correct, with the shop managers and hotel receptionists
being the highest. None of the groups had very low
scores, 5 being the lowest, for the production
operatives, whereas 10% of the drivers scored 6 or less.
At the other end of the scale, three of the groups had
higher top scores than the drivers, with 12.7% of the
shop managers being in the top band (scores over 42).
In terms of risk score (words incorrect) the bus drivers
appear in the middle of the five groups tested, with the
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production operatives being lowest and the hotel
receptionists the highest.
A breakdown of mean scores by depot is given in the
appendix. There was a great variation for numbers of
words correct, with Fraserburgh being the lowest (15.6)
and Forres the highest (32.2). Most of the remaining
depots were in the range 19-24 making Forres very much the
exception. Its average was based on only six scores,
however (26, 27, 31, 34, 36 and 37) none of which was
below the sample mean. This can be compared with its
main depot, Elgin, where scores ranged from 2 to 42 and
five of the 16 drivers scored ten or less. At
Fraserburgh four (of eleven) drivers scored, ten or less,
and the range was from 5 to 31. A more regular pattern
was found with numbers of words wrong: the means ranged
from 3.1 (Cumnock) to 5.1 (Hawick). Interestingly,
Fraserburgh was the second-lowest (3.2) and Forres the
second highest (4.8).
(ii) Cattell's "culture fair" test of 'g'
This gives five scores - one from each of the four sub¬
tests and a total. Published norms are available for
only the total (IPAT, 1973); however, three of the four
studies listed above also used this test, so the drivers
can be compared against them. The scores for the sample
of bus drivers were as follows:
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Table 5.4
Drivers ' scores on Culture Fair.
Standard
Mean deviation
Test 1 (12 items): next in a series 7.80 2.44
Test 2 (14 items): classification 6.67 1.85
Test 3 (12 items): matrices 7.72 2.27
Test 4 (8 items) : discovering rules 4.87 1.90
Total (46 items) 27.08 6.34
N = 612 Range 4-43
Comparing the total with the published norms, once again
the drivers were below average. The average score for
the test as a whole was 32 (giving an IQ of 100); the
drivers' mean of 27 gives an IQ of 91. The table below
shows the proportion in each percentage grade:
Table 5.5
Drivers' scores on Culture Fair by grade.
Proportion of
Grade Band Scores drivers with these scores
A Top 10% 38-46
B Next 20% 35-37
C Middle 40% 28-34
D Next 20% 21-27
E Last 10% 0-20













The total scores can be compared with those for three of




Comparison of drivers' scores on Culture Fair with other
groups.
Standard
Group Mean deviation Range
Shop managers 30.57 5.43 20-40
Production operatives 31.02 5.46 19-41
Public house managers 28.63 5.89 10-38
Source: C C P Ingleton and associates, op cit.
In this instance it was the production operatives who had
the highest mean (and closest to the published norms).
The drivers themselves had the highest individual score
(43 correct), although also by far the lowest (4).
One possible explanation may be advanced at this stage to
account for the bus drivers' scores being lower than the
published norms and the specific occupational groups, on
both tests so far described. The average age of the
driver sample was higher than that for the other groups,
with a wider range of ages represented, as the next
section will discuss. The drivers' average was 39.8
years (S.D. 10.5) compared with the shop managers' (mean
34.9, S.D. 9.7) and public house managers (mean 34.7,
S.D. 7.1), with the production operatives being closer
with a mean of 37.6 (S.D. 9.1). As people get older,
their ability to do these tests diminishes; therefore,
as the drivers were (on average) older than the other
samples, there should be little surprise in their scores
being slightly lower. This relationship between test
208
performance and age was borne out in the data on the bus
drivers, as the section on correlations will show.
The full breakdown of mean scores by depot is again given
in the appendix. In terms of total score Forres was
again well above the average of 27.1, with a mean of
33.2. The next highest depot was Alloa (mean of 29.8)
with the lowest being Peterhead (23.3). In terms of the
sub-tests Forres had the highest score for all except the
second (where Alloa was highest); there was no such
pattern for those with the lowest score, which were
respectively Hawick, Peterhead, Fraserburgh and Elgin.
Two of the large urban depots - Edinburgh and Wishaw -
along with Alloa consistently were above average on the
subtests. Peterhead and its sub-depot Fraserburgh
tended to be below-average on each occasion, while Wishaw
always had a score greater than nearby Hamilton depot.
(iii) Cattell Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire
(16PF)
This gives numerical scores on fifteen personality
dimensions and one intelligence scale, with British
Standardised norms being available (Saville, 1972). The
mean scores for the drivers, along with the equivalent
'sten' scores, were as follows:-
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Table 5.7
Drivers' mean scores on the 16PF.
Bus Drivers National
Factor/Description (low/high) Mean S.D. Sten Mean S.D.
A Reserved/outgoing 9.67 2.82 6 9.35 3.09
B Intelligence 7.15 1.92 6 7.17 3.14
C Emotional stability (less/more) 14.27 4.04 5 15.25 3.88
E Humble/assertive 11.50 3.96 5 12.28 4.28
F Sober/enthusiastic 13.02 4.61 6 12.39 5.05
G Expedient/conscientious 12.57 3.35 5 12.47 3.73
H Shy/venturesome 13.18 5.67 5 13.25 5.51
I Tough/tender minded 8.95 3.01 6 9.16 3.42
L Trusting/suspicious 8.70 3.34 6 8.64 3.43
M Practical/imaginative 11.15 3.43 5 12.37 3.45
N Forthright/shrewd 10.94 3.18 6 10.52 3.06
0 Se1f-assured/apprehensive 11.86 4.17 6 10.27 4.27
Q1 Conservative/experimenting 9.43 3.27 5 10.12 3.23
Q2 Group-dependent/self-sufficient 11.28 3.68 5 11.60 3.48
Q3 Lacks/is socially-precise 12.78 3.24 6 12.79 3.30
04 Relaxed/tense 12.43 4.71 5 11.99 4.99
Sten scores (from "standard ten") are distributed over
ten equal interval standard score points from one to ten,
assuming a normal distribution. The population mean is
5.5 with the standard deviation being two sten scores.
Between 4.5 and 5.5 is one half standard deviation below
the mean, therefore; between 5.5 and 6.5 is one half
standard deviation above it. All the scores for the
driver population lay within this centre block.
Included also in the table are the means and standard
deviations for a general British male population
(Saville, 1972; table iv). Although these were based on
a larger group (1104 subjects) the average age was
identical to that of the drivers - 39.8 years. For each
factor both sets of means look as if they are fairly
close to each other. To see whether there were
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statistically significant differences between the driver
group and the general population, a student's t test was
performed on the means and standard deviations for each
factor. Half were found to be different at a
significance level of p = 0.05 or greater. Four factors
had means greater than the national mean:
Factor Description Significance
A Reserved/outgoing p = 0.05
F Sober/enthusiastic p = 0.01
N Forthright/shrewd p = 0.05
0 Self-assured/apprehensive p = 0.01
Another four factors had means significantly lower than
the national mean:
Factor Description Significance
C Emotional stability p = 0.01
E Humble/assertive p = 0.01
M Practical/imaginative p = 0.01
Q Conservative/experimenting p = 0.01
This would appear to suggest that bus drivers who work
for the Scottish Bus Group, when compared with a general
British population, are more outgoing in nature but at
the same time have more worries, are more easily annoyed
and have a more practical and traditional outlook on
life. In many respects this fits in with the nature of
the job. Drivers are expected to be forthcoming and
friendly with passengers, and tend to fit in better to
the organisation if they accept and do what they are told
without question. The job itself is of a practical
nature, not requiring much in the way of intellectual
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thought. It can be fairly stressful at times, however,
with responsibilities such as ticket issuing, fare
collection, maintaining driving schedules, passenger and
vehicle safety tending to weigh on the drivers' minds.
They should be both shrewd and humble when dealing with
passengers: shrewd enough to ensure that a young person
does not pay a half fare when a full fare is due, and yet
humble not to answer back to a passenger who is being
rude or complaining.
This is very much an overview, however, and a discussion
of the factors that make for either good or bad
performance will come later. It is not entirely
unexpected that there should be differences between the
driver and general populations. The latter sample was
drawn from all strata of the population, with care being
taken to ensure a representative group in terms of
geographical location, social group, marital status,
working hours, terminal education age, and actual age.
The drivers' sample, on the other hand, consisted of
people from only one part of the UK who were members of
only one socio-economic group. They tended to be less
well educated, and came from a slightly narrower age
range (most were between 21 and 64; those in the
national sample were between 15 and 69).
The table below gives the depots with the highest and
lowest means for each scale.
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Table 5.8
Depots with highest and lowest mean scores on each scale
of the 16PF.
Factor Highest mean Lowest mean
A 11.07 Hawick 9.13 Fraserburgh
B 7.83 Forres 5.75 Fraserburgh
C 15.08 Alloa 12.32 Peterhead
E 13.31 Fort William 9.56 Elgin
F 14.25 Fraserburgh 10.87 Elgin
G 15.33 Forres 12.11 Hamilton
H 15.54 Fort William 11.26 Peterhead
I 10.54 Fort William 7.79 Alloa
L 10.71 Hawick 5.63 Fraserburgh
M 12.11 New Street 9.32 Peterhead
N 15.12 Fraserburgh 10.41 New Street
0 13.79 Peterhead 11.56 New Street
Q1 10.25 Alloa 7.67 Forres
Q2 13.00 Forres 9.87 Fraserburgh
Q3 13.63 Alloa 11.57 Hawick
Q4 15.00 Forres 11.74 Paisley
There was a fairly small variation on scale B
(intelligence) but it did support the results found
earlier, namely that the sample of drivers tested at
Forres was above average in this respect. Their mean
score for the total on the Culture Fair test was the
highest; so was their mean score for scale B on the
16PF. At the opposite end of the scale, Fraserburgh and
Peterhead had two of the lowest scores on the Culture
Fair; this was repeated on the intelligence scale for
the 16PF. The mean score for Elgin on factors E and F
(9.56 and 10.87) were some way below the means of 11.50
and 13.02 respectively. The next lowest scores were
10.5 for E at Cumnock and 11.89 for F at Peterhead. A
low score on factor E indicates a more sober and serious
personality; on factor F, a more humble disposition.
These are perhaps an indication of the sorts of drivers
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who participated in the research at Elgin - those who
were less argumentative and more easily persuaded by the
supervisor; those who did not take part were perhaps the
more assertive members who followed the line taken by the
(in the eyes of the management) militant shop steward.
Factor L showed some interesting variations between
depots. A low score indicates a trusting and carefree
personality; a high score supports a suspicious and
distrustful nature. It could be postulated that the
latter is more likely to be found in the larger depots
where there is a less personal relationship between
management and drivers. In fact the two depots with the
highest means for this factor were Hawick (10.7) and
Peterhead (10.3); next in line were Fort William (9.7),
Wishaw (9.2) and Elgin (9.1). Peterhead had one of the
highest scores, yet its sub-depot Fraserburgh had the
lowest (5.6) with Forres being the second lowest (7.0).
In addition, it tended to be the smaller depots which had
the higher scores on factor N. A low score on this
dimension supports a more forthright and open
personality; a high score a more shrewd and calculating
disposition. Once again, the opposite to what might
have been expected occurred: the depots with the highest
means were Fraserburgh (15.1), Forres (13.8) and
Peterhead (12.4); at the larger depots the scores were
all slightly below or around the overall mean for the
sample.
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Among the other scores there is an interesting contrast
between scales Q1 (conservative vs experimenting) and Q3
(undisciplined self-conflict vs socially precise).
Alloa had the highest scores on both factors, whereas it
might be expected that a low score on one would be
matched by a high score on the other, and vice-versa.
The small size of the sample at Forres (six cases)
perhaps accounts for the unusually high scores on scales
Q2 and Q4: both were very much above both the average
and the next highest in each case.
It is also perhaps surprising that Peterhead and Forres
were highest for 0 and Q4 respectively. High scores on
these tend to indicate apprehensiveness and worry (0) and
tension and frustration (Q4), each of which might be
expected to be related to working in busy urban
conditions. In fact, the opposite is the case -
Edinburgh and Paisley have the lowest scores on these
factors.
5.2.2 Analysis of background variables
(i) Age, service and joining age
The mean age of the sample was 39.8 years with a standard
deviation of 10.5. On the whole, the urban depots had a
lower average age than the rural depots: Edinburgh had
the lowest (at 38.9 years), whereas the average for
Hawick was 48.4 and for Fraserburgh it was 51.0. These
patterns are borne out when looking at the range and skew
of the age distribution. There were a greater
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proportion of younger drivers at the large depots (those
with over 100 drivers) - at Edinburgh, Paisley and
Hamilton 10% of the drivers were aged less than 29 years,
compared with Elgin where only 2 of the 42 drivers were
under 30 and Fraserburgh where the youngest driver was
35. Each depot contained drivers aged 60 and over, but
the smaller ones tended to have a greater proportion of
older men. Over 50% of drivers at Hawick and
Fraserburgh and 40% of those at Fort William and Elgin
were over 50 years of age. This contrasts with depots
such as Edinburgh (18% over 50) and Hamilton (16.5% over
50) .
Similar patterns were observed for length of continuous
service. The average for this variable was 8.24 years
with a standard deviation of 7.93. Overall, drivers in
the large depots had a lower average length of service
than those in the smaller depots, though there were one
or two interesting exceptions. The mean lengths of
service for the four large depots ranged from 5.83 for
Paisley to 8.30 for Wishaw. Alloa, however, had a mean
of 6.94 and Forres was even lower with 4.75 years. The
remainder were higher, with Cumnock having the highest
average length of service - 14.3 years. There was a
fairly wide range of actual lengths of service in most
depots, but within this, it was the smaller, more rural,
depots which had the greater proportions of drivers with
long service. 25% of Cumnock's drivers, for example,
had more than 20 years' service, and 50% of Hawick's had
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over 15 years'. This can be compared with Edinburgh
where only 10% of the drivers had more than 20 years'
employment, but where 50% had less than 4 years'. In
Paisley, only 10% had more than 15 years' experience but
50% had less than 3 years'. In Cumnock, by contrast,
only a quarter of drivers had less than ten years'
employment.
Averages and ranges do mask individual cases in small
depots, however. In Fort William, for example, the
driver with the longest service came in 1939, the one
with the next longest in 1966, with one or two in each of
the following years. The present complement of Forres
depot comprised drivers who joined as follows: 1 in each
of 1966, 1970, 1980, 1981; 4 in 1983 and 2 in 1984. It
is not known whether there were a number of resignations
or retirals in the early 1980s, but the structure there
was biased towards those with little service.
The figures for the large depots were in part a
reflection of local labour markets, even in the central
belt of Scotland where turnover was still fairly high.
Edinburgh depot, for example, took on 43 new drivers in
1984. The effect of specific events was more noticeable
in the smaller depots. Although there were some long-
serving drivers at Fort William, two-thirds of those
employed there had less than 10 years' service, and this
can perhaps be attributed in part to the improvement of
local employment opportunities in the last decade with
the expansion of the wood pulp mills. There was some
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turnover at the bus depot in the mid-1970s, as drivers
left to take up the better pay offered by the mills,
necessitating a search for replacements. In Peterhead a
similar situation arose with the development of the North
Sea oil industry in the 1970s, where again the prospect
of high wages (even for semi-skilled work) attracted a
number of drivers away. 50% of Peterhead's drivers had
less than 6 years' service.
In a more negative vein, the lack of local employment
opportunities combined with a decline in the traditional
coal mining industry, was perhaps a major reason for the
high average length of service at Cumnock. Another
factor accounting for this might be the decline in the
numbers employed as a result of "Scotmap" - these fell
from 100 in 1982 to 66 in 1985, with presumably those
with the least service being made redundant first of all.
A comparison of the range and skew figures illustrates
that while a number of drivers with long service did take
part in the project, in many depots it was predominantly
those with shorter service who did so.
The third variable in this group - age on joining - was
computed by subtracting length of service from current
age. The mean age on joining was 32.5 years (standard
deviation of 8.7), with the lowest being at Cumnock
(30.6) and Wishaw (30.9), and the highest at Fort William
(37.7) and Peterhead (37.5). The ages ranged from 17 to
59 years. It is not possible to obtain a full PSV
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licence until the age of 21: those entering under that
age often did so as conductors and transferred to driving
at 21. In this category were mostly those in large
depots, where on-going turnover of drivers enabled
conductors to progress if they wished, and where
redundancies were few when the move to one-man-operation
came. At the other end of the scale, those entering at
a high age were often those who had been previously
employed and did not therefore require training. Almost
all those in this category were in the large depots (eg,
8 of the 81 drivers seen in Paisley; 7 of the 138 drivers
seen in Hamilton) where re-employment was much more common
than in the small depots.
(ii) Application form data
As mentioned in the research methodology chapter, in some
depots forms were only available for some of the drivers.
The data presented here, therefore, should in some cases
be taken with caution as it may not paint an accurate
picture of the depots concerned.
The first section concerned licences held at the time the
driver commenced his present employment, with data being
available for 60% of the sample. The data for the basic
driving licence was recorded in terms of years, as this
was usually recorded accurately on the form. The mean
number of years was 12.06, with a standard deviation of
8.28. In general (and this was perhaps a reflection of
the higher age profiles) those entering the smaller
depots had more years' driving experience than those
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joining the larger ones. Peterhead, for example, had a
mean of 19.67 years and Fort William one of 19.50. The
four large depots ranged from 10.72 at Hamilton to 13.73
at Paisley. An exception to this was Cumnock, with 9.3
years, although data was only available on 12 drivers
(18% of the depot).
The two other classes of licence considered were those
for public service vehicles (PSV) and heavy goods
vehicles (HGV); in both cases merely the presence or
absence was recorded. Overall, around a half of present
drivers held a PSV and 15% an HGV licence prior to
joining their present depot. There was, however, some
variation from this average. The proportion of HGV
holders entering (or re-entering) the industry appeared
to be much greater in the smaller depots. 57% of those
at Fraserburgh, 45% at Fort William and 44% at Hawick,
for example, were in this category as compared with only
2% at Hamilton and 9% at Paisley. Although these
figures may not be totally accurate they do show an
interesting trend, which may be a reflection of more
plentiful opportunities for lorry drivers in the central
belt.
The proportion holding a PSV licence was much higher in
Peterhead (89%), Elgin (80%) and Fort William (64%), and
lower in Hawick (40%) and Edinburgh (42%). One possible
explanation for these differences might be the presence
or absence of other operators: certainly in the Wishaw
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area there are several fairly large independent operators
and virtually none in Hawick. Several of Peterhead's
drivers have either transferred from other SBG companies
(especially Midland) or from municipals or NBC
subsidiaries in England.
In most cases it was possible to see where these drivers
were employed previously. Looking at the trends for the
overall population, most of the drivers fell into one of
the categories of previous employment with present
company, with either a municipal operator or NBC
subsidiary, and with an independent operator. As some
of the categories are mutually exclusive it is possible
to aggregate some of them as follows
Table 5.9






previously dismissed 21 4.4
Municipal/NBC 66 13.7
Independent operator 45 9.4
For the depots studied, over a quarter of drivers had one
or more periods of previous employment there. Although
the recession has reduced employment opportunities, these
figures are a reflection of the problems of labour
retention which the industry has faced in the past. The
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figures were much greater for the industrial areas -
Hamilton (41.6% of drivers) and Wishaw (44.4%) being
particularly high - than the rural ones where alternative
employment tends to be less readily available. Equally
interesting is that 21 had been dismissed from their
depots and then re-employed at a later date, despite some
having their record cards marked "Do Not Re-employ".
Most of these cases were at the large urban depots (in
particular Hamilton and Wishaw), and this again may have
been a reflection (certainly of up to a few years ago) of
labour shortages.
Substantial numbers have also had previous experience in
the municipal sector or with the NBC - this was
especially so at Edinburgh where 46 drivers (28.2% of
those for whom records were available) were in this
category. Most had come from Lothian Region Transport.
Four drivers at Fort William (one-third of those for whom
records were available) were also in this category -
according to the area manager some were people from
England who came to the area on holiday, liked it and
wanted to settle there. There was also some degree of
movement between public and private sectors as the 45
drivers who had worked for the latter shows. This was
noticeable in areas where the latter was well-
represented: Wishaw (8 drivers) and Paisley (9), for
example, and the movement was often two-way.
It was mainly in the urban areas where substantial
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numbers of drivers had previous bus company employment.
Fraserburgh, by comparison, contained only one driver in
this category, Hawick four and Cumnock eight. Alloa
appeared to have more in common with the larger depots in
industrial areas when considering the variable of bus
company employment. Overall, almost a third of the
drivers have had previous employment at their depot.
One had been dismissed, and six had worked for an
independent operator.
In addition to the above, data was also collected on all
other types of previous employment. Taking the overall
picture, the three main categories were:-
manual semi-skilled 133 cases 29.7%
manual skilled 85 cases. 18.9%
driving (licensed) 103 cases 23.0%
Between 25% and 40% of the drivers in most depots have
had at least one semi-skilled job prior to joining their
company - Peterhead was the exception, where the total
was only two out of the 14 tested. The larger depots
tended to contain a greater proportion of drivers from
skilled jobs than did the small, rural ones, although
Hawick was an exception to this. This may well have
been a function of the fact that skilled trades are more
in demand in industrial areas, and that in recent years
they have suffered with the decline of heavy industry in
the central belt.
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The third main category was that referred to as
"licensed" driving: this included HGV driving as well as
delivery vans and taxis, in other words all driving apart
from buses which requires a licence. In the small
depots in particular, this accounted for quite a
substantial number of drivers: 60% in Fraserburgh, 21%
in Peterhead and 37.5% in Cumnock have had at least one
driving job. Among the other categories, certain ones
had significant representation in selected depots.
Service in the armed forces or police, for example,
accounted for one-third at Forres and a fifth at Elgin -
due, no doubt, to their proximity to the RAF base at
Kinloss. 26 drivers at Edinburgh (16%) also had this
background, and were usually willingly offered employment
because of it. Edinburgh had the greatest range of
occupations represented - from unskilled manual to
managerial - due in part to its size and the nature of
the city in which it is located. The greatest
proportion of semi-skilled workers was at Fort William (6
out of 11), many of them laid off in the contraction of
the wood pulp and aluminium industries in the early
1980s.
Connected with the types of previous employment were the
number of jobs a driver had held in the five years prior
to his present job. This included any jobs, permanent
or temporary, although excluded periods of unemployment.
The period of five years was chosen as the SBG
application form requests details of all employment in
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this period, and could provide some sort of measure as to
how stable individual drivers were. The mean number of
previous jobs overall was 2.29 with a standard deviation
of 1.17. The lowest were Fraserburgh and Forres (2.0)
and the highest Hawick (3.1) and, while it appeared that
the larger depots had slightly higher averages, this was
not a hard and fast rule. In most depots the number of
previous jobs ranged between one and five, with most
drivers having held between one and three. In Hamilton
there were two drivers who had held six jobs and at
Edinburgh one who had held seven jobs in the five years
prior to commencing employment, but these were the
exceptions.
The final category which can be considered under
background variables is level of education. This
produced the variable of the highest level of education
attained. Overall, only 39.5% of drivers had some sort
of educational qualification, the most common one being
either a college diploma or (in the majority of cases) a
trade qualification (usually "City and Guilds"). This
accounted for 21% of all drivers, the next most common
being a "general certificate" held by 9% of drivers.
This preceded the present day system of O/A levels, and
is mainly held by older drivers. This accounted for so
few cases at Hamilton and Wishaw: the educational
attainments of the longer-service drivers were not known
as all application forms before 1979 had been destroyed.
In general, the drivers at the larger depots were better
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qualified educationally than those at smaller ones - half
of those at Edinburgh and Paisley having some
qualification (although only 29% at Hamilton and 28% at
Wishaw). At the smaller depots, only one out of 14 at
Elgin, two out of nine at Peterhead and four out of 23 at
Cumnock had qualifications. Edinburgh contained the
greatest proportion of well-educated drivers, including
three out of the five who held degrees and the greatest
proportion of those who held a diploma or trade
qualification (26%).
5.3 Analysis of criterion variables
The final set of variables which can be considered on a
depot-by-depot basis are those relating to "performance"
- offence and accident records, along with miscellaneous
items such as cash shortages and absenteeism. The mean
figures for the offence and accident categories were low
because the actual figures have been divided by the
number of years for which records were available -
therefore, the figures represent an annual average.
Once again, the full breakdown of figures by depot and by
category is given in the appendix.
5.3.1 Offences
(i) General
Moving first to offences, the table below




Summary of offence variables.
Standard
Offence Mean deviation
1. Poor timekeeping .25 .47
2. Ticket issuing faults .42 .68
3. Failure to stop .14 .35
4. Rudeness .06 .20
5. Carelessness .21 .36
6. Quality of driving .03 .13
7. Excessive absenteeism .08 .26
8. Excessive cash shortages .27 .73
9. Miscellaneous .01 .08
10. Complaints .12 .30
11. Commendations .05 .24
Total offences 1.47 1.75
"Total offences" is the sum of the first nine items.]
Such overall figures hide important variations, however,
as can be seen from the next table which shows the number
of drivers with clean offence records in each depot. No
drivers in Alloa, Hawick or Wishaw had clean records, and
only a small proportion had in Edinburgh (3.5%). By
contrast, over half the drivers in Hamilton and three
quarters of those in Cumnock were in this category. It
is particularly interesting to note the difference
between Hamilton and Wishaw: both belong to Central
Scottish and are no more than five miles apart, yet there
appears to be great differences in policy towards the
recording and punishment of offences.
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Table 5.11
















This difference manifests itself also when looking at the
figures for total offences. Here the overall average
was 1.49, but for Hamilton it was 0.80 and for Wishaw it
was three times as great, 2.68. The figure was highest
for Alloa (3.09) and lowest for Cumnock (0.14) with
Hawick and Edinburgh being above average and the rest
below. Looking back at table 5.10, it would appear that
some offences were "committed" more often than others.
The most common were those relating to ticket issuing
faults, excessive cash shortages and poor timekeeping.
Those least reported included reports on the quality of
driving, rudeness to passengers and/or company officials,
complaints, failure to stop and uplift passengers, and
excessive absenteeism. There were also very few
commendations, most being made to drivers at Edinburgh on
account of their work on extended holiday tours.
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(ii) Discussion of specific offences
"Timekeeping" was one of the categories with a fairly high
mean score, ranging from Elgin and Fraserburgh (0.00 and
0.01) to Wishaw, the highest at 0.60. Edinburgh, Hawick
and Forres were also high (over 0.2).
A failure to issue tickets correctly may well be
considered one of the worst offences a driver can commit
in Eastern Scottish, as the mean scores for both
Edinburgh and Hawick were by far the highest for this
category, at 1.03 and 0.97 respectively. Indeed, at the
former depot, nine drivers had ten or more "convictions"
for offences in this category (over a five-year period);
and at the latter four drivers had eight or more
convictions. All the other depots had means below 0.25.
The pattern for excessive cash shortages was somewhat
different. At only five of the twelve depots did this
appear on drivers' offence records, and of these the mean
scores for Alloa and Wishaw were much higher than for
Edinburgh, Hamilton and Paisley. The means for Alloa
and Wishaw were 1.39 and 1.16 respectively. This wide
variation was due in part to differences in recording and
punishing shortages, as discussed in the previous
chapter. At Alloa, for example, in this category (and
within four years) two drivers had eight entries, and
there was one driver for each of 9, 14, 19 and even 25
entries for cash shortages. There were similarly large
amounts of interviews at Wishaw - two had nine, two had
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11 and one had 18 within four years.
At this stage it is appropriate to bring in the figures
for the number of weeks a cash shortage was reported.
These were taken from the actual record books and were
only available in some of the depots. It is interesting
to note that the highest figures were for two of the
Northern depots - Elgin and Peterhead - and for Hamilton.
In the first two cases there were no records of drivers
being reprimanded for cash shortages, and in Hamilton the
figure was fairly low. Additional light may be cast
upon this by examining the table listing the average size
of weekly shortage - by depot and per driver.
Table 5.12
Average cash shortages per week per depot.
Time Average Weekly Shortage (£)
Depot N Period Total Per Driver
Fraserburgh 12 6 months 2.84 0.24
Forres 12 3 months 1.01 0.08
Peterhead 37 6 months 14.03 0.38
Elgin 43 3 months 13.24 0.31
Cumnock 68 6 months 11. 74 0.17
Hamilton 177 3 months 241.90 1.37
Wishaw 180 6 months 73.17 0.41
Those in the Northern Scottish depots were low and for
small amounts per driver ■- Forres being by far the
lowest: 8p per driver per week on average. There was .
great difference between Hamilton and Wishaw, however,
with the former having over three times the size of
shortage than the latter. Perhaps this reflected the
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amount of importance which cash shortages were given in
each depot. At Wishaw, where shortages over £2 were put
on disciplinary records, the average weekly amount and
the average number of weeks were lower than at Hamilton,
where a less-strict approach was adopted but where
shortages were much larger and more frequent. The case
of Cumnock was different again: not only were there a
low average total and a low number of weeks when
shortages occurred, but there was no disciplinary action
taken either. The Area Manager told the researcher that
he preferred to use informal methods to reduce occasional
cases of cash shortages. In the depots where detailed
figures were available very few drivers had completely
clean records. Most drivers had a cash shortage at some
time or another within the time period.
General carelessness, a category which included a variety
of offences from wearing non-uniform clothes to
displaying the wrong destination on a bus, followed a
similar pattern to other categories. The depot with the
highest mean score was Hawick (mean of 0.40), followed by
Alloa and Forres (0.35), Wishaw (0.34) and Edinburgh
(0.33). Those with the lowest average number of
offences under this heading included Cumnock (0.03) and
Hamilton (0.09).
Most depots in the survey had received complaints from
the public about the attitudes or actions of some of
their drivers. No complaints were recorded against
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drivers in Cumnock, Fort William and Fraserburgh. The
highest number were recorded at Edinburgh, where the
average was 0.26.
Excessive absenteeism appeared as an entry on the offence
records of most depots, with only Elgin, Fraserburgh,
Forres and Peterhead being completely free in this
respect. [Absenteeism in this context refered to
absence from duty without permission, and did not include
holidays or sickness as defined under statutory sick pay
legislation.] Other than at those places, the fewest
number of disciplinary actions for this were taken at
Hamilton (mean of 0.007), whereas the largest number on
average was over 50 times greater at Wishaw (0.32). At
this depot five drivers had five entries and three
drivers had six entries in this category. Fairly high
numbers were also recorded at Alloa (average 0.12) and
Paisley (0.11).
It is interesting to compare these with figures from
depots where figures of the actual numbers of days absent
were available. These are shown in the table below.
Table 5.13
Average annual days absent
Depot Mean S.D.






Although this was based on only a small number of depots
in the sample, it is clear that absenteeism was worst at
Hamilton where ironically the fewest drivers were
disciplined for this. Average days absent at Wishaw was
a little less, and yet disciplinary actions were just as
high.
In similar vein, figures for the average number of times
drivers were late in reporting for duty were also
collected, and these are summarised below:
Table 5.14








In this respect Edinburgh had the worst record: drivers
were late for work on an average of 1.74 occasions per
year. The problem was of far lesser proportion in the
small depots of Hawick and Elgin, and in Hamilton.
Perhaps if drivers there find that they are late for work
they do not bother trying to get to the depot at all and
take the day off. This may reflect the comparatively
few occasions on which disciplinary action was taken for
lateness and absence.
The use of overall averages in cases such as these may
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tend to give the impression that every driver has been
late or absent on at least one occas/ion. The records
show that this was not the case, however, and that there
were quite considerable numbers who have perfect
attendance records. The table below shows the numbers
for each depot who were in these categories.
Table 5.15





















In terms of absence, the lowest proportion of drivers
with clean records were found at Wishaw, which may
account for the large average number of disciplinery
actions for this. Although more drivers at Hamilton had
a clean record for absenteeism, the average number of
days absence was higher than Wishaw and this was
reflected in the greater ranges. The actual numbers of
days absence at Wishaw ranged from 0 to 13, with there
being four drivers with ten days or more per year. At
Hamilton the range was 0 to 16, but 17 drivers had ten
days or more absence. There was much greater variation
with lateness, with Edinburgh and Elgin drivers having
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the fewest clean records, and those at Hamilton and
Hawick having the most. The ranges tended to be less
than for absence, with Elgin being 0 to 4.7 and Hamilton
0 to 5, although Edinburgh was the exception: the
numbers of days ranged from 0 to 12.5.
Finally in this section, brief mention can be made of the
other discipline categories, where the average number of
occurrences tended to be much lower. The mean number of
offences for failure to stop and uplift was 0.14, with
the worst depots in this respect being Wishaw (mean of
0.23) and Edinburgh (mean 0.28). All the other depots
had scores well below the mean, with no drivers at
Cumnock, Forres or Fort William having this offence on
their record.
An interesting pattern was found with the rudeness
variable (mean of 0.06). As with the previous case,
Edinburgh was well above-average: the mean is 0.14. (One
driver had had eight disciplinary interviews for this.)
None of the drivers at Fraserburgh, Forres, Peterhead or
Cumnock had offences in this category.
Quality of driving was another minor offence overall
(mean 0.024) , where it was often just a few drivers who
had bad records in this respect. It was one such case
that made Fraserburgh the highest for this category (mean
of 0.078) - one driver had six such offences on his
record over seven years; at Hamilton there was one
driver with seven offences in two years. Fraserburgh
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apart, Edinburgh, Hawick, Wishaw and Alloa had the
highest scores. At the other end of the scale, no
driver at Forres, Fort William or Cumnock had offences in
this category.
The final category was one of the few positive indicators
of performance - commendations - if one considers that
all the others are in effect negative in that they record
when something has been done wrong. In virtually all
cases, however, commendations only appeared on a record
when a member of the public has written to the company
congratulating a driver on his behaviour, and this has
been passed on to the driver concerned. Hardly ever do
traffic supervisors make commendations on their own
initiative. Thus in a number of depots no drivers have
any commendations, and only a few in most of the others.
The depot with the highest average is Edinburgh, where
the bulk of such compliments were from grateful
passengers who travelled on coach tours operated by this
depot. One driver had eight such letters, one nine, one
ten and two had twelve each.
(iii) Disciplinary action
The reporting of a driver for any of the above offences
will, in most cases, lead to an interview taking place.
As a result disciplinary action is usually taken against
the driver concerned and it is to an analysis of this
that attention now turns. This was discussed in detail
in the chapter on research methodology and it will be
recalled that disciplinary action can range from the
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driver merely being interviewed (and perhaps instructed
as to how to deal with a situation properly) through
various levels of warning (verbal and written) to a
period of suspension or even dismissal. Table 5.16
below gives a summary of the average number of actions in
each category per driver.
Table 5.16
Average number of disciplinary actions per driver.
Category Mean S.D.
Interview/instruction 0.29 0.64
Verbal warning 0.95 1.33
Written warning 0.10 0.31
Final warning 0.03 0.14
Suspension (periods of) 0.10
Dismissal then reinstatement 0.02
0.26
0.22
This shows that a verbal warning was the form of action
most used. "Interview and instruction" was the least
serious result of a disciplinary interview, and was
really the equivalent of no action being taken. The
mean for this variable (0.29) was somewhat misleading, as
Edinburgh had a score which was far higher (at 0.99) than
any of the other depots, none of which exceeded 0.14.
Turning to the first proper level of disciplinary action
- the verbal warning - Wishaw, Alloa and Hawick had by
far the highest averages on this, being 2.78, 2.12 and
1.81 respectively. The high scores for the first two
depots were, in part, a result of their policy in
recording cash shortages, whereby any shortage over a
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certain limit (£1 for Alloa and £2 for Wishaw)
automatically resulted in an interview, followed by a
verbal warning or worse. Some drivers at these depots
had very high numbers of warnings: at Alloa, for
example, almost one-third of the drivers had more than
ten in the five years for which the records were taken;
five had over 30 and one (who was not tested) had 47
warnings. Six Hawick drivers had more than ten in the
same time period, although the highest was a mere 19.
Ticket issuing and general carelessness were the main
causes here. The average numbers of warnings at
Edinburgh and Hamilton were about one-third those of
Wishaw and Alloa (at around 0.8) - at Edinburgh, for
example, only five drivers had more than ten warnings in
five years. Hawick excepted, it was at the smaller
depots where warnings appeared less - at Fraserburgh the
average was 0.11 for example and at both Elgin and Fort
William it was 0.17 - with Cumnock having the least, at
0.06.
The next form of action, in terms of seriousness, was the
written warning. As with most other types of action,
the scale was much lower, and indeed the overall average
was one-tenth that for verbal warnings. This general
relationship did not hold for all depots, however, with
the larger depots tending to have proportionately more
than the smaller ones. Edinburgh, for example, had an
average of 0.19 written warnings per driver which was a
quarter of the number of verbal ones. Although these
were the more extreme examples, the overall pattern was
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that Edinburgh, Wishaw and Paisley were above average in
terms of numbers of written warnings per driver, with all
the others being well below.
Forres provided an interesting exception to the general
pattern of small depots having lower averages for
disciplinary action than the larger ones. The average
number of final warnings (0.056) was double the overall
average (of 0.027) and behind only Wishaw (0.09) and
Paisley (0.06). This should not suggest a harsh
disciplinary regime at Forres, however, rather it was an
illustration of the dangers of relying on arithmetical
means in small samples without studying the underlying
distributions. Only two drivers had received final
warnings - both had only one year's service. In a small
depot this was sufficient to make for a fairly high
overall average. Paisley and Wishaw were the other
depots which also had fairly high scores: in the former,
in particular, this form of action appeared to have been
quite extensively used. In other depots, this occurred
much less frequently; indeed, no driver at Hawick or
Fort William had received one.
There was an overall average of 0.098 suspensions per
driver. The highest number occulted in Edinburgh - a mean
of 0.22. Wishaw (0.12), Alloa (0.09) and Paisley (0.08)
were also high. The lowest were in Hamilton (0.004) and
most of the smaller depots. Once again, the figures for
Forres were affected by one or two drivers with very
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short periods of service - one driver with two years'
service had two suspensions, for example. At the other
end of the scale, in some depots drivers had amassed
fairly large numbers of suspensions. At Edinburgh, for
example, three drivers had five, three drivers had six,
one had seven and one had nine periods of suspension
within five years. One possible explanation for this,
advanced by an inspector, was that the continued shortage
of drivers owing to high turnover meant that dismissal
only took place in exceptional circumstances: an offence
which might bring dismissal in any other depot, was often
punished by a period of suspension or a final warning in
Edinburgh. The figures in Paisley were similar: 26 had
one, four had two, four had three and four had four
suspensions. In the smaller depots this form of action
was much less common, with it often applying to a very
few drivers. In Peterhead, for example, there was one
case of a driver having three suspensions, and at Cumnock
one driver had four, but these were exceptions to the
rule.
The final level of action for the purposes of this
research was dismissal on those cases where the driver
was reinstated after appeal. Dismissal is, of course,
very much a last resort and in a number of the smaller
depots - Forres, Hawick, Fort William and Elgin - there
were none in this category. The highest average was
recorded at Paisley - the mean was 0.085, where there
were four drivers who had been dismissed and reinstated
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once, and two to whom this had happened twice. One of
these had also received several periods of suspension and
six final warnings within a period of eight years.
Alloa also had a fairly high number of occurrences of
this (three) - but this tended to be much less frequent
in the other depots.
5.3.2 Accidents
(i) General
The final major category of data concerning drivers was
that relating to accidents, divided into two main
sections - collision and non-collision. Table 5.17 below
summarises the means and standard deviations for each
accident category as well as for the summary variables.
Table 5.17
Average number of accidents per driver per year.
Accident Type Mean S.D.
Collision Accidents
with other vehicles 0.88 1.03
with pedestrians 0.03 0.15
with animals 0.03 0.19




aboard bus 0.14 0.38
vandalism - outside 0.32 0.61
vandalism - inside 0.04 0.17
miscellaneous 0.07 0.18
total 0.61 0.83
Average total number of accidents 1.81 1.59
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Overall, the average driver in the depots surveyed had a
mean of 1.81 accidents per year. There were approximately
twice as many collision accidents as non-collision ones.
The most frequently occurring type of accident was
collisions with other road vehicles, with an average of
0.88 occurrences per driver per year. Next most
frequent were collisions with inanimate objects (anything
from fence posts and shop canopies to stone walls and the
iron girders holding up the garages), with a mean of
0.26, and vandalism from outside (mean of 0.32). Apart
from accidents aboard buses (mean of 0.14) the other
accident types were comparatively infrequent.
Table 5,18






























































Table 5.18 shows the proportion of drivers in each depot
with a clean record for both each summary category and
overall. There was only a small proportion of drivers
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who had no accidents at all - 7.3% - with this ranging
from none in some depots (such as Elgin and Peterhead) to
13% in Hamilton and over 28% in Hawick. A similar
pattern can be seen in the numbers with no collisions -
12.9% overall - with depots ranging from none (Peterhead
and Elgin) to over a quarter (Hawick, Hamilton and
Wishaw). Around one-third of drivers overall had no
non-collision accidents, ranging from 18% in Fraserburgh
to over 90% in Hawick. Fort William and Alloa also had
a high proportion in this category - the former with 67%
and the latter with 50% This is somewhat surprising, as
both depots had only one driver with no collisions and no
accidents in total.
The proportion of drivers with clean accident records
makes an interesting comparison with the figures for
those with clean discipline records, presented earlier.
23.7% of drivers had no disciplinary entries in their
records whereas only 7.3% had no accidents. One of the
greatest differences was for Cumnock, where 78% were in
the former category and yet only 11% in the latter. The
opposite was the case at Hawick - all drivers had been
disciplined at some time and yet over a quarter had no
accidents.
Returning to the figures for the numbers of accidents at
each depot, those for total accidents show the Paisley,
Hamilton and Edinburgh drivers had the greatest amounts,
with averages of 2.53, 2.07 and 1.86 respectively. The
remaining depots were all below the average of 1.70, with
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the exception being Forres (1.93). This should not
indicate that Forres drivers on the whole have more
accidents than others, rather, it was once again the
effect of having so many drivers with short lengths of
service which can produce some unrealistic arithmetical
averages. One driver had ten accidents in two years;
another had eleven in two-and-a-half years. Those with
low numbers of accidents per driver included Hawick
(0.48), Fraserburgh (0.86), and Alloa (1.20).
(ii) Specific accident types
Turning first to collision accidents, those with the
greatest numbers included Paisley (1.62) , Edinburgh
(1.51), Forres (1.38) and Peterhead (1.37) with Hawick
(0.46) and Fraserburgh (0.65) the smallest. Collisions
with other road vehicles were by far the most common form
of accident to occur. In terms of the depot-by-depot
picture, Edinburgh and Paisley were the worst in this
respect, with averages of 1.20 and 1.16 respectively.
In the former, for example, six drivers had ten
collisions in this category, one had eleven, one twelve,
three had thirteen, one fourteen, one fifteen, and one
even had seventeen (over five years). The only other
depot above the average of 0.88 was Peterhead (0.92),
where six drivers had seven collisions with vehicles, and
one had twelve. Amongst those at the other end of the
scale were Hawick (0.33), Fraserburgh (0.46) and Wishaw
(0.53).
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The other major types of collision was that concerning
"inanimate objects". The overall scale of these
accidents was much less than for those with other
vehicles, with an average of 0.26, and the highest being
Forres (0.68) and Peterhead (0.44). The problem of
extreme ratios with a small sample led to the high
average score for Forres once again - it was mainly
accounted for by one driver having five collisions with
inanimate objects within the space of a year. Cumnock
had the lowest occurrences of this type of accident -
0.07 per driver per year - followed by Hawick,
Fraserburgh and Elgin.
Pedestrians and animals were the other two categories of
collision accidents, both of which were almost negligible
in comparison with the first two. The largest
occurrences of the former type were in the busiest urban
areas - Edinburgh, Wishaw and Hamilton. Pedestrians
were safest in Forres and Hawick, where none were hit by
buses. Collisions with animals were similarly
infrequent, the victims most often being dogs. Paisley
and Forres had the worst records for this category, with
means of 0.08 and 0.07; the least accidents took place
in Fort William (0.008) and Elgin (0.007), with none
occurring in either Hawick or Fraserburgh.
The ratio of the proportion of collision to non-collision
accidents overall was of the order of two-to-one. This,
however, did not always hold. Some of the greatest
differences were at Hawick, where the respective averages
245
were 0.46 and 0.01 and Fort William (1.12 and 0.11). On
the other hand, the two were almost equal at Hamilton and
Wishaw. The most frequent type of non-collision
accident was vandalism from outside the vehicles which
usually took the form of stones, bricks and other
missiles being thrown at buses with the object of
breaking windows. The depot with the most cases of this
being reported per driver was Hamilton, with a mean of
0.88. Sister depot Wishaw had a lower occurrence of
this (0.25) as did Paisley (0.25). As an indication of
the extent of the trouble at Hamilton some figures over a
two-year period were interesting: 33 drivers suffered
two occurrences of this, 19 suffered three, 11 had four,
six had five, three had six and one had seven. By
comparison, at Paisley 13 drivers had two cases of this
and two had three, over a period of five years.
Needless to say, this was much less of a problem in rural
areas, with it not being reported at all in many of the
depots there. Vandalism inside buses was much less of a
problem overall, (with a mean of only 0.04), with no
cases being reported in Fraserburgh, Forres, Hawick or
Fort William. Wishaw was the one exception to this,
with a mean of 0.16 which was three times as great as the
next largest depot, Hamilton.
Apart from this the other major form of accidents in the
non-collision category concerned those taking place on
board buses. The overall average was 0.14, with all
the rural depots and Hamilton being well below it. The
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worst depots in this respect were Paisley (0.34) and
Edinburgh (0.21). At Paisley the average number of
boarding and alighting accidents (0.23) was also well
above the average of 0.05. This category concerns
passengers who trip or fall whilst boarding or alighting
from a bus, whether injury arises or not, and in Paisley
there were several cases of intending passengers actually
collapsing and dying whilst doing this. It is hard to
provide possible explanations for the reason why Paisley
should have so many cases of this type of accident. All
the Bus Group companies have a mix of vehicles, and it is
not the case that Paisley has a greater than average
proportion of single-deckers with the Alexander "Y" type
bodywork, which feature three fairly steep steps up to
the main deck.
The final category (miscellaneous) covered those
accidents which could not easily be classified into any
of the other groups. Interestingly, it was some of the
rural depots which had the highest scores here. The
average overall was 0.07, but for Elgin it was 0.43 and
for Forres it was 0.21. Windscreens broken by loose
chippings on the roads were the main cause of this, with
one or two Elgin drivers having six or more such cases on
their records. A possible explanation for this is that
the winters can be very harsh up in the north-east of
Scotland, with frost action exploiting any weaknesses in
road surfaces and causing stones to come loose.
Similarly, there is often not the same volume of traffic
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up there to sweep loose stones to the side of the road as
there is in the central belt, and consequently buses
there may be more vulnerable to such stones.
(iii) Disciplinary action
In common with offences, once an accident report has been
submitted the Traffic Supervisor will interview a driver
to determine whether he was at fault or not. If a
driver was at fault, then appropriate action is taken
ranging from "no action" (meaning "at fault, but no
action taken as the accident was very minor and being the
equivalent of "interview and instruction"), through the
range of warnings to suspensions and dismissals. The
table below summarises the number of disciplinary actions
per driver.
Table 5.19
Average number of disciplinary actions for accidents per
driver.
Type Mean S.. D.
Not at fault 1.03 1..10
No action 0.34 0..59
Verbal warning 0.27 0..45
Written warning 0. 05 0.,18
Final warning 0.01 0.,22
Suspensions (periods of) 0.10 0.,46
Dismissal then reinstatement 0.006 0.,14
The most common outcome in the case of acccidents was
"not at fault" - this accounted for the majority of
disciplinary actions, with "no action" coming second.
This implies that in many cases drivers who were involved
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in accidents received no adverse reports on their record:
they were either not to blame for an accident taking
place or, if they were, no action was taken against them.
When action was taken, the verbal warning followed by
periods of suspension were most often used. Written and
final warnings, and dismissal, were comparatively
infrequent.
It is interesting to compare this with the table of
disciplinary actions for offences discussed earlier.
The overall scale of actions taken for accidents appeared
to be much lower than for disciplinary offences. There
was an average of 0.27 verbal warnings per driver for the
former, for example, whereas in the latter the average
was 0.95 per driver. Suspensions are the one category
which were the same. On the other hand there was a much
greater incidence of cases where no action was taken: an
average of 1.37 for accidents (if "not at fault" and "no
action" are added together) as against 0.29 for offences.
Taking the individual categories for disciplinary action,
"not at fault" was the most common form occurring most
often in some of the large depots - Paisley (mean 1.66),
Hamilton (mean 1.46) and Wishaw (mean 1.23) in
particular. By contrast Edinburgh had one of the lowest
scores for this variable - a mean of 0.56 - along with
most of the smaller depots such as Fraserburgh, Alloa and
Peterhead. Comparing the records over the last five
years for Paisley and Edinburgh drivers, in the former
depot were 15 drivers with ten or more "not at faults" on
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their record, with one having seventeen and one nineteen.
By contrast, at the latter only two drivers had more than
ten - one with eleven and one with thirteen.
The situation between these two depots was reversed when
studying the next variable - no action for accidents.
Edinburgh in fact had the highest number (an average of
0.60 per driver) and Paisley the lowest (mean of 0.01),
with the average being 0.34. These differences were
confirmed when looking at the frequencies for each depot:
at Paisley seven drivers had one no action and one had
three; at Edinburgh 72 drivers had three or more, with
three drivers having nine such items. Hamilton also had
a high score on this variable - a mean of 0.58 - in
complete contrast to Wishaw where there were no instances
of no action reported. Most of the rural depots had low
scores for this, as did Alloa and Cumnock, although
Peterhead was an exception with an above-average score of
0.42.
The verbal warning was the most common type of positive
action taken where a driver was at fault for an accident,
with an average of 0.27 occurrences per driver per year.
The depots with the highest scores on this included
Edinburgh (0.41), Alloa (0.50) and Peterhead (0.52); it
appeared the least in Hamilton (0.02) and Cumnock (0.01).
The difference in the magnitude of disciplinary actions
between Hamilton and Wishaw appeared again when dealing
with accidents - the average number at Hamilton was far
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lower than those at Wishaw - 0.37, a difference which
continued through the range of actions.
Much less frequent was the incidence of written warnings.
The mean for these overall was 0.05, with the range being
from zero in some depots (Fraserburgh, Elgin, Peterhead
and Cumnock), to 0.09 in Edinburgh, 0.12 in Paisley and
0.14 in Fort William. Final warnings were only used in
three depots, with the range being from an average of
0.009 in Fort William to 0.10 in Paisley. Dismissal,
followed by reinstatement after appeal, was an even less
common outcome of an accident, occurring in only three
depots - Edinburgh (average of 0.001), Peterhead (0.005)
and Paisley (0.043). With accidents, dismissal is
regarded as the last resort, and would only result if a
driver had had several large accidents where he was to
blame and could have avoided them, or for one very major
accident. An example of this was one accident which
happened to a Paisley driver: his bus skidded out of
control (in the summer) and hit a wall. This caused
£1,800 damage to the wall, £5,000 of damage to the bus,
and the driver was dismissed, only to be reinstated on
appeal. An accident of this magnitude is a rare
occurrence.
These forms of action were fairly rare, however, and in
second place to verbal warnings were periods of suspension
with an overall average of 0.10. Two depots were well
above average on this score; the remainder were well
below. Paisley had the highest number of suspensions
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per driver of 0.29, and second was Edinburgh with an
average of 0.19. Drivers at Hamilton and Hawick had no
suspensions recorded against them, and the remaining
depots ranged from means of 0.01 at Fraserburgh to 0.08
at Peterhead.
5.3.3 Status
The final measure to be considered in this section is the
status of each driver approximately one year after the
psychological tests were conducted. Although perhaps
not a true measure of performance as such, it can still
be included, even if just to identify those whose
"performance" or abilities were exceptionally good or
bad. The categories include those who are promoted to
inspector (or above) and those who are dismissed.
The following table summarises the status of drivers one
year after the tests were carried out.
Table 5.20
Status one year after sitting tests.
Status Number %
Still a driver 534 87.1
Still a depot controller 9 1.5
Shop steward 13 2.1
Since promoted 10 1.6
Since resigned 36 5.9
Since retired/deceased 4 0.6
Since dismissed 7 1.1
TOTAL* 613 100.0
* Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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Nine-tenths of those tested were still in the same job a
year afterwards, either as a driver, depot controller or
shop steward. The largest proportion of the remainder
had resigned, with only small numbers retiring or being
either dismissed or promoted. All depots were similar
in that the majority of drivers and depot controllers
were still in the same position when the performance data
were collected. Ten drivers had been promoted in this
period, accounting for 1.6% of the sample population,
with resignations being 5.9%. The greatest proportion
of these were in Edinburgh (12.9%); apart from smaller
depots where there were one or two, there were five
resignations at Wishaw and three at Paisley.
The situation at Edinburgh would have been regarded as a
norm (or even low) for the industry in the 1960s and
1970s, but it was very much the exception (certainly as
far as this sample was concerned) and perhaps explains
the preference of supervisors at that depot to use
suspension in preference to dismissal. Dismissals and
retirals were comparatively infrequent, and to the
researcher's knowledge, there were no deaths. In
several cases fraud (or attempted fraud) and bad
absenteeism/lateness records were the cause of dismissals
occurring; unfortunately, it was rarely possible to
discover why people left of their own accord as their
resignation letters tended to be very brief, with the
reasons perhaps being explained verbally to their traffic
supervisor. The employment situation in the smaller
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depots tended to be more stable than in the larger ones,
where the scale of operations perhaps means inevitably
there will be more ongoing labour turnover.
5.4 Tests of significance
Attention now turns to tests which determine whether the
differences between sub-groups of data were statistically
significant. In other words, this determines the
probability that two groups of cases came from the same
population as opposed to different ones. Students' t-
tests were carried out by SPSS-X to investigate this,
after the data had been assembled into appropriate sub¬
groups .
The t-test procedure calculated both the F-value and the
t-test statistics. As Guilford and Fruchter (1973)
recommend, if the F-test shows that the two samples have
significantly different variances, then the t-test is
questionable. Therefore, in this research, the t-test
was ignored if the F-test had a significance level of
p=.05 or greater. The variables reported in the
sections below are those for which the variances between
groups are significantly different, providing that the F-
value is not significant.
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5.4.1 Tested vs. untested groups
A number of t-tests were carried out to investigate the
differences between those who took part in the research
project and those who did not. This was to see how
representative the tested group were as a sample from all
drivers in the depots which were studied. This in turn
was to help to determine how representative the research
findings might be. The tests, therefore, were
restricted to the performance data collected - 40
variables covering age, length of service, disciplinary
offences, accidents and disciplinary actions for both, as
well as the specific figures for average lateness,
absence and weeks of cash shortage. Not only were the
data analysed en masse, but they were also analysed for
the sub-groups of those aged below/above 40 years, for
those in small and large depots (with the dividing line
being drawn at 100 drivers), and for each depot.
Very few variables were statistically different at a
significance level of p=.05 or greater. Age was one of
the main ones to differ, with the tested group being
younger than the untested one. In some cases length of
service was also significantly lower for the tested
group. The following tables list these differences.
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Table 5.21
T-tests for tested vs untested groups of drivers,
(a) All drivers
Variable Tested group Untested group F T Prob
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Value
Age 39.83 10.50 42.99 10.77 1.05 -4.48 >.01
Ticket issue 0.42 0.68 0.29 0.63 1.18 2.68 .01
Interview/
instruction 0.29 0.64 0.19 0.61 1.11 2.29 .02
No Action
(accidents) 0.34 0.59 0.23 0.62 1.12 2.72 .01














Joining age 38.86 7.99 37.14 8.35 1.09 2.28 .02
Service 10.48 8.37 13.00 9.56 1.31 -2.93 >.0|
Total colls 1.04 0.89 0.85 0.86 1.10 2.23 .03
No action 0.26 0.43 0.16 0.46 1.16 2.57 .01
(c) Drivers under 40 years of age
None














Age 43.49 10.01 47.68 9.97 1.01 -3.22 >.01














Age 38.58 10.38 41.28 10.55 1.03 -3.33 >.01
Ticket issue 0.49 0.75 0.35 0.69 1.14 2.42 .02
Interview/
instruction 0.38 0.72 0.25 0.70 1.07 2.35 .02
No action
(accidents) 0.40 0.66 0.26 0.65 1.01 2.79 .01
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(f) Individual depots
Variable/ Tested group Obtested group F T Prob
Depot Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Value
Elgin
Age 42.44 9.55 49.52 9.09 1.10 -2.42 .02
Service 7.76 6.43 17.52 9.22 2.05 -3.81 >.01
Not at fault
(accidents) 1.03 0.49 0.67 .40 1.52 2.69 .01
Cumnock
Age 43.04 8.62 48.05 9.58 1.24 -2.12 .04
Service 12.19 6.80 18.90 8.12 1.42 -3.52 >.01
Paisley
Service 4.60 5.32 7.23 6.29 1.40 -2.77 .01
Hamilton
Age 38.27 9.82 43.87 10.03 1.04 -2.90 >.01
Wlshaw
Age 37.97 9.48 42.19 10.68 1.27 -2.61 .01
There were no statistically significant differences
between tested and untested groups at the remaining
depots: Fraserburgh, Forres, Hawick, Fort William,
Peterhead, Alloa and Edinburgh.
5.4.2 Specific sub-groups of data
(i) All cases
Further tests were carried out on two subdivisions of the
data used in the subsequent analysis: under 40
years/over 40 years and those in small/large depots, with
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the division being at a size of 100 drivers. These t-
tests involved comparing one part against the other (eg.
large depots versus small depots) Cash shortages, in
terms of weeks per year when a cash shortage was
reported, appeared more frequently in this section.
The results of the t-tests were as follows:
Table 5.22
T-tests for all drivers split by group.
a) "Age group"
Variable Older group Younger group F T Prob
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Value
General
carelessness 0.19 0.38 0.24 0.41 1.18 -2.07 .04
Miscellaneous
accidents 0.07 0.17 0.05 0.17 1.05 1.92 .05
Cash shortages 19.48 14.64 22.26 13.78 1.13 -2.58 .01
b) "Depot group"
Variable Larger group Smaller group F T Prob
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Value
Age 39.57 10.52 45.10 10.18 1.07 -7.20 >.01
Joining age 32.45 8.59 33.70 8.82 1.06 1.96 .05
ii) Tested only
T-tests were also carried out on the sample of drivers
tested, again split by age group and depot size; this
time both test and performance measures are included.
The following were the variables where there was a
statistically significant difference between groups.
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Table 5.23
T-tests for tested drivers only, split by age group.
Variable Younger group Older group F T Prob
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Value
WRT Right 24.74 9.97 17.58 9.90 1.01 8.79 >.001
CF1 8.42 2.24 7.06 2.48 1.23 7.04 >.00i
CF2 7.01 1.91 6.28 1.71 1.25 4.85 >.00|
CF3 8.44 2.06 6.85 2.20 1.13 9.13 >.001
CF4 5.25 1.83 4.40 1.91 1.09 5.54 >.001
CFT 29.12 5.95 24.62 5.92 1.01 9.23 >.001
16PF - C 14.70 4.10 13.70 3.96 1.07 2.96 >.001
- E 12.07 3.91 10.74 3.95 1.02 4.04 >.001
- F 13.83 4.73 11.96 4.25 1.24 4.95 >.00/
- G 11.89 3.32 13.45 3.19 1.09 -5.72 >.001
- Q1 9.97 3.28 8.75 3.14 1.09 4.54 >.001
" Q3 12.30 3.27 13.35 3.13 1.09 -3.91 >.001
Cash shortages 18.63 14.44 22.63 14.11 1.05 -2.96 >.001
It is perhaps not surprising that there were significant
differences between the two groups in terms of
intelligence test scores, on account of age being an
important determinant of intelligence test performance.
In terms of the 16PF factors, the indications are that
the older drivers were less emotionally stable (C), more
humble and mild (E) and more sober and serious (F) than
the younger ones. They also had higher standards, were
more conservative and more tolerant of traditional
difficulties (G,Q1 and Q3).
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Table 5.24












WRT Right 22.22 10.63 19.52 9.99 1.13 -2.77 .01
WRT wrong 4.07 3.22 3.53 2.84 1.29 -1.88 .06
CF3 7.84 2.28 7.40 2.19 1.09 -2.08 .04
CFT 27.36 6.42 26.25 6.06 1.12 -1.89 .06
16PF - B 7.25 1.93 6.86 1.84 1.10 -2.12 .03
- C 14.45 4.09 13:72 3.85 1.13 -1.90 .06
- M 11.51 3.42 10.06 3.25 1.11 -4.51 >.0(
- N 10.67 3.11 11.76 3.26 1.10 3.64 >.01
- 0 11.59 4.17 12.69 4.09 1.04 2.78 .01
- Ql 9.66 3.27 8.73 3.19 1.05 -3.01 >.01
Age 38.58 10.38 43.49 10.01 1.08 -5.10 >.01
Joining age 32.04 8.71 33.83 8.72 1.00 2.18 .03
There was a small difference between the two sizes of
depots in terms of intelligence: the significance level
was marginal for Culture Fair total and so was included
in the table. Interestingly, factor B was significantly
different here: it was not so in the other case
discussed above.
Those in the larger depots were slightly higher in terms
of imagination and thought (M) and in a questioning
attitude (Ql); they were more forthright and
unpretentious (N) and were less worried and apprehensive
(0) than those in the smaller establishments.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter has examined the data collected in the
research at a descriptive level, providing frequencies,
means and standard deviations. A section was also
devoted to the differences between sub-groups of the
data, most importantly (for the eventual application of
the results) between those who took part in the project
and those who did not. Few significant differences were
found, mostly those of age, length of service and some
offences. A number of differences were discovered
between young and old drivers, and between those in large




RESULTS (2) : CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the results of correlational
analyses performed on the data. Pearson product-moment
correlations were calculated using the "Pearson Corr"
procedure on SPSS-X. A number of analyses were
performed, of the biographical and psychological test
data (the inputs), the situational variables (the
treatments) and the performance criteria (the outputs).
A large number of correlation matrices were produced,
many containing considerable numbers of correlations with
significance levels greater than p=.01. The full
matrices, reduced and photocopied from the original
computer printout, are given in Appendix C. The
matrices shown in this chapter are edited to show just
the statistically significant correlations. To simplify
presentation of these matrices, it is assumed that all
correlation coefficients are in the range -99 to 99,
hence nonsignificant zeros and decimal points are
ommitted to ease clarity. A coefficient of +0.32 is
entered as 32, for example; one of -0.14 is expressed as
-14. In the tables the significance level of
coefficients is abbreviated to "**" for those where p=.01
or greater, "*" for those where the significance is
between p=.01 to p=.05. Correlation coefficients which
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are not statistically significant at p=.05 or greater are
indicated by a dash (-) in the tables.
This chapter first examines the intercorrelations amongst
groups of variables, then explores the correlations
between different groups. The variables were described
in detail in the research methodology chapter.
6.2 Intercorrelations
6.2.1 Biographical and situational variables
The table below shows the intercorrelations amongst the
biographical variables for each driver - current age, age
on joining, length of service, the number of years a car
licence was held prior to joining the bus company and the
number of previous jobs the driver has held in the five
years before joining. In addition, the size of depot
each driver works in (measured by number of drivers
employed there) and the distance that depot is from the
headquarters of its company were also entered into the
analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Age
(2) Joining age 75**
(3) Service 56** -13**
(4) Car licence 78** 87**
(5) Previous jobs -09* -10* -10*
(6) Depot size -18** -10** -13** -20**
(7) Distance HQ 18** 13** 11** 21** -79**
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There was a fairly wide range of correlation
coefficients, from very high (eg, age and service; depot
size and distance from head office) to very low and not
significant. Most of the relationships were self-
explanatory from what was described in the previous
chapter. The older drivers tended to be longer serving
than the younger ones and tended to work in the smaller
depots. Similarly, the larger the depot, the lower the
average age and average length of service. In terms of
the depots themselves, the smaller ones tended to be
located further from their company head office than the
larger ones.
Age and age on joining were positively related - this
implies that the older drivers were quite old when they
joined their depot; age on joining increased as depot
size decreased, which makes sense when one considers that
a greater proportion of older drivers tended to be
employed in the smaller establishments. The number of
years a car licence was held prior to employment with the
bus company was positively linked to joining age - again
this was understandable as those older on joining were
more likely to have possessed a licence for longer. Age
on joining and service were negatively correlated,
implying that those who have been with their depot for a
shorter time were older when they joined. This would
appear to contradict the positive relationship between
age and service.
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Number of previous jobs correlated negatively with both
current age and age on joining: the drivers both who are
younger now and were younger when they joined held more
jobs in the five years prior to joining, and had
possessed a car licence for a shorter period of time.
This may well be a reflection of the labour market in the
early 1980s, with both large scale redundancies in major
industries (such as steel and engineering in the
Hamilton/Wishaw and Paisley areas) and a lack of
employment opportunities for school leavers, in these
areas especially. Those who were unemployed have often
just taken any job that was available. Such jobs (from
reading application forms at the three depots listed
above in particular) were frequently short term in
nature, either because they were only temporary, or were
subject to redundancy, or the person left owing to a
better job being available elsewhere. This helps to
explain the relationships between previous employment and
both age measures.
The opposite is often the case at the other end of the
scale, a number of drivers who were older when they
joined had often come from either long service in one of
the armed forces, or from a long period of continuous
employment with one firm (perhaps being made redundant).
Such persons are often welcomed by supervisors who
recruit, as they believe that a long period of stable
employment encourages people to stay with the company.
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6.2.2 Word Recognition Test and Intelligence Test items
The table below gives the intercorrelations among the
intelligence test items and the Word Recognition Test
(WRT). "WRT" refers to total number of words correct on
the this test; "risk" to number of words wrong. "CFl"
to "CF4" refer to the four subtest scores on the Culture
Fair test, "CFT" to the total. "B" is the raw score
from factor B on the 16PF, which represents intelligence.
(8)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) WRT
(2) Risk -
(3) CFl 39** -
(4) CF2 33** - 39**
(5) CF3 45** -08* 52** 41**
(6) CF4 32** - 39** 30** 41**
(7) CFT 50** - 80** 68** 79** 68** -
(8) B 32** _ 29** 22** 34** 23** 37**
The results were more or less as would be expected. The
individual sub-tests and the total of the Culture Fair
test were highly intercorrelated, as they should be for
any group of people with an average range of ability
taking it. "WRT" was also highly correlated with
intelligence (as measured by the two other tests), the
highest correlations being with sub-test 3 and overall
total for Culture Fair. "Risk", the number of words
answered incorrectly on the Word Recognition Test, was the
one variable which did not correlate significantly with
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any of the intelligence ones, although Ingleton (1986)
does not claim that it should.
On account of the high correlation coefficients amongst
the subtests of the Culture Fair, all future references
to this test will contain only the total score. The
data above provided further evidence for the link between
the Culture Fair test (on a measure of "g", general
intelligence) and factor B on the 16PF - the two have a
significant positive correlation (as noted by, for
example, Ajwani, 1982).
Of the four subtests of Culture Fair, it was the third
which had the highest correlation coefficient with WRT
and the only one (negative) with Risk. The subtest asks
people to complete matrices, where one sector is missing;
the WRT asks people to complete words which have not been
printed properly. It is purely a matter for speculation
at this stage as to whether there is any meaning in these
relationships: those who are good at making sense of
incomplete words also achieve a high score when solving
incomplete matrices. Those who answer a high number of
words incorrectly on WRT are less likely to be able to
complete matrices, either through omission or commision.
As the correlation with risk and CF3 is very small, it is
perhaps unwise to read too much into it.
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6.2.3 Intercorrelations among 16PF items
Three-quarters of the correlation coefficients in this
matrix were significant at p=.05 or greater, 79 out of a
total of 105 pairs with factor B being excluded as it
receives more detailed treatment elsewhere. No further
discussion of this matrix will take place, as the
correlations amongst the 16PF factors are best left to
the factor analysis discussed in the next chapter.
6.2.4 Correlations between 16PF and intelligence test items
The next table summarises the statistically significant
correlations for the above. Factor B on the 16PF is
included with the intelligence test items, as in the
previous section.
Factor WRT Risk CFT B
A -14** -10**
C 09* -10** 10**
E 07* 07* 16**
F 10** - 13**
G - -08*
H - - - -
I - - -17** -12**
L -09** - -11**
M 11** - 12** 13**
N -12** -10** -11** -08*
0 -14** 09** -11** -10**
Ql -
Q2 - - - 08*
Q3 -
Q4 - 10*
Only three personality factors (M, N and 0) correlated
with all three intelligence items - WRT, Culture Fair
total and factor B. A further five correlated with WRT
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and CFT and another two with CFT and B. Risk correlated
significantly with six personality factors. No factor
correlated with all four test variables. The highest
correlation coefficients tended to involve CFT; the
lowest, risk. Three personality factors had no
significant correlations with any test items - H
(shy/venturesome), Q1 (conservative/questioning) and Q3
(lacks/has self-control).
M was positively related - a high score represents those
who are imaginative, creative, absorbed in ideas and
often oblivious of people. These people tend to be
thinkers which may well help explain the positive
correlations with intelligence. The other two-were
negatively correlated. Low N describes spontaneous,
forthright, natural and trusting behaviour. In some
respects it is strange that such individuals should have
high intelligence. Cattell et al (1982) report that the
groups which score highest on these factors include the
skilled professions and precision occupations, such as
time study engineers, accountants and electricians. They
also tend to be intellectual and analytical of both their
own selves and of others' motives. It would appear that
a high score might represent academic intelligence, which
is not necessarily what these tests measure. On the
other hand, the lack of both social polish and a hard-
headed approach to people (both features of high N),
combined with genuine liking for people (low N), may
explain the high correlation with WRT, which Ingleton
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(1987) postulates measures "social intelligence" - a
capacity to deal with people. Low scores on factor 0
are associated with self-assured, confident, expedient
behaviour: it could be that their intelligence makes
them cope with what they might regard as the minor
frustrations of bus driving and keep them in perspective.
Those with low intelligence, who score high on 0, may
become over-anxious about the everyday problems and
difficulties of the job.
A number of other factors correlated with at least two of
the intelligence items, some of the highest coefficients
being for factor I. These were negative, suggesting that
the more intelligent have low scores on this factor, in
other words are more tough- than tender-minded,
realistic, down to earth and independent. It may well be
that their practical approach to life made it easier for
them to solve the intelligence tests which required
choice of the most straightforward answer. It is harder
to account for the high positive correlation with factor
E and Culture Fair, high scores on this factor
representing assertive, competitive and self-assured
behaviour. Possibly, these peoples' intelligence makes
them more assertive in the situation of a bus company,
where they might be intolerant of situations where they
can see better ways of doing things but where the system
makes it hard for them to put forward their suggestions
in a light that will be seen as constructive and as
insolence.
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Two factors correlate only with the number of words
wrongly answered on the WRT only, the variable which it
is postulated measures unconscious risk. G correlates
negatively: this makes some sense in that low scores on
this factor describes expedient individuals who disregard
rules, are irresponsible and not conscientious. On the
WRT candidates are warned not to guess if they are unsure
of an answer - it may be these individuals did. Q4
correlated positively - a high score represents
frustration and tension. This might have been felt by
those who were unable to see many words in the test, and
started guessing in order to be able to put at least some
words down, so as not to be embarrassed in the eyes of
their colleagues. C, N and 0 also correlate with
WRTwrong, a low score on C suggesting a lack of tolerance
for frustrating conditions and easily annoyed.
6.2.5 Correlations between WRT/intelligence
and background variables
The next table shows the correlations between the WRT and
intelligence items, and the biographical/situational
variables.
Age had a strong, negative relationship with both WRT and
Culture Fair: as one gets older, one's ability to do
these tests diminishes. There was no significant link
between age and B and a small one with Risk (positive).
Length of service, car licence and age on joining
followed a similar pattern, not surprising as the longer-
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WRT Risk CFT B
Age -37** 08* -42** -
Join age -23** 07* -28** -
Service -27** - -28** -
Car licence -27** - -29** -
Previous jobs 10* - - -
Depot size 14** 06* 11** 12**
Distance HQ -07* — — -07*
serving drivers will almost certainly be the older ones.
The same applies to the car licence variable. Number of
previous jobs had just one statistically significant
correlation with one intelligence item - WRT. Depot
size was positively correlated with all four variables;
distance from headquarters was negatively correlated with
two of them.
6.2.6 Correlations between 16PF and background variables.
The statistically significant correlations between these
two groups of variables are summarised below. Age,
joining age, service and, to some extent, car licence go
hand in hand in terms of direction of correlations,
although the size of the coefficients sometimes varied.
Previous jobs had only three correlations with test
factors. Size of depot and distance from head office
correlated significantly with around half of the factors;
in only one case did they both have coefficients in the
same direction - factor N.
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Background/situational variable




A - - - - -09* 07*
C -12** -08* -07* - - 08* -08*
E -19** -08* -18** -15** - - -
F -27** -1.4** -22** -19** - - -
G 25** 22** 09* 25** - -10** 08*
H - - -09* - -09* - -
I 13** 09* 07* 09* 11* - -
L - - - - - - -
M - - - - - 20** -12**
N 13** - 18** 11** -08* 17** 15**
0 09** - 09* - - -10** 09*
Ql -19** -11** -15** -14** - 09** -18**
Q2 09** - 07* 08* - - -
Q3 18** 13** 09** 17** - - -
Q4 - - -15** - - 09**
Several factors had fairly high correlation coefficients
with the age-related variables, among them factors E and
F - this suggested that with greater age drivers become
both more conforming and humble and have a more sober and
serious outlook on life. In addition, older drivers
would appear to be more conscientious, conforming and
controlled (G, Q3), more shrewd and less natural (N) and
more conservative and traditional (Ql). Two other
factors correlated strongly with just age - these are C
(greater age bringing less emotional stability and low
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frustration tolerance) and I (greater age with this
factor making for a more tough-minded, no-nonsense and
realistic approach to life).
The effect of age on these 16PF scores can be compared
with other research findings, as summarised by Cattell et
al (1982) who report that age can affect seven of the
sixteen scales. The findings here contradict these to
some extent. Four factors in the driver research follow
Cattell et al's pattern, namely a decline in F, and a
rise in G, I and Q3. However, Cattell et al suggest
that 0 should fall (it rises with the drivers), Q1 should
rise steadily (it falls significantly) and Q4 should fall
(the correlation with age is not significant; with car
licence, however, it does fall significantly). In
addition, from his own research, Cattell suggests that C
rises moderately with age (the opposite is the case here)
and that E falls for women only (it falls in this
research, where almost all the respondents were
men). He also suggests that H and M rise for men and L
falls - none of these were significant here.
Looking at the situational variables, factors M and N had
the highest coefficients. This suggests that in the
larger depots, and those nearer their company head
office, drivers are more self-motivated and creatively
imaginative (high M). In both larger depots and those
further from head office, drivers are more shrewd,
socially aware and calculating (high N). This is also a
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feature of older drivers: as there tend to be more in
the more rural depots (such as Fort William, Peterhead
and Elgin) this might account for the positive
correlation with the distance variable. There was also
a fairly high coefficient of correlation between this
variable and factor Q1, implying that the more
traditional and conservative drivers are found in depots
far away from their company headquarters. This is
backed up to some extent by the correlations with G,
scores on which fall as depot size increases and distance
decreases.
6.2.7 Summary
A number of brief remarks can be made on the basis of the
correlations presented so far. The older drivers tend
to be longer serving (although some were older when they
joined) and tend to be located in the smaller depots,
which are further from company headquarters than the
larger ones. The more intelligent drivers tend to be
younger with shorter service and are employed in larger
depots. There were a fairly large number of significant
correlations between the 16PF and both intelligence and
biographical and situational variables.
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6.3 Intercorrelations between performance measures
6.3.1 Offence variables
The next table shows the correlation coefficients for the
"offence" variables, which were discussed in some detail
in the research methodology chapter. To recap briefly,
the "offence" data was collected both from drivers'
individual records (items 1 to 10 below, each expressed
as an average number per year) and from depot records
(unauthorised absence, lateness in reporting for work and
cash shortages - average number of days per year for the
first two, average number of weeks per year for the
third). The final variable is the sum of the first ten.
There was, in general, positive intercorrelations amongst
these variables. Some were particularly high, for
example between poor timekeeping and ticket issuing
faults, poor timekeeping and excessive absence, and poor
timekeeping and excessive cash shortages; and number of
complaints with each of failure to stop and uplift,
rudeness and poor quality of driving. The last three
are not particularly surprising, as these often are the
main causes for complaint by members of the public.
There were very strong correlations between the summary
variable (total disciplinery offences) and most of the
individual measures, the two exceptions being average
lateness and average cash shortages. This is hardly
surprising as the individual measures (numbered 1 to 9 in
the table) were added together to produce the total
offences category.
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5 27** 28** 22** 14**
6 22** 12** - 15** 12**
7 23** - - 16** 22** 08*
8 15** - - 07* 23** - 37**
9 08* - 07* - 10** - 08* 07*
10 24** 26** 47** 40** 22** 30** -
11 11* -09* - 30** 25**
12 19** 24** 11* 13** 14** 08* 35** 16* - - 23**
13 - -19** - -14** - - 10* 33** - -10* 31**
14 65** 62** 48** 31** 59** 24** 47** 56** 15** 15** 34**
Notes
** = significant at p=.01 or greater




2. Ticket issuing faults
3. Failure to stop
4. Rudeness
5. General Carelessness
6. Poor quality of driving
7. Excessive absence




11. Unauthorised absence (days per year)
12. Lateness for work (days per year)
13. Average cash shortages (average weeks in which shortage
reported).
14. Total disciplinary offences
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6.3.2 Accident variables
Accident data were collected in two ways. Firstly,
there were counts of each type of accident for each
driver, averaged to a figure per year. Secondly, the
accidents were totalled under two headings - collisions
and non-collisions. Taking the individual accident
variables, there were few significant correlations between
them as the table on the next page shows.
There were only two significant intercorrelations amongst
the collision categories - collisions with vehicles
correlated with collisions with pedestrians and
collisions with animals correlated with collisions with
objects. Amongst the few significant correlations for
non-collision accidents were those between
boarding/alighting accidents and accidents aboard buses;
and the correlation between the two types of vandalism -
that occurring outside (such as a stone thrown at a
window) and that taking place inside (for example, a seat
covering being cut with a knife). [This gives rise to
the suggestion that some drivers may be more vandalism
prone than others.]
As with the offences (see previous section) the two
summary variables had very high correlations in many
cases with the individual categories; they also had a
fairly high degree of intercorrelation. This suggests
that drivers are more likely to have both collision and







5 - - 24**
6 35** - - 25** 25**
7 - io** - -09*
8 _ 35**
9 - - - -07* - -
10 88** 27** 24** 46** 07* 39** 08*
11 19** 07* - 20** 37** 44** 74** 46** 18** 24**
Notes
** = significant at p=.01 or greater
* = significant in range p=.05 to p=.01.
1. Collisions - vehicles
2. Collisions - pedestrians
3. Collisions - animals
4. Collisions - objects
5. Boarding and alighting accidents
6. Accidents aboard bus
7. Vandalism - outside




proportion than to have a preponderance of one or the
other. In turn, this supports the accident-proneness
theories that suggest that some people are more likely to
have accidents than others. This was discussed in the
literature review chapter.
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6.3.3 Correlations between discipline and accident records
There were a number of intercorrelations between offence
and accident variables, which lead to the suggestion that
a poor record in one area may be matched by a poor record
in the other.
Collisions with vehicles had the highest number of
significant correlations with offence variables - ten out
of the fourteen. The coefficients ranged from r=-.10 for
cash shortages to r=.39 for timekeeping. Average cash
shortages correlated negatively with collisions with
vehicles and also with accidents aboard buses, but
positively with five other accident categories. In
similar vein, the summary variable, average collisions,
correlated significantly with seven of the thirteen
disciplinary categories, including failure to stop,
general carelessness, complaints and quality of driving.
Four of the six accident variables which correlated with
ticket issuing were also negative - boarding/alighting
accidents, both categories of vandalism and
miscellaneous. Interestingly, for these categories
drivers are most often found to be the victim of




Cat 123456789 10 11
1 39** - 29** - 33** 11**
2 35** - -08* 21** -15** -08* -11** 31** -07*
3 14** 08* - 19** - - -07* 12**
4 - - - - - 08* - - - - -
5 12** 07* - 09** ----- 14**
6 11** - -- -- -- - 09**
7-------09*---
8 -07** ----- 10** 12** - - 10**
9------ - 19** - - -
10 12** - - - - 16** -08* - - 12**
12 10* - - 09* 13** -14** - - - 11* -
13 -10* - 10* - 10* -25** 30** 09* 09* - 24**
14 26** - - - - 19** - - _ii** 24**
Notes
** = significant at p=.01 or greater
* = significant in range p=.05 to p=.01.
Offences: Accidents
1. Poor timekeeping
2. Ticket issuing faults
3. Failure to stop
4. Rudeness
5. General carelessness
6. Poor quality of driving
7. Excessive absence







1. Collisions - vehicles
2. Collisions - pedestrians
3. Collisions - animals
4. Collisions - objects
5. Boarding/alighting accidents
6. Accidents aboard bus
7. Vandalism - outside





6.3.4 Correlations involving disciplinary actions
for "offences"
The table below shows that these are fairly highly
intercorrelated.
Interview/ Verbal Written Final




Written Warning 18** 22**
Final warning - 28** 40**
Suspension 27** 27** 37** 45**
Dls/reinstatement _ _ 69** 16** 09*
The general trend would appear to be that the worse the
level of disciplinary action, the less likely it is to be
correlated with disciplinary actions at the other end of
the scale, and vice versa. "Verbal warnings", for
example, only correlated as far up the hierarchy as
"suspensions"; "dismissal then reinstatement" only with
"written warnings" and above. The exception is
"suspensions", which correlated with all other variables.
This suggests that there may be drivers who have nothing
worse than "verbal warnings" on their records; there may
also be drivers with predominately "written" and "final
warnings", "suspensions" and "dismissals" on their
records, and very few mere "interviews" and "verbal
warnings".
Taking next the relationships between offences and
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disciplinary actions for those offences, there is not
unsurprisingly a great number of significant
correlations. Virtually all are positive, implying that
the higher the number of offences, the higher the number
of "actions". There are one or two exceptions to this,
however. Interview and instruction correlated r=-.14
with average number of days of unauthorised absence,
r=-.28 with average weeks of cash shortages, and r=-.14
for disciplinary interviews for excessive cash shortages.
This implies one (or both) of two things, firstly that
drivers who have greater absenteeism and cash shortages
have fewer interviews and instructions for disciplinary
offences, and/or secondly, that these drivers are likely
to receive a worse level of disciplinary action than a
mere interview. Dismissal then reinstatement only
correlated with four variables - poor timekeeping, ticket
issuing faults, excessive absenteeism and miscellaneous
offences - which suggests that these are the only
offences serious enough in most circumstances to warrant
dismissal. The other offences do not consistently
attract this option.
6.3.5 Correlations involving disciplinary action
for accidents
Overall, there were far fewer significant correlations
amongst disciplinary actions for accidents, and between
them and the accident variables, than there were for
offences. The table overleaf illustrates these. "Not
at fault" correlates with "no action" and those at the
more serious level, but not with those in the middle
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("verbal" and "written warnings"). "Final warnings" has
a very high correlation with "suspensions", suggesting
that those who have high numbers of the former have also
received high numbers of "suspensions".
Not at No Verbal Written Final





Final warning 32** -
Suspension 27** - 08* - 85**
Dis/reinstatement 08* - -
Moving to the correlations between disciplinary action
and collision accidents, those with vehicles consistently
correlated with most of the action variables except
"dismissal-then-reinstatement", with coefficients as high
as r=.59 (p=.00). Collisions involving pedestrians only
correlated with two variables ("not at fault" and "no
action"), collisions with animals with "not at fault",
"verbal warnings" and "dismissal then reinstatement".
Collisions with objects correlated with all actions
except "written" and "final warnings". One possible
reason for the high correlations with collisions with
animals and collisions with objects is that there is
perhaps less scope for a driver to be "innocent" if he
collides with inanimate objects (such as posts, walls,
gates) and with animals, than there is when dealing with
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pedestrians (often under the influence of alcohol) and
other road users. Of the two summary categories, total
collisions correlated with all action variables (from
r=.18 for "dismissal then reinstatement" to r=.53 for
"suspensions"); total non-collisions correlates very
highly with "not at fault" (r=.84) and less so with "no
action" (r=.18), "final warnings" (r=.22) and
"suspensions" (r=.18).
Comment has been made earlier of the likelihood of
drivers being not held responsible for events outwith
their control (such as vandalism) but sometimes being to
blame for situations where on first sight they may have
had little influence (such as accidents aboard buses).
The relationships found here bear this out, to some
extent. External vandalism correlated positively with
the first two action categories - not at fault (r=.62)
and no action (r=.21) - and negatively with the third
(verbal warnings) at r=-.16. The only significant
correlation with internal vandalism was r=.35 with not at
fault. In similar vein, drivers are sometimes held
responsible for passenger accidents aboard their
vehicles, where a sudden movement (eg. sharp swerving or
braking) has caused someone to fall off their seat and be
hurt. The correlations illustrate this: numbers of
passenger accidents correlated r=.40 for not at fault,
r=.18 for verbal warning, r=.47 for final warning and
r=.53 for suspensions. There were fewer correlations for
boarding and alighting accidents: r=.31 for not at fault
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and r=.15 for verbal warnings.
6.3.6 Correlations between actions for both accidents
and "offences"
*
The table below gives the statistically significant
correlations for the two groups of disciplinary action
variables. "Not at fault" only applied to accidents and
hence is not given in the offence group;
"interview/instruction" for offences equates to "no
action" for accidents.













Not at fault -17** - 19** - -08* 33**
No action 38** - - - - -
Verbal warning 23** 14** 11** 12** 13** -
Written warning 11** - - - - -
Final warning - - 61** - - 88**
Suspension 07* - 64** - 11** 83**
Dism/reinst. _ _ _ _ _
There were a fairly high number of correlations between
the two groups which were significant. As might be
expected, there was a negative correlation between "not
at fault" for accidents and "interview/instruction" for
offences, as the former implies no blame and the latter
some blame. It was not always the case that an accident
action variable correlated with the same action for
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offences (eg, "verbal warnings" for accidents and "verbal
warnings" for offences) - "written" and "final warnings"
and "dismissal then reinstatement" did not correlate
significantly between offences and accidents. Some of
the highest correlation coefficients were found with
"written warnings" (for offences): with "final warnings"
and "suspensions" for accidents; also "dismissal then
reinstatement" for offences had very strong correlation
coefficients with "final warnings" and with
"suspensions".
6.3.7 Summary and overall comments
A few comments will be made at this stage to summarise
and evaluate some of the correlations involving
performance measures found so far, before moving on to
discuss the correlations between the predictors
(biographical, situational and psychological test data)
and the criteria (offence and accident data). Taking
the offence variables first, there is a high degree of
intercorrelation amongst them which in most cases is
positive. This suggests that the more offences a driver
has "committed" in one category, the more he will have
committed in another. The exceptions to this are
discussed below. There is a lesser extent of
intercorrelation amongst the accident variables, although
the coefficient of r=.24 between total collisions and
total non-collisions gives rise to the suggestion that
some drivers may be more "accident-prone" than others.
The majority of the correlations between offence and
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accident variables are positive, which in turn leads to
the suggestion that a poor accident record is likely to
be matched by a poor offence record. The pattern of
correlations amongst disciplinary action variables seems
to mirror the pattern for the actual offence and accident
variables to which they relate. There is therefore a
fairly high degree of intercorrelation between
disciplinary actions for offences and a fairly low degree
for disciplinary actions for accidents, with quite a high
number of correlations between the two categories.
Cash shortages (average weeks per year) has some
interesting relationships with other variables. One of
these is the negative one with ticket issuing offences -
the higher one is, the lower the other. Commonsense
might suggest that the two should be positively related:
the more likely a driver is to issue a wrongly printed
ticket (through accidently entering the wrong details
into the ticket machine) the more likely he is to be
inaccurate in looking after his cash (either collecting
fares and giving change, or in counting up takings at the
end of the day). An alternative explanation is that
there may be some drivers who take a chance by issuing
tickets for the wrong value (they charge the passenger
the correct fare, but print a lesser amount on the
ticket, thus keeping the difference) but who take extra
care to cash-in correctly. The takings are always
counted by the cashiers at each depot; there is less
chance of an inspector boarding a bus and finding a
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wrongly printed ticket. Average cash shortages also
correlates negatively with collisions with vehicles and
with accidents aboard buses, but positively with five
other accident categories (collisions with animals,
boarding and alighting accidents, both types of vandalism
and miscellaneous accidents). All but the first of the
latter group usually result in the driver being not
blameworthy; with both the accidents in the former group
the driver is often to blame. This suggests that
drivers with low cash shortages have more accidents where
they are to blame.
Accidents aboard buses is another variable to have some
interesting correlations with other variables. In this
study it is in the non-collision category, where drivers
are most often found to be the victim of circumstances
and not at fault. Accidents on board buses, whilst
often falling into this category, sometimes resulted in
the driver concerned being disciplined in, for example,
cases where he braked too severely for the situation and
perhaps caused a passenger to fall off their seat and be
injured. [These injuries often appear to be slight,
from reading accident report forms, but both legislation
and company rules insist they have to be recorded.]
This type of accident correlated positively with
collisions with vehicles, which implies that these
drivers are perhaps less carefull than others.
Accidents aboard buses also correlated positively with
six disciplinary variables: poor timekeeping, ticket
289
issuing faults, failure to stop, rudeness, number of
complaints and total offences. The coefficients range
from .08 to .29, all but one significant at p=.00. This
variable also has some very high correlations with
disciplinary action variables, both with "not at fault"
(r=.40) and with some of the at fault categories, ranging
from r=.18 for "verbal warning" to r=.53 for
"suspensions". This implies that drivers who have high
numbers of accidents aboard their buses are also likely
to have a poor disciplinary record (and have received
harsh punishments).
This in turn suggests that this category of accident is
as likely to result in blame as to result in no blame.
There were fewer correlations for boarding and alighting
accidents: r=.31 for "not at fault" and r=.15 for
"verbal warnings". By contrast, external vandalism
correlated positively with the first two action
categories - "not at fault" (r=.62) and "no action"
(r=.21) - and negatively with the third ("verbal
warnings") at r=-.16. This implies that those suffering
attacks of vandalism on their vehicles are less likely to
be at fault for accidents.
6.4 Correlations between predictors and criteria.
6.4.1 Biographical/situational variables and performance
The following table summarises the number of
statistically significant correlations between the
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background variables and the offence (offences and
disciplinary actions) and accident variables (accidents
and disciplinary actions). In almost all cases there
were at least as many correlations, if not more, for the
offences than for the accident variables.
Variable Age Joining Service Car Prev Depot Dist.
age 11c. Jobs size from HQ
Offences:
Poor timekeeping -16** - -16** -12** - 21** -14**
Ticket issuing faults -07* - -16** - - 36** -14**
Failure to stop -11** - -14** _ _ 24** -15**
Rudeness - 19**
General Carelessness -09** -07* - -15** 14** 13**
Poor quality of driving - - - - - 09**
Excessive absenteeism - -10** - -11* 14** 09* -10**
Excessive cash shortages -11** -07** -07* -11* - - -11**
Total offences -18** - -20** -15** 09* 31** -21**
Number of complaints -10** - -13** -09* - 24** -14**
Lateness (days) -20** - -24** - - 26** -18**
Absenteeism (days) -21** -12** -17** -19** - - -14**
Cash shortages (weeks) -11** - -17** - - 24** 17**
Verbal warnings -15** _os* -12** -16** - 12** -11**
Suspensions - - -09** - - 21** -12**
Accidents
Collisions - vehicles -11** - -20** - - 14** -12**
Collisions - people - - -10* 08*
Collisions - animals - - -07* - - - -
Collisions - objects -14** - -14** -11** -
Total collisions -16** - -24** - - 14** -11**
Boarding/alighting -08* - -09* -
Accidents aboard bus -12** - -11** - - 10** -11**
Vandalism (outside) -11** - -13** - - 15** -21**
Vandalism (inside) - - - - -08**
Miscellaneous - - - -20** 29**
Verbal warnings - - -17** -
Suspensions -07* - 08* -08*
The general pattern was for age and service to be
negatively correlated with performance variables, and for
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depot size to be positively correlated. Distance from
headquarters was negatively correlated. Car licence
tended to mirror age and service, for reasons discussed
earlier. Joining age was also negatively correlated,
although it had far fewer correlations than either age or
service. The variable with the fewest correlations was
number of previous jobs.
The patterns above underlie the trend described in the
previous chapter, when it was mentioned that those in
larger depots tended (on average) to have worse
discipline and accident records. In addition, the older
drivers and those with longer service have better records
(in terms of fewer offences and accidents) than those who
are younger and have less service. This suggests not
only an age effect but also a learning effect - more
experienced drivers incur fewer disciplinary actions and
have fewer accidents.
The few significant correlations which exist between
number of previous jobs and offences are all positive
(with general carelessness, excessive absenteeism and
total offences) which suggests that the more jobs a
person has held in the five years prior to joining his
bus company, the more likely he is to be disciplined.
This in turn might suggest that those who drift between
jobs fairly frequently make less satisfactory drivers
than those who have a more stable pattern of previous
employment. Interestingly, the reverse is true for the
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only accident variable this correlates with - collisions
with pedestrians.
Collisions both with vehicles and with people correlated
positively with size of depot. This suggests that these
accidents are more likely to occur in busier urban areas
(the four large depots are all situated in major
conurbations). A possible reason for this is that in
urban areas there are more cars and people around than in
the country; consequently, bus drivers may be more likely
to collide with other vehicles and people there than with
objects or animals. The opposite of this might be the
case in rural areas, where a lesser proportion of
vehicles and people may mean that drivers working at the
smaller, country depots (such as Fraserburgh, Forres and
Hawick) may have more accidents with objects and animals.
One of the few exceptions to the rule of distance from
head office being negatively related to worse performance
is for average weeks of cash shortages, where it is
positive. Another exception to the general trends with
the situational variables is the negative correlation
between depot size and miscellaneous accidents: this may
well be due to the unusually large number of smashed
windscreens at Elgin referred to earlier. This receives
support from its correlation with distance from head
office: Elgin and Forres were two of the most distant
depots in the survey.
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It is also worthwhile to look at the effect of the
background variables on the other accidents that are
supposed to be beyond the drivers' control - those which
take place in boarding/alighting and aboard a bus, and
vandalism. There were significant relationships between
the first two types of accident and both age and service,
and with the latter category, with depot variables. In
most situations vandalism followed the pattern of the
other performance and accident variables; namely that
the older and more experienced drivers reported fewer
cases of it, and that it was more likely to occur in the
larger depots. There was a particularly strong
correlation between distance from head office and
external vandalism: this may well be due to the effect of
the two Central Scottish depots in this group (Hamilton,
size = 177; Wishaw, size = 180) along with Paisley (size
= 146), where the problem is worst. As these are all
very near their respective head offices there may be more
pressure on drivers to report vandalism.
6.4.2 WRT/intelligence scores and performance variables
The next table shows the correlations between the WRT and
intelligence scores and the performance measures. The
performance variables for which none of the
WRT/intelligence items correlated significantly are
excluded.
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Variable WRT Risk CFT B
Discipline variables:
Poor Timekeeping - - 11** 08**
Ticket issuing faults 10** 09** - -
Failure to stop - 11** - -
Excessive absenteeism - - 06* -
Excessive cash shortages - - 07* -
Total offences 08* - 12**
Average lateness 16** - 08* -
Cash shortages (av weeks) -16** - -14** -15**
Verbal warning (discipline) - - 08* -
Suspension (discipline) - - 07* -
Accident categories:
Collisions - vehicles 09** 07* 06* -
Collisions - objects 12** - 09** 09*
Total collisions 14** 09** 09** 08*
Accidents aboard bus 06* - 09** 08*
Verbal warning (accidents) 13* _ 10* 08*
Suspension (accidents) 08* - - 07*
There were comparatively few significant correlations
between the intelligence test items and the performance
variables; the significant coefficients were fairly
small in most cases. One general trend appears to be
that higher intelligence was associated with a worse
record, and more warnings and suspensions. Similarly,
those who were quick-on-the-uptake (measured by words
correct on the WRT) also seemed to have worse records, in
particular average days late for work, collisions with
objects and verbal warnings for accidents. Cash
shortages is once again an exception to this rule: the
more intelligent had fewer. This could be that they
realise they will be financially penalised for any
shortage, and take steps to ensure that they collect the
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correct fares, give the exact change, and count their
takings precisely at the end of their shift. WRT Wrong,
the variable postulated to measure risk, has only four,
positive correlations.
6.4.3 Correlations between 16PF and performance measures
The full matrix for this is given in the appendix.
Taking the "offence" variables first, almost a third of
them correlated significantly with the test factors
(excluding factor B, intelligence, which was discussed
earlier) at a probability level of 5% of greater. In
general, the correlation coefficients were fairly small,
most being in the range .07 to .12. Some test factors
had more significant correlations than others. These are
summarised in the table below.
Factor/Description (low/high) No. Direction
A Reserved/outgoing 3 2 +ve, 1 -
C Emotional stability (less/more) 0 -
E Humble/assertive 12 All +ve
F Sober/enthusiastic 9 8 +ve, 1 -
G Expedient/conscientious 9 1 +ve, 8 -'
H Shy/venturesome 12 All +ve
I Tough/tender minded 3 2 +ve, 1 -
L Trusting/suspicious 5 All +ve
M Practical/imaginative 8 All +ve
N Forthright/shrewd 8 All -ve
0 Self-assured/apprehensive 2 Both -ve
Q1 Conservative/experimenting 8 All +ve
Q2 Group-dependent/self-sufficient 6 All -ve
Q3 Lacks/is socially-precise 8 All -ve
Q4 Relaxed/tense 2 All +ve
94 correlations (31.33%) were significant at p = .05 or
greater, from a total of 300 pairs.
No. = number of statistically significant correlations
between each factor and the disciplinary variables,
+ve = number of these which were positive
-ve = number of these which were negative
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Two factors had the highest number of significant
correlations with the offence variables - E and H - both
in the positive direction. A high score on factor E
represents "assertive, self-assured and independent-
minded" people who tend to be "disregarding of authority"
(IPAT, 1986, p 25) and in this respect it is interesting
that the highest correlation coefficient was with the
rudeness variable (r=.14, p=.00). Also high were total
disciplinary offences and those relating to absenteeism
and lateness. Factor H, at the high level, describes
people who are "sociable, bold, ... and abundant in
emotional response ... However, they can be careless of -
detail, ignore danger signals and consume much time
talking" (IPAT, 1986, p 27). This correlated positively
with total offences (r=.12, p=.00), those relating to
cash shortages and absenteeism, general carelessness
(which includes cases of drivers being disciplined for
setting the destination blind of a bus wrongly, for
example, or for wearing uniform incorrectly) and all
levels of disciplinary action from verbal warnings up to
dismissal then reinstatement.
Two factors correlated with nine performance indicators:
F, positively and G, negatively. High scores on F
(representing happy-go-lucky, enthusiastic and carefree
behaviour) were associated with poor performance,
illustrated by correlations with absenteeism (r=.16,
p=.00), lateness (r=.12, p=.00) and disciplinary actions
for cash shortages (r=.ll, p=.00), for example. G is
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negatively correlated with poor performance: a high score
on this factor illustrates hard working, conscientious
and responsible people with a sense of duty - it is not
surprising that such people have fewer offences and
disciplinary actions. G correlates r=-.14 with average
number of days of unauthorised absence, for example, and
correlates r=-.ll with both verbal warnings and cash
shortages (all are significant at p=.00).
Most of the correlations were in the direction as might
be expected, for example negatively between Factor N and
the criteria: a low score on this suggesting forthright,
natural and perhaps outspoken behaviour which, for
example, correlated r=.ll with both total disciplinary
offences and suspensions (each at p=.00). Positive
correlations were found with factor Q1 (high score
representing questioning attitude to life) and poor
performance; negative correlations between factor Q3
(low score indicating lack of control and careless of
social rules) and poor performance, the largest being
r=-.12 (p=.00) with total offences. Of the factors
which had few significant correlations, one stands out.
This is the correlation between factor I and poor quality
of driving of r=.14 (p=.00), a high score on I suggesting
tender-minded, sensitive personalities being linked with
reports for bad driving.
Looking at the matrix the other way round, as it were,
some variables correlated with more factors than others.
These included absenteeism and shortages, warnings and
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suspensions, and rudeness, general carelessness and
miscellaneous offences. This suggests that personality
determines these to some extent. Those correlating
the fewest were failure to stop, quality of driving,
complaints and timekeeping.
The next table shows the number and direction of
correlations between the 16PF and the accident variables
which were significant at p=.05 or greater. As can be
seen there was a lower proportion of such correlations
that were statistically significant than with the
disciplinary variables.
Factor/Description (low/high) No. Description
A Reserved/outgoing 0
C Emotional stability (less/more) 0 -
E Humble/assertive 2 Both +ve
F Sober/enthusiastic 5 All +ve
G Expedient/conscientious 4 All -ve
H Shy/venturesome 5 All +ve
I Tough/tender minded 2 Both -ve
L Trusting/suspicious 3 All -ve
M Practical/imaginative 7 6 +ve, 1 -ve
N Forthright/shrewd 6 All -ve
0 Self-assured/apprehensive 5 All -ve
Q1 Conservative/experimenting 5 4 +ve, 1 -ve
Q2 Group-dependent/self-sufficient 3 1 +ve, 2 -ve
Q3 Lacks/is socially-precise 1 -ve
Q4 Relaxed/tense 0 -
48 correlations (17.78%) out of 270 pairs were
statistically significant at p=.05 or greater.
No. = number of statistically significant correlations
between each factor and the accident variables
+ve = number of these which were positive
-ve = number of these which were negative
As with the offence variables, the size of the
correlation coefficients was fairly small, ranging from
299
around r=.06 to r=.13. Factor M on the 16PF had the
highest number of correlations, six being positive with
accidents. A high score on this indicates someone who
might be "unconcerned over everyday matters, ... often
absorbed in thought, and oblivious of particular people
and physical realities" (IPAT, 1986, p 28). Those at the
opposite end tend to be "attentive to practical matters,
concerned over detail, able to keep their heads in
emergencies" (IPAT, 1986, p 28). It would appear that
these are fairly good descriptors of those who have high
and low numbers of accidents respectively. The highest
correlations were r=.10 for total collisions and verbal
warnings; the negative correlation was r=-.07 (p=.04)
for dismissal then reinstatement for accidents.
Factor N had the highest correlation coefficients in this
section, of r=-.13 with total collisions (p=.00) and
r=-.ll with collisions with vehicles (p=.00). Four
factors had five significant correlations with
performance. Of these, factor F had a coefficient of
r=.12 with total collisions (p=.00) and factor Q1 had one
of r=.12 with collisions with animals (p=.00). The second
of these was the more unusual and harder to explain. A
high score on Q1 indicates a questioning, analytical and
liberal personality, the opposite of the low scorer -
conservative, respecting of established ideas and
tolerant of traditional difficulties. It could be that
those who have a low tolerance are more likely to run
over animals than those with high tolerance. Factor 0
correlated r=-.07 with collisions with vehicles and
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r=-.08 with total collisions.
Some of the test factors which had a high number of
correlations with discipline variables had only a few
with the accident criteria. E, G and Q3 are examples of
this. Factor E, which had the most correlations with
discipline variables, had only two with accident ones,
both of which were fairly small: r=.10 with total non-
collisions (p=.009) and r=.07 with "not at fault"
(p=.037). Q3 had only one correlation, of r=-.09 with
"no action" (p=.016). Accident variables correlated
negatively with factor G, the largest being r=-.ll with
vandalism from outside (p=.003). This suggests that the
more conscientious drivers take more care to ensure that
their vehicles are not subject to attacks from outside,
perhaps by not lingering in troublesome areas or by not
inviting attack by disgruntled passengers.
The variables which had a high number of correlations
with the test factors were mostly those which had fairly
high frequencies - collisions with both vehicles and
objects, and total collisions. A number had very few
significant correlations: vandalism inside had none;
collisions with pedestrians, boarding and alighting
accidents, accidents aboard buses and verbal warnings had
only one; and collisions with animals and vandalism
outside had two each.
It is worthwhile at this stage to compare the
301
correlations found in this research between 16PF
variables and accident criteria with the published
research studies in the same field discussed in the
literature review. Amalgamating the results of such
studies (Bracy, 1970; Freeman, 1952; Suhr, 1953, 1961)
the following factors are suggested to correlate with
high accidents: A+, C-, E+, F+, G-, M+, 0+, Q1+, Q2-,
Q3+, Q4+. In this research three factors did not
correlate significantly with any of the accident
variables - A, C and Q4. Q3 just had one relationship
with the accident variables - negative with "no action".
As discussed earlier, factor M had the greatest number of
(positive) correlation coefficients with accident
variables, which concurs with Cattell et al's remark that
"automobile accidents are quite significantly lower for
M- individuals" (Cattell, 1982, p 99). In addition,
factors E, F, G and Q1 all correlated with accident data
in the direction expected. The relationship was less
clear with factor Q2: published studies suggest that
those with a low score on this factor (ie, those who are
more group-dependent) will have more accidents. With
two variables this was the case (total non-collisions -
r=-.ll, p=.01 and boarding/alighting accidents - r=-.07,
p=.05) but with another the opposite applied - written
warnings for accidents (r=.08, p=.03). Finally, with
factor 0 the research results in this study were the
opposite to what might be expected, a high score (ie,
more anxious) being associated with fewer accidents.
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6.4.4 Correlations between commendations and performance
The one positive indicator of performance is the number
of commendations a driver receives. This is probably
far from perfect, as it may depend on depot policy
whether such things are included in individual records,
or it may depend on the extent of excursion and holiday
tour work available in a depot, and who is allocated to
it. The table below summarises the correlations between
this variable and performance, both for the overall
population and for Edinburgh only. The latter has such
a high proportion of commendations issued to drivers in
the sample that it merits separate treatment here.
Variables
Category








































It would appear that this variable captures a unique
source of variance, as it has relatively few correlations
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with other variables. It was strongly correlated with
age and service. In Edinburgh, in particular, most of
the commendations came from passengers who have been on
tours. The drivers operating these tend to be the older
and longer-serving, this being a privilege which comes
with seniority. Three 16PF factors correlated with
commendations - high scores on I (tender-minded) and N
(shrewd, wordly) as well as low scores on Q1
(conservative, traditional, tolerant) all correlated with
high numbers of commendations. In this research, all
three of these factors also correlated significantly with
age - I and N positively and Q1 negatively. One
unexpected relationship was with dismissal then
reinstatement for accidents, at Edinburgh. On the
basis of the few significant correlations with
performance, it might be expected that "good" performance
leads to commendations and that "bad" performance would
lead to few, if any. It would be highly unlikely that
dismissal for an accident would fall into the former
category. Given the small number and uneven
distribution of commendations, however, it is perhaps
best not to draw too many conclusions from the above.
6.4.5 Summary
From the evidence from correlation matrices presented so
far, the following direction of values of background and
scores on the tests might seem to determine good and bad
performance. "Good" and "bad" performance are, of
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Older Younger Dis, acc
Older Younger Dis





Distance from head office
Smaller Larger Dis, some acc
Further Nearer Dis, some acc
Word recognition/culture fair tests:
WRT right (quick on uptake) Low High** Dis, acc
WRT wrong (risk) Low High** Dis
Culture Fair total (intelligence) Low High** Acc
16PF variables:
A Reserved/outgoing No evidence
B Intelligence Low High* Acc
C Emotional stability (less/more) No evidence
E Humble/assertive Low High Dis
F Sober/enthusiastic Low High Dis, acc
G Expedient/conscientious High Low Dis
H Shy/venturesome Low High Dis
I Tough/tender minded No ievidence
L Trusting/suspicious Low High Dis
M Practical/imaginative Low High Dis, acc
N Forthright/shrewd High Low Dis, acc
0 Self-assured/apprehensive High Low Acc (weak)
Q1 Conservative/experimenting Low High Dis, acc
Q2 Group-dependent/self-sufficient High Low Dis
Q3 Lacks/is socially-precise High Low Dis
04 Relaxed/tense No «evidence
References:
* = reverse for the only accident variable
** = reverse is true for cash shortages
Dis = discipline (and attendance/cash shortage) records
Acc = accident records
No evidence = insufficient significant correlations to form conclusion
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF PREDICTOR AND CRITERION VARIABLES
7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the third level of
analysis, the multivariate analysis of the variables. A
description of factor analysis was given in the fourth
chapter. In effect, this reduces the large number of
original variables to a smaller number in order to see
the underlying relationships, and hopefully provide some
explanation for them.
Both the tests of significance and the correlations
described in the previous chapters suggested that age and
size of depot have an effect on performance: on average,
the older drivers tend to have better performance (or
more accurately, have fewer offences and accidents) than
do drivers in smaller depots. In order to investigate
these relationships further the data is not only analysed
as a whole, for all drivers, but is also divided into
groups by age and by size of depot.
Separate analyses were carried out for drivers
above/below the age of 40, and for drivers in depots
greater than and smaller than 100 drivers. 40 was
chosen as the dividing point for age as it was the mean
(the median was 39 and the mode 38). This split the
data into two groups of approximately equal size. In
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addition, most of those recruited are under the age of
40. As one purpose of this research was to provide data
on which to revise recruitment procedures, this gives an
extra justification for splitting the drivers into two
groups.
Depots of around 100 drivers and over in the Scottish Bus
Group have both an area manager (in charge overall, with
responsibility for both running services and maintenance
of vehicles) and a traffic supervisor (his deputy, in
charge of the drivers), above the ranks of inspectors and
drivers. Those of under 100 drivers tend to have just
an area manager and inspectors, with no intermediate
grade. In addition they also, by reason of their size,
tend to be located in more rural areas and operate fewer
exclusively town services. The opposite is the case for
the larger depots: the four in this survey are all
located in large urban areas, with a high proportion of
driving within these areas. The "large depot" category
contains around 420 cases, the "small depot" category
around 140.
Factor analysis was carried out on all cases for which
complete data (ie. both test and performance) were
available. As described in the methodology chapter, the
analysis was performed by SPSS-X using the "Factor"
procedure, with the following options: "meansub"
(replacement of missing values with the variable mean);
"alpha" factor extraction; and "oblimin" (oblique)
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rotation. As with the previous chapters, the resultant
computer printouts have been placed in the appendix
(Appendix D) with summary tables of the factors from the
"structure matrix" appearing as appropriate in the main
body of the text. The factor loadings are treated in
the same way as the correlation coefficients were
previously: it is assumed that they are in the range of
-0.99 to +0.99 and are presented to two decimal places
with nonsignificant zeros and decimal points being
ommitted, to ease the reading of tables. In the few
cases where the loadings exceed +/-0.99, the full
notation is used.
As this research was concerned to discover the
relationships between the "inputs" a driver brings to the
work situation (measured here principally by the
psychological test scores) and the "outputs" he makes
(the offence and accident variables) the two sets of data
are factor-analysed separately, with the final stage
being the intercorrelation of the two groups of factors.
This chapter, therefore, first discusses the factoring of
the test scores, compares these second-order factors with
published data in this field, and then examines the
correlation of these factors with performance variables.
The performance variables are then subjected to factor
analysis. The final section examines the correlations
between the two sets of factors.
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7.2 Factor analysis of predictor variables
7.2.1 Introduction
The predictor variables comprised the test scores from
the WRT, Culture Fair (total score) and the 16PF, along
with age as it has a strong influence on test
performance. As there was a high degree of
intercorrelation amongst the other biographical items
(such as joining age and service) these were omitted.
Also omitted were those which were not at either the
interval or ratio level of measurement (most of those
relating to previous employment and education) which is
required for factor analysis, following the
recommendations of Kim and Mueller (1978b).
In essence, the factor analyses of these test variables
produced second-order factors. The 16PF gives scores
for primary (or first order) factors, as it itself is
derived from factor analysis; the analyses following
involved taking these first-order factors and conducting
a further factor analysis, thus producing second-order
factors.
7.2.2 All drivers
The table below details the six factors derived from an
analysis of all cases (taken from the structure matrix on
the output), along with the percentage of variance
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accounted for by each factor, the variables loading on
each and the size of their loading. The labels are
based on the internal correlations in each factor.
% of
Factor Variance Variables Loading Label
















4 3.7 M -35 Imaginative/
Risk -26 risk (low)
[N 34]
[Age -28]
5 3.4 G 63 Age/
Q3 59 conscientious
Age 47 (high)
6 3.0 CFT 80 Intelligence
WRT 70 (high)
B 44
Total amount of variance accounted for was 42.9%.
The variables shown under each factor were those derived
and sorted by the program. On occasions some of the
other variables also had high loadings for particular
factors, and these are shown in brackets under each
factor. Six, clearly identifiable factors emerged
therefore. Two of these were immediately recognisable as
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established second-order factors in the 16PF - anxiety
and extroversion - with intelligence being composed of
CFT and WRT as well as factor B, and conscientiousness
having age as part of it as well as G and Q3. The first
factor - labelled here as tolerance - was not one of the
established factors from the test. At the "high" end it
might describe someone who is fairly humble,
conservative, quiet and not argumentative. The opposite
might be a person who is assertive, forthright,
questioning and less likely to accept the status quo. A
full discussion and comparison of these factors with the
established second order ones is be made in section
7.3 below.
The output also gives a factor correlation matrix, which
is shown below:
1 2 3 4 5
1 —
2 -06 -
3 14 13 -
4 -08 03 03 -
5 -19 08 07 12 -







Among the larger correlation coefficients were those
between 1 and 5 (suggesting that the older subjects with
higher standards tended to be more tolerant) and between
1 and 6 (implying that the more intelligent were less
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tolerant and more likely to argue with their superiors or
passengers, perhaps because their intelligence made them
know they were right). Lower anxiety was associated
with higher intelligence and with a more extrovert
personality. As might be expected from the previous
chapter, the age and intelligence factors were strongly
related: higher age bringing lower intelligence.
7.2.3 Cases split by age
The following factors emerged when the data was split by
age:
(a) Aged 40 and below
Factor Variance Variables Loading Label











3 8.4% WRT 80 Intelligence
CFT 67 (high)
B 44












Total amount of variance accounted for was 43.7%.
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Correlation matrix between the factors:
1 2 3 4 5
1 —
2 -12 -
3 13 04 -
4 01 06 -11 -
5 12 16 -05 08 -







(b) Aged above 40
Factor Variance Variables Loading Label






2 8.4% CFT 69 Intelligence
B 54 (high)
WRT 52










5 3.3% Age 70 Age/risk
Risk 23 (high)
[CFT -43]
6 2.5% I -51 Toughness
[CFT 31] (high)
[B 31]






Total amount of variance accounted for was 44.6%
The following is the correlation matrix between the
factors:
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 —
2 16 -
3 12 -08 -
4 14 07 23 -
5 02 -15 -08 -05 -
6 02 13 -01 -13 -17 -








A pattern of factors similar to those for all cases
emerged when the data was split by age. Anxiety and
intelligence each accounted for approximately the same
amount of variance in each group, with the tolerance
factor being of greater importance in the younger group
and extroversion being likewise in the older group. The
composition of some of the factors differed as well. In
both the overall and younger groups age was linked with
G, suggesting that the older drivers had higher
standards. However, with the over-40 group, age and the
number of words wrong on the WRT came together to form a
factor. There was a very small correlation coefficient
between age and conscientiousness.
The correlations between factors were similar to those
found for the overall situation, as well. In the
younger group age/conscientiousness was associated with
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both high tolerance and low intelligence. Low anxiety
and high extroversion were also related. In the older
group, high tolerance was strongly related to low
toughness (ie, tender-mindedness) (both these factors
accounted for very small proportions of the variance,
however). Intelligence and age/risk were negatively
related, not only implying that the older one becomes,
the lower one's score on the intelligence tests, but that
the older drivers scored more words incorrectly on the
WRT. This was suggested in the correlation chapter.
Somewhat surprisingly, conscientiousness (with no age in
this situation) was fairly strongly associated with both
low anxiety and high extroversion.
7.2.4 Cases split by size of depot
The third way in which the predictor variables were
factor-analysed was by dividing them into two groups on
the basis of size of depot. Similar factors to the ones
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Total amount of variance accounted for was 47.5% (the
highest of all five analyses). The intercorrelation
matrix is given below:
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4 -11 18 11 -
5 18 -11 12 -10 -
6 -15 -21 02 00 06 -
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Total variance accounted for was 43.9%
The intercorrelation matrix is given below:
1 2 3 4 5
1 —
2 16 -
3 20 -07 -
4 -16 02 -16 -
5 07 -05 -03 -11 -







Extroversion and intelligence accounted for large
proportions of the variance in both cases; anxiety
accounted for the largest proportion in the small depots
but the smallest in the large ones. Similarly,
tolerance was the first factor to emerge for the large
depots, but only the fourth (with a small proportion of
variance) in the small ones. In both cases age was
included in the intelligence factor, negatively related
to high scores on the tests. The pattern of factors in
the large depots was very similar to the overall pattern,
not surprisingly as they accounted for around three-
quarters of all cases. In the smaller depots, tolerance
just comprised three factors, risk formed a factor on its
own as did M, with loadings on intelligence.
Studying the intercorrelation matrices between these
factors, in the small depots two of the factors which
comprised very few primary factors had some high
correlation coefficients with other factors. Factor 7
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("thoughtfulness"), for example, was associated with low
anxiety, high intelligence and extroversion. Factor 6
("risk") was strongly correlated with both high anxiety
and low intelligence. High conscientiousness and low
anxiety went together as did high intelligence and low
tolerance. The patterns in the large depots were more
or less as expected - high tolerance being associated
with conscientiousness, low intelligence and
introversion. Extroversion and anxiety were negatively
related.
7.2.5 Summary
A number of factors consistently emerged from the•
analyses presented above. These included some which
were recognisable from published material on second-order
factors in the 16PF (anxiety, introversion/extroversion,
intelligence and conscientiousness) (eg, Cattell et al,
1982) and others which were less-so, in particular
"tolerance" and those involving the variable "WRTwrong".
At this stage a few comments can be made concerning some
of the principal correlations between the second-order
factors. The tolerant drivers would appear to be the
older ones who have low anxiety, high standards, lower
intelligence and are more introvert. Correlations
coefficients between this factor and that involving risk
were almost neglible. In two of the situations above,
however, high tolerance was associated with high risk:
overall, where risk was joined by M and with older
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drivers, where it was joined by age. In both cases,
however, this relationship may have more to do with the
other variables loading with risk than with risk itself,
as they were both associated with high tolerance. In
addition, the coefficients were very small.
The more intelligent drivers, by contrast, tended to be
younger, less conscientious and have lower tolerance.
However, they also had lower anxiety and (except with the
smaller depots) were more introvert. Unlike the other
groups, those under 40 had higher risk.
Conscientiousness was mainly associated with high
tolerance and low intelligence, the latter being
principally a function of the effect of age. It was
also related to low risk (except in the small depots) and
low anxiety. In general, conscientiousness went with
introversion, however, the reverse was the case for small
depots and those over 40. Extroversion was associated
with low anxiety.
The correlations involving "risk" (other than those
discussed already) tend to be very small: in most cases
it is related to introversion, high anxiety and younger
people. The highest correlation involving anxiety is in
the small depots (r=-.15) and the highest one with age in
the younger age group (r=.15). The latter suggests
that, within this group, those at the upper end of the
age scale are less likely to have a high risk score than
those at the lower end.
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7.3 Interpretation of the second order factors
This section examines in more detail the factors derived
from the analysis and described above, comparing them
with published data on second-order 16PF factors, both
from the official handbooks and research papers. The
"official handbooks" are those published by the
publishers of the test - the Institute for Personality
and Ability Testing (Champaign, Illinois). In this
particular research, however, the sixteen scores from the
personality test have been joined by age along with
scores from the Culture Fair test (total only) and the
WRT.
7.3.1 Comparison with IPAT second-order factors
Cattell et al, in their Handbook to the 16PF (1982),
refer to eight second-order factors for the test,
although advise that at least two have not been well-
defined and have weak criterion associations, and include
intelligence, which is based only on primary factor B.
The more recent IPAT publication, Administrator's Manual
for the 16PF (Krug and Johns, 1986) , contains just five
second-order factors, with slightly different and more
precise formulae for their calculation. These were
based on a large-scale cross-validation of the test and
do not include intelligence.
A number of the second-order factors from the bus driver
research bear fairly close relation to their "official"
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counterparts, as described in the IPAT publications
referred to in the previous paragraph. These were
anxiety, extroversion, intelligence and conscientiousness
(this author's label for "super-ego strength/control").
Anxiety was a factor which consistently accounted for a
large proportion of the variance in each analysis.
Those with a low score for this are described as those
who are generally satisfied in life, are able to achieve
what they want to, but who may, if they have a very low
score, lack motivation for difficult tasks. High
anxiety can be understood for its everyday meaning -
people who are frustrated with not being able to meet the
demands of life and achieve what they desire. The
factor is defined as follows:
Factor Direction Description
C Low Affected by feelings
H Low Shy, restrained, threat-sensitive
L High Suspicious, hard to fool
0 High Apprehensive, worrying
Q3 Low Undisciplined self-conflict
Q4 High Tense, frustrated, overwrought
In some of the research results the anxiety factor
comprised exactly these factors; in others, 'H' did not
appear and in one case, the factor just comprised low C,
high 0 and high Q4 ("large depots").
The extroversion factor was the other which followed
almost exactly the ideal pattern. This again frequently
accounted for a high proportion of the variance. A high
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score on this factor indicates one who is socially
outgoing, uninhibited and good at making and keeping
personal contacts. A low score describes a shy,
inhibited person who finds it hard to make contact on a
personal level. The latter tended to make for the
better driver, in terms of the criteria used by the bus
companies. Extroversion is defined in terms of four
16PF factors:
Factor Direction Description
A High Outgoing, warm-hearted, participating
F High Enthusiastic, lively
H High Venturesome, socially bold, uninhibited
Q2 Low Group dependent - joiner and follower.
The 1982 Handbook included 'E' in this factor (assertive,
aggressive, competitive); more recent studies have
dropped it (Karson and O'Dell, 1976; IPAT, 1986). In
the driver research, the four factors above describe
extroversion on all but two occasions, where factor E is
included ("all cases greater than 40"; small depots).
Intelligence was the third factor to appear consistently
in the research. As mentioned earlier, Cattell et al
(1982) find that it is related only to factor B on the
test. A high score on this factor describes one who is
intelligent, quick to grasp ideas and bright. A low
score describes the opposite - one who is slow to learn
and grasp ideas, and who is given to concrete and literal
interpretation. It is perhaps not surprising that this
factor becomes a second-order factor on its own, as
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Cattell et al say,
the principal object in measuring it in the
16PF is not to add personality information as
such, but to complete the supply of data on the
range of source traits important in most
predictions, for general ability is obviously
an important dimension in individual
differences (p.82)
Furthermore they recommend supplementing 'B' with the
IPAT Culture Fair test in order to get a more accurate
measure of intelligence. This is in fact what did
happen, with the Word Recognition Test being added as
well.
The strong correlations between the culture fair scores,
B and WRT Right are reinforced by their appearance in the
intelligence factor. As age also correlated highly with
this, it is perhaps surprising that age was loaded with
intelligence only when the data was split by size of
depot, although there were often high correlations
between the factors containing intelligence and age in
practice. In each case, the three intelligence
variables (Culture Fair Total, total correct on the Word
Recognition Test and factor B on the 16PF) formed a
distinct second-order factor with no other variables
having high loadings.
The fourth factor to bear a fairly strong resemblance to
published factors is what is referred to here as
"age/conscientiousness" and in the literature as
"superego strength/control". Those who score highly on
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this tend to be self-controlled and to abide by the rules
of the situation they are in; at the extreme are those
who are so controlled as to be perceived by others as too
rigid or moralistic. At the opposite end of the scale
are those who are flexible and follow their own impulses,
rather than conventionally perceived values or standards,
and bend rules when it suits them. Krug and Johns
(1986) define the factor as having just two primary
factors:
Factor Direction Description
G High Conservative, moralistic
Q3 High Controlled, socially-precise
In the 1982 Handbook these were joined by low F (sober,
prudent, serious). In the driver research, these were
joined by a variety of different factors. Age came into
these factors in all but one case. In "all cases" the
factor just comprised the two variables above with age;
with "drivers under 40" G and age were joined by N
(shrewd, calculating, worldly), with Q3 not loaded to any
great extent. In the former (all cases) it appeared
that the older subjects had higher standards; in the
latter situation, the drivers at the upper end of the
younger age group were more likely to have higher
standards but perhaps also have the ability to sense when
they should put them into operation and when not to. By
contrast, the standards factor in the case of older
drivers and those in larger depots comprised the two
original factors above along with low M (practical,
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careful, conventional). This suggests that perhaps
those with high standards have a desire to do things the
correct way and pay attention to detail, albeit in
rather an unimaginative way.
The standards factor in the small depots was different
once again: G, Q3 and age were joined by I (tender-
minded, sensitive) along with high loadings on A
(outgoing), H (venturesome), low Q1 (conservative) and
low Q4 (relaxed). It is hard to draw conclusions from
this other than to suggest that those with high standards
are also fairly sensitive whilst at the same time
appearing relaxed and outgoing.
There is one second-order factor which consistently
appears in the driver analysis and often accounts for a
fairly large proportion of the variance. It is labelled
in this research as "tolerance" but does not appear in
either of the IPAT manuals for the test. It was
composed of the following:
Factor Direction Description
E Low Humble, mild, conforming
N High Shrewd, socially aware, experienced
Q1 Low Conservative, respects established ideas
H Low Shy, restrained, timid
L Low Trusting, adaptable
F Low Sober, prudent, serious
The first three factors were present in each analysis; H
in all but one ("small depots"), L in all but two ("small
depots", "all cases") and F in all but two ("over 40" and
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"small depots"). People who score high on this could
perhaps be described as showing tolerance to all around
them - passengers, other road users and superiors; by
accepting situations and orders without question and
generally getting on with their job without making
trouble. Those who score low on this factor are more
likely to be of an argumentative and rude disposition,
not being tolerant of those around them, continually
questioning orders and situations, and perhaps incurring
more the displeasure of their supervisors.
The correlation between factors discussed earlier showed
that high tolerance was related to age/standards: the
older drivers being more tolerant, perhaps due partly to
their inbuilt high standards and partly to experience
telling them that not arguing and questioning makes life
easier for them. High tolerance was often found to be
negatively related to intelligence - the more intelligent
drivers seeing faults in work systems and orders, and
perhaps being less tolerant of passengers who might not
really know where they are going or of other road users
who make driving errors. This suggests that their
intelligence would enable them to find faults in systems
and people, and their personality would cause them to
draw attention to them.
This tolerance factor bears some resemblance to Krug and
Johns' interpretation of the independence second-order




*E High Assertive, aggressive, stubborn
G Low Expedient, disregards rules
*H High Venturesome, socially bold, uninhibited
*L High Suspicious, self-opinionated
*N Low Forthright, natural, unpretentious
0 Low Self-assured, confident
*Q1 High Experimenting, literal, analytical
Q2 High Self-sufficient, prefers own decisions.
(* = factors in common with tolerance)
A person high on tolerance could, therefore, be low on
independence. The latter state is referred to as
subduedness and described as being group-dependent,
chastened, passive and seeking and needing support from
other people. Tolerance was similar to this but without
both the group-dependency (Q2) and high anxiety (0);
high standards being implied if not actually being
present. Those high on independence tend to be
aggressive, independent and daring, seeking situations
where this sort of behaviour is tolerated or even
rewarded, and where they can show initiative.
The final second-order factor to emerge from the analysis
was the one which contained the "WRT Wrong" variable.
It is harder to draw from conclusions about this, as
different analyses produced different combinations of
primary factors, and the variance accounted for in each
case was small. With the exception of the case for
small depots, where "WRTwrong" formed a separate factor,
one or two summaries can be made:-
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1. Cases : all under 40
Factor Direction Description
Risk High Risk-taker
G Low Expedient, disregards rules
I High Tender-minded, sensitive
M High Imaginative, careless of practical matters




M High Imaginative, careless of practical matters
N Low Forthright, unpretentious
Age High Older subjects




CFT Low Less intelligent
Any interpretation drawn from these factors is tentative
to the extent that "WRT Wrong" is hypothesised to be a
measure of risk-taking (Ingleton, 1987): there is a lack
of concrete research data at present to prove as
conclusively as is possible in social science that it is.
Bearing this in mind, the first case referred to above
links risk-taking with expediency, sensitivity and
imagination: factors G and M, in particular, are
associated with the way the Word Recognition Test is
completed: those who have a high number of words wrong
are those who tend to disregard rules (they are told
clearly not to guess) and are imaginative (they "fit"
other words to ones they do not know). Interestingly
(in the case of all subjects under 40) it was also linked
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to the quickness-on-the-uptake score, with number of
words wrong perhaps being related to the total number
identified.
This situation is close to two of Cattell et al's
original eight second-order factors. One of these is
QUI "tough poise", comprising (for males) low A, low I
and low M. At the high end this is described as being
cheerful, alert and ready to tackle problems at an
objective level, to deal with facts at the expense of
people. At the low end this is associated with
sensitivity to the needs of others and thinking about a
problem before taking action. "Tough poise" in the most
recent IPAT manual (Krug and Johns, 1986) contains (for
males) two additional first order factors, F+ and Q1-,
neither of which load on to the risk factor in the driver
research. This much reduces the resemblance of tough
poise to risk and is the reason why the earlier formula
(Cattell et al, 1982) is used instead. The other
second-order factor is one which they do not discuss at
length for lack of criterion validation. This is QVI:
"cool realism versus prodigal subjectivity", comprising
primary factors I(high), M (high) and L (low). The last
is described as "suspicious, hard to fool, self-
opinionated" and is replaced in the drivers' case by G
(low).
The second case above associated risk-taking with
imagination (as before) but also with forthrightness.
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Those who have the latter characteristic will perhaps not
worry about putting down wrong answers (or those where
they have used their imagination). In the overall
sample, this tendency increased with age. The dominant
factor in the final situation is probably age, with no
16PF factors appearing at all. It merely suggests that,
in the older half of the sample, the older a driver was,
the more likely he was to have a higher number of words
wrong in the WRT and a lower level of intelligence.
7.3.2 Interpretation: evidence from research studies.
Turning now to the wider body of research using the 16PF,
a number of studies have produced data on second-order
factors derived from the test. Eighteen of these have
been examined, ranging from Cattell (1956) - one of the
first to discuss second-order factors on the test - to
one of the most recent, Reuter et al (1985) . The factors
which these studies discovered will be compared with
those derived in the present research.
Extroversion and anxiety are replicated more or less
exactly in most of the studies. Taking the first of
these, some included low M (practicality) and low Q1
(traditional), neither of which were found in this
research. Some of the earlier studies, such as Horn
(1963), Tsujioka and Cattell (1965) and Gorsuch and
Cattell (1967) found high E (assertiveness) as well,
which was found to be associated with extroversion in
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older drivers and those in small depots. Later studies
have not found E to be included in this dimension.
Some of the analyses of driver data included factor H in
the anxiety factor (as in the IPAT descriptions), others
did not. The same is true for published research.
Those that do include Gorsuch and Cattell (19 67) , Cattell
and Nichols (1972) and Bolton (1977); those that do not
include Krug and Laughlin (1977), Cattell (1956) and
Winder et al (1975). No other variables were found to
load on this factor.
More interesting differences are found with the other
factors, for example that referred to as "superego
strength" in the IPAT manuals and as
"age/conscientiousness" here. In this research this
factor was less consistent across different analyses, and
age was included in some of them. Some of the earlier
published studies, in particular, did not derive this
factor at all, eg. Cattell (1956), Tsujioka and Cattell
(1965) and Hundleby and Connor (1968). In others, it
followed closely the formula of the later IPAT manual
(1986), of being composed of just factors G and Q3 (for
example Krug and Laughlin, 1977); Gillis and Lee, 1981).
Age/standards for the older drivers comprises, in
addition, factor M in the opposite pole to G and Q3. As
discussed earlier, this implies that high standards are
associated with a practical and conventional approach to
life. This combination has not been found in any of the
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published studies.
It was mentioned earlier that the "tolerance" factor from
the driver research bore some resemblance to Krug and
Johns (1986) independence second order factor, in the
IPAT manual. Their factor comprised eight primaries
from the 16PF of which five were in common with
tolerance. Some of the published research studies come
closer than this. Winder et al (1975) is an example of
this: their study was principally concerned with
experimental motivational distortion and faking scales
for form A (form C already has a scale built-in to
measure this). At the same time, they conducted a
second-order analysis which came fairly close to the
usual factors. One of these was independence, composed
of E+, L+, N- and Q1+. The only comment which they make
is that the inclusion of N- is atypical; in this case,
however, it is almost an exact "replica" of the factor
derived for the younger drivers (those aged 40 and
under). A similar pattern is found in a cross-cultural
study between Japanese and American subjects carried out
by Tsujioka and Cattell (1965). The indepedence-vs.-
subduedness factor for one of the USA groups comprises
E+, F+, G-, N+ and Q1+. This is an interesting
variation, in that G- is included (expediency) with high
independence, and that factor N is in the same direction
as E, F and Ql. In addition, their "insecure
assertiveness" factor for samples from both countries
comprised L+, N+ and Q1+: these are three of the
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components of tolerance for the younger drivers, with
only factor E missing.
In the IPAT manual (1986), Winder et al's research
(outlined above) and the bus driver study, N was in the
opposite direction to the other three. In these cases,
high tolerance or subduedness includes high N
(shrewdness); in the case above it would be associated
with low N (forthright and unpretentious). A similar
situation is found in an earlier study by Cattell (1956),
where E+, G-, N+ and Q1+ form a factor he calls "unbroken
success vs. frustration". At the low end this would
signify a conservative, conventional and fairly
conforming personality, not particularly sophisticated
but being fairly forthright. Another variation to this
was derived by LaForge (1962), whose "unbroken success"
factor comprises just E+, N+ and Q1+.
Another factor which was harder to relate to the
"official" second-order factors was that which included
"WRT Wrong". Above it was found that two of the
original second-order factors - tough poise and realism -
had elements of the factor involving risk-taking. The
picture is little clearer when other research studies are
examined. Few in fact refer specifically to the realism
factor (although some incorporate elements of it). Of
those that derived "tough poise" (or "cortertia vs.
pathemia" as a number call it) most include factor A(+)
along with 1+ and M+ (eg. Gorsuch and Cattell, 1967;
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Winder et al, 1975; Bolton, 1977) and some include Q3(-)
(eg. Gillis and Lee, 1978). Horn (1963) has a factor
which has A+, G-, I+, M+ and N-: he finds this unusual
in that it did not clearly replicate previous findings
and he felt it reflected "individual differences in a
sensitive causalness such as is sometimes said to
characterise the artist or actor" (p.130).
There are one or two exceptions, for example Krug and
Laughlin (1977): their tough-poise factor contains just
I- and M- (for males; with females it includes Q3-).
The same was found by LaForge (1962) who labelled it
"sensitivity", and Golden (1978); with Allen and Schuerer
(1983) Q2 loads in the same direction as I and M, and for
Reuter et al (1985) these two are joined by B, again in
the same direction. All these are fairly close to the
situation for the younger group of drivers, where the
factor was composed of these two primaries along with WRT
Wrong (low) and a smaller loading on G+. Another is
Becker (1961): his "masculinity-femininity" factor has
just M+ and N-, which are the two original variables in
the risk factor (along with WRT Wrong) for all cases.
7.3.3 Comparison of correlations between factors
Section 7.2.5 above discussed the main correlations amongst
the second order factors derived from test scores. This
section now compares some of these correlations with
those studies which have published data on such
correlations. Only three of the above studies refer to
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these: the test Handbook (Cattell, et al. 1982), and the
papers by Gorsuch and Cattell (1967) and Krug and
Laughlin (1977). The correlations mentioned in this
section just include those from the driver research which
are easily recognisable; they do not include tolerance or
those involving risk, for example, as these are not
easily comparable with the published studies. None of
the correlations which Gorsuch and Cattell report between
the variables used here are of any consequence, and so
receive no further mention here.
The correlations discussed here can be divided into two
groups - those involving anxiety and those involving
conscientiousness. To take the first of these, (low)
anxiety correlated with three other factors: (high)
intelligence, extroversion and conscientiousness. With
both intelligence and extroversion, both Krug and
Laughlin and the test Handbook report high correlations
with anxiety, in the direction expected. Only the
handbook reports a strong correlation with
conscientiousness; in the two articles it is almost
neglible. Conscientiousness was also found to be
associated with two other variables - high extroversion
and low intelligence. Taking the first of these,
extroversion and conscientiousness were positively
related in all cases except the younger age group); only
in Krug and Laughlin's research was this found, and only
for their male sample; in the Handbook it was negative.
The other correlation discussed here (between high
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conscientiousness and low intelligence) was borne out by
both the Handbook and Krug and Laughlin.
7.4 Correlations between test factors and criteria
The next stage was to correlate the factors derived above
with measures of job "performance". Following the
factor analysis detailed in the previous section, the
factor scores were calculated for each driver, and these
were then correlated (using Pearson product-moment
correlation) with the actual offence and accident
variables detailed previously. These, therefore, are
"external" correlations between the factors as a whole
and outside variables. SPSS-X produced tables in a
rectangular format which are included in the appendix.
The following summarise these by showing those
correlations where the statistical significance was p=.05
or greater.
7.4.1. All cases




































Factor 2: Anxiety (low)
Collisions - vehicles 09
Accidents aboard bus 08













Factor 5: Age/conscientiousness (older/higher)
Poor timekeeping -12
Ticket issuing faults -08











Collisions - vehicles -11
Collisions - pedestrians -08




Factor 6; Intelligence (high)
Poor timekeeping 12
Ticket issuing faults 10
Average lateness 13
Shortages (average weeks) -16
Average total offences 12
Collisions - vehicles 10
Collisions - objects 15
Total collisions 11
338
The first and fifth factors had the largest number of
statistically significant correlations with the criteria.
Factor 1 suggests that the less tolerant drivers are more
likely to have worse offence records and more accidents
than those who are not. They are also more likely to be
late for, or absent from, work more often and to record a
shortage in paying-in cash. A similar pattern (although
with fewer significant correlations) is found for Factor
3, extroversion. The opposite of these is suggested by
Factor 5, namely that the older drivers and those with
higher standards are less likely to have bad disciplinary
records and accidents. It is those drivers who receive
more commendations from members of the public, and fewer
complaints - the reverse of the case with of who are less
tolerant.
There were only two correlations with the second factor -
anxiety - which accounted for over 13% of the variance,
and three with the fourth factor - risk. The latter
suggests that those with a higher "risk" score (mainly
from the WRT) are less likely to receive commendations,
and more likely to have disciplinary entries both for
general carelessness and the quality of their driving.
The final factor is less easy to explain, as it suggests
that the more intelligent drivers have less good
disciplinary and accident records, although they are less
likely to record cash shortages.
A number of the disciplinary action categories also have
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significant correlations with the test factors, and some
of these have been added to the lists above. "Verbal
warnings" for offences, for example, correlated
positively with (low) tolerance negatively with (high)
standards. "Suspensions" for offences correlated
negatively with both (high) imagination/risk and (low)
standards. Most of the actions taken in respect of
accidents did not correlate significantly with the
factors, except for anxiety and intelligence. For the
latter, "verbal warnings" and "suspensions" correlated
positively.
7.4.2 All cases, split by age
(a) 40 years of age or below













Collisions - animals 14
Collisions - objects 15
Total collisions 12
Total non-collisions 10
Factor 2: Anxiety (low)
Rudeness -11
General carelessness -10
Shortages (average weeks) -16
Dismissed then reinstated 11
Collisions with vehicles 12
Accidents aboard buses 10
Vandalism - outside -13
Suspensions 10
340
Factor 3; Intelligence (high)
Shortages -30
Collisions - vehicles 14
Vandalism - outside -12
Vandalism - inside -09





Collisions - vehicles -10
Miscellaneous accidents -11
Written warnings -12







Vandalism - inside -12
Total collisions 11
Factor 6: Age/standards (high)








Collisions - vehicles -12
Collisions - objects -16
(b) Greater than 40 years of age




Factor 2; Intelligence (high)
Cash shortages -21
Suspensions 16
Accidents aboard bus 15
Vandalism inside 11




Collisions - pedestrians 12
Written warnings -12
Suspensions -11
Factor 4; Conscientiousness (high)
No correlations with offence/
accident variables
Written warnings (Offences) -11
Suspensions (Accidents) -11
Worst action (Accidents) -16
Factor 5: Age/risk (high)
Commendations 11
Factor 6; Toughness (high)
Boarding/alighting -12
Total collisions 10




The most obvious difference between the two groups is
that the younger group had far more significant
correlations than the older group. The correlations for
the younger group were similar to those for the overall
sample. Factors 1 and 5 were still more or less limited
to general indiscipline and high accidents, although it
is worth noting that the more extrovert drivers in this
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group have fewer cases of vandalism occurring inside
their buses - presumably their personality causes them to
take steps to stop any occurrences of this. This may
also be the case with the more intelligent in this group
- they have fewer instances of both kinds of vandalism
(inside and outside the vehicle) and perhaps use their
intelligence to avoid its occurrence. It may also be
that they are more meticulous in reporting incidences of
this which other drivers may consider to be too minor or
unimportant to bother about. They also had a very high
correlation (for this survey) with cash shortages, r=-.30
at p=.001.
The correlations with the anxiety factor suggest that the
more anxious drivers will be more careful in the way they
carry out their duties (in terms of fewer cases of
rudeness, general carelessness and cash shortages),
although they have more collisions with other vehicles
and more accidents aboard their own buses. The latter
could again be a function of recording - the anxious
drivers may be those who are more conscientious in
reporting all such incidents; those who worry less may
overlook trivial cases where little or no injury
occurred.
Similar patterns occured as with the overall group
regarding disciplinary actions taken against the younger
group, with the more argumentative, more extrovert and
older/low standards people having more warnings and
suspensions.
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A different picture emerged for the older age group, with
the test factors showing very few statistically
significant correlations with the criteria. Total
offences did not correlate with any of the factors. The
anxiety factor which accounted for nearly 15% of the
variance, was only correlated with driving quality
(negative) and miscellaneous offence reports. There was
a similar pattern to the other group with the
intelligence factor - the more intelligent had fewer cash
shortages and more reports of both vandalism and
passenger accidents inside buses. This may well have
been for the reasons discussed above. They also tended
to have more serious levels of disciplinary action on
their records for offences (for example, a correlation of
r=.15 for "worst action" at p = .009). Factor 6 in this
group was not shared with either the overall or the
younger groups, and was labelled "toughness". The more
tough-minded drivers, it would appear, have fewer reports
of boarding/alighting accidents. It may be the case
that they have genuinely fewer cases of this nature;
alternatively, it may be that (like the extroverts in the
previous paragraph) they consider some incidences to be
too trivial to report, or they "persuade" people not to
complain. They do, however, have worse levels of
disciplinary action awarded against them.
Factor 2 is also negatively-weighted, implying that the
more intelligent drivers over the age of 40 will have
fewer cash shortages but will report more non-collision
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accidents (particularly passenger accidents and interior
vandalism) and will have been disciplined more for errors
in issuing tickets. They will also have had worse
disciplinary action taken against them. It is a matter
of speculation as to whether these people are using their
intelligence to find ways of issuing wrongly-printed
tickets in the hope of keeping the surplus cash.
7.4.3 Analysis by size of depot
The third method of breakdown of these data was to look
at the differences between large and small depots, the
dividing line being at 100 drivers. The following
tables illustrate the significant correlations with the
test factors derived in the earlier analysis.
(a) Small depots (less than 100 drivers)









Collisions - animals 15
Collisions - vehicles 14
Vandalism inside -14
Dismissed then reinstated -17
345




Collisions - vehicles 19




Factor 4: Tolerance (low)
Commendations -22
Collisions - vehicles 15
Total collisions 15
Factor 5; Conscientiousness (high)
Rudeness -16
Average lateness -50
Collisions - pedestrians -14
Collisions - objects 15
Accidents aboard bus -16
No action -15
Verbal warnings 15
Factor 6: Risk (high)
Miscellaneous accidents 18
Factor 7: Thoughtfulness
Ticket issuing faults 19
Quality of driving -15
Excessive absence -15

















Collisions - objects 12
Total collisions 08










Dismissed then reinstated 08
Factor 3; Intelligence (high)
Poor timekeeping 09




Dismissed then reinstated 08
Collisions - vehicles 09
Collisions - objects 16






Factor 4; Conscientiousness (high)
Poor timekeeping -09








Collisions - vehicles -09




Factor 5: Risk (high)
Commendations 15




Factor 6: Anxiety (high)
Dismissed then reinstated -09





There are some differences between the two size groups,
with the large group having far more significant
correlations than the smaller one. This may be a
function of sample size, with the former having
approximately three times as many cases as the latter.
Anxiety came as the first factor with the small depots,
where the less anxious drivers are more likely to be late
for work, have cash shortages and boarding/alighting
accidents but are less susceptible to vandalism inside.
In the larger depots (where this factor was the last to
emerge) the more anxious appear to have fewer accidents,
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perhaps taking more care in busy traffic conditions.
The extroversion factor had differences between the two
groups, with it containing mostly accident criteria (and
disciplinary actions for offences) in the small depots
and exclusively offence data in the large ones. The
more extrovert drivers in the small depots are more
likely to have accidents of all types with the highest
correlation coefficient being for average collisions.
In the larger depots this factor is correlated mainly
with general carelessness, cash shortages and absenteeism
and with disciplinary actions for offences. As was
found with other groups, the tolerance factor in the
large depots was also linked with many of the offence
categories. This was not the case in the small depot
group, however, where the factor was negatively
correlated with commendations (as might be expected) and
positively with both total collisions and collisions with
other road vehicles.
The two groups were reasonably similar regarding the
intelligence factor. It would appear that the clever
drivers in small depots are more likely to collide with
animals and vehicles, but to be less often dismissed for
accidents and to have fewer cash shortages and
commendations. In the larger establishments, however,
it was positively related to a number of offence and
accident categories (eg. ticket issuing; collisions with
vehicles and inanimate objects), but negatively to cash
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shortages and exterior vandalism.
The conscientiousness factor also shows some differences.
In the small group it had a very high negative
correlation with lateness, implying that the drivers with
low standards are late in reporting for work. The
remaining correlations are within the typical range for
this study. Interestingly, "conscientiousness" was
positively correlated with both collisions with inanimate
objects (perhaps these drivers are concerned to avoid
accidents with living beings but are less worried when it
comes to objects) and verbal warnings for accidents.
The correlations in the large group (including collisions
with objects) were all negative.
The remaining factors also had some interesting
differences. In the small depots risk-takers had more
miscellaneous accidents. The more thoughtful drivers
(factor 7, based on M and two intelligence measures) were
more likely to have ticket issuing offences on their
records, but less likely to be reported for poor driving,
to be absent without leave and to experience accidents
aboard their vehicle. They were, however, more likely
to experience vandalism inside their buses. In the
large depots, however, the "risk-takers" were more likely
to be disciplined for poor driving quality, and to be
suspended more, but to be absent less and report fewer




In this section the first indications have emerged as to
which personality and ability factors might make for good
or bad performance in the job. On the whole, a "good"
bus driver would appear to be one who is tolerant, has
high standards and is conscientious, and is not
particularly intelligent. The "poor" drivers, on the
other hand, would appear to be characterised by an
extrovert personality, with low anxiety, a lack of both
tolerance and standards, but who are intelligent. The
next section examines the pattern of factors underlying
the performance variables.
7.5 Factor analysis of criterion variables
This section presents and discusses the results of the
factor analysis of the criterion variables, in other
words, those intended to provide the measures of driver
"performance". A similar process to that described
above was followed to select which variables would be
analysed: an a priori examination of the correlation
matrices suggested that the eight basic offence
categories (poor timekeeping, ticket issuing faults,
etc), commendations and the eight basic accident
categories (four collision types, vandalism and on-board
accidents) would be most suitable. Once again, the
variables shown under each factor were those derived and
sorted by the program. On occasions some of the other
variables also had high loadings for particular factors,
and these are shown in brackets under each factor. A
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format similar to that used with the test variables was
followed, analysing first the data as a whole, then
breaking it down by age group and by depot category.
7.5.1 All cases
The following seven factors emerged when the complete set





































































Collisions with people 38





Total variance accounted for was 35.5%
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The interpretation of these factors is more complicated
than for the test factors, as little reference can be
made to past studies. There appears to be little
interrelationship between the offence variables and the
accident ones, with factors involving the latter being
easier to interpret. The second factor concerns
vandalism, the fourth, "non-human" accidents, the sixth,
on-bus accidents and the seventh, "people" accidents.
The dichotomy between collisions involving people and
collisions involving "non-humans" is interesting, as it
was hinted at in the correlations chapter. The first
and third factors can be interpreted as being of general
poor performance, with perhaps the former being to do
with inaccuracy (such as incorrect issuing of tickets and
failing to stop at bus stops) and the latter to do with
the subjects of complaints (rudeness and quality of
driving), although it is interesting that commendations
should be positively associated with these. Factor five
could be interpreted as "not doing things" - not
reporting for work, not cashing-up correctly and general
slackness. The next table illustrates the
intercorrelations between the factors:
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 —
2 02 -
3 -25 10 -
4 -02 01 04 -
5 -14 -13 11 -02 -
6 07 -03 05 12 04 -
7 17 -01 12 -06 05 00
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1. General offences (high)
2. Vandalism (high)
3. "Complainable" offences (low)
4. Collisions - "non-human" (high)
5. Excesses (low)
6. On-board accidents (high)
7. Collisions - "human" (high)
There were fairly high intercorrelations between the
three offence categories - 1, 3 and 5. Factor 5 also
correlated negatively with vandalism. This illustrates
another finding of the correlations, that drivers
suffering vandalism tended to have fewer offences.
"Human" collisions were positively related to factor 1
and negatively to factor 3; "non-human" collisions to
on-board accidents.
7.5.2 Data subdivided by age
(a) Aged 40 or less
Ftr Variance Variables





















5.3% Rudeness -39 "Complaints"
Quality of driving -44
Commendations -20
[Poor timekeeping -45]
[Ticket issuing faults -30]












Collisions - objects 65
Collisions - animals 34
Vandalism (outside) 66
Vandalism (inside) 53
Aboard bus accidents 63
Boarding/alighting 57






Total variance accounted for was 33.7%
Correlations between factors:
1 2 3 4 5
1 —
2 -12 -
3 09 -13 -
4 -04 01 00 -
5 00 19 07 03 -







General offences and "human" collisions (high)
General offences (source of complaints) (low)
Excesses (high)
Collisions - "non-human" (high)
Vandalism (high)
Aboard-bus accidents (high)
Most of the factors were similar to those for all cases
described above, with the exception that the first was an
amalgam of general bad performance and "human
collisions". It might be described as a lack of
concern for people, containing in addition as it does
accidents aboard buses and quality of driving, for
example. There were only three fairly large correlations
of note: between this factor and the second one (subject
of complaints); factors 2 and 6 (on-board accidents) -
again, in combination, these might be called a general
"lack of concern for people", with both accidents
involving people and rudeness and poor driving quality;
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and factors 4 ("non-human" accidents) and 6 - perhaps
suggesting a general accident proneness.
The next table gives the factors, and their
intercorrelations, for those over 40:
(b) Age greater than 40
Fctr Variance Variables Loading Label
12.2% Ticket issuing faults 71
Fail to stop 69
Poor timekeeping 68
General offences 57
5.7% Vandalism (outside) 70
Vandalism (inside) 40
Poor quality of driving 39
3.4% Boarding/alighting 53
Aboard bus accidents 39
Collisions - vehicles 36
7.2% Collisions - objects 1.12
Collisions - animals 48
5.4% Excessive shortages -47
Rudeness 31
Commendations 26
[Ticket issuing faults 31]
3.7% Excessive absences 73
[Excessive shortages 38]















Total variance accounted for was 39.7% (the largest in
this section).
Correlations:
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 —
2 06 -
3 15 -05 -
4 03 -04 -01 -
5 21 -08 07 -04 -
6 17 04 -12 06 -03 -
7 -06 -06 -06 00 01 -01
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1. General offences (high)
2. Vandalism (high)
3. Human accidents (high)
4. Non-human collisions (high)
5. Rudeness/low shortages (high)
6. Excesses (high)
7. Human collisions (low)
These factors had less similarity to the overall group,
and tended to be more discrete than with the younger age
group: there were very few variables from other factors
which loaded heavily on them, the exception being factor
6. Factor one had no accident variables loaded onto it;
vandalism and poor driving quality formed a factor and
the third was "human accidents" with one collision
category and two non-collision categories. "Excessive
shortages" loaded both onto rudeness/commendations and
onto excessive absence, and collisions with people formed
a factor with vandalism and rudeness being loaded. The
highest correlations amongst factors all involved factor
1, with factor 3 (bad performance/people accidents), with
factors 5 and 6 (both general poor performance).
7.5.3 Division by depot size
(a) Small depots
Fctr Variance Variables


















Fctr Variance Variables Loading Label
2 3.4% Collisions - vehicles 54
Collisions - people 34
[General carelessness 24]
3 7.1% Rudeness -66





5.4% Collisions - animals 78
[Aboard bus accidents 30]
[Poor timekeeping 27]
[Collisions - vehicles 25]
[Collisions - objects 23]
3.4% Excessive absence -77
Excessive shortages -54
[General carelessness -44]
[Failure to stop -23]
[Poor timekeeping -21]
3.0% Vandalism (outside) 50
Vandalism (inside) 33









Total variance accounted for was 37.4%,
The following are the intercorrelations between these
factors:
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 —
2 08 -
3 -01 01 -
4 07 01 11 -
5 -26 -05 19 03 -
6 -10 21 -06 -06 03 -
7 12 10 07 19 01 -01
1. General discipline + collisions with objects (high)
2. Collisions - "human" (high)
3. Sources of complaints (low)
4. General accidents (high)
5. Excesses (low)
6. Vandalism (high)
7. Boarding/alighting (+ poor timekeeping) (high)
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Factor one formed a general poor performance factor,
although it is interesting that in this situation
commendations (and aboard bus accidents) correlated
negatively with the other variables. Factor four
appeared to be a general accident factor, perhaps best
termed "lack of concern". The negative relationship
between vandalism and other "at fault" accidents is shown
in factor six. The final factor consisted mainly of
boarding/alighting accidents, though poor timekeeping was
also loaded. Perhaps these have something to do with
lateness - if a driver is behind schedule on a journey,
he "encourages" people to board and alight quickly,
causing some to lo/se their footing.
In terms of the correlations between factors, factor five
("not doing things") correlated strongly with both the
first and third factors, both indications of general poor
performance. Factors two and six related positively:
human accidents and vandalism, as did four and seven
(general "lack of concern").
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(b) Large depots
Fctr Variance Variables Loading Label
1 10.7% Collisions - vehicles 55 General
Ticket issuing faults 54 offences
Failure to stop 40
Poor timekeeping 71
[General carelessness 37]
[Aboard bus accidents 42]
[Quality of driving 27]
2 6.2% Vandalism (outside) 69 Vandalism
Vandalism (inside) 45
[Ticket issuing faults -29]




4 7.6% Collisions - objects 1.03 Non-human
Collisions - animals 39 collisions
5 3.0% Quality of driving 28 Complaints
Rudeness 35
Commendations 22
[Ticket issuing faults 28]
[Vandalism - outside -23]
[General carelessness 24]
6 3.1% Aboard bus accidents -61 On-board
Boarding/alighting accs -52 accidents
[Collisions - objects -42]
7 1.8% Collisions - people 38 Human
[Collisions - vehicles 41] collisions
[Ticket issuing faults 26]
[General carelessness 23]
[Failure to stop 22]
Total variance accounted for was 37.2%.
Correlation matrix:
1 2 3 4 5 6
1
2 -05 -
3 -13 -09 -
4 -03 03 -01 -
5 20 -14 -09 -05 -
6 -06 03 -05 -11 05 -
7 22 -03 03 -09 -09 00
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1. General offences (high)
2. Vandalism (high)
3. "Complaints" (low)
4. Collisions - non-human (high)
5. Excesses (high)
6. On-board accidents (low)
7. Collisions - "non-human" (high)
As with the test data, the pattern for the larger depots
bore marked similarities to the overall situation.
Amongst the larger correlations, factor five (poor
performance that invites complaints) was strongly related
positively to factor one (poor performance in general)
and negatively to factor two (vandalism). Factor one
also correlated strongly with factor three ("not doing
things") and with factor seven ("human accidents").
7.5.4 Summary
One or two comments can be made at the end of this
section. As with the predictor variables, a number of
fairly clear factors emerged from the analysis of the
criterion data. These tended to be divided into offence
and accident categories, with each analysis above
typically producing three or four of each. The offence
factors tended to be of the order of general
indiscipline, although rudeness/quality of driving did
come together consistently (along with commendations,
which is somewhat surprising), as did "excesses" (of cash
shortages and absenteeism). The accident factors were
easier to interpret, including "human" and "non-human"
collisions suggested in the previous chapter on
correlations, vandalism and on-board accidents.
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In terms of the intercorrelations between these factors,
poor performance correlated positively with human
collisions and, especially with the older drivers, was
associated with on-board accidents. There was a very
small negative relationship between human and non-human
collisions (the opposite is the case in small depots) - a
stronger one might have been expected on the basis of the
frequencies and correlations discussed earlier. Non-
human collisions and on-board accidents correlated
positively (with the exception of the older drivers);
vandalism correlated negatively with excesses and, in the
small depots only, positively with human collisions.
The offence factors are fairly highly intercorrelated,
the accident ones less so.
7.6. Correlations between test and performance factors.
The final stage in the presentation and analysis of the
results from the factor analysis is to examine the
correlations between the second order factors from the
test data (intelligence and personality) and those
emerging from the performance variables. This is the
most important stage as it brings together both the
predictors and criteria in an attempt to explain the
determinants of bus driver performance. The factor
scores from both the test and performance factors were
correlated using Pearson product-moment correlation.
The correlation matrices are summarised below, with only
the correlation coefficients significant at p=.05 or
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greater being shown, and are again presented in the
format of all cases, followed by sub-division by age and
by depot size.
7.6.1 All cases
The following table gives the statistically significant
correlations between test and performance factors for all
























** = significant at p=0.01 or greater
* = significant between p=0.01 and p=0.05







Performance factors (35.5% of variance)
1. General offences (high)
2. Vandalism (high)
3. "Complaints" (low)
4. Collisions - non-human (high)
5. Excesses (low)
6. On-board accidents (high)






Over a third of the correlations were statistically
significant and they more or less substantiated earlier
findings, as detailed under the correlations between
variables, and between test factors and individual
performance measures. High levels of both tolerance and
conscientiousness were associated with "good"
performance, whereas high intelligence (and to a lesser
extent, extroversion and high risk) were associated with
the opposite. Anxiety did not correlate with any of the
performance factors, and extroversion with only one.
Performance factors 3, 6 and 7 had the fewest (and some
of the lowest) correlations that were significant, while
factors 1 and 5 had some of the largest.
7.6.2 Data split by age
The older drivers had one of the largest correlation
matrices (7 x 7) yet the fewest number of statistically
significant correlations - one. This was between test
factor 3 (extroversion) and performance factor 7 (human
collisions), r=-.13 (p=.02).
There were more correlations with the younger group





1 2 3 4 5 6
1 -16**
2
3. 18** 10* -11*
4. 16* 14** -10* -13**
5 -10* -12*
6
** = significant at p=0.01 or greater
* = significant between p=0.01 and p=0.05







Performance factors (33.7% of the variance)
1. General offences and "people" collisions (high)
2. "Complaints" (low)
3. "Not doing things" (high)
4. Collisions - "non-human" (high)
5. Vandalism (high)
6. Aboard-bus accidents (high)
The strongest relationships involved tolerance,
intelligence and conscientiousness, again in the
direction expected. As previously, the anxiety and
extroversion factors had fewest statistically significant
correlations. Unlike the overall group, the performance
factors with the most correlations were 3 (excessive
absence and cash shortages) and 4 (non-human collisions).
Offences (sources of complaint) and on-board accidents
had none; the remaining ones had only one or two.
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6.3 Division by depot size
The next two tables present the correlations between test
and performance factors for both small and large depots.
(a) Small depots (137 cases)
Perf. Test factors
factors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. - - 14** 15** 14*
2. - 19** 15** -
3. - 14**
4. - 17* 18*
5. - -15* -
6. - - - 15* 14*
7. -19** - - 14* 14*
** = significant at p=0.01 or greater
* = significant between p=0.01 and p=0.05








Performance factors (37.4% of the variance)
1. General discipline + collisions with objects (high)
2. Collisions - "human" (high)
3. Sources of complaints (low)
4. General accidents ("lack of concern") (high)
5. Excesses ("not doing things") (low)
6. Vandalism (high)
7. Boarding/alighting (+ poor timekeeping) (high)
366
(b) Large depots (425 cases)
Perf. Test factors
factors
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. - 12** -13**
2. - -08* - - 08*
3. -15** -15** - 09
4. 11** - 14** -11**
5. - - - - 12**
6. - - -13** - - 08*
7. - - - -11**
** = significant at p=0.01 or greater
* = significant between p=0.01 and p=0.05







Performance factors (37.2% of the variance)
1. General offences (high)
2. Vandalism (high)
3. "Complainable" offences (low)
4. Collisions - non-human (high)
5. Excesses (high)
6. On-board accidents (low)
7. Collisions - "non-human" (high)
As with the younger drivers, the correlation coefficients
in the small depots were higher in general than in the
large establishments. In the small depots the test
factors with the most significant correlations with
performance factors were risk (four significant
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correlations), thoughtfulness (3) and extroversion and
tolerance (2 each). The remaining three had one each.
By contrast, in the large depots, intelligence and
conscientiousness had the highest number of significant
correlations (4 each) with risk and extroversion having
only one each. In terms of the performance factors, in
the small depots human collisions and boarding and
alighting accidnts had the most; in the large depots, it
was sources of complo-int and non-human collisions which
had the most.
The small depots had the most and highest correlations
involving the "risk" factor - that based on the "WRT
Wrong" variable. In three of the correlations - with
performance factors 1 (general discipline plus collisions
with objects), 6 (vandalism) and 7 (boarding/alighting
accidents) there was a positive correlation between high
risk and poor performance. In the other correlation
involving this factor, that with "complainable offences"
in the small depots (rudeness and quality of driving) the
relationship was negative. This is unexpected and goes
against what might be expected - that the high risk
drivers receive fewer complaints about rudeness and the
quality of their driving than the low risk ones. To
counter this hypothesis, however, one must remember that
this just occurred in the smaller depots where the sample
size (137) was lower than in the other group (425).
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7.6.4 General comments
An analysis of the correlations between test and
performance factors has produced relationships more or
less as expected, on the basis of the previous
discussions. The factors which make for good
performance (or, rather, fewer accidents and disciplinary
offences) are high tolerance and standards, high anxiety
and introversion. Those who are extrovert, intelligent
and (in some cases) have high risk tend to be worse






This, the final chapter, summarises and concludes the
report of the research which was carried out. The first
section summarises the main points of each chapter and
the second reviews the methodological approach. The
final part concludes the thesis by examining the research
in the context of the two questions posed at the start.
8.2 Summary
The first chapter put the research in context, by dealing
with the history of the British bus industry, from its
early beginnings in the horse bus era of the nineteenth
century, through the first mechanical buses at the turn
of the twentieth century and the formation of some of the
companies which have continued to this day. The hectic
e
and fiercely competitive environment of the 1920s gave way
to the highly regulated and more stable atmosphere of the
1930s. The basic structure of the industry was
established in that decade: in addition to the railways
there were three categories of operators - municipals,
teritorials and independents. This structure evolved
slowly and changed little over the next fifty years,
despite nationalisation and the formation of PTAs, and
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despite a steady decline in bus usage with the spread of
private cars.
All this changed in the present decade, with the
"deregulation" of firstly express and then local
services, the privatisation of the National Bus Company
and the general necessity for bus operators to improve
efficiency and respond to the needs of the market.
Security and slow evolution gave way to free competition
and rapid change. For the Scottish Bus Group this
involved a major market analysis project and internal
restructuring.
The second chapter continued to put the research into
context, by studying some historical aspects of the
driver's job. Conditions have altered much over the
years, with the job losing and gaining popularity and
status at different times. The 1960s were perhaps one
of the worst periods for the industry, with high
employment providing problems of recruitment and
retention of staff for the companies, and there being
much in the way of industrial action. Several authors
have also criticised the quality of bus company
management for failing to attack the industry's problems,
which were becoming apparent in the 1960s.
A review of the Scottish Bus Group then followed, showing
that labour costs had fallen in the past decade with the
spread of 0M0 (one-man-operation), that industrial
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relations were in general peaceful and that (compared
with other major operators) the Group was relatively
efficient. The job of the bus driver was then analysed,
in terms of tasks (eg, driving, ticket issuing),
requirements (courtesy, following rules) and environment
(legal regulation, recent changes in company structure).
The third chapter reviewed literature pertinent to the
research, in terms of the long history of the use of
psychological tests to recruit and measure the
performance of drivers. This provided justification for
the general approach used in this research, and some
inspiration for the classification of performance data.
Three fairly distinct historical phases were identified
for bus drivers: (i) pre-1940, where the emphasis was on
using mechanical-type tests to measure qualities such as
reaction time and visual acuity; (ii) the 1940s-1950s
when paper and pencil tests became more popular in
measuring personality and intelligence; and (iii) the
1960s to the present, when a variety of qualitative and
quantitative studies have been carried out but without
the central themes which characterised the earlier
periods. A review of literature using similar
techniques for other categories of driver (such as trucks
and cars) found similar use of psychological tests.
Research methodology was discussed in the next chapter,
both from a theoretical and a practical perspective.
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The major theories underlying the research were
discussed - those principally of Cattell and Randell -
along with a consideration of research design ("ex-post
facto") as a prelude to introducing the methodology.
This was to take predictive measures of driver behaviour
(from biographical data and psychological tests) and
analyse them with the criteria of actual performance on
the job. The strengths and weaknesses of the predictors
and criteria were discussed along with a description of
and justification for the actual measures employed.
Six hundred and seventy bus drivers in sixteen depots
throughout Scotland sat three psychological tests (the
Ingleton Word Recognition Test, the Cattell "Culture
Fair" test of "g" and the Cattell 16PF). Depot response
rate varied from 10% to 100%, and the reasons for this
were considered. Data on job performance were then
collected on 997 drivers from 12 depots, both those
tested and those not. Problems with collection of this
data were also reviewed.
The next three chapters analysed this data, on three
levels: descriptive statistics (frequencies, means and
standard deviations), correlations both among groups of
variables and between predictors and criteria, and
finally multivariate analysis. Factor analysis was the
method employed to reduce the large number of variables
to a smaller number of underlying factors.
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Chapter five discussed the variables collected, at a
descriptive level. Taking the psychological tests
first, the results indicated that, as a group, the sample
of bus drivers were less intelligent than the general
population, but had a lower propensity to take
subconscious risks. On the personality questionnaire,
although the means were within one standard deviation of
the population mean, four scales were significantly above
average (A, F, N and 0) and four below (C, E, M and Ql).
The "background" data was also analysed in this section:
the small depots tended to have older and longer-serving
drivers. Application form data (where available) showed
that half the present drivers possessed a PSV licence and
15% a HGV licence when they applied for their present
position. Around a third of drivers had been previously
employed by their company, a number gaining re-employment
even after dismissal, and others had been employed by
either municipal or independent operators. The main
categories of non-bus company employment were skilled and
semi-skilled manual work, and "licenced" driving, often
of vans or trucks. Other than trade qualifications
(such as "City and Guilds") few drivers possessed much in
the way of educational attainments.
The criterion measures were divided into three categories
for the purposes of analysis: offences, accidents and
status. The offence categories appearing most on
drivers' records related to poor timekeeping (on
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journeys), ticket issuing faults, general carelessness
and excessive cash shortages. There were some regional
variations (ticket issuing faults were most common in
Edinburgh and Hawick, for example) and drivers in the
large depots tended to have "worse" records than those in
the small ones. Accidents were divided into four
collision categories and four non-collision categories,
with the proportion being 2:1 respectively. The most
frequently occurring types of accident were collisions
with vehicles (half of the total number), followed by
vandalism from outside, collisions with objects and
accidents aboard buses. Vandalism was prevalent in the
major urban areas, especially Hamilton and Wishaw. A
hierarchy of disciplinary actions existed for both
offences and accidents.
The final criterion category was the status of the driver
a year after the psychological tests had been
administered. 90% were still in the same position as
they were, with 6% having resigned and a few either being
promoted or dismissed, or having retired.
The final section of this chapter used tests of
statistical significance to compare different groups of
drivers. There were very few differences between those
who sat the tests in each depot and those who did not,
except that the latter tended to be older on average and
in some cases have fewer disciplinary actions. A number
of variables were significantly different between age
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groups (those aged 40 and under, those over 40) and
between depot groups (those of less than/greater than 100
drivers).
Correlations between variables were discussed in chapter
six. This examined first the intercorrelations amongst
groups of variables, divided into predictor and criterion
variables. [The level of statistical significance was
taken at p=.05 or greater.] Taking the former of these,
age, service and depot size were inter-related: the
older drivers tended to have longer service and be
located in the smaller depots. The intelligence test
items were strongly interrelated, although "risk" (the
number of words incorrectly answered on the WRT)
correlated with very few items. Intelligence was
related to both age (and service and joining age) and
depot size: the more intelligent drivers tended to be
younger, with shorter service and located in the larger
depots. A fairly high proportion of the correlations
involving the 16PF (both amongst factors, and between
factors and both intelligence and background data) were
statistically significant.
The criterion data were analysed by group (offences and
accidents) and overall (offences against accidents).
Taking the former group, most items were positively
related - in other words, a high number of one variable
was accompanied by a high number of another. The
general variable correlated positively with most others.
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Cash shortages was an exception to this, however, being
negatively related to four other variables including poor
timekeeping and rudeness. There were fewer significant
correlations amongst the accident criteria: collision
and non-collision categories tended to remain separate.
Taking the former, there were correlations between those
involving vehicles and pedestrians, and between those
involving animals and objects. In the latter, those
involving on-board and boarding/alighting accidents
correlated, as did the two types of vandalism. Despite
this apparent dichotomy between the two types of
accident, the two summary variables (total collisions and
total non-collisions) were strongly related to each
other. In correlating offences with accidents, there
were a number of significant relationships including
those between the summary categories of each.
The final stage of this analysis was to correlate
predictors with criteria. The good performers tended to
be older, longer-serving and worked in the smaller
depots. In addition, they tended to be less
intelligent. Fifteen of the 16PF factors correlated
with the offence criteria, those factors with the most
correlations being factors E and H. As with previous
analyses, there were fewer correlations involving the
accident measures: the factors with the most correlations
being M and N.
The penultimate chapter presented and discussed the
377
results of the factor analysis, the method employed to
reduce the large number of variables to a smaller number
of underlying factors: twenty predictors formed six
"test" factors and seventeen criteria were reduced to six
"performance" factors.
Similar factors were derived each time an analysis was
carried out, whether on all cases or data split by either
age group or depot size. The main factors from the test
scores were labelled as anxiety, extroversion, tolerance,
conscientiousness (often related to age) and intelligence.
The first four were recognisable as established second-
order factors for the test; the fifth, tolerance,
appeared to be "new" in the sense that no-one had
reported its existance in this form, although it did bear
some resemblance to "independence". The factor involving
"risk" was less consistent, though in part it was related
to "tough-poise".
The performance factors also appeared to be relatively
consistent in the different analyses. They tended to
split into offence- and accident-related, with few
factors containing many of both types. Among the
"offence" factors were those of general indiscipline
(sometimes involving a collision category); a
combination of rudeness, quality of driving and
commendations (unusual as the first two are often
associated with complaints) and "excesses" (absenteeism
and cash shortages). The accident factors tended to be
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easier to explain, as they often fell into three or four
fairly distinct factors: "human" collisions (those
involving vehicles and people) and "non-human" ones
(involving animals and objects); vandalism and "on-bus"
accidents.
Three test factors consistently correlated with
performance factors: conscientiousness, tolerance and
intelligence. Those involving the first two were mostly
in the direction expected, namely the conscientious and
tolerant drivers committed fewer breaches of the rules and
had fewer accidents than those who were not. The
correlations between intelligence and performance were
not as expected: they suggested that the more
intelligent, although being more diligent in their
calculations of cash taken and in preventing (or at least
suffering less from) vandalism, attracted more
disciplinary offences and had more accidents. The
remaining test factors had fewer correlations at a
statistically significant level with the performance
factors, although most had some correlations with the
basic performance variables. In general, extroversion,
low anxiety and high risk were associated with poor
performance.
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8.3 Review of the research methodology
This section evaluates the approach of the research,
using the scheme of Berelson and Steiner (1964). They
list six objectives which behavioural scientists should
strive to achieve in their methodology, which are given
here along with some remarks relating them to this
research (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, pp 16-17).
One objective is that the procedures are public, in terms
of the method and results being both communicable and
communicated. Not only should they be written down, but
they should be replicable by another researcher.
Hopefully this objective has been achieved in this
thesis.
The second objective is^the definitions are precise.
This has been at least partly achieved in this research,
especially with the performance data which took the form
of "number of offences of type x per driver per year" or
"number of days late for duty per driver per year", and
with some of the biographical data, such as age and
length of service. The definitions are less precise
with the psychological test data, as they were based on
constructs about which knowledge is less perfect.
"Intelligence", "conscientiousness" and "anxiety", for
example, are expressions about which there is fairly
general understanding but where different people might
define them in different ways. In defence of the
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measures used here, however, it should be said that two
of the tests were widely established and validated.
Objectivity in data collecting is another objective,
namely that the investigator has to follow the data even
if they go against personal preferences or ideas. This
was achieved in this study: a wide variety of data was
collected, rather than just taking specific areas in the
hope of "proving" a particular relationship. In
addition, the factor analysis of the test data was not
carried out with the objective of replicating perfectly
Cattell's second-order factors: an open-minded,
exploratory approach in fact lead to the discovery of a
"new" factor. Similarly, the relationship between
intelligence and performance was the opposite to what
might have been expected: no attempt was made to hide
this interesting but potentially controversial finding.
This leads onto a further objective, that the findings
must be replicable by another researcher. Ideally this
should be possible with this research, as the data were
all objective in the sense of being the results of tests
and of counting up various categories of offences and
accidents. Where it might be less replicable, however,
is in the interpretation of the factors derived from the
analyses. The naming of factors is to some extent a
subjective process as was recognised earlier: one
person's interpretation might be different from that of
another.
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The approach should be systematic and cumulative, aiming
to build upon existing bodies of knowledge through the
use of central concepts in order to develop theories.
In this research, the existing knowledge was both from
previous research into the use of tests and performance
measures into "drivers" in general and bus drivers in
particular, and from the cumulation of knowledge in the
use of such tests to investigate human behaviour. The
central concepts in this case might be the techniques of
statistical analysis, from the elementary level
(frequencies and means) to the more advanced (factor
analysis). This research has not developed theories as
such; rather it has suggested some tentative hypotheses
which can be subjected to further testing, both within
the original population of bus drivers in the SBG and
outwith, to other groups of bus drivers and other types
of driver.
The final objective is that the purposes are explanation,
understanding and prediction. In this research, the
first two have been attempted - an explanation of the
behaviour of bus drivers and some understanding of why
this takes place. The third is less certain and will
benefit from the further research being undertaken into




This research was established five years ago with two
principal aims. Firstly, to investigate the nature of
the performance of bus drivers, and secondly, to improve
procedures for recruiting and selecting new drivers. It
is appropriate to conclude this thesis by returning to
these aims to see the extent to which they have been
achieved.
In examining the first, reference is made to the
"systems approach" of industrial behaviour (Randell,
1966) introduced in the methodology chapter, as a way of
attempting to tease out some conclusions about why
drivers behave in the way they do. To take the second
aim, that of improvements to selection procedures, work
on this is currently in progress. Analysis here
centres around both the main findings from the research
and on theories of selection and productivity.
The discussion now turns to a more detailed consideration
of the nature of driver performance. The systems
approach provides a means of interrelating all the
variables in terms of "inputs", "treatments" and
"outputs". Driver performance can be seen as
both the interaction of variables which make up each
element, and the interaction of all three elements. It
is therefore a complex process.
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In this research, the inputs were the predictors of
behaviour: background data (such as age and length of
service) as well as scores from the psychological tests
of ability and personality. These interact with each
other. Similarly, the treatments also interact. In
this study these were the historical aspects of both the
industry and the driver's job, along with the environment
in which the job takes place. The final part of the
systems model is the outputs. These are the results of
the drivers' inputs (personality/ability) interacting
with the treatments (operating environment), consisting
of disciplinary actions and accidents.
The analysis showed that the inputs interrelated to a
large extent. Age had a strong influence on
intelligence and various aspects of personality, for
example; age and service were positively related;
previous jobs and joining age were negatively related.
In factor analysis six second-order factors emerged,
based on the correlations between the primary variables:
tolerance, anxiety, extroversion, conscientiousness, risk
and intelligence. These factors themselves were
interrelated, high tolerance, for example, being
associated with low anxiety, high standards and low
intelligence.
The "treatment" part concerns the environment in which
bus driving takes place. This has a number of
elements. Firstly, there is the historical aspect of
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the development of both the industry in general and the
Scottish Bus Group in particular. The main features of
the industry (at least until the time the research took
place) were slow evolution since the present structure
was established in the 1930s, combined with security (of
routes and of subsidy) which tended to promote stagnation
(of ideas and initiatives). This is linked to the
nature of management which in general has tended to be of
low quality, in terms of ability and imagination. This
conclusion arises both from personal observation during
the research and from those who have written on this
(especially Johnston (1981) and Malins (1973)).
The nature of both the industry and management are
interrelated: the lack of the need for change (owing to
security of routes) meant that senior managers had little
need to consider changes in routes, marketing and working
practices. Examples of this included the slowness in
implementing one-man-operation and a lack of
effort in preventing the decline in bus usage in the
1960s. Similarly, lower management worked in an
environment where there was little flexibility to
implement new ideas, where the emphasis was on operating
services in accordance with timetables and in ensuring
that drivers kept to clearly defined rules. This tended
to foster an inward-looking and unimaginative approach,
with drivers being disciplined for seemingly minor
misdemeanors, and little notice being taken of ideas for
improving efficiency. This aspect is examined in more
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detail later.
The industry and its management are further related with
the labour environment. The problems of labour
recruitment and retention in the 1960s may have been in
some part to do with management attitudes. This was a
period of near full employment, when bus driving (and
conducting) was often seen as something to do in-between
"proper" jobs. Few were prepared to make a career in
the industry, partly because of the poor image of the job
(Richman, 1969), partly because of increased problems of
traffic congestion and partly because of management
attitudes towards drivers (a very strict disciplinary
code and a failure to improve the working environment)
(Johnston, 1981). Shortage of labour, therefore,
resulted in the industry taking often poor quality people
who lacked ability and commitment. The image of the job
and of the industry was reduced even further by lowering
standards to re-employ both those who had drifted between
bus companies and those who had been previously dismissed.
These aspects of the environment have changed somewhat
since the bulk of the initial research was undertaken, as
the Scottish Bus Group companies now have to operate
within commercial constraints, make profits (in
preparation for privatisation) and compete with other
operators (both on established routes and for contracts
to operate subsidised services). Senior management has
had to become more market- (and marketing-) orientated.
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A number of innovations have appeared recently, including
minibuses, the reintroduction of crew operation in some
areas and more express services, as well as improved
marketing, publicity and a variety of ticketing schemes.
However, the changes at lower levels have been less.
The move to decentralise management (with an area manager
at each depot) was not been accompanied to any great
extent by decentralisation of decision-making power to
depot level, with the functions of the traffic
supervisors and inspectors being virtually unchanged.
The bulk of route planning and scheduling still takes
place at head office level. At least one company has in
fact abolished the grade of area manager, reverting to
the old system of traffic and maintenance supervisors at
a depot reporting to their appropriate superiors at head
office.
A further aspect of the "treatment" part of the model is
the actual environment in which the drivers work. This
includes both the size of depot (linked to the distance
it is from the company head office) and the nature of the
driving. At the extremes, this ranges from constantly
driving in busy urban areas congested with traffic and
heavy passenger loads to driving in mostly rural parts of
the country where traffic is light and passengers fewer.
Other parts of the environment include the nature of the
passengers and services (for examples, schools and works
contracts, driving in prosperous or deprived areas);
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some depots have a much higher incidence of vandalism
than others, for example.
The local labour market is another environmental
influence: it may determine the ease with which
disaffected drivers can seek alternative employment. In
the past, in some areas especially, good employment
opportunities elsewhere (within or outwith the bus
industry) meant that drivers could easily leave or did
not have to worry if they were dismissed. Particular
cases were noted in earlier chapters of industries in
some areas attracting drivers away from the bus industry
with higher wages - the wood pulp and aluminium
industries at Fort William and the North Sea oil
industries at Peterhead are particular examples.
The third part of the systems model is the result of the
drivers' inputs (personality/ability) interacting with
the treatments (operating environment) - the "outputs".
In this research (in common with similar studies, such as
Ghiselli and Brown (various), Heron (1954) and McFarland
and Moseley (1954)) these were mostly negative, being
measured by numbers of individual offence and accident
items, along with cash shortages and attendance data.
As with the items comprising the inputs and the
treatments, these were not discrete. Offence measures
intercorrelated to suggest an aspect of general
indiscipline; similarly, different types of accidents
inter-related to give support to accident-proneness
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theories. At the same time, collisions separated into
the two types of "human" and "non-human". Further, the
two main aspects of performance themselves correlated,
implying a driver with a poor disciplinary record will
also have a bad record of accidents. Individual
measures showed often strong correlations - accidents
aboard buses was positively related to six offence
variables.
The systems model does not examine each aspect in
isolation, however; it is concerned with the inter¬
relationship of the three parts. One such relationship
has already been mentioned: the development of the
industry has affected the management philosophy, which in
turn means that a rigid set of rules exist for drivers to
operate under - if they deviate, they are disciplined.
It is very rare, therefore, for a driver to have a clean
disciplinary record. The main performance indicator is
the extent of these, and accident, records. Very rarely
are praiseworthy remarks noted on such records.
The input-treatment-output approach suggests that drivers
with certain characteristics will produce certain types
of performance under certain conditions. One of the
most important of these is the relationship between
intelligence and performance, with the less intelligent
having fewer offences and accidents. [This is contrary
to established thought, which believes that the more
intelligent employees perform better, eg, Ghiselli and
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Brown (1955).] The hypothesis is as follows:
intelligent drivers see inconsistencies/inefficiencies in
working methods and use their intelligence to discover
new (and often more effective) ways of doing things.
This contravenes the rules. When this is noted, a
defence is to attempt to demonstrate that the "wrong" way
is more effective than the established way. Punishment
follows, as supervisors in an environment where
intelligence is not needed, lack the power to change
anything. The implication of this for selection and
promotion is discussed later.
Age, service and depot size have important influences
both on each other and on other variables. In the small
depots (in the more rural areas of the north of Scotland
and the borders) the drivers tended to be older, have
longer service and "better" records; in the large depots
(in the urban areas of the central belt of Scotland),
consequently, average age and length of service were
lower, with the drivers having "worse" records. In
addition, there were personality and intelligence
differences between both younger and older drivers, and
between those in small and large depots, although
performance did not differ significantly.
Personality factors which make for "good" performance in
the job include tolerance and conscientiousness, in that
drivers possessing them receive fewer disciplinary
actions and have fewer accidents. The way these
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personality factors are thought to interact with the
environment is as follows: drivers who are tolerant
accept life as it is - therefore, they do not question
their supervisors' actions (even if these are misguided),
they do not complain when given an old bus to drive or a
difficult route to operate, and do not get too annoyed
when traffic is heavy or passengers awkward. Similarly,
the conscientious drivers take care to keep to the
timetable, issue tickets and give change correctly, and
have fewer accidents.
Other factors associated with "good" performance included
anxiety and introversion-extroversion. Drivers with
higher anxiety tend to perform better as they are
concerned to do a good job. This may take the form of,
for example, attempting to make up time if their service
is running late. A driver with low anxiety may not
worry if he is behind schedule. Similarly, the more
introvert drivers tend to be better: they may not, for
example, seek to argue with passengers or supervisors.
This thesis has presented some convincing evidence to
support the generation of such hypotheses; further
research is needed to verify or disprove these
explanations.
The second aim of the research project was to improve
recruitment and selection procedures. This arose out of
a concern of the Scottish Bus Group to reduce the
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historically high rates of labour turnover, by recruiting
more people who would make committed, long-term and
satisfactory bus drivers. This section looks at the
nature of the problem, what has been done so far to
improve methods and what future research is planned.
To some extent the nature of driver selection was a
reflection of the problems of labour recruitment and
retention (especially in the 1960s and early 1970s) when
the job suffered from poor conditions and a poor image;
it was also partly a reflection of management quality and
the lack of personnel specialists to advise on more
effective procedures. In many cases, selection
procedures have tended to be fairly amateurish and
selective. At worst, people were offered immediate
employment (virtually without interview) if they
possessed a PSV licence; a number of cases came to light
during the collection of performance data of people being
reemployed after their company had dismissed them,
despite record cards being marked "do not reemploy".
Some were even rehired after dismissal for smelling of
alcohol.
A two part approach has been used to redesign selection
procedures. Firstly, theories in the area of selection
and productivity were consulted; secondly, the results
from the above research have been applied.
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Hunter and Schmidt's (1982) work on the impact of
improving personnel selection on productivity formed a
crucial part of the redesign of selection procedures.
Their conclusion from reviewing the development of
selection utility models, and from proposing their own,
is that even a small correlation coefficient between a
selection test and job performance measures can make a
significant difference in productivity and cash savings.
The Word Recognition Test is currently being used to
assist in the selection of new drivers at a number of
depots, on the basis of the words correct score
correlating with cash shortages and the risk score
correlating with several accident and offence variables.
The other aspect from which selection procedures were
redesigned was from the research results. Several
factors in particular have formed headings under which to
collect evidence in a selection interview - tolerance,
conscientious, anxiety, and risk (the last also based on
the WRT) (Ingleton and Macandrew, 1985, 1987). Research
is currently in progress to evaluate the success of these
procedures.
A number of areas for future research are indicated by
the foregoing. The most important is perhaps the
negative relationship between intelligence and poor
performance. This has important implications not only
for selection but for promotion of drivers to supervisory
levels and lower management, and even to more senior
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levels.
It implies that the less intelligent are promoted and the
more intelligent fail to get promoted (perhaps causing
them to leave). The hypothesis which might explain this
is as follows: the intelligent drivers tend to have
poorer records (in terms of more offences and accidents)
and are therefore considered worse drivers. The less
intelligent (providing they are also tolerant and
conscientiousness, in particular) are considered to be
better drivers as they have fewer accidents and offences.
When the need arises to promote a driver to inspector or
above, those with a better chance are the duller drivers.
This is suggested to be because of their "cleaner"
records. The cycle perpetuates itself: unintelligent
supervisors praise unintelligent drivers (obey the rules)
and punish intelligent ones (break the rules);
unintelligent ones are promoted (on account of their
"clean" records) who go on to take action against the
clever ones who alter the rules in an attempt to work
more efficiently.
In order to improve the quality of lower management (in
particular) at a time of greater commercial and
competitive pressure, the SBG should consider promoting
more intelligent drivers and encouraging them to put
their ideas into practice.
The obtaining of financial data on the costs of accidents
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(both direct, in terms of repairing damaged buses, and
indirect, in terms of compensation to victims and their
vehicles) is essential if calculations of the financial
benefits of improved selection are to be quantified.
Further, it would be useful to obtain other financial
data, for example insurance premia, depot operating costs
(fuel, maintenance and parts for vehicles) and other
costs to add to calculations of this nature. At the
very least, these could be correlated with mean test and
performance scores at depot level to investigate whether
differences exist.
The benefits of selecting staff on the basis of the
research results are potentially very great. Firstly
there are the savings in accident costs from hiring
people who are likely to have fewer accidents.
Secondly, there are savings in recruitment costs
(advertising, interviewing, testing, administration, etc)
if one selects people who are more likely to give long
service and less likely to have to be dismissed for poor
performance. Thirdly, there are savings in the time of
the traffic supervisor and inspectors in having drivers
who commit fewer breaches of the rules: by having fewer
disciplinary interviews to conduct they have more time to
concentrate on commercially essential matters. Finally,
there are public relations advantages in having contented
and satisfactory drivers who are pleasant to passengers,
make few mistakes (in driving, ticketing and cash) and
have few accidents. This can only enhance the image of
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the Scottish Bus Group.
The recent changes in the operating environment make it
all the more essential for improved selection to take
place. The Scottish Bus Group has had to face
deregulation of both express and local services. Its
responses have been to reorganise its structure and to
introduce both new services and new types of service.
It also has to operate all routes either profitably or
through public subsidy, both being in competition with
other operators.
As the 1990s approach, the Scottish Bus Group is facing
the challenge of privatisation. At the time of writing
it is not certain what form this will take; what is
certain, however, is that the need for profit will become
all the greater under private ownership. Improving the
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Appendices A to D
These contain extracts from computer printout
illustrating:
a) Variables sex, bus company and other employment,
level of education and status broken down by
depot;
b) Psychological test, biographical and performance
data broken down by depot;
c) Correlation matrices of predictor and criterion
variables;
d) Factor analysis results.
On the next page is a list of the abbreviations
used in the 'printouts.
List of abbreviations used in computer printouts
Label Description
Age Age at time of testing
Service Length of service at time of testing
Joinage Age when joined bus company
Carlic Number of years car licence held prior
to joining
Prevjobs Number of previous jobs in five years
prior to joining
Depsize Size of depot (number of drivers)
DistHQ Distance of depot from company head office
WRTRight Score of words correct on WRT
WRTWrong Score of words incorrect on WRT
CFl to CF4 Scores on subtests 1 to 4 of Culture Fair
CFTotal Total score on Culture Fair
SPFA to SPFQ4 Scores (raw) on 16PF scales A to Q4
ADl Poor timekeeping
AD 2 Ticket issuing faults
AD 3 Failure to stop and uplift
AD 4 Rudeness
AD 5 General carelessness
AD 6 Poor quality of driving
AD 7 Excessive absenteeism
AD 8 Excessive cash shortages
AD 9 Miscellaneous offences
Acomp Number of complaints
Acomm Number of commendations
Avtotdis Total disciplinery offences
Shorts Cash shortages (number of weeks per year)
Aviate Lateness (for work) - days per year






AAD7 Dismissal then reinstatement
AA01 Collisions - vehicles
AA02 Collisions - people
AA03 Collisions - animals
AAO 4 Collisions - objects
AA05 Boarding/alighting accidents
AAO 6 Accidents aboard bus
AA07 Vandalism - outside
AAO 8 Vandalism - inside
AAO 9 Miscellaneous accidents
Acol Total collisions
Ancol Total non-collisions






AAA 7 Dismissal then reinstatement
Appendix Al: Variable sex by depot
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ROW PCT IMALE FEMALE ROW
COL PCT X TOTAL
I 11 21
DEPSIZE
11 I 11 I I 11
FRASERBURGH I 100.0 I I 1.8
I 1.8 I I
4—
13 I 6 I I 6
FORRES I 100.0 I I 1.0
I 1.0 I I
4—
20 I 14 I I 14
HAWICK I 100.0 I I 2.3
I 2.3 I I
4—
23 I 15 I I 15
FORT WILLIAM I 100.0 I I 2.4
- I 2.5 I I
39 I 24 I I 24
PETERHEAD I 100.0 I I 3.9
I 4.0 I I
4—
40 I 24 I I 24
ALLOA I 100.0 I I 3.9
I 4.0 I I
4—
42 I 16 I 1 I 17
ELGIN I 94. 1 I 5.9 I 2.8
I 2.7 I 7.7 I
4—
66 I 46 I I 46
CUMNOCK I 100.0 I I 7.5
I 7.7 I I
4--
146 I 77 I 4 I 81
PAISLEY I 95. 1 I 4.9 I 13.2
I 12.8 I 30.3 I
177 I 137 I 1 I 138
HAMILTON I 99.3 I .7 I 22. 5
I 22.8 I 7.7 I
180 I 63 I 4 I 67
WISHAW I 94. 0 I 6.0 I 10.9
I 10.5 I 30.8 I
235 I 167 I 3 I 170
EDINBURGH I 98.2 I 1.8 I 27. 7
I 27.8 I 23. 1 I
COLUMN 600 13 613
TOTAL 97. 9 2. 1 100. 0
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS 0
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OWN CO D OTHER SB MUNICIPA
ISMISSED G CD L OR NBC
DEPSIZE
TAB PCT IOWNCOMPYISACK ED IOTHERSBGINBCMUNI IINDEF I
—+
11 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 1 I
FRASERBURGH ' I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I o.o I 100. 0 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 2.3 I
I 0. 0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.5 I
13 I 1 I 0 I 1 I 1 I 1 I
FORRES I 33.3 I 0.0 I 33 ■ 3 I 33. 3 I 33. 3 I
I 0.9 I 0. 0 I 4.3 TX 1.7 I 2.3 I
I 0.5 I 0.0 I 0.5
T
X C. 5 I 0. 5 I
+-
20 I 4 TX 0 I 0 I 0 I 1 I
HAWICK I SO. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 20.0 I
I 3.8 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 2.3 I
I 2. 1 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.5 I
23 I il I 0 I 2 I 4 I 2 I
FORT WILLIAM I 25. 0 I 0. 0 I 25. 0 I SO. 0 I 25. 0 I
I 1.9 I o.o I 8.7 I 6. 7 I 4. 5 I






39 I 2 I 1 I 2 I 1 I 4 I
PETERHEAD I 25.0 I 12.5 I 25. 0 I 12. 5 I 50.0 I
I 1.9 I 5. 3 I 8.7 I 1.7 I 9. 1 I
I 1.0 I 0.5 I 1.0 I 0.5 I 2. 1 I
^—
40 I 7 I 1 I 0 I 0 I 3 I
ALLOA I 77.8 I 11.1 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 33.3 I
I 6.6 I 5.3 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 6.8 I
I 3.7 I 0. 5 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 1.6 I
+-
42 I 7 I 0 I 1 I 1 I 3 I
ELGIN I 77.8 I O.O I 11.1 I 11.1 I 33.3 I
I 6.6 I 0. 0 I 4.3 I 1.7 I 6.8 I
I 3.7 I 0. 0 I 0.5 I 0. 5 I 1.6
1
66 I 8 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 2 I
CUMNOCK I lOO.O I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 25.0 I
I 7.5 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 4.5
■r
X
I 4.2 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 1.0 I
+ -
146 I 6 I 1 I 4 I 7 I 8 I
PAISLEY I 33.3 I 5. 6 I 22. 2 I 38. 9 I 44. 4 X
I 5.7 I 5.3 I 17.4 I 11.7 1 18.2 I
I 3. 1 I 0. 5 I 2. 1 I 3.7 I 4.2
177 I 30 I 11 I 3 I 3 I 5 I
HAMILTON I 69. 8 I 25. 6 I 7.0 I 7. 0 I 11.6 I
I 28.3 I 57.9 I 13. 0 5. 0 I 11.4 I
I 15.7 I 5. 8 I 1 . 6 I 1. 6 I 2.6 I
+ -
180 I 16 I 3 I 0 I 3 I 8 I
WI SHAW I 76.2 I 14.3 I 0.0 I 14.3 I 38. 1 I
I 15. 1 I 15. 8 I 0.0 I 5.0 I 18.2 I
I 8.4 I 1.6 I 0.0 I 1.6 I 4.2 I
235 I 23 I T I 10 I 40 I 6 I
EDINBURGH I 39.7 I 3. 4 I 17.2 I 69.0 I 10. 3 I
I 21.7 I 10. 5 I 43.5 I 66. 7 I 13.6 I
I 12. 0 I 1.0 I 5 • 2 I 20. 9 I 3. 1 I
COLUMN 106 19 23 60 44




















OFERCENTS AND TOTALS BASED ON RESPONDENTS
O 191 VALID CASES 262 MISSING CASES




SB6 BUS DRIVER STUDY
*•£.«. C.C. EHAS-A AMDAHL V7»* AMDAHL. V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
CROSSTABULATION
DEPSIZE






TAB PCT 3I. ISEMISKLOXSX ILLFT) ICLERICALIMANAGER IOFFROAD IDRIVING I SELLINS IFORCES IMISC I
11 I I 3 I 1 I 0 X 1 I 0 I 4 X 0 X o I 0 Z lO
FRASERBURGH 10.0 I 30.0 I 10.0 I 0.0 I lO.O I 0.0 I 60.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 2.6
3. 1 I 2.3 I 1.2 I 0.0 I 4.2 X 0.0 I 3.8 I 0.0 X 0.0 I 0.0 z
0.3 I O.B I 0.3 I O.O X 0.3 I 0.0 Z 1.6 I 0.0 X 0.0 I O.O X
13 0 I 2 I 1 I 0 I 2 I 0 I 1 I 1 X 2 I 0 I 9
FORREB 0.0 I 40.0 I 20.0 I 0.0 I 4O.0 I 0.0 I 20.0 I 20.0 I 40.0 I 0.0 I 1.3
0.0 I 1.3 I 1.2 I 0.0 I 8.3 I 0.0 I 1.0 I 2.4 I 9.1 I 0.0 I
0.0 I 0.9 I 0.3 X 0.0 X 0.9 X 0.0 I 0.3 X 0.3 X 0.9 X 0.0 I
20 1 Z 4 X 3 X o X 0 1 0 X 4 I 2 I 0 I o I 4
HAMXCX 11.1 I 44.4 I 33.3 I 0.0 I 0.0 X O.O X 44.4 I 22.2 X 0.0 X O.O z 2.3
3. 1 I 3.0 I 3.9 I O.O X O.O X O.O X 3.4 X 4.8 X O.O I O.O X
0.3 1 1.0 I 0.8 X O.O X 0.0 X O.O I 1.0 I O.S I O.O I O.O 1
23 0 I 4 X 1 I 0 X 0 I 1 X 4 I 1 I o I 2 I iO
FORT WILLIAM O.O I 60.0 I 10.0 I O.O I 0.0 X 10.0 X 40.0 I lO.O I O.O I 20.0 z 2.6
O.O z 4.3 X 1.2 X O.O X O.O X 4.3 X 3.4 X 2.4 X O.O I 4. 1 z
O.O I 1.4 X 0.3 X O.O X O.O X 0.3 I l.O X O. 3 X O.O X O.S X
34 3 I 2 X 3 X o I 0 X o X 3 X 0 X 1 X o X lO
PETE»4«AO 30. 0 I 2O.0 1 30.0 X O.O X 0.0 X 0.0 X 30.0 z O.O I 10. o I o.o X 2.6
4.4 I 1.9 I 3.9 X O.O X 0.0 X 0.0 I 2.4 1 O.O I 2.4 I O.O I
O.S I 0.3 I 0.8 X O.O X O.O X O.O X 0.8 X O.O X 0.3 X O.O X
40 0 I 8 X 9 I O I 2 X 1 I 6 I 1 X o X 2 I 20
ALLOA O.O I 40.0 X 29.0 X O.O I lO.O 1 9.0 X □O.O I 9.0 X O.O I lO.O I 9.2
0.0 I 6.0 I 9.4 I O.O X 8.3 X 4.3 I 9.8 X 2.4 X O.O X 4. 1 X
0.0 I 2.1 X 1.3 I 0.0 X 0.9 X 0.3 I 1.4 I 0.3 X O.O X 0.9 I
42 2 1 2 X 3 X o X 0 X o X 9 X 3 X 3 X o I 13
ELGIN 19.4 I 19.4 I 23.1 I 0.0 X 0.0 I 0.0 I 38.9 X 23. 1 I 23. 1 I O.O I 3.4
4.3 I 1.9 I 3.9 X O.O X O.O X O.O X 4.4 X 7. 1 X 7.7 I O.O X
0.9 I 0.9 X O.S X O.O X O.O X O.O X 1.3 X 0.8 X 0.8 I 0.0 X
64 1 I 4 X 3 2 0 I 2 X 2 X 12 X 2 I O I 0 I 30
curmocx 3.3 I 30. O X 10.0 X O.O X 4.7 X 4.7 X 40.0 X 4.7 X 0.0 X O.O X 7.8
3.1 I 4.8 X 3.9 X 0.0 I 8.3 X 12.9 I 11.7 X 4.8 X O.O I O.O X
0.3 I 2.3 I O.S X O.O X 0.9 X 0.9 X 3. 1 X O.S X O.O X O.O X
144 9 I 20 I 11 X 3 I 3 X 3 X lO X 3 X 2 X O 1 47
PAISLEY 10.4 I 42.4 X 23.4 X 4.4 X 4.4 X 4.4 I 21.3 X 4.4 I 4.3 X O.O X 12.3
19.4 I 19. O X 12.4 X 30. O X 12.9 X 18.8 I 4.7 X 7. 1 X 9. 1 X O.O I
1.3 I 9.2 X 2.4 X O. 8 X O.S I 0.8 X 2.4 X O.S I 0.9 I 0.0 I
177 4 I 22 X 14 X 1 X 3 I 9 I 14 I 7 X 4 I 3 X 64
HAMILTON 4.4 I 34.4 I 29.0 I 1.4 X 4.7 X 7.8 I 29. O X 10. 4 I 4.3 X 4.7 X 16.7
18.S I 14.9 X 18.8 X lO.O X 12.9 X 31.3 X 19.9 X 14.7 X 10.3 I 13.4 I
1.4 I 9.7 I 4.2 X 0.3 X O.S 1 1.3 I 4.2 X 1.8 z l.O X O.S X
ISO 4 I 13 I 8 I 1 I 2 X 2 I 3 X 3 I 1 I 0 I 27
MISHAM 14. S I 48. 1 I 24.4 X 3.7 I 7.4 X 7.4 X 11.1 X 11.1 X 3.7 1 O.O I 7.0
12.9 I 4.8 I 4.4 I lO.O I 8.3 X 12.9 I 2.4 X 7.1 I 2.4 X 0.0 I
1.0 I 3.4 X 2. 1 X 0.3 I 0.9 I 0.9 I O.S X O.B I 0.3 I O.O I
233 4 I 42 z 30 X 9 I 4 X 2 X 33 X 14 X 24 I 19 I 138
EDINBURGH 4.9 I 30.4 X 21.7 I 3.4 X 4.9 X 1.4 I 23.4 X 13.8 X 18.8 X 10.4 X 36. O
28. 1 z 31.4 I 39.3 X 90.0 I 37.9 I 12.9 X 32.O X 49.2 I 44.7 1 68.2 I
2.3 I 11.0 X 7.8 I 1.3 X 2.3 X 0.9 I 8.4 I 9.0 I 4.8 X 3.4 X
COLUWi 32 133 *3 lO 24 1* 103 42 34 22
TOTAL 8.4 34.7 22.2 2.* 4.3 4.2 24.4 11.0 10.2 S.7
0PEPCENT8 AM) TOTALS BASED ON RESPONDENTS
O 3*3 VALID CAGES 230 MI88INB CASES
Appendix A4: Level of education by depot
22 APR 88
15:02:10
SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
**E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
* * * CROSSTABULATION * * *
BY
DEPSIZE







OR A LEV DIPLOMA
ELS
DEGREE







_ , .ueraiit r ~
11 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 1 I
FRASERBURGH I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 100.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 1.2 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
4.
0.6 I
13 I 3 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 1 I
FORRES I 75.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 25.0 I
I 6.5 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 1.2 I
I 1.8 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.6 I
20 I 0 TX X I 1 I 0 I 0 TX 2 I
HAWICK I 0.0 I 33. 3 I 33. 3 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 66.7 I
I 0.0 I 1.4 I 5.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 2.4 I
I 0. 0 I 0.6 I 0.6 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 1.2 I
23 I 3 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 2 I
FORT WILLIAM I 75.0 I O. O I O.O I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 30.0 I
I 6.5 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 2.4 I
I 1.8 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 1.2 I
39 I 1 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 1 I
PETERHEAD I 50.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 50.0 I
I 2.2 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 1.2 I
i 0.6 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.6 I
40 I 1 I 3 I 1 I 0 I 0 I 4 I
ALLOA I 14.3 I 42. 9 I 14.3 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 57. 1 I
I 2. 2 I 4. 1 I 5.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 4.8 I







42 I 0 I 1 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I
ELGIN I 0.0 I 100. 0 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I O.O I
I 0.0 I 1.4 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.6 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I
66 I 4 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I
CUMNOCK I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 8.7 I 0. 0 I 0. 0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 2.4 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0. 0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
146 I 6 I 16 I 4 I 1 I 1 I 11 r
PAISLEY I 21.4 I 57. 1 I 14.3 I 3. 6 I 3. 6 I 39.3 1
I 13.0 I 21. 6 I 20.0 I 10. 0 I 20.0 I 13. 1 1
I 3. 6 I 9. 7 I 2. 4 I 0. 6 I 0.6 I 6. 7 I
177 I 1 I 10 I 2 i 0 I 1 I 19 I
HAMILTON I 4.2 I 41. 7 I 3.3 I 0. 0 I 4.2 I 79.2 I
I 2. 2 I 13. 5 I 10.0 I 0.0 I 20.0 I 22.6 I
I 0.6 I 6. 1 I 1.2 I 0. 0 I 0.6 I 11.5 I
ISO I 3 I 6 I 0 I 1 I 0 I 6 I
WI SHAW I 27.3 I 54. 5 I 0.0 I 9. 1 I 0.0 I 54.5 I
I 6.5 I 8. 1 I 0.0 I 10.0 I 0.0 X 7.1 I
I 1. 8 I 3.6 I 0.0 I 0. 6 I 0.0 X 3.o I
235 I 24 I 37 I 12 I B I 3 I 37 I
EDINBURGH I 31.6 I 48. 7 I 15.8 I 10. 5 I 3. 9 I 46.7 r
I 52. 2 I 50. 0 I 60.0 I 80.0 I 60.0 I 44.0 I
I 14.5 I 22.4 I 7.3 I 4. 8 I 1. 8 I
COLUMN 46 74 20 10 5 84
TOTAL 27.9 44. 8 12. 1 6. 1 3.0 50. 9
165
1 CO. O
OFERCENTS AND TOTALS BASED ON RESPONDENTS
165 VALID CASES 448 MISSING CASES
Appendix A5; Status by depot
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
15:34:28 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7»* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)




ROW PCT IDRIVER DEFOT CN SHOP STE SINCE PR RESIGNED RETIRED DISMISSE ROW
COL PCT I TRLLR WARD OMOTED OR DECEA D TOTAL
I 11 21 31 41 51 61 71
DEPSIZE
11 I 9 I 1 I 1 I I I I I 11
FRASERBURGH I 81.8 I 9. 1 I 9. 1 I I I I I 1. 3
I 1.7 I 11.1 I 7.7 I I I I I
13 I 4 I I I I I I I 6
FORRES I 66. 7 I 33.3 I I I I I TX 1.0
I . 7 I 22.2 I 1 I I I I
-t—
20 I 10 I I 2 I I I 2 I I 14
HAWICK I 71. 4 I I 14.3 I I i 14.3 I X 2.3
I 1.9 I I 15.4 I I I 50.0 I I
23 I 12 I 1 I 1 I I 1 I I 15
FORT WILLIAM I 80. 0 I 6.7 I 6.7 I I 6.7 I I I 2.4
I 2.2 I 11.1 I 7.7 I I 2.8 I I I
39 I 21 I I I 1 I 1 I I 1 I 24
PETERHEAD I 87. 5 I I I 4.2 I 4. 2 I I 4.2 I 3.9
I 3.9 I I I 10.0 I 2.8 I I 14.3 I
40 I 19 I I 2 I I 2 I I 1 I 24
ALLOA I 79.2 I I 8.3 I I 8.3 I I 4.2 I 3.9
I 3.6 I I 15.4 I I 5.6 I I 14.3 I
42 I 15 I I 1 I 1 I I I I 17
ELGIN I 88.2 I I 5.9 I 5.9 I I I I 2.8
I 2.8 I I 7.7 I 10.0 I I I I
66 I 40 I 1 I 1 I 2 I 2 I I I 46
CUMNOCK I 87.0 I 2.2 I 2.2 I 4.3 I 4.3 I I I 7.5
I 7.5 I 11. 1 I 7.7 I 20.0 I 5.6 I I I
146 I 73 I I 2 1 I 3 I 1 I 2 I 31
PAISLEY I 90. 1 I I 2.5 I I 3.7 I 1.2 I 2.5 I 13.2
I 13. 7 I I 15.4 I I 8. 3 I 25.0 I 28.6 I
177 I 133 I 2 I 1. I 2 I I I I 133
HAMILTON I 96. 4 I 1.4 I . 7 I 1.4 I I I xi2. 5
I 24. 9 I 22.2 I 7.7 I 20.0 I I I I
180 I 58 I I 2 I 1 I 5 I I 1 I 67
WI SHAW I 86. 6 I I 3.0 I 1.5 I 7.5 I I 1.5 I 10. 9
I 10.9 I I 15.4 I 10.0 I 13. 7 I 14.3 I
235 I 140 I 2 I I 3 I 22 I 1 I 2 I 170
EDINBURGH I 82.4 I 1.2 I I 1. B I 12.9 I . 6 I 1.2 I 27. 7
I 26. 2 I 22. 2 I I 30.0 I 61. 1 I 25.0 I 2o .6 I
^—
COLUMN 534 9 13 10 36 4 7 613
TOTAL 87. 1 1.5 2. 1 1.6 5.9 . 7 1. 1 100.0
ONUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 0
Appendix Bl: Test data statistics by depot
22 APR SS SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY FAGE
11:59:02 **E .R . c. c,. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
o D E S C R I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I G N S
CRITERION VARIABLE WRTRIGHT








OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 21.5270 10.5310 611
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 15.6364 8.4294 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 32.1667 5.1153 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 21.5000 9.8274 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 19.2000 12.3126 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 16.6667 10.2731 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 24.2063 7.0586 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 19.3750 11.9157 '16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 17.3913 8.7394 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 22.0625 10.3744 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 19.6304 10.2822 138
DEPSIZE 130 WISHAW 21.4328 10.2177 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 24.6941 10.7269 170
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 2 OR 0.3 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY 1
11:59: 02 + *E.,R.,C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7+* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- D E S C R IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N s — ■
CRITERION VARIABLE WRTWRONG








OFOR ENTIRE: POPULATION 3.9313 3.1324 611
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 3.1818 2.7136 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 4.8333 1.4720 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 5.1429 4.4869 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 3.3333 2.5542 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 3.3750 2.8562 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 3.2500 1.7998 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 3.9375 3.1511 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 3.0870 2.7392 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 4.2375 3.0822 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 3.7754 3.0923 138
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 4.1642 3.1747 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 4.1941 3.4043 170
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 2 OR 0.3 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
11:59:02 * +E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- D E S C R IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N S - -
CRITERION VARIABLE CF1
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 7.7974 2.4418 612
DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH 7.3636 1.6293 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 10.1667 1.1690 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 6. 6429 3.1282 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 7.4667 2.4456 15
DEPSIZE 39 FETERHEAD 6.7917 2■2259 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 8.8333 1.9262 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 7.8235 1.5506 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 7.7391 2.0810 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 7.6420 2.0935 81
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 7.4599 2. 5782 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 7.9552 2.7216 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 8.1588 2.5218 170
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 1 OR 0.2 PCT.
Appendix B2: Test data statistics by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
11:59:02 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE CF2
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 0.6748 1.8505 612
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 6.5455 1.3685 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 7.3333 1•3663 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 6.2143 2.0821 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 6.9333 2.0517 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 5.6250 1.7399 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 7.5000 1.8882 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 7.0000 1.4577 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 5.9565 1.6049 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 6.6049 1.6709 81
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 6.4015 1.9115 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 7.0896 2.1301 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 6.9588 1.7486 170
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 1 OR 0.2 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY f
11:59:02 + *E. R.> C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMA5-3 (VSS)
0 D E S C R IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I O N S - -
CRITERION VARIABLE CF3
BROKEN DOWN BY .DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE
— —
VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 7.7255 2.2662 612
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 6. 3636 1.3040 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 9.3333 1.6330 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 7.0000 2.3205 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 6.9333 2.2509 15
DEFSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 0. 6667 2.3713 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 8. 2083 1.5317 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 7.7059 2.0544 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 7.5217 2.2972 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 7. 6296 2.2608 81
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 7.4088 2.5192 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 6. 0149 2.0852 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 8.2118 2.1156 170
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 1 OR 0.2 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY FAGE
11:59:02 +*E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 CVSS)
0- DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE CF4
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 4.8709 1.9065 612
DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH 4.6364 1.5667 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 6.3333 .8165 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 4. 6429 2.0609 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 4.8667 2.2949 1 5
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 4.2083 2.0212 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA > '.jjjj 1.4346 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 4.1176 2.0881 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 4■5435 1.6694 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 5.0370 1.7709 81
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 4.5328 1.9668 137
DEPSIZE 1B0 WISHAW 4-. 8806 1.9964 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 5 a 1.8883 170
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 1 OR 0.2 PCT.
Appendix B3: Test data statistics by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
11:59:02 +*E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7**
0— — DESCRIPTION OF
CRITERION VARIABLE CFTOTAL
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
PAGE 8
AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
SUBPOPULAT I ONS -----
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 27.0784 6.3442 612
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 24.9091 4.5487 11
DEPSIZE 13 F0RRE5 33.1667 3.4303 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 24.5000 7.3249 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 26.2000 6.9200 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 23.2917 6.4772 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 29.8333 5.1047 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 26.6471 4.4150 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 25.7609 5.4454 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 26.9136 5.5299 81
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 25.8394 6.6909 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 27.9701 6.8046 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 28.5647 6.2150 170
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 1 OR 0.2 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
11:59:02 **E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E S C R I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I O N S ■
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFA
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE
~
VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 9.6712 2.8177 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 9.1250 3.6425 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 9.6667 3.2660 6
DEFSIZE 20 HAWICK 11.0714 3.2217 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 10.2308 3.4678 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 10.6342 1.7014 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 9.3333 2.9142 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 9.7500 2.8166 16
DEPSIZE 60 CUMNOCK 9.8478 3.1125 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 9.7792 2.7173 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 9.8903 2.8119 137
DEPSIZE ISO WISHAW 9.5303 2.8405 66
DEPSIZE 233 EDINBURGH 9.2317 2.7011 164
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
11:59:02 «*E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
10





OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 7.1542 1.9172 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 5. 7500 1.2817 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 7.8333 .7528 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 7.5000 2.1750 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 6.3077 1.6525 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 6. 2105 1.9026 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 6.9167 1.6918 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 7.1250 2.0290 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 7.0435 1.8614 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 7.0779 1.7679 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 7.1241 2.1401 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 7.0000 1.6267 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 7.5366 1.9198 164
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
Appendix B4: Test data statistics by depot (contd)
22 APR 38 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
11:59:02 ••E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7»*
0 DESCRIPTION OF
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFC
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
PAGE 11
AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 <VSS)
SUBPOPULAT I ONS -
OVARI ABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 14.2678 4.0396 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 14.2500 4.0970 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 12.8333 3.6009 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 13.7857 3.9648 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 13.6154 3.1501 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 12.3158 2.8098 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 15.0833 3.7754 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 14.1250 4.1453 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 13.4783 4.2622 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 14.7922 4.0760 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 14.1606 3.9912 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 13.9545 3.8448 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 14.7256 4.2676 164
0 TOTAL CASES a 613
MISSING CASES a 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
11:59:06 • •E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 <vss>
0 UJQ S C R IPTION OF SUBPOPUL A T I 0 N s - -
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFE









DEPSIZE 11 FF1ASERBURGH 11.2500 4.0267 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 11.6667 3.4448 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 12.2857 3.6465 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 13.3077 4.6437 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 10.6316 3.5310 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 11.8750 3.5178 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 9.5625 5.1247 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 10.5000 3.6742 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 11.3377 3.8886 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 11.3431 3.8203 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 12.6818 4.2251 66




23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
11159:06 *»E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7**
PAGE 13
AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 <VSS>






























































MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
Appendix B5: Test data statistics by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
11:59:06 *»E.R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
PASE 14





OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 12.5712 3.3526 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 12.5000 1.8516 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 15.3333 2.8048 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 13.5714 3.4354 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 12.9231 2.9850 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 13.9474 2.1724 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 12.6667 2.8691 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 12.1250 2.8954 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 13.1522 3.2384 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 12.8442 2.9158 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 12.1095 3.6716 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 12.4091 3.3649 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 12.3902 3.5472 164
0 TOTAL CASES - 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
11159:06 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 DESCR IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I O N S
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFH
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 13.1847 5.6720 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 15.3750 6.1630 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 13.6667 4.3205 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 13.5714 5.7608 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 15.5385 5.5169 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 11.2632 3.9978 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 12.1667 6.4919 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 12.1250 6.7318 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 12.5652 5.7837 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 13.5325 5.8817 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 13.0803 5.4867 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 13.5909 5.8203 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 13.2SOO 5.6257 164
0 TOTAL CASES - 613
MISSING CASES » 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
11:59:06 +*E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 DESCR IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N S
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFI






OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 8.9475 3.0103 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 9.8750 2.3566 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 8.0000 2.7568 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 8.0000 3.0634 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 10.5385 1.9839 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 9. 3684 2.5432 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 7.7917 3.0214 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN B.7500 2.6708 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 9.5217 2.4562 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 9.1558 2.9606 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 8.6496 2.8661 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 9.1212 3.1453 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 8.9512 3.3540 164
i TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
Appendix B6; Test data statistics by depot (contd)
22 APR aa SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
11:59:06 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7**
0 DESCRIPTION OF
CRITERION VARIABLE SFFL
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
PAGE 17
















0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES - 23 OR 3.8 I
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY

























































DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 10.1250 3.2705 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 11.5000 2.5884 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 10.2143 3.1908 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 10.0000 3.1885 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 9.3158 3.4649 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 9. 95B3 3.5567 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 11.3125 3.3609 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 9.7609 3.1140 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 11.3636 3.4102 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 11.5036 3.1086 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 10.2121 3.7273 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 12.1159 3.4113 164
I TOTAL CASES 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY !
11:59:06 »*E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
D E S C R IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N s - ■
CRITERION VARIABLE SFFN
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 10.9373 3.1807 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 15.1250 2.4165 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 13.8333 1.8348 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 11.7857 3.6623 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 11.4615 3.0718 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 12.4211 2.5236 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 10.9583 3.7122 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 11.2500 2.8868 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 11.3043 3.2855 46
DEPSIZE 146 FAISLEY 10.8701 2.9707 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 10.7153 2.8074 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 10.9545 3.0150 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 10.4146 3.4426 164
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
Appendix B7: Test data statistics by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
11:59:06 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7**
0- DESCRIPTION OF
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFO
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
PAGE 20
AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
SUBPOPULAT IONS _____
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 11.8627 4.1724 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 12.8750 3.2705 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 12.3333 4.5019 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 13.0000 4.6904 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 12.0769 2.8420 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 13.7895 3.7650 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 11.8333 4.0504 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 12.4375 4.7465 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 12.8696 4.3236 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 11.5714 4.4822 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 11.6277 4.0293 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 11.5909 4.2823 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 11.5671 4.1240 164
0 TOTAL CASES S 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
11:59:06 **E.• R,. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E S C R IPTION OF SU B P 0 P U L A T I D N S
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFQ1






OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 9.4288 3.2748 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 8.6250 2.7742 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 7.6667 3.8816 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 8.5000 2.5944 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 9.6154 2.6627 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 7.7368 3.2972 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 10.2500 3.1794 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 8.3125 2.8453 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 8.4565 3.4170 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 9.8182 3.3589 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 9.8540 3.1913 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 9.5000 3.3661 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 9.4878 3.2794 164
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
11:59:06 **E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- D E S C R IPTION OF SU B P 0 P U L A T I □ M S — — — —
CRITERION VARIABLE SFFQ2






OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 11.2763 3.6827 590
DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH 9.8750 2.9970 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 13.0000 5.z5^6 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 10.285/ 3.4065 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 11.7692 2.3859 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 11.3684 3.0950 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 10.7500 3.5294 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 11.4375 3.0977 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 10.6957 3.6078 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 11.2078 4.2032 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 11.2409 3.5283 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 11.4242 4.0309 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 11.5427 3.6744 164
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
Appendix B8: Test data statistics by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 23
11:59:06 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
O DESCRIPTION OF SUB POPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFQ3
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 12.7847 3.2459 590
DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH 12.7500 2.9155 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 12.6667 3.1411 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 11.5714 3.3904 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 12.6923 3.1194 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 13.1579 2.6302 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 13.6250 2.8255 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 12.4375 2.9205 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 12.9348 3.5864 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 13.1948 3.1956 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 12.6350 3.2333 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 12.5455 3.4693 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 12.7561 3.2974 164
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY f
11:59:06 **E., R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E SCR IPTION OF SUBPOPUL A T I 0 N s - ■
CRITERION VARIABLE SPFQ4
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 12.4254 4.7092 590
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 12.B750 5.2491 8
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 15.0000 2.0976 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 13.2857 3.5394 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 13.5385 5.0102 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 13.5263 2.8938 19
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 12.75C0 4.6086 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 13.4375 4.1468 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 12.1739 5.3388 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 11.7403 4.6915 77
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 12.1460 4.6218 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 12.9697 5.0O45 66
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 12.2B05 4.8379 164
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 23 OR 3.8 PCT.
Appendix B9; Biographical data by depot
22 APR 88 SB6 BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12103:38 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- - DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS - - - •
CRITERION VARIABLE AGE CURRENT AGE
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE








DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 51.0000 7.4685 10
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 37.8333 7.5741 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 45.5714 ' 14.4792 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 44.9286 8.3248 14
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 45.7083 11.7120 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 39.0417 8.1852 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 42.4375 9.5497 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 43.0444 8.6207 45
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 38.4250 11.1193 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 38.2661 9.8229 138
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 37.9701 9.4756 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 39.1585 10.8802 164
i TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 11 OR 1.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
12:03:40 **E. R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
PAGE
0- - DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS












DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH 13.9091 8.0182 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 1.6667 .5164 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 12.5714 11.8043 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 7.4667 4.5961 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 8.1667 8.8203 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 7.1364 5.9546 22
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 7.7647 6.4375 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 12.1957 6.8007 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 4.6000 5.3263 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 6.8551 4.8684 138
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 7.0597 5.1224 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 7.0238 8.5387 168
i TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES — 5 OR 0.8 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:42 **E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)














DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 36.3000 8.7312 10
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 36.1667 7.8592 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 33.0000 8.5575 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 37.7143 9.0505 14
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 37.5417 9.0216 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLQA 32.1364 9.3620 22
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 34.6250 9.5350 16
DEFSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 30. 5778 6.9625 45
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 33.8250 9.8286 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 31.4130 8.7293 138
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 30.9104 8.2952 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 32.1595 8.2177 163
' TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 14 OR 2.3 PCT.
Appendix BlO: Background data by depot (contd)
Performance data by depot
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:42 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
o DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS












DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 17.8333 11.3387 6
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 13.0000 8.3666 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 16.1250 8.7250 8
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 19.6667 7.4666 9
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 18.0000 5.6569 2
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 14.3158 7.8248 19
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 18.lOOO 7.5048 10
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 10.3000 3.2199 10
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 13.5192 9.0196 32
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 10.0348 7.6247 73
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 10.1338 6.8192 39
DEPSIZE 233 EDINBURGH 11.3582 8.1401 134
) TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 245 OR 40.0 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:42 **E. R. C.C. EMA5-A AMDAHL V7»* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)





NUMBER OF JOBS IN FIVE YEARS FRIOR TO JO
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 2.2920 1.1697 411
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH 2.0000 .8944 6
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 2.0000 . 6325 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 3. 1111 1.0541 9
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 2.1667 1.5859 12
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 2.1667 1.1690 6
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 2.3684 1.0116 19
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 2.0625 .9287 16
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK 2.2500 1.1255 16
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 2.0769 1.0819 52
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 2.2714 1.1662 70
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 2.3333 1.1773 39
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 2.3687 1.2369 160
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 202 OR 33.0 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY f
12:03:44 *»E.i R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E SCR I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N s - ■
CRITERION VARIABLE AD1 TIMEKEEPING
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .2466 .4754 594
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .0111 .0368 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .4254 .3993 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .2169 . 2585 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0676 . 1160 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 0764 . 1661 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 1605 .2221 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0000 . OOOO 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK ■ 0343 .0896 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 1748 .6010 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 1821 . 4178 1 33
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .6011 .5996 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .3394 . 4956 165
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 FCT.
Appendix Bll: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:44 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE AD2 TICKET ISSUE
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —, — — —
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .4154 .6816 594
DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH . 0776 .0987 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 1173 . 1821 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .9731 .5861 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .1112 . 1639 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .2278 .3101 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .2436 .2873 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 1493 . 1868 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0286 .0997 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 1372 .6115 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 1477 .3516 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .2356 .3725 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 1.0309 . B340 165
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
12:03:44 **£.. R.. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- D E S C R IPTION OF SUB P 0 P U L A T I 0 N s - -
CRITERION VARIABLE AD3 FAILURE TO STOP






OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION . 1361 .3486 394
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . 0340 .0798 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 .OOOO 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 1010 . 1698 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0000 .0000 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0312 . 1391 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0611 . 1244 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .0163 . 0674 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0000 .OOOO 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0764 .3638 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0783 .2498 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .2316 .3625 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 2789 .3731 165
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
12:03:44 *»E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*f AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- D E S C R IPTION OF SUB P a P U L A T I D N S - -
CRITERION VARIABLE AD4 RUDENESS




















DEFSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . OOOO . OOOO
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .0000 .0000
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0397 . 1485
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0084 .0327
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0000 . OOOO
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0273 .0702
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0557 .1188
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . OOOO . OOOO
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 0306 .2271
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .01 19 .0704
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0867 .2562
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 1353 .2720
' TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
Appendix B12: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 1
12:03:44 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 DESCRIPTION OF SUB POPULATIONS -----
CRITERION VARIABLE ADS CARELESSNESS
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION . 2093 .3643 594
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . 0802 . 1140 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .3519 .5462 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 4008 .5776 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 1073 . 1627 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 1750 .2458
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 3468 .3893 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 1814 • 2358 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0343 . 1054 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 1080 .2690 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0954 . 2618 133
DEPSIZE 180 WI SHAW .3377 .4644 65
DEPSIZE 233 EDINBURGH . 3392 . 4220 163
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY I
12:03:46 **E.. R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- D E SCR I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N S - ■
CRITERION VARIABLE AD6 QUALITY OF DRIVING






OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION . 0293 . 1259 594
DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH .0779 .2584 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 . 0000 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0397 .1485 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0000 .0000 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0067 .0314 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0268 .0698 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .0149 .0421 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0000 . OOOO 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0073 .0489 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0251 . 1384 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0385 .1115 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 0521 . 1666 165
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
12:03:48 **E. R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E SCR I P T I 0 N OF S U B F 0 P U L A T I C N s —
CRITERION VARIABLE AD7 XS ABSENITEEI SM






OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .0841 .2583 594
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . 0000 .OOOO 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 . OOOO 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0714 . 1608 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0253 . 0524 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 0000 . OOOO 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 1221 . 2227 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0000 .0000 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .0172 . 1164 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .1149 .2836 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0075 .0611 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 3478 . 5366 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 0759 . 1962 165
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
Appendix B13: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBS BUS DRIVER STUDY

















DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . 0000 .0000 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 . 0000 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0000 . 0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0000 • OOOO 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 0000 .0000 2-7
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 1.3902 1.0580 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0000 . OOOO 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0000 . OOOO 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 1906 .4002 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 3116 .6773 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 1.15S8 1.3600 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .0146 .0802 165
' TOTAL CASES = 613
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
12:03:48 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)







OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .01 IB .0771 594
DEPSIZE "11 FRASERBURGH . OOOO .OOOO 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .0000 . OOOO 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0159 .0594 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . OOOO . OOOO 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0000 .0000 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0131 .0415 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . OOOO .OOOO 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . OOOO . OOOO 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0199 . 1261 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0111 .0734 133
DEPSIZE 1 BO WISHAW . 0227 .0943 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .0120 .0739 165
0 TOTAL CASES =» 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 16
12:03:48 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE ACOMP COMPLAINTS









DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH . 0000 . OOOO 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .0617 . 1512 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0650 . 1940 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . OOOO . OOOO 15
DEPSIZE 39 FETERHEAD . 0608 . 1430 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0749 . 1700 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0470 . 1158 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . OOOO . OOOO 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0912 .3795 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0586 . 1995 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0920 . 2024 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .2586 . 401 1 165
' TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
Appendix Bl4: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 98 S8G BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:49 **E * R. Ca Ci. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 <VSS>
0 D E SCR I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N S
CRITERION VARIABLE ACOMM COMMENDATIONS
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN
—
STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .0318 .2388 394
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .0000 .OOOO 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 . OOOO 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0000 .0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0083 .0323 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0000 .0000 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0000 .0000 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . OOOO .0000 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .0031 .0211 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0216 . 1633 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0038 .0434 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .0077 .0620 65
DEPSIZE 233 EDINBURGH . 1684 .4138 165
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY f
12103:48 **E..R.C.C., EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E SCR I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N s - ■
CRITERION VARIABLE AVTOTDIS AVERAGE TOTAL DISCIPLINERY OFFENCES
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 1.4671 1.7459 594
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .2808 .3372 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .8945 .8302 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 1.8386 1.1324 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .3199 .2332 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .3371 .6272 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 2.3913 1.4826 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .4177 . 4230 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .1144 .2864 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .8398 1.4236 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .8709 1.3070 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 3.0606 2.3197 63
DEPSIZE 233 EDINBURGH 2.2732 1.3793 163
0 TOTAL CASES — 613
MISSING CASES S3 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
12:03:48 »*E., R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E SCR I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I Q N s - -
CRITERION VARIABLE AVLATE AVERAGE DAYS LATE FOR WORK PER YEAR
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN
~
STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 1.1959 1.7235 389
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK • 0371 . 1222 14
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .2562 . 2780 16
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 9.9000 . OOOO 1
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 7060 . 9864 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 1.2692 1.5858 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 1.7365 2.0852 156
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 224 OR 36.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
12:03:48 **E. R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 '(VSS)
0 D E SCR I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N s — —
CRITERION VARIABLE AVABS AVERAGE DAYS ABSENCE PER YEAR
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN
—
STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION 2.4460 2.9552 372
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .OOOO . OOOO 14
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 3.4672 3.6077 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 2.4385 2.7331 63
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 1.7633 2.1128 156
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 241 OR 39.3 PCT.
Appendix B15: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
12:03:48 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
PAGE
0 D E S C R I P T I 0 N
CRITERION VARIABLE SHORTS 1











0 TOTAL CASES = 613
0 F SUBFOPULATIONS































MISSING CASES = 162 OR 26.4 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12103:48 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-fi AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E S C R IPTION OF SUBPOPUL A T I 0 N S - ■
CRITERION VARIABLE AAD2 INTERVIEW/INSTRUCTION
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .2955 .6449 594
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .0222 .0493 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 .0000 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0140 .0524 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0568 . 1619 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 1427 .2284 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 1339 .2843 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0706 . 1665 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .0114 .0543 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0269 .2253 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0107 .0667 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0000 .0000 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .9880 .8839 165
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY 1








OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .9461 1.3317 594
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .1142 . 1860 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .7279 .5296 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK 1.8064 1.0478 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 1697 . 1874 15
DEPSIZE 39 FETERHEAD .3559 .4424 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 2.1211 1.3947 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 2994 .3481 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0400 .0956 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 4299 .7358 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 8748 1.3688 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 2.7751 2.0244 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 8394 .7325 165
0 TOTAL CASES 3. 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
Appendix B16: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBS BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 24
12:03:50 **£. R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS - _ _
CRITERION VARIABLE AAD4 WRITTEN WARNING
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
^VARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
3F0R ENTIRE POPULATION . 1035 .3070 594
DEFSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .0333 .0570 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .0556 . 1361 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0317 .1188 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0508 .0809 15
DEFSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0000 .0000 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . OOOO .0000 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0322 . 0795 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0114 .0776 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY ■ 1656 . 6072 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0095 .0793 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 2057 .3901 65




19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
























1 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 1
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
12:03:50 **E. R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAH1














































DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .0222 .0493 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .1111 . 2722 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0317 .0807 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0260 .0733 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0263 .0972 2°
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0951 . 1372 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .0077 .0319 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .0458 . 1692 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0829 . 1990 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0047 . 0542 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 1256 .3287 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH
. .2194 .3682 165
i TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
Appendix B17: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBS BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 27
12103:50 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7.* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
o DESCRIPTION OF SUBFOPULATICNS ___
CRITERION VARIABLE AAD7 DISM THEN REINSTATED
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION . 0183 .2174 594
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .0111 . 0368 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 . 0000 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .OOOO . 0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0000 . 0000 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0189 .0888 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0212 ■ 0536 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0000 .0000 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .0172 .1164 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 0853 .5680 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0038 .0434 133
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .0162 . 1306 65
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .0049 « 0382 165
0 TOTAL CASES - 613
MISSING CASES = 19 OR 3.1 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY 1
12:03:50 **E. R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
PAGE 28
0 DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS












DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . 4697 . ^.5J3 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .6729 .5731 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .3311 .4170 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .7598 1.0683 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .9221 .5837 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . B003 ■ 5671 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .6022 . 4698 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 7147 .7829 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 1.1602 1.8020 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 7221 .8315 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW ■ 5288 .6235 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 1.1960 . 9460 168
I TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:52 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
O DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS













DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .0229 oHinc 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 . 0000 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0000 . 0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0392 - 1519 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 0O66 .0309 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0137 .0434 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0264 .0610 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0114 .0543 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0166 .0886 30
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0447 . 1573 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .0522 .1541 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 0431 .2138 168
i TOTAL CASES = 613
Appendix B18: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SB6 BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 30
12:03:32 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE AA03 COLLISION WITH ANIMALS
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARI ABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .0276 . 1870 6C)4
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .OOOO . 0000 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .0758 . 1856 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0000 .0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0083 .0323 13
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 0111 .0359 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0246 .0618 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0072 .0296 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .0114 . 0543 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 0812 .4637 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0219 . 1027 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0373 . 1324 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 0159 .0667 168
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY F
12:03:52 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7«* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
O D E S C R IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I O N S - -
CRITERION VARIABLE AA04 COLLISION WITH INANIMATE OBJECTS
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE








DEPSIZE 11 FFiASERBURGH . 1594 .0946 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .6898 . 6430 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 1320 . 1923 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 3093 .2652 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 4480 .3991 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .2732 .4134 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 1997 .2667 17
DEF^SIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0686 . 1407 46
DEFSIZE 146 PAISLEY .3582 . 7317 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 2284 . 4081 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .2277 .3857 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .2970 .3674 168
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.3 FCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY FAGE
12:03:52 «»E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 - D E S C R IPTION OF SUBPOPULh T I 0 N S
CRITERION VARIABLE AA05 BOARDING/ALIGHTING ACCIDENTS
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
_ _ _ _ - - - - - — __________ _________ — _ _ _ ______
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION . 0467 . 2213 604
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . OOOO . OOOO 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 1728 .2837 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . OOOO . OOOO 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . OOOO . OOOO 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 0055 . 0260 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0200 . 0640 21
DEFSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0937 . 1207 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0229 . 0730 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 2319 . 3338 SO
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0182 .0941 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0149 . 0857 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 0115 . 0740 168
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
Appendix B19: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 33
12:03:52 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE AA06 ACCIDENTS ABOARD BUS
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION . 1363 .3854 604
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . 0126 .0419 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .0758 . 1856 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0000 . OOOO 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0551 .1195 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0295 . 0675 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0122 .0386 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .0532 . 1349 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 1564 .2083 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 3434 . 8671 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0196 .0967 137
DEFSIZE ISO WISHAW . 1025 .2484 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH • 2075 .2956 168
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:52 «*E.,R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7+* AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
UJQ1111O SCR IPTION OF S U B P a P U L A T I 0 N S •






MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .3207 .6110 604
DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH . OOOO .0000 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . OOOO . OOOO 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . 0159 .0594 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . OOOO .0000 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0173 .0447 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0222 .0569 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .OOOO .OOOO 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0629 . 1135 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 2528 . 4430 so
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 8832 .8437 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 5012 .7638 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .0887 . 1780 168
0 TOTAL CASES 3 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:52 *»E. R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E SCR IPTION OF S U B P □ P U L A T I 0 N S — — — -
CRITERION VARIABLE AA08 VANDALISM INSIDE
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .0393 . 1743 604
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . OOOO .OOOO 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . OOOO . OOOO 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . OOOO .0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . OOOO . OOOO 15
DEPSIZE 39 FETERHEAD . 0055 . 0260 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0122 . 0560 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0120 .0495 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0057 . 0388 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0546 • 1676 SO
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0520 . 1848 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 1642 . 3832 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 0025 .0233 168
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
Appendix B20: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBS BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 36
12:03:54 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7»* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0-- DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS ___
CRITERION VARIABLE AA09 MISCELLANEOUS
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .0672 . 1776 604
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .2004 . 1422 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .2424 .4133 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0000 .0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0560 . 1537 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .2179 • 1865 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0239 .0610 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .4358 .3333 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0700 . 1556 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0326 . 1667 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0588 . 1836 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0299 . 1477 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .0446 .1136 168
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:54 **E. R.! C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E S C R IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N S
CRITERION VARIABLE ACOL TOTAL COLLISIONS PER YEAR








OFOR ENTIRE: POPULATION 1.2091 1.2023 604
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .6520 .2703 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 1.4384 1.2443 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .4631 ■ 4658 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM 1.1168 1.1914 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 1.3878 .8777 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 1.1137 .8217 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 8355 . 4994 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .8063 .7922 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 1.6162 1.9579 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 1.0171 1.0435 137
DEPSIZE ISO WISHAW .8461 .7467 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH 1.5520 1.1520 168
0 TOTAL CASES 3 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 FCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:54 **E. R. C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*» AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0- D E S C R IPTION OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N 5 - - - -
CRITERION VARIABLE ANCOL AVERAGE NO OF
'
NON-COLLS










DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .2130 . 1554 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 5527 .6396 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0159 .0594 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .1111 . 1949 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD 1.0801 2.7543 24
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA 2.1625 6.5550 24
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 5908 .3482 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .31 BO .3289 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 1.0249 1.5489 81
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 1.0464 . 9802 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .8052 1.0564 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 4629 1.1020 170
i TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 1 OR 0.2 PCT.
Appendix B21: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
12:03:54 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 CVSS)















DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .3535 . 1750 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES 1.1993 1.1451 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0159 .0594 14
DEFSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .8152 1.0342 15
DEFSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .6114 .4170 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .5932 .4313 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN 1.0343 . 4961 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 9375 . 7256 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY 1.6696 1.6663 SO
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON 1.4654 1.1765 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW 1.2327 1.2567 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .5622 . 4800 168
' TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 40
12:03:54 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)




















































22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY
12:03:54 +*E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7*« AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)















DEPSIZE 1 1 FRASERBURGH . 2589 . 2314 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 3261 . 4024 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .3743 . 3924 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 1599 .2259 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD . 5240 .7122 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 5002 . 5876 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 2253 . 3258 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0114 . 0543 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .3738 .6212 SO
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0193 . 1026 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .3663 .4404 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 4146 . 4580 168
' TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
Appendix B22: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 42
12:03:54 **E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
o DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS ___
CRITERION VARIABLE AAA4 WRITTEN WARNING









DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH . 0000 .0000 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES .0758 . 1856 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0447 .0894 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 1456 . 1796 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0000 .0000
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0087 .0397 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN . 0000 . 0000 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0000 .0000 46
DEPSIZE 146 FAISLEY . 1178 .4042 80
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . 0036 .0427 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .0224 . 1042 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 0883 . 1665 168
I TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY 1
12:03:56 **E. R. C. C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)







— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ■
OVARIABLE VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .0147 .2177 604
DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .OOOO . OOOO 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . OOOO . OOOO 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK . OOOO . OOOO 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0087 .0335 15
DEPSIZE 39 PETERHEAD .0000 .0000 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0000 .OOOO 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .0000 . OOOO 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . OOOO .0000 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .0972 .5839 BO
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . OOOO .0000 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .0149 . 1222 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .0000 .0000 168
0 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
22 APR 88 SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE 44
12:03:56 *»E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7»* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 DESCRIPTION OF SUBPOPULATIONS
CRITERION VARIABLE AAA6 SUSPENSIONS









DEPSIZE 11 FRASERBURGH .01 11 .0368 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0758 . 1856 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0000 . OOOO 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM . 0392 . 1519 15
DEPSIZE 39 FETERHEAD .0814 . 1573 22
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA .0642 . 1762 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .0215 .0479 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK .0172 .0657 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY .2895 1.1434 30
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON . OOOO . OOOO 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW .0149 . 1222 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH . 1870 .2837 168
1 TOTAL CASES = 613
MISSING CASES = 9 OR 1.5 PCT.
Appendix B23: Performance data by depot (contd)
22 APR SB SBG BUS DRIVER STUDY PAGE
12:03:56 »*E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7f» AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
0 D E S C R I P T I 0 N OF S U B P 0 P U L A T I 0 N s - ■
CRITERION VARIABLE AAA7 DISM THEN REINST
BROKEN DOWN BY DEPSIZE
OVARIABLE
—
VALUE LABEL MEAN STD DEV CASES
OFOR ENTIRE POPULATION .0061 . 1361 603
DEPSI2E 11 FRASERBURGH .0000 .0000 11
DEPSIZE 13 FORRES . 0000 .0000 6
DEPSIZE 20 HAWICK .0000 . 0000 14
DEPSIZE 23 FORT WILLIAM .0000 .0000 15
DEPSIZE 37 FETERHEAD . 0055 .0260
DEPSIZE 40 ALLOA . 0000 . 0000 21
DEPSIZE 42 ELGIN .0000 .0000 17
DEPSIZE 66 CUMNOCK . 0000 .0000 46
DEPSIZE 146 PAISLEY . 0422 • 3750 79
DEPSIZE 177 HAMILTON .0000 .0000 137
DEPSIZE 180 WISHAW . 0000 .0000 67
DEPSIZE 235 EDINBURGH .0012 .0154 163
0 TOTAL CASES » 613






SPSS—X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS


























































































































































O(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1—TAILED SIG) " . " IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED
22 APR 88 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS
16:33:48 ••E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
O- PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS - - - -
0

































































































































































































O(CQEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1—TAILED SIG) " IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED




EMA6-A flWMH. V7»* AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EJ1A8-3 <VS8)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































C 390) ( 390)


























































0 (COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1—TAILED SIS) " 18 PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COf^UTED
Appendix C3: Intercorrelations - test data (contd)
22 APR 88
16:35:48
SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS



































































































































































































































































































































( 390) ( 390)























































































( 390) ( 390)




















( 390) < 390)






















©(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1—TAILED SIG) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTE
Appendix C4: Correlations - test data against background
22 APR 08
16:38:38
SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS






























































< 606) ( 397)































































( 383) < 376)


























( 383) C 376)










































































































































































( 393) ( 390) ( 590)
P- .203 P- .002 P« .043
.0247 .0792 -.0773
( 393) < 390) < 390)
P- .313 P- .027 P- .030
.0314 .0372 -.0191
( 393) ( 390) ( 390)











( 393) ( 390) ( 390)










. 0O25 -.1028 .0862
( 393) ( 390) ( 390)













O(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / I—TAILED SIS) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED

































( 394) ( 394)
P- .OOO P- .OOO
.0438 .2247
< 394) ( 394)
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■ .002 P- .047
.3486 .1648 .0329
383) < 383) ( 383)













































































































































































































































































































O(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1—TAILED SIG) . - IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED
Appendix C6: Intercorrelations - offences (contd)
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
AVIATE AVABS SHORTS AA02 AA03 AA04 AAD3 AAD6 AA07 ACOHM
.1832 .1142 .0300 .2699 .4699 .3393 .2322 .3271 .4298 .0013
< 383) < 344) < 444) ( 394) < 394) ( 394) ( 394) < 394) < 394) < 394)





< 344) ( 444)
P- .034 P- .OOO
-.0443 -.0469































































































































































» .OOO P- .OOO
.049O —.0009
366) ( 444)
































































































































( 0) ( 349)























. 0430 . 3144
( 344) ( 349)












































.2229 . 2178 . 2339
( 383) ( 346) ( 444)
















































383) < 366) ( 444)



































































































O <COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1—TAILED SIG) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CAfWOT BE COrrPUTED
Appendix CI: Intercorrelations - accidents
SPSS—X RELEASE 2.2 TOR IBM/MVS






















































































































< 604) ( 604)
P- . 420 P- . 368
.0104 -.OlOO
< 604) < 604)
P- .344 P- .403
.0124 -.0124
< 604) ( 604)


























































































































































































































































































































































































O (COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1—TAILED SIG> IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CAf*JOT BE COriPUTED





















SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS




































































































































































































































































































































































































IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE CO!
22 APR 88
16:44:26
SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS
♦•E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7^» AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (VSS)
OPRECEDING TASK REQUIRED 2.68 SECONDS CPU TIME! 18.00 SECONDS ELAPSED.
Appendix C9: Correlations - offences against accidents
22 APR 88
14:44:22
SPBB-X RELEA6E 2.2 FOR IBH/MV8




































































































393) < 393) ( 393)
- .002 P" .071 P- .237
. 0444 -.0333
393) ( 393)


















-. OlOO .0124 -.0076
< 393) ( 393) ( 393)
P- . 404 P- . 30O P- .427
.4498 —.0O49 -.0192
< 393) < 393) < 393)













< 393) < 393)
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O(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / I—TAILED SIS) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COfTt/TED





















































-.0343 .1739 .1303 .0091 -.0180 -.0O23 -.0134
( 393) < 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 593) ( 392)






















-.0443 .1164 .1823 .0306 -.0326 .0376 -.0243
( 393) < 393) < 393) < 393) < 393) ( 393) < 392)






















-.0189 -.1019 .0871 -.0407 -.0143 .0072 -.0127
( 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 392)






































































































































































































































-.0821 .0423 .1238 .0111 -.0167 .1038 -.0131
< 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 393) ( 393) < 393) < 392)











































©(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1-TAILED SIG) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED
Appendix Cll: Correlations - predictors against criteria
22 APR 80 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS
16:33:06 ••E.R.C.C. EI**S-A AMDAK. V7»* AMDAHL V7 000001 EMAS-3 (VSB)
0- PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
0
AD1 AD2 AD3 AD4 AOS AD6 AD7 AOS AW
AGE -.1386 -.0637 1106 0033 -.0928 -.0334 -.1201 -.1128 -.0307 -.1018 -.1802
( 387) < 387) ( 387) < 387) ( 387) ( 387) < 387) ( 387) < 387) ( 387) < 387)















































































































































































































































































































































( 371) < 371)








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































O <COEFF ICIENT / (CASES) / 1-TAILED SIG) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED




SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS
••E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7«* AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 <VSS>
• PEARSON
AVAB6 SHORTS


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 <COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / I—TAILED SIS) - IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE CONFUTED




SPSS—X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS









































































































































































































X 393) X 393)




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































) (COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1-TAILED SIS) - IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CAf*<OT BE COMPUTED




SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR IBM/MVS
••E.R.C.C. EMAS-A AMDAHL V7** AMDAHL V7 OOOOOl EMAS-3 (V6S)
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
-.1331 0562 -.0186
( 395) < 395) ( 395)
P» .001 P- .078 P- .325
-.1603 -.1639 -.0877
( 604) ( 604) < 604)



















( 367) ( 367)




















( 602) ( 602)
P- .039 P» .162
.0331 .1021
( 603) < 603)
P* .096 P- .006
-.0010 -.0433
( 381) ( 381)
P" .491 P- .148
.0760 .0798
( 581) ( 381)
P» .034 P- .027
.0493 -.0312
( 381) ( 381)
P- .117
-.0249 .0138
< 381) ( 381)







( 381) < 381)
P- .036 P- .383
.0988 .10G6
< 381) < 381)





( 381) ( 381)
P- .282 P- .404
.0478 .0311
( 381) < 381)







































• .326 P» .499
-.0893 .0198 -.0373
( 381) < 381) < 381)
P» .016 P- .317 P- .183
-.0025 -.0392
C 581) ( 381)
P- .476 P- .077
.0373 .0189 .0132
( 381) ( 381) < 381)





















. 199 R" . 139
.0622 .0265
381) ( 381)
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P« .097 P- .130

















Appendix D: Results of factor analysis
For each of the five groups of analysis
(all cases, young/old drivers, small/
large depots) the results are presented
in four parts:
i) Test variables: structure matrix
and factor correlation matrix;
ii) Correlations between test factors
and performance variables;
iii) Performance variables: structure
matrix and factor correlation
matrix;
iv) Miscellaneous statistics for each
variable, including communalities
and proportion of variance: for
both test and performance factors;
Correlation matrix between test
and performance factors.
Each page will just be headed with the
group the statistics refer to and the
part number, based on the above.
Appendix Dl: All cases (i)




























































































































































































































































































. 0300 , 0383 . 0O84 , 1173 .1163
363) < 363) < 363) < 363) ( 363)
.239 P- . 182 P- .421 Pm . 003 Pm .003
,0702 ,0338 . 0601 .0763 . 1019
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 048 P- . 198 P« .077 Pm .033 Pm . 008
,0203 ,0163 .0097 , 1066 , 049Q
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) < 563)
.314 P- .330 Pm . 409 Pm . 0O6 P- . 119
.0302 , 0038 .0147 .0378 ,0146
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
.117 P- . 446 P- .364 Pm . 183 P- .364
,0471 , 1023 .0868 , 1074 .0307
363) ( 363) < 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 132 P- . 0O8 P- .020 Pm . OOS Pm . 113
,0461 ,0383 .0896 .0367 .0206
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 137 P- . 181 Pm .017 Pm . 192 Pm .313
,0103 , 0630 .0140 , 0922 .0327
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 403 P- .068 P- . 371 Pm - 014 Pm . 106
, 0180 . 1341 .0313 .0783 , 0460
363) < 363) ( 363) < 363) ( 363)
.333 P- .001 P« .111 Pm .031 Pm . 138
,0473 . 088O .0293 .0316 ,0473
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 130 P- .018 P- .242 Pm .111 Pm . 131
.0143 .0134 .0497 . 1080 , 06O7
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 366 P- .373 Pm . 120 Pm .003 Pm . 073
,0171 , 1134 .0264 , 1613 . 1243
363) ( 363) < 363) ( 563) < 363)
.343 P- . 003 pm .266 Pm .000 Pm .002
,0431 ,1143 . 0033 . 1367 . 1332
376) { 376) ( 376) ( 376) ( 376)
. 191 P- .013 Pm .473 P- . 004 Pm . 004
i Ol 43 , 1047 . 0333 , 1833 ,0623
361) < 361) ( 361) < 361) ( 361)
.393 P- .023 Pm . 153 P- .000 Pm' . 118
,066O , 0736 .0337 , 1313 , 1338
431) ( 431) ( 431) ( 431) < 431)
.086 P- .063 pm . 124 Pm . 0O3 Pm .001
0133 , 02O7 . 1093 , 0876 ,0011
363) < 363) ( 363) < 363) ( 563)
.373 P- .312 P- .003 P- .019 P" • 490
0863 0311 ,0397 ,1107 1011
371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371) < 371)
.020 P- .112 Pm . 172 Pm . 004 Pm . 008
, 0O44 ,0163 , 0640 ,0797 , 028O
371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371)
. 438 P- .349 Pm .063 P- .029 Pm .232
0117 , 0O63 .0331 ,0664 , 0302
371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371)
. 390 P- .439 Pm • 201 Pm .036 P« . 116
0208 ,0376 ,0313 , 1034 . 1327
371) ( 371) I 371) ( 371) ( 371)
. 310 Pm . 183 Pm . 109 P" .007 P- .OOO
0O34 ,0332 . 0O16 ,0333 ,0333
371 ) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371)
. 449 P- . 102 P» .483 Pm .212 P» .214
0834 ,0217 .0146 , 0341 , 1183
371) ( 371) < 371 ) 1 371) < 371)
.023 P- . 303 P- . 364 P- .208 P- . 0O2
0338 , 0026 .0332 , 1171 ,0427
371) ( 371) ( 371) < 371) ( 371)
.210 P- .473 Pm . 200 Pm . 0O3 Pm . 134
0O99 ,0316 , 0O68 0377 , 0031
371) < 371) ( 371) < 371) < 371)
.406 P- .109 P" .433 P« .084 P- .432
0432 ,0367 .0208 ,0172 ,0123
371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371)
. 140 P- . 190 Pm .310 Pm .341 Pm .383
0826 0607 ,0668 1333 1473
371) < 371) < 371) ( 371) < 371)
.024 P- .074 Pm . 036 P- .000 Pm .OOO
0283 0738 .0133 0683 0389
377) < 377) ( 377) ( 377) ( 377)
.247 P- .034 Pm .357 P- .031 Pm . 176
0219 0791 0043 1301 0632
563) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 302 P- . 03O Pm . 460 Pm • OOl Pm .061
ooei 0663 , 1011 1073 0683
363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363) ( 363)
. 424 P- .037 Pm . 008 P- . 003 Pm .033
0234 0142 ,0467 Ol 83 1360
371 > ( 371) < 371) < 371) c 371)
.272 P- .368 Pm . 132 P- .331 p- .001
0810 0314 0213 0463 0876
371) (. 371) ( 371) ( 371) ( 371)
.027 P- .227 P- - 303 P» . 133 Pm .018
Appendix D3; All cases (iii)






















































































































































































Appendix D4: All cases (iv)
VARIABLE CONMUNALITY FACTOR SS LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT
WRTRIQHT .31666 1 2.13681 10.7 10.7
WRTWRONQ .07943 2 2.74346 13.7 24. 4
LF TOTAL .63627 3 1.66481 8.3 32.7
SPFA .31929 4 .73963 3.7 36.4
SPFB .21773 5 .68778 3.4 39.9




























OBLIHIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS I
O QBLIMIN CONVERGED IN 21 ITERATIONS.
KAISER NORMALIZATION.
VARIABLE COMMUNALITY FACTOR SS LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT
AOl .37863 1 1.84338 10.8 10.8
AD2 .43446 2 1.01170 6.0 16.8
AD3 .20348 3 .79709 4.7 21.3
AD4 .19828 4 1.26199 7.4 28.9
AOS .31431 3 . 30903 3.0 31.9
AD6 .14629 6 .32034 3. 1 33.0











OBLIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION I IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION.














< 362) ( 362) ( 362)
P- .006 P- .032 P» .034
.0609 -.03O4 .0123
< 362) ( 362) ( 362)
P- .075 P- .236 P- .306
.0333 -.0103 .0219
( 362) ( 362) ( 562)
P- .103 P- .402 P- .302
-.0419 -.0190 .0817
( 362) ( 362) ( 562)
P- .161 P- .327 P- .026
-.1443 -.1153 .0161
( 562) ( 362) ( 562)






















< 362) ( 362)














< 362) ( 362)
P" .173 P« .066
-.1237 .0422
< 562) ( 362)














< 562) ( 362)
P» .289 P= .024
-.0388 -.1035
( 362) ( 362)




O(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1-TAILED SIS) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED








































































































































































FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR
FACTOR 1 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 2 -.12356 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 3 .12696 .04545
FACTOR 4 .01005 .06111
FACTOR 5 .12022 .15905
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D7: Drivers 40 years and under (iii)
STRUCTURE MATRIX:











































































































































FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5
FACTOR 1 1.00000
FACTOR 2 -.12457 1.00000
FACTOR 3 .09316 -.13424 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 4 -.04403 .01037 .00095 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 5 -.00088 .18939 .06993 .03041 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 6 .00647 -.04047 -.00897 .16525 -.08678
FACTOR 6
FACTOR 6 1.00000









































OBLIHIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION.
0 OBLiniN CONVERGED IN 13 ITERATIONS.
VARX ABLE COMMUNALI TV • FACTOR SS LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT
A01 44993 • 1 1 .82737 10.7 10.7
A02 38636 * 2 .09724 3.3 16.0
AD3 16594 • 3 1 .06920 6.3 22.3
A04 20332 • 4 1 .01976 6.0 28.3
ADS 33467 * 3 .52206 3. 1 31.4
AD6 23376 *
'












OBLIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION
0 OBLIMIN CONVERGED IN 25 ITERATIONS.
0
0
EAR SON C 0 R R E L A T I 0 N C 0 E F F I
PERF1 PERF2 PERF3 PERF4 PERF3 PERF6
TEST1 .0629 -.0796 1763 . 1539 .0474 .0282( 300) ( 308) ( 300) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308)P- .133 P- .082 P» .001 P« .003 P- . 204 P» .311
TEST2 • OG54 . 0004 _ 0792 _ . 0266 -.0984 . 0484( 300) < 3oe> ( 3O0) ( 308) < 308) ( 308)P- .067 P- .497 P- .003 P- .321 P- .042 P- .199
TE8T3 .0633 -.0787 0381 1449 -.1169 .0634( 3O0) ( 308) ( 300) ( 300) ( 308) ( 308)P- .134 P- .004 P- .253 P- .003 P- .020 P- .133
TEST4 -.0578 .0529 O052 _ .0987 . 0O53 —.0O59( 308) ( 3O0) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308)P- . 156 P- .177 P- .068 P- .042 P- .463 P- .459
TESTS .0085 .0323 1018 .0238 -.0302 .0676( 308) ( 300) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308)P- .061 P- .179 P- .037 P- .339 P- .299 P- .118
TEST6 -.1603 .0173 1067 _ 1280 .0245 -.0854
< 300) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308) ( 308)P- .002 P- .381 P- .031 P« .012 P- .334 P- .067
0(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / I—TAILED SIG) - . ' IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT
Appendix D9: Drivers over 40 years (i)
















































































































































































FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR
FACTOR 1 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 2 .15971 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 3 .12002 -.07998 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 4 .14144 .07242 .22774 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 5 .01714 -.15370 -.08247 -.04861 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 6 .02381 .12727 -.00935 -.13180 -.16774
FACTOR 7 .10663 -.04646 -.10076 .12179 -.03108





Appendix DIP: Drivers over 40 years (ii)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Dll: Drivers over 40 years (iii)


























































































































FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR
FACTOR 1 1.00000
FACTOR 2 .06842 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 3 .15268 -.04781 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 4 .03128 -.03708 -.00567 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 5 .21369 -.07727 .06943 -.04516 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 6 .16949 .04418 -.11919 .05645 -.03079
FACTOR 7 -.06061 -.06142 -.06458 .00088 .00620
FACTOR 6 FACTOR 7
FACTOR 6 1.00000
FACTOR 7 -.01464 1.00000
Appendix D12: Drivers over 40 years (iv)
FINAL STATISTICS:
VARIABLE COfWUNALITY FACTOR 5S LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT
WRTRIQHT .28330 1 2.93099 14.7 14.7
MKTNRONB .10031 2 1.67314 3.4 23.0
CFTOTAL .64873 3 1.69717 8.3 31.3
BPFA .33846 4 1.03829 3.2 36.7
SPFB .34407 3 .65823 3.3 40.0
SPFC .60232 6 .30264 2.3 42.3

























08LIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION.

















COMMUNALITY • FACTOR SS LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT
.30239 * 1 2.07163 12.2 12.2
.33737 * 2 .97372 3.7 17.9
.48437 * 3 .37132 3.4 21.3
.17928 * 4 1.22236 7.2 28.3
.33366 * 3 .92133 3. 4 33.9
.23433 * 6 .62633 3.7 37.6











OBLIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1
O OOLIHIN CONVERSED IN 38 ITERATIONS.
IN ANALY6IS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION.
o- - P E A R SON C 0 R R E L A T I 0 N C 0 E F F I C I E
0
PERF1 PERF2 PERF3 PERF4 PERF3 PERF6 PERF7
TEST1 0O36 0338 0060 . 0803 0241 .0026 -.0639
( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) < 234) ( 234) ( 254)
P» .477 P- . 188 P- .462 P- .101 P- .331 P- .483 P- .148
TEST2 0732 0079 0327 .0732 0014 -.0438 .0481
( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) < 234) ( 234)
P- . 123 P- . 4SO P- .201 P- .123 P- . 491 P- .234 P- .223
TEST3 0242 0663 ,0677 023O 0167 .0289 -.1260
( 234) ( 234) < 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234)
P- .330 P- . 146 P- . 141 P« .337 P» .396 P- .323 P= .022
TEST4 0448 , 0438 , 0200 .0318 ,0332 -.0324 -.0119
( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234)
P- .238 P- .243 P- . 376 P- .206 P- . 190 P- .203 P- .423
TEST3 _ < 0333 _ < , 0333 ,0032 -.0641 ,0312 -.0249 -.0318
< 234) < 234) < 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234)
P- .299 P- . 199 P- . 480 P» .134 P« .310 P- .347 P= .307
TEST6 0549 . 0261 .0304 -.0247 , 0649 -.0066 .0062
( 254) < 234) < 254) ( 234) ( 254) ( 234) ( 254)
P- . 192 P- .339 P- .313 P« .347 P- . 151 P- .438 P= .461
TEST7 0373 -t,0779 ,0061 -.0203 .0248 -.0730 .0502
( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 234) ( 254)
P- . 181 P- . 108 P« . 086 P« .374 P«i .347 P- .123 P- .213
0(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1-TAILED SIS) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE
Appendix D13: Drivers in small depots (i)























































































































































































FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR
FACTOR 1 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 2 . 1 1104 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 3 .12092 .12363 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 4 -.10737 .17953 .10533 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 5 .17340 -.11471 .12609 -.10104 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 6 .21381 .23378 -.14306 .02388 -.02480
FACTOR 7 -.13538 -.19067 .02283 -.00487 .06033







Appendix D14: Drivers in small depots (ii)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D15: Drivers in small depots (iii)




























































































AA05 .03393 ,10259 -.01295 .06646 .00763



















FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR
FACTOR 1 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 2 . 07937 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 3 -.00892 .00708 1.OOOOO
FACTOR 4 .07030 .01212 .11285 1.OOCOO
FACTOR -.25541 -.04984 .19521 • 03538 1.OCOOO
FACTOR 6 -.10430 .21192 —.06581 -.06133 .02830
FACTOR 7 .12274 .10418 .07436 .19197 .01139















































































OBLIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS I - KAISER NORMALIZATION.
O OBLIMIN CONVERGED IN 17 ITERATIONS.
VARIABLE COMMUNALITY FACTOR SS LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT


















OBLIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION.






PERF4 PERF3 PERF6 PERF7
—.0023 -.0378 0073 .0264 -.0470 .0638 -.1897
( 137) < 137) ( 137) ( 137) < 137) ( 137) < 137)







































( 137) < 137)






















































































©(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1-TAILED SIG)
Appendix D17: Drivers in large depots (i)
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR :
SPFE .59884 .30193 .11192 —.22865 .17872
SPFL .45424 .05633 -.10941 -.03935 .13073
SPFQ1 .45028 .00097 .09958 -.25518 .06028
5PFI -.40361 -.01883 -.19663 -.08131 .15361
SPFN -.33326 -.16372 -.17746 .30990 -.30939
SPFH . 38353 .7063O .02192 .07473 .21151
SPFF .44637 .70519 .12653 -.10993 -.10806
SPFQ2 -.01673 -.65621 .07831 -.06173 .06712
SPFA -.09322 .51797 -.1B304 .11232 -.04073
CFTOTAL .13433 -.05817 .77302 -.11473 -.15116
WRTRIGHT .03106 -.02663 .69215 -.14919 .02733
AGE -.21968 -.18697 -.42892 .38458 .42678
SPFB .12722 -.16253 .42704 .00276 .13977
SPFG -.13901 .06874 -.08896 .613D3 -.04183
SPFQ3 -.13561 .04371 -.05932 .60398 .01341
SPFM .02007 -.15142 .10874 -.42007 .27264
WRTWRONG .02821 -.02339 .03199 -.06363 .29690
SPFQ4 .23935 -.09372 .04791 -.19819 .07539
SPFC -.07100 .22623 .036O9 .14077 -.17444






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D19: Drivers in large depots (iii)

































































































AA02 .03492 .07129 .00213 -.04731 -.03894



























































































Appendix D20: Drivers in large depots (iv)
VARIABLE COMMUNALITY FACTOR SS LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT
WRTRIGHT .49928 1 2.28022 11.4 11.4
WRTWRONG .09817 2 2.66962 13.3 24. 7
CFTOTAL .61749 3 I.66477 8.3 33. 1
SPFA .31656 4 .77833 3.9 37.0
SPFB .23424 3 .79778 4.0 41.0















OBLIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION.
0 OBLIMIN CONVERGED IN 36 ITERATIONS.
VARIABLE COMMUNALITY FACTOR SS LOADINGS PCT OF VAR CUM PCT
AD1 .33939 1 1.82634 10.7 10.7
AD2 .41823 2 1.03048 6.2 16.9
AD3 .22966 3 .01683 4.8 21.7
AD4 .13187 4 1.28619 7.6 29.3
ADS .33329 3 .30637 3.0 32.3
AD6 .17266 6 .32304 3. 1 33. 4











OBLIMIN ROTATION 1 FOR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER NORMALIZATION.








































































































































5 Buccleuch Place, EDINBURGH EH8 9LW.
031-667 1011 ext. 6821/6305
DRIVER RESEARCH PROJECT
We are Edinburgh academics, doing research into how people cope with their jobs.
The Scottish Bus Group is helping us study the bus driver's job; your colleagues
on the negotiating committee are also supporting our efforts. Our research will
not in anyway affect the employment of existing drivers.
We may be able to discover the cause of some of the stresses a driver experiences
(this would interest your union). We might be able to suggest new ways of
recruiting drivers (which the Group are interested in).
Around 1,000 Drivers will be taking part in this project, and will be asked to
complete four, straightforward guestionnaires. This will take approximately
1% - 2 hours. Your replies to these questionnaires will be seen by no-one but
ourselves at the University, and as academics we are bound by strict rules of
confidentiality. Your results will be used solely for research purposes.
A general report about this project will go both to the Group and the Union, and
any publications based on the study will be freely available. If you would like
a brief personal summary of your results, write to us and we will be pleased to
let you know quite soon.
Here are some examples of the sorts of questions asked. The first three
questionnaires are timed; in the last you can answer at your own pace and
leave as soon as you finish. Each shall be fully explained when we meet.
The first questionnaire tests how well you can follow simple directions. You
must put a cross in a box indicated to you by a direction.
for example, count from the left below and cross boxes 3, 6 and 8.
L □□□□□□□□□□□□□□ R
In the second questionnaire you are asked to recognise words which have not been
—properly printed, for example:
1 2 " >r>' ^ o^I
